# FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 1 of 36 *PUBLIC * > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aftc%3A24b6794525bcb828 ## Record - **Collection:** Agency decision - **Document type:** Agency decision ## Text FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 1 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES __________________________________________ ) In the Matter of ) ) ∗ Eusabio Juarez-Ruffino, ) ) Appellant. ) __________________________________________) Docket No. 9444 ORDER ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND MOTION TO STAY This case arises from sanctions imposed against Eusebio Juarez-Rufino (“Mr. Juarez”), a trainer, after an Arbitrator held him liable for possession of diisopropylamine (‘‘dipa”) in violation of rules adopted to implement the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). 1 Mr. Juarez has filed an Amended Petition for Appellate Review and Combined Motion to Stay Suspension Order (the “Review Pet.”). 2 The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”) timely filed individual responses to Mr. Juarez’s Petition (respectively, the Authority’s “Review Resp.” and “Stay Resp.”). This Order resolves both matters. I am spelling Appellant’s name as it appears in the Amended Petition for Review and Combined Motion to Stay, which the Office of the Secretary of the Commission used in assigning the matter a docket number. However, Appellant’s racing trainer license, and the Appeal Book generally, spell his name “Eusebio Juarez-Rufino.” See, e.g., Appeal Book at 160. Where necessary, I use the Appeal Book spelling throughout the body of this Order. ∗ See 15 U.S.C. § 3051 et seq. Capitalized terms used, but not defined, in this Order, are from HISA Rule 1020 of the General Provisions and the Protocol. References to a “Rule” are to those promulgated under HISA, unless otherwise identified. 1 2 15 U.S.C. § 3058; 16 C.F.R. § 1.146 (the “FTC Rules”). FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 2 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Neither party included, in its papers, the Arbitrator’s decision—a core paper that should rarely be omitted from these initial filings. The Authority, however, has filed its Appeal Book (“AB”), which includes the Arbitrator’s Corrected Final Decision, among other materials. 3 I have, therefore, drawn on the Corrected Final Decision and other parts of the Appeal Book for facts bearing on Mr. Juarez’s petition and stay motion. I. Summary of the Case and the Arbitrator’s Decision The Authority has adopted, and the FTC has approved, various rules to implement HISA, including those comprising the Anti-Doping and Medication Control (“ADMC”) Program. The Horseracing Integrity & Welfare Unit (“HIWU”) enforces these rules on behalf of the Authority. 4 Violations of various Rules implementing the ADMC Program provide for sanctions, which can include a period of Ineligibility to participate in HISA-governed thoroughbred racing, a fine, and payment of adjudication and legal costs. 5 During the period relevant to this case, Mr. Juarez was employed as an “exercise rider” for another Trainer. 6 There is no dispute, however, that he is subject to the prohibitions in the ADMC Program. 7 3 AB 640 (Corrected Final Decision). 4 Rule 3010(e)(1). 5 See, e.g., Rule 3212. HISA Rule 1020 defines “the penalties resulting from the occurrence of one or more [Rule] violations” as “Consequences,” which parties often refer to as “sanctions,” a term also used, but not defined, in the Rules. For simplicity, I use the term “sanctions.” 6 AB 99-100 (EAD Notice), 163 (Ruddick Interview Memo), 572-73 (Juarez Pre-hearing Brief). 7 AB 648, at ¶ 4.4, 649, at ¶ 5.2 (Corrected Final Decision). 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 3 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC A. The Violation Charged Rule 3214(a) of the ADMC Program prohibits “Possession of a Banned Substance . . . unless there is compelling justification for such Possession.” HISA Rule 1020 defines “Possession,” providing in pertinent part: Possession means actual, physical possession, or constructive possession (which shall be found only if the Covered Person has exclusive control or intends to exercise exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance . . . or the premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . exists). The Rule imposes strict liability, regardless of knowledge or intent, except where “constructive Possession” is charged: If the Covered Person does not have exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance . . . or the premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . , or the premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . exists, constructive Possession shall only be found if the Covered Person knew about the presence of the Prohibited Substance . . . and intended to exercise control over it. 8 HIWU, however, maintained that Mr. Juarez had “exclusive control” over his SUV, thereby precluding any need to resort to the knowledge and intent elements of “constructive” Possession. 9 8 Rule 1020 (definition). See Matter of Shell, FTC No. 9439, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11, n.16 (ALJ Mar. 6, 2025): HIWU v. Poole, JAMS Case 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8 (Aug. 8, 2023), aff’d, FTC No. 9417, 2023 WL 8435860 (ALJ Nov. 13, 2023) 9 AB 086, at ¶¶ 43-46 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief), 15, at ≈4:31:00-4:33:16 (Hearing Video). 3 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 4 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Both equine sporting association codes and those in sports generally include analogous provisions. 10 Violation of the Rule carries a mandatory 24-month Ineligibility period for a first offender, plus potential monetary sanctions. 11 In addition to the “compelling justification” defense embedded in the Rule 3214(a), the Rules provide for two other defenses: (1) No Fault or Negligence (“NF”); and (2) No Significant Fault or Negligence (“NSF”). If the person charged can prove there was NF on their part, then Rule 3224 eliminates sanctions entirely. If NSF is proven, sanctions may be reduced, albeit not eliminated, under Rule 3225. B. The Underlying Facts On January 29, 2025, HIWU investigators searched Mr. Juarez’s SUV, then parked at Oaklawn Park Racetrack in Hot Springs, Arkansas. In the SUV’s frontseat center console, they discovered two hypodermic syringes, which were filled with a substance later determined, upon laboratory analysis, to be dipa. 12 Dipa is “a vasodilator, causing smooth muscle relaxation and widening of blood vessels.” 13 It “can improve blood flow and increased oxygen delivery to various parts of the body,” See e.g., Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication Regulations, Article 2.6 (4th ed. 2025); World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Code, Article 2.6 (2021); USADA v. Drummond, Case No. AAA 01-14-000-6146, at 19 (Dec. 17, 2014) (“The Panel rejects Drummond’s contention that actual possession requires his specific intent to have under his custody and control a particular banned substance whose characteristics were fully known to him.”); Eder v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), CAS 2007/A/1286, 1288 & 1289, at ¶¶ 42, 52 (Jan. 4, 2008) (possession does not require proving “subjective intent,” or “intent to use”); Diethart v. IOC, CAS 2007/A/1290, at ¶ 40 (Jan. 4, 2008) (possession “constitutes in itself an antidoping rules violation”). 10 11 Rule 3223(b). 12 AB 641-42, at ¶¶ 2.9-.10, 2.16. 13 AB 178, at ¶ 5 (Healy Witness Statement). 4 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 5 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC which can potentially “lead to performance enhancing effects in racehorses.” 14 Dipa, which lacks FDA approval, has “no reported efficacy or safety data in any species.” 15 Therefore, under the Rules, dipa is a Banned Substance, the use of which “is prohibited at all times.” 16 Upon HIWU discovering the filled syringes during its search, Mr. Juarez said “he had no idea how [they] got into his vehicle,” and that he did not “know[] what substances the two syringes contained.” 17 He further said “he [had] recently received the vehicle back from the repair shop and suggested they could have come from there.” 18 Subsequently, HIWU served Mr. Juarez with an EAD Notice, stating that he had been found in Possession of a Banned Substance, a possible Anti-Doping Rule Violation (“ADRV”) that could lead to sanctions. 19 In response, Mr. Juarez’s counsel provided to HIWU written factual narrative, which HIWU has summarized thusly: Mr. Juarez “did not ‘own’ or intend to possess the substance,” explaining that the “substance [dipa] was intended for administration to some injured roosters” owned by Mr. Luis Terrazas, who Trainer Juarez claimed is his auto-mechanic. 20 14 AB 179, at ¶¶ 5-6 (Healy Witness Statement). 15 AB 179, at ¶ 9 (Healy Witness Statement). See 88 Fed. Reg. 5124 (Jan. 26, 2023) (Appendix 1 to Rule 4000 Series); AB 179, at ¶¶ 7-9 (Healy Witness Statement). 16 Rule 4111. 17 AB 642, at ¶ 2.11 (Corrected Final Decision). 18 AB 642, at ¶ 2.11 (Corrected Final Decision). 19 AB 642, at ¶ 2.17. See AB 97 (EAD Notice). 20 AB 79-80, at ¶ 20 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief) (footnote omitted), quoting AB 167-68, at ¶¶ 2-3, 7 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice). 5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 6 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC The writing further stated that before entering Oaklawn Park on the day of the search, “Mr. Juarez did not inventory the contents of his vehicle” and thus “was unaware of the prohibited substance being present.” 21 Mr. Juarez’s counsel elaborated on the facts in an “unsigned, unnotarized, draft affidavit,” purportedly by Mr. Terrazas, which counsel also provided to HIWU. 22 He further submitted an alleged receipt for Mr. Terrazas’ work. 23 The following paragraph summarizes the contents of this document, bearing in mind that, when offered to HIWU in response to the EAD Notice, Mr. Terrazas had not signed it. Mr. Terrazas serviced Mr. Juarez’s SUV during the period January 13-28, 2025. 24 Mr. Juarez brought his SUV to Mr. Terrazas because it “had been repeatedly overheating.” 25 In order to re-create and then repair the condition, Mr. Terrazas “drove the SUV several times over the course of about one week.” 26 During that time, he “put the two syringes” into the console of Mr. Juarez’s SUV. 27 Mr. Terrazas had obtained the two filled syringes “from a friend” in order “to administer the substance in both syringes to several farm animals at [his] home 21 AB 167, at ¶ 1 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice). 22 AB 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief). 23 AB 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief) & 175 (repair shop receipt). 24 AB 171, at ¶¶ 2, 4 (unsigned affidavit). 25 AB 171, at ¶ 2 (unsigned affidavit). 26 AB 171, at ¶ 2 (unsigned affidavit). 27 AB 171, at ¶ 7 (unsigned affidavit). 6 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 7 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC later that day. These animals had been gravely injured by a predator.” 28 The syringes, however, were not used, as Mr. Terrazas’s wife suggested an alternative treatment, which was successful. 29 Mr. Terrazas never removed the two syringes from Mr. Juarez’s SUV and “never told [Mr. Juarez he] had put the syringes in the SUV console[.]” 30 HIWU determined that Mr. Juarez’s explanation “lacked credibility,” and thus charged Mr. Juarez with “a Possession ADRV . . . .” 31 HIWU’s Possession charge here was not Mr. Juarez’s first encounter with dipa, however. In April 2024, HIWU discovered a single syringe, filled with dipa, during a search of the vehicle Mr. Juarez’s wife had driven to Oaklawn Park. Mrs. Juarez allegedly obtained the dipa to treat chickens that the couple raise. HIWU did not charge Mr. Juarez with any ADRV. 32 Besides HIWU charging Possession of dipa in this case, the Oaklawn Park stewards charged Mr. Juarez with a violation of Racetrack Safety Program Rule 2230(e), which prohibits any person from “possess[ing] a . . . syringe capable of accepting a needle or injectable of any kind” on the racetracks. 33 Hearings were conducted before the stewards, who ruled against Mr. Juarez, and, for reasons not 28 AB 172, at ¶ 7 (unsigned affidavit). 29 AB 172, at ¶¶ 8-9 (unsigned affidavit). 30 AB 172, at ¶¶ 11-12 (unsigned affidavit). 31 AB 643, at ¶ 2.21 (Corrected Final Decision). See also AB 80-81, at ¶ 25 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief). 32 AB 15, at ≈0:36:12-0:37:30, ≈1:14:39-1:14:59 (Bennett) & ≈2:57:38-3:02:00, ≈3:24:43-3:34:35 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). 33 AB 643, at ¶ 2.27. See also AB 580 (Agreed Order). 7 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 8 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC pertinent here, Mr. Juarez eventually agreed to a 30 day suspension and $2,000 fine. 34 According to Mr. Juarez’s counsel, Mr. Terrazas testified in that stewards’ case. 35 C. The Arbitration Proceeding An arbitration was begun, and in June 2025, the Arbitrator issued Procedural Order No. 1, which set September 11, 2025 for the hearing on the merits. 36 The Order further: (1) established the schedule for the parties to submit pre-hearing briefs in August 2025; (2) required disclosure of each side’s witnesses and corresponding witness statements to accompany their pre-hearing briefs; (3) directed the parties to submit any stipulation of facts shortly before the hearing dates, and to coordinate on scheduling witnesses. 37 The Order also provided that “[a]ll deadlines and requirements stated herein will be strictly enforced.” 38 Things did not proceed smoothly, however. First, Mr. Juarez failed to serve his pre-hearing brief and related hearing submissions by the August deadline, and HIWU moved for a default judgment. 39 After a September 5 conference at which both sides appeared, the Arbitrator denied HIWU’s motion. 40 At this point, Mr. Juarez had identified no hearing witnesses, but instead argued that “HIWU 34 AB 581, at ¶ 2 (Agreed Order). 35 AB 15, at ≈2:25:43-2:25:59 (Juarez counsel), ≈2:46:16-2:46:36 (Juarez) (Hearing Video); Review Pet. at 4, 6. 36 AB 643-44, at ¶¶ 3.1-3.3 (Corrected Final Decision). 37 AB 644-45, at ¶ 3.4 (Corrected Final Decision). 38 AB 645, at ¶ 3.4 (Corrected Final Decision). 39 AB 645, at ¶¶ 3.5-3.7 (Corrected Final Decision). 40 AB 645, at ¶¶ 3.8-.10 (Corrected Final Decision), 568 (Procedural Order No. 2). 8 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 9 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC should know what [his] defense and evidence and witnesses would be based upon [Mr. Juarez’s] prior litigation in the HISA Stewart’s Ruling,” referred to above. 41 The Arbitrator “ruled that [Mr. Juarez] is entitled to due process and should, at a minimum, be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses called by [HIWU] and to make an argument in his defense at the Hearing on the merits.” 42 With the September 11 merits hearing only a few days away, Mr. Juarez’s defense to HIWU’s Possession charge was, in summary, that: (1) he “did not inventory the contents of” his SUV before driving it to Oaklawn Park on the day of the search, and thus “was unaware of the prohibited substance [dipa] being present in the front seat center console” 43; (3) “he did not ‘own,’ control, or intend to possess the substance/syringes,” which Mr. Terrazas allegedly had intended to use “to treat injured farm animals” 44; and (3) “he did not have any viable cause to purposely bring the [dipa] within the enclosure as it was not even a racing day.” 45 On September 9, Mr. Juarez served a pre-hearing brief, which identified Mr. Terrazas as a witness and summarized the facts Mr. Juarez had offered to HIWU months earlier in response to HIWU’s EAD Notice. 46 Among the proposed exhibits, also included, was the unsigned Terrazas affidavit, followed by a signed 41 AB 645, at ¶ 3.9 (Corrected Final Decision). 42 AB 645, at ¶ 3.10 (Corrected Final Decision). 43 AB 643, at ¶ 2.22 (Corrected Final Decision). 44 AB 643, at ¶ 2.23 (Corrected Final Decision). 45 AB 643, at ¶ 2.23 (Corrected Final Decision). 46 AB 570 et seq. (Juarez Pre-hearing Brief) 9 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 10 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC and notarized signature page, dated February 1, 2025. 47 Other proposed exhibits included the repair shop receipt, dated January 28, 2025, also previously provided. 48 HIWU promptly moved to exclude Mr. Juarez’s untimely submission or, alternatively, for a continuance of the hearing, set to begin in less than 48 hours. 49 The Arbitrator granted exclusionary relief: [Mr. Juarez’s] untimely witness[], Luis Terrazas . . . , [is] hereby excluded from the Hearing on the Merits for this matter tomorrow. Further, the untimely documents [Mr. Juarez] provided to [HIWU] and filed with on September 9, 2025 are hereby excluded from the Hearing on the Merits tomorrow.” 50 D. The Arbitrator’s Decision The hearing proceeded on September 11. HIWU produced witness testimony and documentary evidence to support its Possession charge. Mr. Juarez did not dispute that: (1) dipa is a Banned Substance; (2) he had Possession of it in his SUV on the date of HIWU’s search; (3) he had no “compelling justification” to have the dipa; and (4) he had an obligation to inventory the SUV when Mr. Terrazas returned it to him the day before the search and failed to do so. 51 Significantly, HIWU’s hearing expert testified, among other things, that the syringes found “were the gauge size and needle length typically and traditionally used for intravenous injections on horses and that they were too large for use on roosters or other fowl. 47 AB 583 (unsigned affidavit) & 586 (signature page). 48 See AB 597 (repair shop receipt). 49 AB 604 (HIWU Motion to Exclude). 50 AB 613, at ¶ 7 (Ruling on Motion to Exclude). See also AB 646, at ¶¶ 3.18-.20. 51 AB 654, at ¶ 7.1 & 656-57, at ¶¶ 7.6-.8 (Corrected Final Decision). 10 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 11 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC He further testified that the volume of diisopropylamine was inconsistent with the volume that could possibly be administered to roosters or other fowl.” 52 Mr. Juarez himself was the only defense witness. He maintained that, from his experience treating chickens, a large hypodermic needle could be used. 53 He also was permitted to testify regarding matters relating to Mr. Terrazas. 54 The repair shop receipt, excluded by the Arbitrator’s pre-hearing ruling, was “ultimately admitted into evidence.” 55 Mr. Juarez testified that, once HIWU’s search ended, “the first thing” he did was “finish my job and call Luis.” 56 The two knew each other. Both raise chickens. 57 However, exactly what Mr. Terrazas told Mr. Juarez during their call is unclear. At one point, Mr. Juarez testified that he learned Mr. Terrazas obtained the filled syringes from a fellow chicken farmer to treat his injured fowl. 58 But on crossexamination, Mr. Juarez said he first learned of the attack on Mr. Terrazas’s chickens “a week, a week and a half” after the search. 59 According to Mr. Juarez, 52 AB 659, at ¶ 7.18.b (Corrected Final Decision). 53 AB 15, at 2:53:22-53:52 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). 54 AB 647, at ¶ 3.25 (Corrected Final Decision). 55 AB 647, at ¶ 3.28 (Corrected Final Decision). 56 AB 15, at ≈2:50:55-2:51:02 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). 57 AB 15, at ≈2:51:33-2:51:41 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). See AB 167, at ¶ 4 (unnumbered) (The two were “previously acquainted.”) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice). 58 AB 15, at ≈2:52:14-2:53:22 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). 59 AB 15, at ≈3:34:44-3:35:13 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). 11 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 12 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Mr. Terrazas knew only that he’d been given medicine, but not what was in the two syringes. 60 After the hearing, the Arbitrator found Mr. Juarez in violation of Rule 3214(a)’s Possession prohibition. Discussing the evidence proving Possession in greater detail, the Arbitrator held that Mr. Juarez “had exclusive control” over his SUV, where the dipa was found. 61 And although Mr. Juarez argued “he was not conscious of the Diisopropylamine being in his vehicle because his vehicle had been in the shop and his mechanic must have placed the Diisopropylamine filled syringes inside his center console,” that was “of no legal moment under the definition of Possession.” 62 That left for determination whether Mr. Juarez had proven either NF or NSF as a defense. Analyzing the facts, the Arbitrator determined that Mr. Juarez’s “objective” and “subjective” fault were considerable.” 63 Therefore, Mr. Juarez “should suffer a period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24 months, commencing with the HIWU notification of Final Sanctions.” 64 60 AB 15, at ≈2:52:36-2:53:19 (Juarez) (Hearing Video),168, at 2 [¶ 2] (unnumbered page) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice). 61 AB 657, at ¶ 7.10 (Corrected Final Decision). 62 AB 657, at ¶¶ 7.8, 7.9 (Corrected Final Decision). . See generally AB 658, at ¶¶ 7.15-.17 (discussing the NSF analysis derived from Cilic v. International Tennis Federation, CAS 2013/A/3327 (Apr. 11, 2024), which is commonly used in HISA cases). 63 AB 659, at ¶¶ 7.19 & 7.20 64 AB 659, at ¶ 7.22 (Corrected Final Decision). 12 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 13 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Since Mr. Juarez’s fault was “considerable,” it necessarily followed he could not eliminate sanctions entirely under a NF analysis. Thus, the Arbitrator did not discuss NF further. Accordingly, the Arbitrator awarded the following sanctions against Mr. Juarez: 1. A 24-month period of Ineligibility. 2. A fine of $10,000, reduced from $25,000 maximum, inasmuch as there was no evidence Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or gained any benefit from Possession of the dipa. 3. A contribution of $8,000 toward HIWU’s share of the arbitration costs. 65 The Arbitrator further directed HIWU to publish his decision in accordance with applicable Rules. 66 E. Mr. Juarez’s Review Petition Mr. Juarez seeks review of the Corrected Final Decision and resulting sanction on the basis of the Arbitrator’s exclusion of “a necessary defense witness despite Trainer’s prior timely identification of that witness.” 67 Although identified only as “Witness A,” the individual is described “as a person with firsthand knowledge concerning how the contraband [two syringes with dipa] came to be located in the center console of Trainer’s vehicle.” 68 From the Appeal Book material 65 AB 659-60, at ¶¶ 7.23-.29 (Corrected Final Decision). sanctions). See Rule 3223 (prescribing the applicable 66 AB 660, at ¶¶ 7.30 (Corrected Final Decision) (citing Rules 3231 and 3630). 67 Review Pet. at 2. 68 Id. at 3. 13 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 14 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC filed, that can only be Mr. Terrazas. His exclusion, Mr. Juarez argues, violated: (1) “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”; (2) “Rule 3220(a)” and “Rule 3219(e)”; (3) “HIWU Arbitration Procedure § 10(d)”; and (4) “[d]ouble jeopardy,” based apparently on the fact that Mr. Juarez was sanctioned for both possession of the syringes and for the dipa they contained. 69 Rule “3219(e),” “3220(a),” and “§ 10(d)” do not exist. And regardless of whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies here, HISA and the Rules themselves provide for due process and therefore provide a basis to review the decision to exclude Mr. Terrazas. 70 For reasons discussed below, I refrain from substantively addressing Mr. Juarez’s “double jeopardy” argument, as it is superfluous for present purposes. Finally, Mr. Juarez requests an evidentiary hearing “to present evidence excluded below over valid objection.” 71 Again, I take this to refer to testimony by Mr. Terrazas. F. The Authority’s Response The Authority contends that the Arbitrator had multiple grounds on which to exclude Mr. Terrazas. In summary, Mr. Juarez “acknowledged that he failed to comply with Procedural Order #1, including the requirement to provide a pre- 69 Id. at 2-5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3057(c)(3), 3058(b)(2)(B) (importing Administrative Procedure Act requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 556); Rule 3122(e); FTC Rule 1.146(c)(1)(ii). 70 71 Review Pet. at 1 (boldface omitted). 14 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 15 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC hearing submission or evidence.” 72 Mr. Juarez, the Authority maintains, “cannot flout the Rules and then cry foul when the Rules are nonetheless applied.” 73 The Authority further notes that the Arbitrator heard “substantial hearsay testimony [from Mr. Juarez] regarding [Mr. Terrazas’s] alleged intended use of the [dipa] found in [Mr. Juarez’s] possession.” 74 Hence, the Arbitrator’s exclusion ruling was “harmless because it would not have changed the Arbitrator’s determination that the Appellant’s failure to mitigate his fault put him in the uppermost range of fault.” 75 The Authority urges resolution of this review on the briefs. However, if an evidentiary hearing is directed, it “requests that the witnesses presented on behalf of HIWU below be permitted to testify.” 76 The Authority offers no elaboration on why it would be appropriate to receive additional testimony from witnesses who already testified for HIWU at the arbitration, however. Besides seeking review and an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Juarez also seeks a stay of the sanctions imposed. I will consider the stay motion first. After that, I address the review petition and the course of further proceedings in this case. 72 Review Resp. at 3 (footnote omitted), quoting AB 645, at ¶ 3.9 (Corrected Final Decision). 73 Review Resp. at 4. 74 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 3 (Since Mr. Juarez had the “opportunity to crossexamine witnesses and make an argument in his defense at a hearing,” he received due process.). 75 Id. at 5. Id. at 6. 76 15 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 16 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC II. Mr. Juarez’s Motion for a Stay Under FTC Rule 1.148(c) & (d), an application for a stay of the sanctions imposed “must provide the reasons a stay is . . . warranted by addressing the [following] factors . . . and the facts relied upon”: (1) The likelihood of the applicant’s success on review; (2) Whether the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted; (3) The degree of injury to other parties or third parties if a stay is granted; and (4) Whether the stay is in the public interest. 77 Moreover, “[a] stay pending appeal is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review, so this extraordinary relief is never granted as a matter of right.” 78 A. Summary of the Parties’ Positions Mr. Juarez maintains that “[g]ood cause exists very simply because the suspension order [that is, the Ineligibility sanction] rests on proceedings that violated due process.” 79 Mr. Juarez argues that he will suffer irreparable injury: “he will unavoidably suffer reputational damage that cannot be undone even if the appeal succeeds; and he will be deprived of income and racing opportunities critical to livelihood.” 80 In his view, “[t]he absence of a stay would effectively destroy appeal 77 87 Fed. Reg. 60083. factors). See generally Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (adopting comparable 78 Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, No. 25-2089, 2025 WL 3135862, at *5 (1st Cir. Nov. 9, 2025) (cleaned up), admin. stay extended, No. 25A539, 2025 WL 3145875 (U.S. Nov. 11, 2025) (mem.). See also Media Matters for America v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (A stay “pending appeal is an extraordinary form of relief.”) (cleaned up). 79 Review Pet. at 7. 80 Id. at 8. 16 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 17 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC rights” and “merely compound[] the deprivation [of due process], rather than curing it.” 81 The balance of equities and public interest are said to “favor[] ensuring [that] disciplinary actions are administered in a manner consistent with constitutional and statutory fairness.” 82 Opposing stay relief, the Authority argues that because Mr. Juarez “fail[ed] to take advantage of procedural safeguards available to him,” his due process and related objections have a “low” likelihood of success. 83 The Authority further cautions that overturning the Arbitrator’s enforcement of his Orders and the procedural Rules “would generally erode the validity of the Arbitration Procedures.” 84 As for irreparable injury, the Authority argues that Mr. Juarez’s “conclusory assertions” of reputational harm and loss of business prospects lack factual support. 85 The Authority also contends a stay would harm other parties—“Responsible Persons,” referring to rival Trainers and other industry participants, as well as “the betting public,” who are the beneficiaries of the ADMC Program’s “mission to protect horse welfare” and “the integrity of horseracing.” 86 Comparable considerations similarly inform the public interest, which is served by “individual 81 Id. 82 Id. at 9. 83 Stay Resp. at 3. 84 Id. at 5. 85 Id. 86 Id. 17 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 18 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC compliance with the rules and regulations validly promulgated by [administrative] agencies.” 87 B. Likelihood of Success On a stay motion, “[t]he first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” 88 Moreover, likely success on the merits must be “better than negligible.” 89 Here, specifically, there is no dispute that in January 2025, HIWU found two syringes, filled with dipa, a Banned Substance, in Mr. Juarez’s SUV, while it was located at Oaklawn Park racetrack. Mr. Juarez, however, denies knowing the two syringes were there and maintains that—unbeknownst to him—the syringes were put there by Mr. Terrazas, the auto mechanic who serviced his SUV in the days immediately preceding HIWU’s search. Mr. Juarez sought to call Mr. Terrazas as an arbitration witness, offering as support a purported signed affidavit by Mr. Terrazas. In that document, Mr. Terrazas recounts his obtaining the two dipa-filled syringes to treat injured fowl he owned and his putting them in the SUV during the time he had the vehicle for servicing. However, he forgot to remove the syringes upon returning the SUV to Mr. Juarez, or to tell Mr. Juarez about them. This exculpatory evidence was not simply a tile in the mosaic of Mr. Juarez’s defense to HIWU’s Possession charge. It was the mosaic itself. Mr. Juarez had no other explanation for what HIWU found. Two years of his professional life was at risk. The Arbitrator excluded Mr. Juarez’s proposed evidence, when formally offered less than 48 hours before the scheduled start of the arbitration hearing. His submission was 87 Id. 88 Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. 89 Id. See also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Crossroads’ appeal shows little prospect of success—an arguably fatal flaw for a stay application.”). 18 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 19 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC untimely under Procedural Order No. 1, to be sure. But—contrary to HIWU’s assertion in moving to preclude—testimony from Mr. Terrazas would not have been “ambush evidence.” 90 Mr. Juarez had alerted HIWU to Mr. Terrazas as a source for the dipa-filled syringes during the very search itself and had provided more detailed information months before the September 2025 proceedings. • January 29, 2025: Mr. Juarez “claimed to have no idea how the two syringes got into his lower center console or what substances the two syringes contained,” and said that “he recently received the vehicle back from a repair shop and alluded the syringes were left behind by the repair technician.” 91 • January 29, 2025: Mr. Juarez told his trainer-employer, Ingrid Mason, that “he had no idea where the needles and syringes came from or how they got in his SUV. He told her maybe the mechanics at the repair shop from where he had just picked his SUV up had put them in it. . . . MASON said she believed JUAREZ was telling her the truth.” 92 • April 25, 2025: In response to HIWU’s EAD Notice, Mr. Juarez’s counsel: (a) advised HIWU that “the ‘substance was ‘intended for administration to some injured roosters’ owned by Mr. Luis Terrazas, who Trainer Juarez claimed is his automechanic.” 93; and (b) also provided a “typed, unsigned, unnotarized, draft affidavit 90 AB 610 (HIWU motion to preclude or, in the alternative, for continuance). 91 AB 141 (HIWU Interview/Intelligence Report of January 29, 2025). See also AB 139, at ¶ 33 (Bennett Witness Statement, confirming that AB 163 “is accurate.”). But see AB 92 AB 163 (HIWU Interview/Intelligence Report of January 29, 2025) (capitalization in original). 15, at ≈0:53:03-0:53:10 (Bennett) (Hearing Video) (when interviewed, Mason “parroted” Juarez’s explanation, suggesting the two had talked). 93 AB 79-80 (footnote omitted) quoting AB 168, at ¶ 7 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice). 19 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 20 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC allegedly from Mr. Terrazas,” as well as “an alleged handwritten receipt for the auto repair.” 94 • July 30, 2025: Mr. Juarez “watched [the HIWU investigator] recover the syringes from the lower center console; [Juarez] suggested they may have been left there by his auto-mechanic.” 95 • August 1, 2025: Mr. Juarez “claimed he had no idea how the two syringes got into his lower-center console and denied knowing what substance the two syringes contained,” and “claimed he recently received the vehicle back from the repair shop and suggested they could have come from there.” 96 The purported Terrazas affidavit and repair shop receipt, which Mr. Juarez offered less than 48 hours before the hearing, were identical to that which his counsel had provided to HIWU more than four months earlier. So, HIWU was not blind-sided in September. When Mr. Juarez filed his belated pre-hearing papers, it is fair to infer that both the Arbitrator and HIWU were frustrated by his failure (or probably more likely, that of his counsel) to comply with the service deadlines and other requirements that had been ordered. Nevertheless, the evidence from Mr. Terrazas was the centerpiece to the entire case. If Mr. Terrazas testified along the lines in the purported affidavit, and after cross-examination proved to be credible, analysis of HIWU’s Possession charge could change markedly. Regardless of the niceties that 94 AB 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief), referring to AB 171 (unsigned affidavit) & AB 175 (repair shop receipt). 95 AB 137, at ¶ 20 (Bennett Witness Statement). 96 AB 77, at ¶ 17(b) (footnotes omitted) (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief). 20 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 21 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC define “actual, physical, and constructive” “Possession” under Rule 1020, Mr. Terrazas’ testimony, if believed, could move the needle on Mr. Juarez’s NF and NSF defenses, potentially reducing the otherwise mandatory two-year Ineligibility period. In granting HIWU’s motion to preclude, the Arbitration cited Rule 7170(e), which provides in pertinent part that “[i]f a party should have submitted evidence in the party’s pre-hearing submission but did not submit such evidence, the arbitrator(s) shall not admit such evidence absent a showing of good cause.” 97 Mr. Juarez had previously provided HIWU with details regarding Mr. Terrazas comparable to those required for a pre-hearing witness statement, however. And as an alternative to preclusion, HIWU itself was willing to accept Mr. Juarez’s proposed evidence if granted a continuance and possible costs. 98 In the circumstances here, there was a colorable showing of “good cause” to relieve Mr. Juarez of his failure to make a timely pre-hearing submission. In Wilkerson v. Turner, 99 the defendant, charged with burglary, obtained an affidavit from another individual, “exonerating the defendant.” 100 The Court denied the defendant a continuance of his burglary trial, which could have allowed the noncharged, confessing individual to be produced as a witness, and the defendant was 97 See AB 646, at ¶ 3.19 (emphasis added). See id. 064, at ¶ 10.a (Procedural Order No. 1). 98 AB 609-10 (HIWU motion to preclude or, alternative, for continuance). 99 693 F.2d 121 (11th Cir. 1982). 100 Id. at 122. 21 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 22 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC convicted. The Court of Appeals held that there was a due process violation and granted habeas corpus relief that effectively required a new trial. 101 Again, putting constitutional applicability aside, HISA itself directs that the Rules implementing the statute “shall provide for adequate due process, including impartial hearing officers or tribunals commensurate with the seriousness of the alleged safety, performance, or anti-doping and medication control rule violation and the possible civil sanctions for such violation.” 102 In approving the ADMC Program Rules, the FTC, too, was mindful that due process needed to be assured. 103 Here, evidence from Mr. Terrazas was so potentially exculpatory that its exclusion impairs the due process protection applicable in HIWU cases. Although the Arbitrator received hearsay testimony from Mr. Juarez, barring Mr. Terrazas himself was not, as the Authority contends, “harmless” as a matter of law on the facts here. 104 Courts have long-described testimonial hearsay as “exceedingly infirm, unsatisfactory[,] and intrinsically weak in its very nature and character.” 105 Thus, its persuasive force will rarely equal that of testimony by a witness with first- See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (exclusion of evidence on “a critical issue” and that bore indicia of reliability—whether or not the defendant was present when another committed the criminal acts—denied due process); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (limitations on defendant’s ability to cross examine a witness who had confessed to the crime with which the defendant was charged denied due process). 101 102 15 U.S.C. § 3057(c)(3). 103 See generally 87 Fed. Reg. 60077-78 (Oct. 4, 2022). 104 Review Resp. at 5. 105 Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. 412, 436 (1836). 22 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 23 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC hand knowledge of the facts. That, after all, is part of the reason that hearsay is often excluded as evidence. 106 I cannot prejudge whether Mr. Terrazas’s testimony will be credible, of course. But the stay factor of success on the merits favors Mr. Juarez. C. Irreparable Injury HIWU argues that “harm to . . . professional reputation and loss of business prospects” often are insufficient to establish irreparable injury, particularly where there is a remedy at law. 107 But as the Authority’s citation to Janvey v. Alguire itself recognizes, there are exceptions. 108 Depending on the facts, denial of the opportunity to practice one’s livelihood pending review of disciplinary action can constitute irreparable injury. For example, in Walker v. Memorial Health System of East Texas, 109 the plaintiff, a physician, received a negative review of his professional competence, which his hospital reported to the National Practitioners Data Bank. That report “almost certainly proves detrimental to a practitioner’s livelihood . . . .” 110 The physician pursued an internal review process and simultaneously filed suit in court for injunctive relief. Granting a preliminary injunction, the Court wrote: “The See, e.g., United States v. Dollison, No. 3:09-cr-00106-SLG-DMS, 2017 WL 3873698, at *7 (D. Alaska Sept. 4, 2017) (“the testimony of witnesses with direct knowledge is generally more persuasive than hearsay witnesses”); Valdez v. Williams Energy Servs., No. Civ. 99-1334 BB/WWD, 2001 WL 37125329, at *2 (D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2001) (“hearsay testimony must be disregarded in favor of the direct testimony”). 106 107 See Stay Resp. at 5. 108 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011), cited in id. at 5 n.15. 109 231 F. Supp. 3d 210 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 110 Id. at 214. 23 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 24 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC injunctive relief that Dr. Walker seeks is very time sensitive, and the dissemination of this report throughout the relevant medical community is a bell that cannot otherwise be unrung.” 111 Similarly, in Berryhill v. Gibson, 112 the three-judge court held that the risk of revocation of a professional license, and attendant publicity, arising from proceedings before a panel whose members practiced the same profession threatened a due process violation that “would cause irreparable damage . . . .” 113 The Court wrote: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” 114 There is no claim here that the Arbitrator lacked impartiality. However, his ruling barring Mr. Terrazas as a witness, instead of granting a continuance of the hearing, meant that HIWU’s charge would be resolved without the admission of significant, potentially exculpatory, evidence. The Arbitrator thereafter ruled in favor of HIWU, awarding sanctions, which currently prevent Mr. Juarez from working at Covered Racetracks for the next two years. On a stay motion, a “sliding scale” analysis often is warranted: “injury held insufficient to justify a stay in one case may well be sufficient to justify it in another, where the applicant has demonstrated a higher probability of success on Id. at 217. See also Rosario v. Weirton Med. Ctr., No. 17-cv-0085, 2018 WL 1960952 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2018) (finding irreparable injury on similar facts). 111 112 331 F. Supp. 122 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d in relevant part, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). 113 331 F. Supp. at 126. 114 Id. at 125. 24 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 25 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC the merits.” 115 The facts here sufficiently call into question the fairness of the arbitration hearing and meet the irreparable injury requirement for stay relief. Accordingly, this factor also favors Mr. Juarez. D. Injury to Others and the Public Interest The Authority contends, in substance, that a stay would harm other industry participants—presumably those who follow the Rules—and the betting public. Likewise, a stay, it maintains, would disserve thoroughbred racing integrity and safety. But there is no evidence that Mr. Juarez doped any horse, or secured dipafilled syringes for the purpose of doing so. Instead, this is a case involving Possession. And if Mr. Terrazas’s testimony were to be believed, the most that could be said is that Mr. Juarez should have searched his SUV more carefully when it came back after servicing. Mr. Terrazas is an auto mechanic whose interests are said not to relate to horses. 116 He would not seem to be a likely supplier of dipa to Mr. Juarez. Moreover, HIWU offered no evidence that he committed prior violations. So, there is no basis for inferring his unwillingness to comply with the Rules. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing authorities); Brady v. NFL, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011). 115 116 AB 167, at ¶ 3 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice). 25 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 26 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Under these circumstances, no meaningful harm to others is apparent. Nor would the public interest mandate denial of a stay. The final factors favor Mr. Juarez. * * * Mr. Terrazas’s testimony has significant exculpatory potential. The contents of his purported, signed affidavit, offered in the arbitration, show that he has firsthand knowledge of facts probative of HIWU’s Possession charge. 117 He swears, among other things, that: I had possession of the SUV from January 13, 2025, until January 28, 2025. The truck was returned to Eusebio on January 28, 2025; . . . . I put the two syringes . . . into the front seat center console compartment of the SUV. . . . I was the only person having access [to] the truck during the week it was at my shop was me [sic]. I was the only person who drove the truck during that time[.] 118 The date on the purported affidavit—February 1, 2025—suggests that the facts were memorialized in writing and adopted by him at a time when they were fresh in his mind, and those facts do not appear to be ones about which Mr. Terrazas might reasonably be mistaken. 119 When Mr. Juarez sought, belatedly, to call Mr. Terrazas as a witness at the arbitration hearing, a fair and impartial resolution of the case would have been better assured not by excluding him, but instead by directing the alternative relief HIWU requested—continuance of the hearing and a possible application for costs. 117 AB 583 (purported affidavit). 118 AB 583-84, at ¶¶ 4,7, 10 (purported affidavit). 119 AB 585-86 (purported affidavit). 26 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 27 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Therefore, to the extent provided below, I will direct an evidentiary hearing at which Mr. Terrazas may testify. III. Petition for Review FTC Rule 1.146(c)(2) provides that: In reviewing the final civil sanction and decision of the Authority, the Administrative Law Judge may rely in full or in part on the factual record developed before the Authority through the disciplinary process under 15 U.S.C. 3057(c) and disciplinary hearings under Authority Rule Series 8300. The record may be supplemented by an evidentiary hearing conducted by the Administrative Law Judge to ensure each party receives a fair and impartial hearing. Within 20 days of the filing of an application for review, based on the application submitted by the aggrieved party or by the Commission and on any response by the Authority, the Administrative Law Judge will assess whether: (i) The parties do not request to supplement or contest the facts found by the Authority; (ii) The parties do not seek to contest any facts found by the Authority, but at least one party requests to supplement the factual record; (iii) At least one party seeks to contest any facts found by the Authority; (iv) The Commission, if it filed the application for review, seeks supplementation of the record; or (v) In the Administrative Law Judge’s view, the factual record is insufficient to adjudicate the merits of the review proceeding. 120 120 In a review proceeding such as this, arising from violation of an ADMC Program Rule, the references in Rule 1.146 to “facts found by the Authority” are sensibly understood to refer to those found by the “Arbitral Body,” which is the fact finder and which may, as here, consist of a single arbitrator. See Rules 3261, 7020, 7060; Order on Application for Review and Application for Stay, Matter of Overly, FTC No. 9443, slip op. at 7, n.23 (ALJ Nov. 20, 2025). By contrast, the Authority can have a role as a fact finder in cases arising from rules implementing the Racetrack Safety Program. See, e.g., Rules 8200(b) & (d), 8320, 8340 8350, 8370. 27 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 28 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Mr. Juarez has requested an evidentiary hearing to offer Mr. Terrazas’s testimony. 121 And if a hearing is directed, the Authority requests that HIWU’s witnesses “below be permitted to testify.” 122 As the preceding discussion reflects, I have determined that the record should “be supplemented by an evidentiary hearing . . . to ensure each party receives a fair and impartial hearing.” 123 The review that I conduct here is de novo. 124 Thus, if testimony from Mr. Terrazas at an evidentiary hearing were deemed credible, it could, conceivably, benefit Mr. Juarez’s NF or NSF arguments and, thus, affect the sanctions imposed. However, full exoneration would be less likely under Rule 3124(a)’s strict liability regime. On the other hand, if Mr. Terrazas’ testimony were lacking in credibility, there could be adverse consequences. Testimony before this Court is, of course, given under oath. Mr. Terrazas does not appear to be a “Covered Person” under Rule 1020 or otherwise subject to HISA and the Rules. 125 Mr. Juarez may be able to secure his appearance and testimony on a voluntary basis. But that alone is not enough. The evidentiary hearing must assure that “each” party’s interests are protected. Thus, the Authority (or HIWU) must be permitted to conduct effective cross-examination, 121 Review Pet. at 1. 122 Review Resp. at 6. 123 FTC Rule 1.146(c)(2). 124 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(1); FTC Rule 1.146(b)(2) & (3). See AB 167, at ¶ 3 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice) (“Mr. Terrazas is not in the horse business and never has been. He is generally unfamiliar with horses.”). 125 28 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 29 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC which may include an opportunity to secure appropriate documents. 126 To accomplish this, I will direct an evidentiary hearing on the condition that Mr. Juarez obtain Mr. Terrazas’s consent to be subject to this Court’s authority. I have, therefore, attached to this Order a draft “Witness Agreement,” which, as explained further below, I propose to finalize and require to be signed. Also, at the arbitration hearing, Mr. Juarez’s counsel argued at length that the Oaklawn Park stewards’ hearing and eventual resolution regarding Possession of the two syringes should operate as some sort of defense to HIWU’s charge of Possession of the dipa itself. Apart from alluding generally to the criminal law doctrine of “double jeopardy,” he offered no authority for his position. 127 His review petition suggests, however, that he proposes to raise the matter in this proceeding. 128 To avoid any misunderstanding, I address this position. FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) provides that, “[e]xcept for good cause shown, no assignment of error by the aggrieved party may rely on any question of fact or law not presented to the [Arbitrator].” 129 Mr. Juarez had an opportunity to introduce facts relating to the Oaklawn Park stewards’ hearing at the Arbitration. Insofar as he failed to do so, he has not set forth grounds sufficient to show good cause entitling him to offer more factual matter. Therefore, I will not permit him to 126 See, e.g., Matter of Lynch, FTC No. 9423, 2024 WL 2045679 (ALJ May 1, 2024) (granting issuance of a subpoena duces tecum). 127 AB 15, at ≈0:17:31-0:23:59, ≈0:26:26-0:30:06, ≈4:58:58-5:01:20, ≈5:02:02-5:07:30, ≈5:10:56-5:14:15 (Hearing Video). 128 Review Pet. at 3, 8-9. 129 See supra n.120. 29 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 30 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC introduce any additional evidence here related to the Oaklawn Park stewards’ hearing. At an appropriate time, I will provide the parties an opportunity to brief Mr. Juarez’s professed “defense.” However, I will not entertain any oral argument on this matter by Mr. Juarez’s counsel at the evidentiary hearing or any other proceeding on this review. The Arbitration hearing record includes his argument there. Any further oral presentation would be needlessly cumulative. A. Steps Relating to the Evidentiary Hearing Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 1. An evidentiary hearing will take place on a date, time, and place to be determined upon the conditions and completion of the matters set forth below. Mr. Juarez will be permitted to call Luis Terrazas as a witness at the hearing. 2. Counsel for the parties must CONFER regarding the attached draft Witness Agreement and NOTIFY me by no later than December 11, 2025, either that: (a) it is acceptable; or (b) they have proposed changes, shown by attaching the draft with redlined edits. If the form of Witness Agreement is acceptable to counsel, or if the proposed edited version is acceptable to the Court, I will issue an Order regarding further procedures leading to an evidentiary hearing (“Hearing Order No. 1”). On the other hand, if changes are proposed that I believe warrant discussion, I will schedule a telephonic or Zoom conference of counsel for the parties. 30 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 31 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC 3. Once the form of the Witness Agreement is finalized, Mr. Juarez’s counsel must provide it to him for signature, after which it must be filed in this case. 4. If Mr. Terrazas declines to sign the finalized Witness Agreement and alternative arrangements, acceptable to the Court, are not otherwise agreed to, no evidentiary hearing will be held. 5. If Mr. Terrazas intends to be represented by counsel at the hearing, counsel must file a notice of appearance or appropriate motion under § 4.1 of the FTC’s Rules of Practice. 6. In issuing Hearing Order No. 1, I will include steps that will enable the Authority to determine whether to renew its request to also call one or more witnesses to testify. If the request is renewed, I will rule on it. B. Additional Required Review Material As noted earlier, although the Authority has filed an Appeal Book, it does not include a transcript of the arbitration hearing. Therefore, I hereby ORDER that: By no later than December 9, 2025, the Authority must file a written transcript of the arbitration hearing, to be denominated “Appeal Book 2” (“AB2”). Each page of AB2 shall bear a sequential number using at least a 20-point font size. The Authority’s attention is further directed to the Matter of Michael Hewitt, FTC No. 9438, 2024 WL 5078323, at*4 (ALJ Nov. 1, 2024): This is the second proceeding in recent months in which HIWU’s Appeal Book has omitted a written transcript of the proceedings sought to be reviewed. The Authority and HIWU are hereby NOTIFIED that: 31 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 32 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC 1. Henceforth, whenever HIWU is required to file an Appeal Book in an FTC ALJ review proceeding, written transcripts of any proceedings relevant to the review sought must be included in the Appeal Book when filed, and not afterward. 2. The transcript may be prepared from a stenographic record created contemporaneous with the proceeding subject to review, or from an audio/video recording of the proceeding created afterwards, or from such other method as the parties may agree to, and must include a certification or party stipulation of accuracy. * * * Unless otherwise ordered, all filing and service dates in this case must be made by 5 p.m. EST on the date specificized. As a reminder, courtesy copies of all papers required to be filed in this case must also be sent to OALJ@ftc.gov. I offer this additional cautionary observation. Procedural Order No. 1 in the arbitration instructed that “[a]ll deadlines and requirements stated herein will be strictly enforced.” 130 Mr. Juarez’s counsel’s attention to, and compliance with, the Arbitrator’s instruction left much to be desired, to put it charitably. I will not tolerate any similar disregard. The deadlines in this case will be strictly enforced as to all parties. 130 AB 645, at ¶ 3.4 (Corrected Final Decision). 32 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 33 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC I have considered all the matters raised in Mr. Juarez’s Amended Petition for Appellate Review and Combined Motion to Stay Suspension Order and find them unpersuasive except to the extent set forth above. ORDERED: Jay L. Himes Jay L. Himes Administrative Law Judge Date: December 2, 2025 33 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 34 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Exhibit A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES __________________________________________ ) In the Matter of ) ) Eusebio Juarez-Rufino, ) ) Appellant. ) __________________________________________) Docket No. 9444 WITNESS AGREEMENT [DRAFT] I, Luis Terrazas, state as follows: 1. I understand that Eusebio Juarez-Rufino, the Appellant in this case, seeks to call me to give sworn testimony as a witness on his behalf at an evidentiary hearing that will be scheduled in the case. I further understand that if I appear as a witness and testify, I will be subject to cross-examination by counsel for the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (“the Authority”) and may also be questioned by the Court. 2. I agree to appear at the evidentiary hearing and to testify. 3. For the purposes of this case only, I voluntarily consent to the authority of this Court, including that conferred by 5 U.S.C. § 556, 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b), and FTC Rule 1.146(c). 4. I understand that the evidentiary hearing is expected to be conducted via Zoom or another comparable video/audio application. If it is, I consent to my 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 35 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Exhibit A testimony at the hearing being deemed given in New York, New York, just as if I testified in person there. 5. I also understand that if satisfactory arrangements for a remote evidentiary hearing cannot be reached, then the hearing will be conducted in person in either New York, New York or Washington, D.C. I will be apprised of the location at least 14 calendar days in advance of the hearing date. 6. I understand that, if I wish to do so, I may speak to an attorney concerning this matter before signing this Agreement. I also understand that I may be represented by an attorney when I testify at the evidentiary hearing. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at ______________, Arkansas, on December______, 2025. ______________________________ Luis Terrazas AGREED: Date:_______________________, 2025 ____________________________ John Mac Hayes, OBA#15512 1601 S. Victor Ave. Tulsa, OK 74104 (405) 918 888 0630 JohnMacHayesLaw@aol.com Attorney for Appellant Eusebio Juarez-Rufino 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 12/02/2025 OSCAR NO. 614366 -PAGE Page 36 of 36 *PUBLIC * PUBLIC Exhibit A ___________________ Bryan Beauman Rebecca Price 333 W. Vine Street, Suite 1500 Lexington, Kentucky 40507 Telephone: (859) 255-8581 bbeauman@sturgillturner.com rprice@sturgillturner.com HISA ENFORCEMENT COUNSEL _______________________ Michelle C. Pujals Allison J. Farrell 4801 Main Street, Suite 350 Kansas City, MO 64112 Telephone: (816) 291-1864 mpujals@hiwu.org afarrell@hiwu.org HORSERACING INTEGRITY & WELFARE UNIT, A DIVISION OF DRUG FREE SPORT LLC 3 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aftc%3A24b6794525bcb828. Public record. Not legal advice.