# Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

Matter of E-M-F-S-, et al., Respondents
Decided January 9, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Death threats alone rarely rise to the level of persecution and only do so if they are
objectively credible and issued by a person or persons with the immediate ability to carry
them out.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ernest Bradley, Esquire, Miami, Florida
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; VOLKERT,
Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:

In a decision issued on November 27, 2024, the Immigration Judge
denied the respondents’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against
Sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the
Torture (“CAT”). 1
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A),
1231(b)(3)(A) (2024). The Immigration Judge denied the applications in part
because the respondents had not demonstrated that the death threats they
received rose to the level of persecution. The respondents appealed. 2 We
will dismiss the appeal.

1

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States on Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2025); 8 C.F.R.
1208.18(a) (2020).
2

The respondents are the lead respondent, the male respondent, and their minor children.
The lead respondent and minor children seek asylum as derivative beneficiaries of the male
respondent’s application. INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.3(a)(1) (2025). The lead respondent and minor respondents have not filed separate
applications and are not entitled to assert a derivative claim for withholding of removal and
CAT protection. See Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275, 279–80 (BIA 2007). However,
the Immigration Judge treated the lead respondent as having filed a separate application
for relief and evaluated her claims independently from the male respondent. For the
purposes of this decision, we will treat the lead respondent and male respondent as having
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondents are natives and citizens of Peru. The lead respondent
was a news broadcaster and television host of a well-known Peruvian news
channel, and the male respondent was a producer on her television show.
After former Peruvian President, Pedro Castillo, gave an interview—that
turned hostile—with another reporter at the news station where the lead
respondent and the male respondent both worked, the respondents suffered
threats and harassment by the former president’s supporters. The respondent
was physically pushed and insulted on numerous occasions as she left the
news station. The respondents also received two anonymous written death
threats left on their doorstep, one week apart, one of which was accompanied
by three bullets. The respondents saw a young man running away from their
home after they received the second threat. After the second death threat, the
respondents reported the incident to the police and resigned from their
positions at the news channel. The respondents left Peru approximately
6 months after the second death threat.
The Immigration Judge found that the respondents had not suffered harm
rising to the level of persecution. The Immigration Judge also determined
that the respondents had not established a well-founded fear of future
persecution because although the lead respondent was threatened on account
of her imputed political opinion, their fear of persecution was not objectively
reasonable and the respondents could safely and reasonably relocate within
Peru. Additionally, the Immigration Judge denied the respondents’
application for CAT protection. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS
An applicant seeking asylum bears the burden of demonstrating that he
or she is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2024). See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A). “An applicant can establish refugee status by showing that
he or she either suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448, 450 (BIA 2008); see also
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) (2020). To establish past persecution, the applicant
must demonstrate that he or she (1) suffered harm rising to the level of
persecution, (2) on account of a statutorily protected ground, and
(3) committed by the government or by persons whom the government is
filed separate applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. All
references to the respondent in the singular refer to the lead respondent.
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either unable or unwilling to control. See Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 97,
99–100 (BIA 2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). To establish a well-founded
fear of persecution, an applicant must demonstrate that his or her fear of
persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See
Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196, 198 (BIA 2007), aff’d sub nom. Shao v.
Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
A. Past Persecution
The Immigration Judge determined that the limited physical harm and
two anonymous threats suffered by the respondents were not sufficiently
severe to constitute persecution. 3 The respondents, however, argue that death
threats alone are per se persecution. We review de novo whether harm rises
to the level of persecution. See Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 497
(BIA 2008), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N
Dec. 586 (BIA 2015).
On appeal, the respondents request that we adopt the approach of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concerning death
threats, which they argue is that death threats constitute persecution per se.
See Sorto-Guzman v. Garland, 42 F.4th 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[T]his
Court has held that ‘the threat of death alone constitutes persecution . . . .’”
(quoting Tairou v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 702, 707–08 (4th Cir. 2018))); see also
Chicas-Machado v. Garland, 73 F.4th 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2023);
Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015);
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 126 (4th Cir. 2011). Having
reviewed the Fourth Circuit case law the respondents cite, however, we are
not persuaded that the Fourth Circuit categorically holds that all death threats
qualify as persecution.
While we recognize the Fourth Circuit has stated that death threats
alone constitute persecution, the factual circumstances of these cases
have consistently included more than death threats alone. As the
Second Circuit has noted, “many of the Fourth Circuit’s cases finding
persecution based on death threats involved aggravating circumstances.”
3

Contrary to the respondents’ assertions on appeal, the Immigration Judge did not
conclude that the lead respondent suffered past persecution. Rather, the Immigration Judge
concluded that the lead respondent’s past threats were on account of her imputed political
opinion but that the respondents had not established that they had suffered harm rising to
the level of persecution. See Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1283, 1291
(11th Cir. 2021) (“To establish asylum based on past persecution, the applicant must prove
(1) that [he] was persecuted, and (2) that the persecution was on account of a protected
ground.” (citation omitted)).
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KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130, 136 n.4 (2d Cir. 2024). For example, in
Sorto-Guzman, 42 F.4th at 446, 449–50, the Fourth Circuit found past
persecution where the respondent had been threatened with death, beaten,
nearly sexually assaulted, and robbed by gang members. Likewise, in
Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 947, 949, the Fourth Circuit found the alien
had a well-founded fear of future persecution where the cousin of her
husband had been murdered by gang members and she was twice threatened
with a gun to her head. Finally, in Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 120,
126–27, the Fourth Circuit found persecution where the alien was threatened
by gang members after gang members murdered his cousin and attempted to
murder his uncle.
Moreover, despite statements in some cases that death threats alone are
persecution, the Fourth Circuit has not found all death threats
to be persecution. In Cortez-Mendez v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 205,
209 n.* (4th Cir. 2019), for instance, the Fourth Circuit declined to conclude
that the death threat against the alien constituted persecution where it was
“communicated through two third parties, across country borders, and a
decade before [the alien] sought legal protection.” Thus, we are not
convinced by the respondents’ assertion that the Fourth Circuit takes such a
broad approach as to conclude that death threats constitute persecution per
se. Immigration Judges interpreting Fourth Circuit law should not apply it
in that categorical manner.
Even if the Fourth Circuit’s case law were interpreted to hold that death
threats constitute persecution per se, no other circuit court has concluded that
death threats categorically rise to the level of persecution. In fact, several
circuit courts have observed that death threats alone rarely rise to the level of
persecution. See, e.g., Brizuela v. Garland, 71 F.4th 1087, 1093
(8th Cir. 2023) (holding that threats rarely rise to the level of persecution and
only when they are “so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or
harm” (citation omitted)). The Second Circuit has held that ‘“unfulfilled
threats alone’ rarely constitute persecution” and that “a death threat may be
too speculative or specious—as opposed to imminent or concrete—to
constitute persecution.” KC, 108 F.4th at 135–36 (citation omitted).
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has observed that while ‘“death threats alone can
constitute persecution,’ they constitute ‘persecution in only a small category
of cases.’” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit, in which jurisdiction in this case arises, has held
that “[a] credible death threat by a person who has the immediate ability to
act on it constitutes persecution regardless of whether the threat is
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successfully carried out.” Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1333–34
(11th Cir. 2010); cf. Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1283, 1292
(11th Cir. 2021) (affirming the Board’s determination that a threat by an
officer to make the alien “disappear” during his detention was menacing
but not persecution). This approach is similar to that of the Ninth Circuit,
which has held that for a credible death threat to rise to the level of
persecution, the group issuing the death threat must have “the will or
the ability to carry it out.” Corpeno-Romero v. Garland, 120 F.4th 570,
578 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1083
(9th Cir. 2021)).
Other circuit courts have also focused on imminence or the likelihood that
a threat will be carried out when finding that “credible” death threats
In finding a
can constitute persecution in some circumstances. 4
respondent’s death threats by the MS-13 constituted persecution, the
Fifth Circuit noted that Salvadoran authorities had deemed the threats
“credible and imminent” and numerous Salvadoran officials told
the respondent to flee the country. Argueta Hernandez v. Garland,
87 F.4th 698, 708–09 (5th Cir. 2023), abrogated on other grounds by
Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025). Likewise, in evaluating whether a
respondent’s death threats by Sri Lankan government officials constituted
persecution, the Seventh Circuit evaluated whether the actions of the officials
suggested a likelihood that the threat would be fulfilled.
See
Pathmakanthan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2010). The Third
Circuit has explained that in determining whether a threat is concrete and
menacing so as to constitutes persecution, “[t]he key is not a threat’s
imminence, but rather its likelihood, which is ‘subsumed in the inquiry as to
whether the threat is “concrete.”’” Blanco v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 967 F.3d 304,
312 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Finally, the Tenth Circuit has held that
threats “only rarely” constitute persecution and only when they are
“immediate and menacing.” Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1305
(10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210
(10th Cir. 2003)).
Any analysis of conduct rising to the level of persecution requires the
consideration of “the cumulative effect of the allegedly persecutory
A few circuit courts have stated generally that credible death threats can constitute
persecution in some circumstances but have not explained what renders a threat credible.
See Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510, 516 (1st Cir. 2023) (“We have long held that
‘credible, specific threats can amount to persecution if they are severe
enough’—particularly if they are death threats” (citation omitted)); Japarkulova v. Holder,
615 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that credible death threats can constitute
persecution even absent physical abuse).

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incidents.” De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1008
(11th Cir. 2008); accord Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1218–19
(9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit has held that a threat may constitute
persecution when it is “specific and menacing and . . . accompanied by
evidence of violent confrontations, near-confrontations and vandalism.” Id.
(quoting Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004)). Other
circuit courts have agreed that “past persecution may be found . . . when the
applicant demonstrates repeated threats combined with other forms of severe
mistreatment.” Martinez, 992 F.3d at 1292; accord Hernandez-Mendez v.
Garland, 86 F.4th 482, 487 (1st Cir. 2023); Herrera-Reyes v.
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 952 F.3d 101, 106–08 (3d Cir. 2020). It is necessary to
consider death threats not in isolation but as part of the totality of the
applicant’s past mistreatment. See De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1008. In
some cases, the “severe mistreatment” apart from the death threats may be
the determining factor in establishing past persecution. Martinez, 992 F.3d
at 1292.
The Board has not adopted a specific standard for when a death threat
may constitute persecution. In Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. 163, 169
(BIA 2007), we stated that a threat of forced abortion may rise to persecution
“when a reasonable person would objectively view the threats as genuine,
and the threatened harm, if carried out, would meet or exceed the threshold
level of harm for past persecution.” However, a death threat that is vague,
anonymous, or used merely to intimidate, by itself, does not rise to the level
of severity required to establish persecution. See Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N
Dec. 1157, 1159 (BIA 1998) (holding that an anonymous, painted death
threat on the exterior of a respondent’s house did not rise to the level of
persecution). As noted above, death threats alone rarely rise to the level of
persecution. See KC, 108 F.4th at 135–36; Brizuela, 71 F.4th at 1093;
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028. Consistent with the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits, we hold that they only do so if they are objectively credible and
issued by a person or persons with the immediate ability to carry them out.
An asylum applicant bears the burden to establish that he or she suffered
harm rising to the level of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). In the
case of death threats, the applicant must produce evidence of the ability of
the persecutor to imminently carry out the threat. See Corpeno-Romero,
120 F.4th at 578. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, ‘“it is the conduct of the
persecutor’ that is relevant to evaluating whether past treatment rises to the
level of persecution—not ‘the level of harm’ or ‘subjective suffering’ the
[applicant] experienced.” Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1074
(9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Consequently, the appropriate inquiry is
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not the subjective suffering of the applicant, but the objective treatment by
the alleged persecutor. 5
We have construed the term persecution to include “either a threat to the
life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who
differ in a way regarded as offensive.” See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N
Dec. 211, 222–23 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). While threats to life
and freedom can constitute persecution, an applicant seeking to prove that he
or she suffered harm rising to the level of persecution due to death threats
must show that he or she suffered more than mere harassment or
intimidation; in other words, the applicant must prove objectively that the
threat was not hollow. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231
(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that ‘“persecution’ is an ‘extreme concept,’
requiring ‘more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or
intimidation,’ and that ‘[m]ere harassment does not amount to persecution.’”
(citation omitted)); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Threats
themselves are sometimes hollow and . . . claims of threats are hard to
disprove.”). Thus, the applicant must establish that the purported persecutor
actually possessed the ability to imminently follow through on the threat.
In this case, the respondents received two anonymous written death
threats outside of their home one week apart, one of which was accompanied
by three bullets. While the respondents testified that they saw a young man
running away from their home after they received the second threat, they
have not presented any evidence concerning the individuals who sent these
threats or their ability to imminently carry them out. Cf. Diallo, 596 F.3d at
1333–34 (finding past persecution where a respondent was threatened with
death by the same soldiers who killed his brother and was able to avoid the
same fate by escaping). The respondents have also not shown that the
pushing and insults by unknown individuals outside the news station where
they worked render the threats credible, or that their cumulative harm rises
to the level of persecution. See Martinez, 992 F.3d at 1292 (holding that the
We acknowledge that several circuit courts have stated that a death threat may constitute
persecution if it is “so menacing as . . . to cause actual suffering or harm.” KC, 108 F.4th
at 135 (citation omitted); accord Corpeno-Romero, 120 F.4th at 579; Brizuela, 71 F.4th
at 1093; Blanco, 967 F.3d at 312–13; Matumona, 945 F.3d at 1305; Japarkulova, 615 F.3d
at 701. While we agree that the infliction of suffering or harm is a key component to
establishing past persecution, we caution that the applicant’s subjective harm, by itself, is
insufficient to demonstrate that an alleged persecutor’s death threat constituted
persecution. See Antonio, 58 F.4th at 1074; see also Flores Molina v. Garland,
37 F.4th 626, 636 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating that the “severity of [the respondent’s] injuries
is not dispositive to whether the threats and violence constituted persecution”).

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applicant’s cumulative mistreatment did not rise to the level of persecution
where he was threatened, detained, and released without harm); Sepulveda,
401 F.3d at 1231 (concluding that menacing phone calls and threats to the
applicant, her family members, and other members of the her group did not
rise to level of persecution). Accordingly, we agree with the Immigration
Judge that the respondents have not met their burden to establish that they
suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a),
(b)(1).
Accordingly, the respondents did not suffer past persecution, and the
Immigration Judge properly determined that they are not presumed to have a
well-founded fear of future persecution. See Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec.
at 450; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). As the respondents’ past mistreatment did
not rise to the level of persecution, they “must prove that [they] have reason
to believe [they] will be treated worse, i.e., persecuted, upon return to [their]
native country.” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005).
B. Future Persecution
We affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondents
have not established a well-founded fear of future persecution in Peru. We
agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondents have not established
an objectively reasonable fear of persecution because they have not shown
that supporters of Pedro Castillo have been looking for them or would seek
to harm them upon their return. See Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. at 198.
As found by the Immigration Judge, the respondents continued to live in Peru
unharmed for 6 months following the second threat against them, and Pedro
Castillo was removed from office and jailed in Peru.
Contrary to the respondent’s appellate assertions, the Immigration Judge
considered the country conditions evidence. The Immigration Judge
permissibly found that freedom of expression was generally respected in
Peru and that although journalists reporting on antigovernment protests have
suffered some aggression, the country conditions evidence did not establish
that this aggression against journalists rises above mere harassment and
intimidation to reach the level of persecution.
See Murugan v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 10 F.4th 1185, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that the
Immigration Judge properly weighed the record evidence and determined
that the applicant had not demonstrated that the mistreatment of similarly
situated persons was sufficient to establish a pattern or practice of
persecution). Moreover, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents
were not similarly situated to these journalists because they did not report on
the protests.
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Additionally, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents could
safely and reasonably relocate elsewhere in Peru.
See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (providing that an asylum applicant does not have a
well-founded fear of future persecution if the applicant can avoid persecution
by relocating to another part of the country of removal); see also
Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 805 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that an
applicant who has not suffered past persecution must show that internal
relocation is not reasonable), overruled in part on other grounds by
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). As the respondents do not
meaningfully contest this dispositive finding, we deem this issue waived. See
Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330, 336 n.5 (BIA 2021).
Thus, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the
respondents did not establish that they possess a well-founded fear of
persecution and therefore have not met their burden of proof for asylum. INA
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because the respondents did
not meet their burden of proof for asylum, it follows that they cannot satisfy
the more stringent standard of a clear probability for withholding of
removal. 6 See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232–33; Matter of M-D-C-V-, 28 I&N
Dec. 18, 34 (BIA 2020).
C. Eligibility for CAT Protection
For the reasons stated by the Immigration Judge, we will also affirm the
Immigration Judge’s denial of CAT protection. To qualify for protection
under the CAT, the respondents bear the burden to show that they would
more likely than not suffer torture by, at the instigation of, or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity upon their removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2025); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1) (2020). We agree with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion
that the respondents did not establish that they will more likely than not be
tortured upon their removal with the consent or acquiescence of the Peruvian
government.
In this case, the respondents have not suffered past harm rising to the level
of persecution, much less torture. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i);
1208.18(a)(2). As stated above, the respondents also do not contest the
Immigration Judge’s determination that they could relocate elsewhere in
As the above grounds are dispositive of the respondents’ claims for asylum and
withholding of removal, we need not address the respondents’ remaining arguments related
to this relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
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Peru where they would not likely be tortured.
See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). The respondents have also not sufficiently established
that the supporters of Pedro Castillo would seek them out and attempt to
torture them upon their removal. See Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
500 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that a CAT claim may fail if
the applicants do not establish that they “would be individually and
intentionally singled out for harsh treatment”). Moreover, we agree with the
Immigration Judge that the ineffectiveness of Peruvian police in preventing
attacks against members of the media does not demonstrate that the Peruvian
government would consent or acquiesce to the respondents’ future harm. See
Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 97 F.4th 725, 744 (11th Cir. 2024) (finding that
the police’s inability to apprehend a perpetrator is not a basis for finding
government acquiescence); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Accordingly, we will
dismiss the respondents’ appeal of the Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.

ORDER: The respondents’ appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland
Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper
the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent
shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the
respondent is in violation. See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024);
8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025). Further, any respondent that has been
denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while
an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter
enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be
fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).

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