# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aftc%3A01d247823bc23076

## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Federal Trade Commission
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Office of Policy Planning
Bureau of Competition

March 31, 2026
Supreme Court of Florida
500 South Duval Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
By electronic submission
Re:

Amendment to Rule 4-13.2 of the Florida Supreme Court’s Rules Relating to
Admissions to the Bar

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida:
We are the Directors of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC or Commission) Office of
Policy Planning and Bureau of Competition. 1 The Office of Policy Planning engages with state
legislatures, regulatory boards, and other government officials on competition and consumer
protection issues to champion the interests of the American people. The Bureau of Competition
enforces America’s antitrust laws. Competition is the lifeblood of the American economy, spurring
innovation, expanding output and employment, lowering prices, improving quality, and increasing
access to goods and services. Promoting competition and enhancing consumer choice are central
goals for the Commission. Eliminating regulatory barriers that raise prices, prop up entrenched
monopolies, or otherwise restrain the competitive economy is key to achieving these goals.
We write this letter to advance those objectives and respond to the Florida Supreme Court’s
(“Court”) invitation for comment on its January 15, 2026 Order (“Order”) amending Rule 4-13.2
of the Florida Supreme Court’s Rules Relating to Admissions to the Bar (“Amendment”). 2 The
Commission has substantial experience evaluating the competitive effects of professional licensing
and related restrictions across the U.S. economy. 3 Through its advocacy program, the Commission
regularly advises states and localities regarding the competitive effects of various professional and
occupational licensing requirements. 4 The Commission’s prior advocacies highlight the risks of
1
This comment expresses the views of staff of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning and Bureau of Competition. It
does not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or of any individual Commissioner. The
Commission has, however, voted to authorize the submission of this comment.
2
In Re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to
the Bar, at 1, Docket No. SC2025-2064 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2026) [hereinafter Order]. The Order also adopted
conforming amendments to other relevant rules regulating the Florida Bar. Id. at 1–2.
3
See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission on
Competition and Occupational Licensure before the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial and Antitrust Law 10–15 (Sept. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Ohlhausen House Statement],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public statements/1253073/house testimony licensing and rbi act se
pt 2017 vote.pdf.
4
See, e.g., MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST,
COMPETITION POLICY AND CONSUMER RIGHTS “LICENSE TO COMPETE: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND THE STATE

entrusting market participants to act as gatekeepers for their profession or to set the terms on which
they and their fellow competitors may compete. 5 A recent advocacy letter supported the Texas
Supreme Court’s effort to end its reliance on ABA accreditation of law schools. 6
Based on this experience, we endorse the Amendment and commend the Court’s decision
“to end the rule’s reliance on the American Bar Association (ABA) as the sole accrediting agency
for law schools whose graduates are eligible to sit for [Florida’s] General Bar Examination.” 7 The
Court correctly concluded that “it is not in Floridians’ best interest for the ABA to be the sole
gatekeeper deciding which law schools’ graduates are eligible to sit” for the Florida Bar
examination. 8 Such control by the ABA is inimical to the principles on which competition law
rests. The ABA is dominated by practicing attorneys, who have strong incentives to limit the
supply of lawyers competing to provide legal services. And its accreditation group is dominated
by law school faculty and administrators with strong incentives to thwart lower cost alternatives
for legal education. Therefore, the prior rule raised serious competitive risks by broadly delegating
to the ABA the state’s authority to set eligibility requirements for admission to the Florida Bar.
Following the Amendment, the state no longer protects the ABA’s longstanding monopoly
over law school accreditation for schools that serve aspiring Florida lawyers. This wise action is
an important step, but it cannot produce true competition for law school accreditation by itself. We
applaud the Court for “creat[ing] the opportunity for additional entities to carry out an accrediting
and gatekeeping function” and its efforts to promote the recognition of new accreditors. 9 We urge
potential new accreditors to seize this opportunity to end the ABA’s law school accreditation
monopoly.
I.

The Amendment ends the state’s express delegation that has enabled the ABA’s
monopoly control over whether a Florida bar applicant’s legal education is
sufficient for admission.

The Amendment revokes the Court’s former mandate that the ABA dictate the education
required to take the bar exam and practice law in Florida. The ABA is the largest voluntary
professional organization in the world; its “mission is to be the national representative of the legal
profession,” serving a membership filled with practicing attorneys. 10 The ABA’s Council of the
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (“ABA Council”) establishes the standards
ACTION DOCTRINE” 1–2 (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Ohlhausen Senate Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/912743/160202occupationallicensing.pdf; Selected Advocacy Relating to Occupational
Licensing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy-research/advocacy/economic-liberty/selectedadvocacy-relating-occupational-licensing (linking to over 20 such advocacies).
5
See Ohlhausen Senate Statement, supra note 4, at 1 (“[W]hen regulatory authority is delegated to a board composed
of members of the occupation it regulates,” their “private interests may lead to . . . restrictions that discourage new
entrants, deter competition among licensees and from providers in related fields, and suppress innovative products or
services that could challenge the status quo.”).
6
FTC Staff Comment to the Texas Supreme Court Regarding Proposed Amendment to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing
Admission to the Bar of Texas (Dec. 1, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/public-statements/ftc-staffcomment-texas-supreme-court-regarding-proposed-amendment-rule-1-rules-governing-admission.
7
Order, supra note 2, at 1.
8
Order, supra note 2, at 2.
9
Order, supra note 2, at 2, 7–8.
10
Consumer FAQs,
A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/
resources_for_the_public/consumer_faqs/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2026).

2

that law schools must meet to become accredited, covering areas such as faculty, admissions,
curriculum, governance, and library and other facilities. 11 It also determines whether law schools
have complied with these standards and warrant ABA accreditation. 12 The ABA Council has
twenty-one members, who are predominantly current or former law school or other university
administrators or faculty; the remainder include practicing lawyers, judges, a law student, and a
Senior Fellow at a trade association that represents universities’ interests. 13 These ABA Council
members are selected by an ABA Section largely composed of law school faculty and
administrators. 14 Thus, ABA accreditation is controlled by entities whose members have strong
incentives to use their power over accreditation to serve anticompetitive ends. 15
The Florida Constitution grants the Florida Supreme Court “exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law.” 16 To be eligible to take the Florida Bar
examination, an applicant must obtain a law degree from “an accredited law school.” 17 Former
Florida Supreme Court Rule 4-13.2 defined “accredited law school” as a “law school approved or
provisionally approved by the American Bar Association.” 18 This express delegation ensured that
the ABA could force law schools seeking to serve students interested in practicing law in Florida

11
See ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval
of Law Schools –2025-2026, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal education/accreditation/standards/standardsrules/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2026).
12
ABA, Schools Seeking Council Approval, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal education/accreditation/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2026). The law school accreditation application process is lengthy, including payment of a fee,
preparation of studies by the applicant, collection of data, and a site evaluation team visit and report. Id.
13
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Leadership, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal education/about/leadership/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2026) (showing the professional titles of the 21 Council
members, with 14 listing current or former positions at law schools or universities and Daniel Madzelan listing his
position with the American Council on Education).
14
The ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar has over 17,000 members, including practicing
lawyers, judges, and legal educators. ABA, About the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/about/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2026); ABA, New to Bar
Admissions? What You Might Like to Know About: The ABA’s Connection to Bar Admissions, 90 THE BAR EXAMINER
86 (Spring 2021), https://thebarexaminer.ncbex.org/article/spring-2021/new-bar-admissions-aba-connections/
(reporting that the Section’s “membership is generally composed of legal educators and bar examiners,” but “is open
to any ABA member”).
15
In another forum, the ABA has argued that the ABA Council is “independent” of the main ABA and that this
“independence” insulates the ABA Council’s accreditation standards from the broader ABA’s interests. See Letter
from the Council of the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar to Supreme
Court of Texas, at 9–10 (June 30, 2025) (on file with Fed. Trade Comm’n). However, the broader ABA House of
Delegates still has the authority to review Council decisions and remand for further consideration, though it must
accept ABA Council decisions after two remands. See United States v. Am. Bar. Ass’n, 135 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C.
2001); Part III, infra. Further, the ABA Council is dominated by interested parties—higher education faculty, their
trade association, and practicing lawyers—and is also subject to influence by the attorneys who dominate the ABA.
16
Fla. Const. art. V, § 15.
17
FLA. BAR ADMISS. R. 4-13.1(a)(1). In addition, graduates of non-accredited schools may sit for the bar if they meet
additional requirements, such as having practiced law for five years or more in another jurisdiction. See Rule 4-13.4(a).
18
Order, supra note 2, at 17.

3

to meet the dictates of the ABA’s standards. It does not appear that the Court actively supervised
the ABA’s exercise of this delegated authority. 19
On March 12, 2025, the Court established a Workgroup to aid in its reconsideration of the
ABA’s delegated role. 20 On October 27, 2025, the Workgroup submitted a report analyzing the
arguments for and against continuing the Court’s express reliance on ABA accreditation, along
with alternatives for consideration. 21 On January 15, 2026, the Court adopted the Amendment,
terminating Rule 4-13.2’s designation of the ABA as the sole accrediting body recognized by the
Court, effective October 1, 2026. 22 Revised Rule 4-13.2 now defines “accredited law school” as
“any law school approved or provisionally approved by (1) a programmatic accrediting agency
recognized by the United States Department of Education to accredit programs in legal education
that lead to the first professional degree in law or (2) an institutional accrediting agency recognized
by the United States Department of Education to accredit institutions of higher education, provided
the institutional accrediting agency is also approved by the Court.” 23
We applaud the Amendment. These important efforts surely make the ABA’s monopoly
less secure. However, as discussed infra in Section IV, the revised rule will not slay the ABA’s
law school accreditation monopoly in the short term. Consistent with the Amendment’s design and
the Court’s intent, 24 new accrediting competitors must emerge to challenge the ABA’s chokehold.
II.

Professional boards or trade associations often have strong incentives to restrain
competition and may misuse delegated state power to exclude competitors.

Antitrust law has long recognized that professional boards and trade associations frequently
have inherent incentives to undermine competition. As Adam Smith observed, “[p]eople of the
same trade seldom meet, even for merriment or diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 25 Professional and trade associations

In order for conduct to qualify for state action immunity from antitrust liability, state officials must actively
supervise the allegedly anticompetitive actions. See infra Part II.
20
In Re: Workgroup on the Role of the American Bar Association in Bar Admission Requirements, Docket. No.
AOSC25-15 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2025).
21
Final Report of the Workgroup on the Role of the American Bar Association in Bar Admission Requirements (Oct.
27, 2025) [hereinafter Workgroup Report], https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2025/10/Final-Report-of-theWorkgroup-on-the-Role-of-the-ABA-in-Bar-Admission-Requirements.pdf.
22
Order, supra note 2, at 2–3, 8.
23
Id. at 5–6; see also id. at 17–18 (setting forth revised Rule 4-13.2).
24
The Amendment is designed “to expand the accrediting agencies” that can approve law schools, Order, supra note
2, at 2–3, 6, and the Court noted its intent to encourage the entry of new accreditors to introduce much-needed
competition, id. at 7–8.
25
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Note, Arbitrary Exclusion
from Multiple Listing: Common Law and Statutory Remedies, 52 CORN. L.Q. 570 (1967)); see ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 55 (Great Books 1952) (1776).
19

4

thus have often been found to violate the antitrust laws when they enter into agreements restricting
competition among themselves, 26 or interfering with the ability of others to compete. 27
Some conduct by professional associations can generate important benefits. For example,
the adoption of voluntary standards governing product safety or professional qualifications,
promulgated with “meaningful safeguards” around the process for developing such standards, can
have “significant procompetitive advantages.” 28 Voluntary industry standards are therefore
generally assessed under the rule of reason, which weighs a restraint’s procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects. 29 Yet courts recognize the inherent anticompetitive incentives in many
standards organizations that may lead to abuse of the standards process, particularly where “many
of [the standards organization’s] officials are associated with members of the industries” it
regulates. 30
The potential for competitive harm increases when state legislation or regulation gives the
force of law to restrictions on competition advanced by professional or trade associations. Antitrust
law respects the authority of states to promote their policy goals through regulation, even when
such actions inhibit competition. It thus affords immunity from antitrust liability when two
conditions are met: (1) the challenged restraint must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy,” and (2) “the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.” 31
There is a particular danger of competitive harm when a state professional board is composed of
unsupervised industry competitors. In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,
for example, the Supreme Court refused to extend immunity to the decision of a state board
dominated by licensed dentists to adopt a regulation prohibiting dental hygienists from offering
teeth whitening services. 32
The Commission has emphasized harm to competition arising when “entrants are
effectively required to obtain permission from incumbent competitors to enter or expand within a
particular market.” 33 These harms from “unnecessary occupational regulation” include
See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975) (holding that a county bar association rule establishing
a minimum fee schedule enforced via potential disciplinary action was “a classic illustration of price fixing” by the
state bar); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 456–65 (1986) (affirming an FTC order that an Indiana
Federation of Dentists policy requiring its members to withhold x-rays violated the antitrust laws).
27
See, e.g., E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 611–14 (1914) (affirming Sherman
Act violation against associations of retail lumber dealers who conspired to prevent competition from wholesale
dealers); Fashion Originators’ Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463–65 (1941) (affirming FTC order that a trade
association of garment manufacturers cease an organized boycott designed to thwart the sale of lower-priced garments
that are similar to the trade association members’ original styles).
28
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (quoting Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs
v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 (1982)); see also Ohlhausen Senate Statement, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that
the Commission “recognize[s] that occupational licensing can offer many important benefits,” such as “protect[ing]
consumers from health and safety risks”).
29
See, e.g., Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500–01.
30
Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 571.
31
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v.
La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (Brennan, J.) (footnote omitted)).
32
574 U.S. 494, 507 (2015).
33
See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Brother, May I?: The Challenge of Competitor Control over Market
Entry, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENF’T 111, 111 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnv028; Ohlhausen House
Statement, supra note 3, at 3 (“Occupational regulation can be especially problematic when regulatory authority is
delegated to a board controlled by active market participants,” since “there is a risk that the board’s decisions will
serve the private economic interests of its members, not the policies of the state or the well-being of its citizens.”).
26

5

“dampening incentives for innovation in products, services, and business models” and “creating
barriers to entry or repositioning by providers.” 34 Legal scholars agree, stressing that boards
composed largely of incumbent members of the profession can serve as “cartels by another name”
that are “deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition.” 35 This “inherent
conflict of interest and a risk of anticompetitive abuse” arises “in any accreditation program where
market participants wield the power to exclude”—“for even the most selfless and well-intentioned
decision makers” may be influenced when decisions “direct[ly] implicat[e] their own status . . .
and well-being.” 36
In engaging with state officials regarding occupational licensing, the Commission “ask[s]
that they consider whether: (1) any licensing regulations are likely to have a significant adverse
effect on competition; (2) those restrictions are targeted to address actual risks of consumer harm;
and (3) the restrictions are narrowly tailored to minimize burdens on competition, or whether less
restrictive alternatives are available.” 37 This inquiry is designed to “help alleviate unnecessary
licensing burdens” that harm competition. 38 When professional licensing restrictions fall short of
these principles, they may not serve the public interest—they may instead further the
anticompetitive goals of market participants who influence and set the standards. Based on these
principles, the Commission has argued against restrictions that would undermine competition by
imposing certification or educational requirements on suppliers beyond what is needed to properly
perform the service. For example, the Commission has frequently advised against restrictions on
those permitted to provide medical or dental services that would exclude qualified suppliers. 39 The
Commission has also recommended caution in imposing costly educational requirements to qualify
for professional licensure. 40

Ohlhausen Senate Statement, supra note 4, at 1.
Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1093–94 (2014). The authors contend that “[l]icensing boards are largely dominated by
active members of their respective industries who meet to agree on ways to limit the entry of new competitors.” Id. at
1095–96.
36
Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035, 1036–37 (2001).
37
Ohlhausen House Statement, supra note 3, at 4.
38
Maureen Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Transcript of the Economic Liberty Taskforce
Roundtable: The Effects of Occupational Licensure on Competition, Consumers and the Workforce: Empirical
Research and Results 4 (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events/2017/11/effects-occupationallicensure-competition-consumers-workforce-empirical-research-results.
39
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Perspectives: Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice Nurses
(2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/policy-perspectives-competition-regulation-advancedpractice-nurses/140307aprnpolicypaper.pdf (cautioning against restricting the scope of practice of advanced practice
registered nurses or subjecting them to excessive physician supervision); FTC Staff Comment Letter on Likely
Competitive Impact of House Bill 684 to Amend GA Code § 43-11-74 (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-georgia-state-senator-valenciaseay-concerning-georgia-house-bill-684/160201gadentaladvocacy.pdf (supporting a bill permitting dental hygienists
to provide certain services without the direct supervision of a dentist).
40
FTC Staff Comment Letter on Washington Administrative Code 4-25-710, § IV (Mar. 18, 1996),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advo cacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-jean-silverconcerning-washington-administrative-code-4-25-710-require/v960006.pdf (cautioning that requiring 150 hours of
undergraduate coursework to sit for the CPA exam could “increase the cost of entry and may raise prices to consumers
of CPA services,” and recommending that the state “seek persuasive evidence that, notwithstanding these concerns,
the net effect of the amendment on consumers would be positive”).
34
35

6

III.

The ABA’s control over law school accreditation and bar eligibility may stifle
competition among law schools and among lawyers.

The Workgroup recognized that “the [ABA], through its Council, holds a near monopoly
over legal education accreditation in the United States,” as the sole law school accreditor
recognized by the Department of Education and the only one to operate across multiple states.41
This monopoly power is enhanced by rules and regulations in most states that, like former Rule 413.2, require that applicants graduate from an ABA-accredited school to be eligible to take their
respective bar examinations. Florida Attorney General Uthmeier emphasized that such provisions
entrenching the ABA’s monopoly give it “enormous power” “to fix prices, punish outsiders, raise
barriers to entry, and stifle innovation,” and to effectively “destroy any law school in Florida.” 42
The ABA, unfortunately, has a long history of using its law school accreditation monopoly
to harm competition. Thirty years ago, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought a Sherman Act
complaint against the ABA and challenged conduct that dated back to 1973. 43 The DOJ alleged
that the ABA allowed “[l]egal educators” to capture the accreditation process, “at times act[ing]
as a guild that protected the interests of professional law school personnel.” 44 The complaint stated
that ABA “salary standards and their application . . . unreasonably restricted competition in the
law school labor market and” forced accredited schools to “ratchet[] up law school salaries.” 45
According to the DOJ, other restrictions “deterr[ed] effective competition from [non-ABAaccredited] law schools.” 46 The ABA settled, resolving the lawsuit through a consent decree. 47 In
2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that “on multiple occasions the
ABA ha[d] violated clear and unambiguous provisions” of that consent decree; it ordered the ABA
to comply and pay $185,000 to compensate the DOJ for the costs of the investigation. 48
Nonetheless, the ABA continues to wield its law school accreditation monopoly in a
manner that harms competition in other ways, such as imposing overly rigid and costly
requirements. When it strikes the right balance, accreditation can be procompetitive and serve the

Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 16.
Fla. Att’y Gen. James Uthmeier, Public Comment to Working Group No. AOSC25-15, In re Workgroup on the Role
of the American Bar Association in Bar Admission Requirements, 2, 9 (July 30, 2025) [hereinafter Uthmeier
Comment].
43
Complaint ¶ 35, United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-cv-1211 (D.D.C. June 27, 1995), Dkt. No. 1,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/485696/dl.
44
Competitive Impact Statement at 2, 4, United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-cv-1211, (D.D.C. June 27, 1995),
Dkt. No. 4, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/485691/dl.
45
Complaint, supra note 43, ¶ 16.
46
Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 44, at 6–7.
47
The consent decree prohibited standards relating to compensation paid to law school faculty and administrators,
restricted the collection and dissemination of information regarding compensation, and eliminated certain restrictions
on accepting transfer credits from state-accredited law schools or enrolling graduates of such schools in post-J.D.
programs. It also included structural provisions designed to insulate the ABA Council’s conduct from influence by
interested parties such as legal educators. See United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436–37 (D.D.C.
1996). The decree was modified in 2001 to limit the ability of the ABA House of Delegates to overrule ABA Council
decisions, in order to conform with Department of Education regulations. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2001).
48
United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-cv-1211, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42645, at *2 (D.D.C. 2006); Petition by
the U.S. for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendant ABA Should Not Be Found in Civil Contempt ¶¶ 11–17, United
States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-cv-1211 (D.D.C. June 23, 2006), Dkt. No. 101.
41
42

7

state’s interest in “safeguard[ing] a baseline of legal educational quality and support.” 49 The ABA
takes a different approach. It forces every law school to follow its preferred costly, elitist model of
legal education. 50 Over twenty years ago, Professor Marina Lao scrutinized the ABA’s
accreditation standards. She concluded that they were “unreasonable and, therefore,
anticompetitive,” because they “reflect the profession’s preference for the elite-model law school,”
and exclude schools providing a “nonelite legal education [that] is perfectly adequate for many
types of legal practice.” 51 Secure in its state-protected monopoly position, the ABA brushed off
such concerns and, in recent years, doubled down on its anticompetitive dictates.
The Workgroup recognized concerns that the burdensome and lengthy ABA accreditation
process increases the costs and risks for a law school seeking accreditation, thereby impeding
entry. 52 The excesses of ABA accreditation take various forms. For example, the Workgroup cited
longstanding concerns that the ABA’s standards “focus on inputs” that unnecessarily increase
costs, including standards for a schools’ physical facilities and limits on the use of part-time
faculty. 53 Such unnecessary edicts can also “stifle competition and innovation” and “result in
‘stagnation in the law school model.’” 54
A better approach would focus standards on “educational outputs” to ensure that schools
deliver a solid product, while allowing schools flexibility to develop innovative programs that
lower costs and boost the supply of law school seats. 55 The ABA has repeatedly failed to heed
calls for a commonsense approach setting minimum baseline requirements. 56 It instead insists on
excessive restrictions that unnecessarily “drive up the cost for law schools” 57 and protect the
interests of incumbent higher education institutions and their faculty. 58 By increasing the costs of
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 17 (footnote omitted).
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 18 (noting the ABA’s imposition of its “conception of best practices and
desirable educational policies” (quoting Letter from Robert Chesney, Dean of the University of Texas School of Law,
to the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court of Texas § 2(a) (June 30, 2025) (Attachment C to
the Workgroup Report))). See also George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA
Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2114 (1998) (“The present accreditation system arose
out of successful efforts during the Great Depression by a combination of elite law professors, elite law schools, and
elite lawyers to limit competition in each of the three related markets for law faculty, legal training, and legal
services.”).
51
Lao, supra note 36, at 1102; see also Shepherd, supra note 50, at 2103 (1998) (“Formal study at an elite-style law
school is certainly one way to train lawyers. But it is not necessarily the best or most cost-effective method for all
potential lawyers.”).
52
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 20.
53
Id. at 18–19.
54
Id. (quoting Uthmeier Comment, supra note 42, at 10).
55
Id. at 18 (quoting Benjamin M. Lepak, Breaking the ABA’s Law School Cartel: A Proposal to Make Oklahoma TopTen in Innovative Lawyer Education, 1889 INSTITUTE (Mar. 2020), https://1889institute.org/breaking-the-abas-lawschool-cartel-a-proposal-to-make-oklahoma-top-ten-in-innovative-lawyer-education/).
56
Despite its contrary actions, the ABA this past August claimed that its “Standards are minimum standards for
ensuring a quality legal education, but law schools should seek to exceed the Standards consistent with their mission
and goals.” ABA, Core Principles and Values of Law School Accreditation 1 (Aug. 2025),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/2025/cor
e-principles-and-values-of-law-school-accreditation.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2026).
57
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 21.
58
See Shepherd, supra note 50, at 2096 (explaining that “faculty control the law schools, and, consciously or not, they
operate them to maximize benefits for faculty”). Moreover, ABA Council members from colleges or universities
without law schools have an interest in the ABA’s insistence that law school students obtain an undergraduate degree
prior to starting law school.
49
50

8

legal education, the ABA’s excessive accreditation standards also limit the supply of new
lawyers. 59 With fewer lawyers available, consumers may struggle to access legal services and pay
more dearly when they do. Thus, ABA accreditation serves the interests of lawyers and law school
faculty who dominate the ABA and Council, while injuring consumers of legal services and
saddling law students with high costs. 60
Moreover, in recent years, the ABA has even dictated that law schools enact measures that
conform to controversial ideological views prevalent among the legal elitists, notwithstanding
public opposition and the measures’ irrelevance to ensuring a baseline level of legal education.
The Workgroup Report describes concerns that ABA standards include “ideological mandate[s],”
to “us[e] ‘law schools as vehicles for broader political or social change.’” 61 Of particular concern
is the ABA’s imposition of DEI requirements on American law schools as a condition of
accreditation, 62 which the Attorney General of the United States and Attorneys General of over 20
states (including Florida) regard as illegal. 63 These actions “endanger the perception that [the
ABA] is an impartial and objective professional association” 64 and fuel views that it has become
“more of a political organization.” 65 Citing such concerns, Florida’s Attorney General concluded
that the ABA “cannot be expected to act as a neutral gatekeeper for law school accreditation.” 66
See, e.g., FTC Staff Comment Letter, supra note 40, § III (explaining that an increase in the course work hours
required for CPA exam eligibility can increase the costs of entry into the profession, and therefore serve the “economic
self-interest” of incumbent suppliers); Press Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, FTC Announces Investigation of American
Medical Association (Apr. 13, 1976) (on file with Fed. Trade. Comm’n) (announcing that the FTC had “commenced
an investigation to determine whether the American Medical Association may have illegally restrained the supply of
physicians and health care services through activities relating to . . . accreditation of medical schools and graduate
programs”).
60
Many law students, as consumers of legal education, are likely injured by the ABA’s costly and unnecessary
standards. However, current law students are unlikely to experience the benefits of more flexible accreditation
standards that could lower costs of legal education in the future. Indeed, current law students expect to soon become
lawyers who may reap the benefits from the reduced competition in the supply of legal services resulting from the
ABA’s costly standards. This dynamic likely makes student representation on accreditation bodies insufficient to
incentivize downward pressure on costs. Rather than current students, the harm from excessive accreditation standards
may be concentrated on potential future students, particularly those prospective students who might only go to law
school if unnecessary accreditation standards did not raise tuition or impose barriers limiting the availability of legal
education (e.g., through restrictions on online education or requirements for extensive library facilities).
61
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 22 (quoting Tarlika Nunez-Navarro, Evaluation of the ABA as an Accreditation
Body – Strengths and Limitations, Public Comment, In re Workgroup on the Role of the American Bar Association in
Bar Admission Requirements (May 5, 2025)).
62
See id. at 22–25.
63
Id. at 23–24. The ABA has temporarily suspended Standard 206 pending review of its consistency with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181
(2023), but has not withdrawn the standard. Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 25. Moreover, in Interpretation 2061, the ABA warned that “a constitutional provision or statute that purports to prohibit consideration of . . . race . . . in
admissions or employment decisions is not a justification for a school’s non-compliance with Standard 206.” Id. at 24
(emphasis added) (quoting ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, supra note 11, at 17).
64
Id. at 25 (quoting Letter from William Barr, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, to Talbot
D’Alemberte, President, American Bar Association (Aug. 7, 1992)).
65
Id. at 26 (quoting Is the American Bar Association the Optimal Home Base for the Regulation of Legal Education?,
Barry Currier (June 13, 2025), https://barrycurrier.substack.com/p/is-the-american-bar-association-the); see also John
S. Baker, Seeking Competition in Law School Accreditation,” 11 TEX. REV. OF L. & POL. 385, 387, 388 (2007)
(declaring that “[t]he fact is that the ABA is an ideological organization forcing its ideology into the standards on
accreditation” and that due to “the lack of adequate competition” “the whole process has become very politicized”).
66
Uthmeier Comment supra note 42, at 5.
59

9

Absent its monopoly bolstered by delegated state power, the ABA’s insistence on an
expensive, ideologically tainted legal education might not raise competitive concerns. It could
even offer a useful signal to prospective law students seeking such an experience. If other,
differentiated law school accreditors existed, schools that wished to compete by offering a more
affordable product could seek accreditation from those ABA alternatives. Competitive market
forces could thus spur innovation in the stagnant market for legal education. And competition
between accreditors could discipline any attempts by the ABA to impose costs or ideological
mandates that serve little educational purpose. Even the ABA’s allies, including a former
managing director for the ABA Council, recognize that alternative accreditors could offer valuable
options to “[s]chools that think that the current ABA process is too expensive, too slow, too
burdensome, or too intrusive on matters that should be left to schools to determine.” 67 But no other
law school accreditors exist, and the ABA’s monopoly remains secure—shielded from
competition, in part, by many states’ delegations of authority to it.
IV.

We commend the Florida Supreme Court efforts to promote the entry of
alternative accrediting agencies.

The Court and Workgroup recognized that the ABA’s anticompetitive actions flow from
its protected monopoly position for law school accreditation. The Amendment therefore deftly
attacks this monopoly position by actively encouraging new competitors. The Court designed its
rule change to “create the opportunity for additional entities to carry out an accrediting and
gatekeeping function on behalf of the Court.” 68 The new rule grants such authority to any
accreditor that is either “(1) a programmatic accrediting agency recognized by the United States
Department of Education to accredit programs in legal education that lead to the first professional
degree in law or (2) an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department
of Education to accredit institutions of higher education, provided the accrediting agency is also
approved by the Court.” 69
In his dissent, Justice Labarga appears to misunderstand these changes. 70 The Court has
not “divest[ed]” the ABA of its authority as an accreditor of Florida law schools, nor has it
“replac[ed]” the ABA “with an unknown alternative” accreditor. 71 Instead, the Amendment merely
creates neutral requirements that may allow for additional accreditors to emerge. Currently, the
ABA is the only accreditor that meets either of the Amendment’s requirements. No other
programmatic agencies exist that accredit law schools in Florida. 72 Nor, to our knowledge, have
67
Letter from Barry Currier to Justices of the Supreme Court of Texas, Comments on the Court’s Reliance on the
ABA Law School Accreditation System 4 (June 23, 2025) (on file with Fed. Trade Comm’n). Mr. Currier “wr[o]te as
the former Managing Director of Legal Education and Accreditation at the American Bar Association (2012-2020),
which manages the law school regulatory process for the Council.” Id. at 1.
68
Order, supra note 2, at 2.
69
Id. at 6; see also id. at 17–18 (setting forth revised Rule 4-13.2).
70
See id. at 9–12 (Labarga, J., dissenting). Justice Labarga’s dissent also ignores the anticompetitive harms that flow
from a state expressly protecting the monopoly of an unaccountable private organization, particularly one with the
ABA’s history of anticompetitive actions.
71
Id. at 10, 12.
72
“Programmatic accrediting agency” means “an agency that accredits specific educational programs, including those
that prepare students in specific academic disciplines or for entry into a profession, occupation, or vocation.” 34 C.F.R.
§ 602.3. Examples include the ABA, the Accreditation Council for Pharmacy Education, and the Midwifery Education
Accreditation Council.

10

any institutional accreditors requested the Court’s approval to accredit law schools. 73 So despite
the Amendment, the ABA’s law school monopoly endures, for now. Of course, as noted, the
Court’s actions surely make it less secure. This alone is a small victory. The threat of its monopoly
position facing potential new competitors could dull the zeal with which the ABA forces
ideological, anticompetitive standards on law schools. 74 While a new accreditor would face
substantial challenges, 75 there is reason for hope.
Recent developments may enhance the odds that a new law school accreditor enters. The
Amendment understandably requires that any new accreditor be recognized by the Department of
Education, as the Department’s process attempts to ensure that an accreditor provides legitimate
oversight. Last April, President Trump issued Executive Order 14279, Reforming Accreditation
to Strengthen Higher Education, to “reform our dysfunctional accreditation system so that colleges
and universities focus on delivering high-quality academic programs at a reasonable price.” 76 EO
14279 specifically directed the Department of Education to “resume recognizing new accreditors
to increase competition and accountability in promoting high-quality, high-value academic
programs focused on student outcomes.” 77
The Department of Education has taken a series of actions to implement Executive Order
14279 and promote competition among accreditors. Last May, the Department issued a “Dear
Colleagues” letter to higher education institutions that “re-establishe[d] a simple process” for
switching accreditors, “that will remove unnecessary requirements and barriers to institutional
innovation.” 78 In late 2025, the Department of Education identified “Supporting the Creation of
New Accrediting Agencies” and “Supporting Institutions in Changing Accrediting Agencies” as
two “Absolute Priorities” for its grantmaking. 79 It awarded $14.5 million to fund new accreditors
seeking recognition and institutions seeking to switch accreditors. 80 In February, the Department
reexamined its regulation requiring that “an agency seeking initial recognition . . . must have

73
“Institutional accrediting agency” means “an agency that accredits institutions of higher education.” Id. § 602.3. As
the Workgroup Report explains, such an accreditor grants accreditation to an entire institution, which may offer either
multiple educational programs or a single program. Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 47 n. 162. Historically, the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC) has accredited higher education
institutions in Florida. See SACSCOC, www.sacscoc.org/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2026).
74
U.S. Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Guidelines § 2.4.B at 12 (2023) (“A perceived potential entrant
can . . . prompt current market participants to make investments, expand output, raise wages, increase product quality,
lower product prices, or take other procompetitive actions.”).
75
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 15–17, 44; see also id. at 30–34, 43–44 (discussing various options through
which the Florida Supreme Court might identify and approve alternative accreditors); Uthmeier Comment, supra note
42, at 11.
76
Exec. Order No. 14279, Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education, 90 Fed. Reg. 17529 § 1 (Apr.
23, 2025).
77
Id. § 3(b)(i).
78
Dep’t of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, Changes to the Approval Process for Changing Accrediting
Agencies, at 3 (May 1, 2025), https://www.ed.gov/media/document/dear-colleague-letter-changes-approval-processchanging-accrediting-agencies-may-1-2025-109941.pdf.
79
Dep’t of Education, Applications for New Awards; Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary
Education—Special Projects (FIPSE—SP), 90 Fed. Reg. 50861, 50864 (Nov. 12, 2025).
80
Katherine Knott, The Trump Admin. Put $169M Toward Its Priorities. Here’s Where the Money Went, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Jan. 6, 2026), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/government/2026/01/06/new-accreditors- civicdiscourse-programs-win-fipse-grants.

11

‘[c]onducted accrediting activities . . . for at least two years prior to seeking recognition.’” 81 The
Department explained that the resulting “cumulative four-to-five year timeframe” for recognition
“creates a significant barrier to entry for new institutional accrediting agencies” and clarified that
a variety of “accrediting activities” trigger the start of the two-year period to shorten the delay
required for new entry. 82 Finally, and most notably, the Department initiated a broad negotiated
rulemaking to “[s]implif[y] and streamlin[e] the Department’s regulations for [] recognition and
review of accrediting agencies.” 83 That rulemaking is ongoing, and we look forward to its results.
We commend these important changes, which build on the first Trump Administration’s
efforts to make accreditation of higher education institutions more competitive. In 2019, the
Department of Education revised a rule to enable the big six regional accreditors—institutional
accreditors with monopolies in their specific portions of the country—to compete with one another
by expanding their operations nationwide without approval from the Department. 84 The
Department explained that this was intended to “introduce greater competition and innovation”
and enable “an institution or program to select an accrediting agency that best aligns with the
institution’s mission, program offerings, and student population.” 85 Thus, as things stand, any of
those institutional accreditors could accredit Florida law schools, if they develop law-schoolspecific standards as contemplated by revised Rule 4-13.2.b.
Florida, and several other states, seized the opportunities created by the Department of
Education’s efforts to promote competition among accreditors. Florida has begun requiring its
public colleges and universities to change accreditors at the end of their accreditation cycles. 86 By
disrupting inertia and forcing its institutions to change accreditors, this action provides
opportunities for new institutional accreditors to emerge. North Carolina has imposed a similar
requirement on the University of North Carolina system. 87 In June 2025, a coalition of six state
university systems, including Florida, founded a new accreditor, the Commission for Public Higher
Education (CPHE). CPHE “will create a first-of-its-kind accreditation model for public higher

Dep’t of Education, Regulatory Guidance Relating to the Criteria and Process for Initial Recognition of an
Accrediting Agency, 91 Fed. Reg. 9709, 9709 (Feb. 27, 2026) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 602.12(a)).
82
Id. at 9709–11. The Workgroup described the impediment posed by this regulation. Workgroup Report, supra note
21, at 44.
83
Dep’t of Education, Intent to Establish Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 91 Fed. Reg. 3403, 3404 (Jan. 27, 2026).
The revisions will “emphasiz[e] criteria and standards requirements that effectively focus on student achievement and
outcomes, high educational quality, and high-value programs and remov[e] criteria that are anti-competitive,
discriminatory, or which contribute to credential inflation and escalating tuition costs.” Id.
84
Dep’t of Education, Student Assistance General Provisions, The Secretary’s Recognition of Accrediting Agencies,
The Secretary’s Recognition Procedures for State Agencies, 84 Fed. Reg. 58834, 58852, 58893-94 (Nov. 1, 2019).
An accrediting agency is now merely required to report any expansion in its geographic scope to the Department and
notify the public. Id. The Department recently issued a proposed rule in which it declared that the term “regional” in
describing an accreditor may mislead regarding the quality of institutions accredited by such accreditors, and “strongly
discourage[d]” any accrediting agency from referring to itself as “regional.” Dep’t of Education, Clarification of the
Appropriate Use of Terms “National” and “Regional” by Recognized Accrediting Agencies, 91 Fed. Reg. 7199, 7202
(Feb. 17, 2026).
85
Dep’t of Education, Student Assistance General Provisions, 84 Fed. Reg. at 58893.
86
Fla.
Dep’t
of
Education,
For
College
Administrators:
Institutional
Accreditation
https://www.fldoe.org/schools/higher-ed/fl-college-system /administrators/inst-accr.stml (last visited Mar. 26, 2026).
87
The Univ. of N.C. System, Accreditation, https://www.northcarolina.edu/offices-and-services/academicaffairs/accreditation/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2026).
81

12

education institutions.” 88 It plans to seek recognition as an institutional accreditor from the
Department of Education, 89 and has received letters from ten institutions stating their intention to
seek accreditation by CPHE. 90 Once approved by the Department of Education, CPHE could seek
the Court’s approval to begin accrediting law schools and, potentially, bring to an end the ABA’s
monopoly control of the legal education requirements for aspiring Florida lawyers.
Florida is not alone in working to end its reliance on ABA accreditation to determine
eligibility to take the state bar examination. The Texas Supreme Court recently amended its rules
to eliminate a provision very similar to Florida’s prior rule, and it is developing an approach
through which it plans to approve non-ABA-accredited law schools. 91 That Court also expressed
an interest in utilizing “a multistate accrediting entity other than the ABA should a suitable entity
become available.” 92 The Supreme Courts of Tennessee 93 and Ohio 94 have instituted proceedings
to examine the issue as well. In addition, as the Workgroup Report describes, California already
allows graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to sit for the bar examination, including
graduates of California law schools accredited by the State Bar of California’s Committee of Bar
Examiners. 95 As more states choose to reduce their reliance on ABA accreditation to determine
the adequacy of a bar applicant’s educational qualifications, the opportunities for entry of new law
school accreditors may expand. While it may be a long process, the Amendment and each
analogous state effort weakens the ABA’s hold on its law school accreditation monopoly and
brings us a step closer to genuine competition.
V.

Conclusion

The Court correctly concluded that the ABA should no longer “be the sole gatekeeper
deciding which law schools’ graduates are eligible to sit” for the Florida Bar examination. 96 The
ABA’s standards for accreditation appear to go far beyond what is reasonably necessary to assure
adequate preparation to practice law in Florida. The current rule therefore likely causes Florida
law schools to incur unnecessary expenses, which increases legal education costs and contributes
to the Florida Bar admitting fewer qualified lawyers who could provide needed legal services to
the public.

CPHE, Press Release, Six Public University Systems Establish First-in-Kind Accreditor (June 26, 2025),
https://cphe.org/six-public-university-systems-establish-first-in-kind-accreditor/.
89
CPHE, Frequently Asked Questions, Operations and Timeline, https://cphe.org/frequently-asked-questions/.
90
Josh Moody, 10 Institutions Seek Recognition by New Accreditor, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 13, 2025),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/governance/accreditation/2025/11/13/10-universities-seek-recognition-newaccreditor.
91
Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Texas, Misc. Docket No.
26-9002 (Tex. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2026).
92
Id. ¶ 6(f).
93
In Re: Public Comments on Potential Regulatory Reforms to Increase Access to Quality Legal Representation,
Docket No. ADM2025-01403 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. Sept. 16, 2025).
94
Staff Report, Supreme Court of Ohio Establishes Advisory Committee to Review Law School Accreditation Process,
Court News Ohio (July17,2025), https://www.courtnewsohio.gov/happening/2025/LawSchoolAccreditation_071725
.asp.
95
Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 11–12.
96
Order, supra note 2, at 2.
88

13

The Amendment is an important step in weakening the ABA’s enduring monopoly and
resulting power to impose costly, overly burdensome law school accreditation requirements. It is
no coincidence that in its 1995 lawsuit challenging the ABA’s anticompetitive conduct, the DOJ
stressed that the ABA’s power over law schools comes, in part, from state mandates: “ABA
approval is critical to the successful operation of a law school” because the “bar admission rules
in over 40 states require graduation from an ABA-approved law school in order to satisfy the legal
education requirement for taking the bar examination.” 97 We commend the Florida Supreme Court
for its initiative to disrupt the anticompetitive status quo and applaud its efforts to promote
alternative accreditors for legal education in the United States. We encourage other states to take
similar steps.
Sincerely,
/s/ Brendan Chestnut
Brendan Chestnut
Director
Office of Policy Planning

97

/s/ Daniel Guarnera
Daniel Guarnera
Director
Bureau of Competition

Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 44, at 2; see also Workgroup Report, supra note 21, at 10–11.

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aftc%3A01d247823bc23076. Public record. Not legal advice.