# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aeoir%3Aa6eff60bc6045dd9

## Record

- **Collection:** Agency decision
- **Document type:** Agency decision

## Text

18 OCAHO no. 1513d
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER

TRAVIS DARNELL AUSTIN,
Complainant,
v.
SPECIALIZED STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Respondent.

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8 U.S.C. § 1324b Proceeding
OCAHO Case No. 2023B00009

Appearances: Travis Darnell Austin, pro se Complainant
Leah Toro, Esq., and Courtney Tedrowe, Esq., for Respondent
AMENDED 1 ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DECISION
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises under the antidiscrimination provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. On November 21, 2022, Complainant Travis Austin
filed a Complaint against Respondent Specialized Staffing Solutions, Inc. (SSSI). Complainant
alleges that SSSI discriminated against him on account of his citizenship status and national origin,
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1); retaliated against him for engaging in § 1324b protected
activity, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5); and engaged in unfair documentary practices, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6). On January 3, 2023, Respondent filed its Answer and
Affirmative Defenses.
A. Complainant’s Adverse Inference Sanctions Related to Discovery Violations
On May 30, 2023, Respondent filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, seeking the production
of ten Requests for Production of Documents and either to compel Complainant’s response to or
deem one Request for Admission to have been admitted. Mot. Compel 4.

The Court issued an Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision on April 30, 2025. This Order
amends the April 30, 2025 Order only to correct typographical errors.

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On October 31, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Respondent’s Motion to
Compel Discovery, directing Complainant to provide responses by November 17, 2023. Austin
v. Specialized Staffing Solutions, Inc., 18 OCAHO no. 1513, 10 (2023). 2
Complainant did not respond to the order, and subsequently Respondent moved for
sanctions related to violations of the Court’s order. Respondent sought sanctions of an adverse
inference on the requests for production of documents not produced, and for several admissions.
Mot. Sanctions 2-3.
Complainant did not respond to this motion either, and on July 31, 2024, the Court issued
an Order on Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions. Austin v. Specialized Staffing, 18 OCAHO no.
1513b (2024). The Court also gave Respondent an opportunity to amend its original Motion for
Summary Decision. Id. at 10.
B. Summary Decision
On September 1, 2023, Respondent filed its initial Motion for Summary Decision and Brief
in Support of Motion for Summary Decision. On August 30, 2024, following the Court’s Order
on Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions, Respondent filed its Amended Motion for Summary
Decision.
Complainant opposed the motion, filing its opposition on September 9, 2024. 3
II.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Following OCAHO precedent, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986) and its subsequent case law, the Court construes the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Monty v. USA2Go Quick Stores, 16

Citations to OCAHO precedents reprinted in bound Volumes 1 through 8 reflect the volume number and the case
number of the particular decision, followed by the specific page in that volume where the decision begins; the pinpoint
citations which follow are thus to the pages, seriatim, of the specific entire volume. Pinpoint citations to OCAHO
precedents subsequent to Volume 8, where the decision has not yet reprinted in a bound volume, are to pages within
the original issuances; the beginning page number of an unbound case will always be 1, and is accordingly omitted
from the citation. Published decisions may be accessed in the Westlaw database “FIM-OCAHO,” or in the LexisNexis
database “OCAHO,” or on the website at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-administrative-hearingofficer-decisions.
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Complainant’s opposition also included belated arguments in opposition to the motion for sanctions, and a second
belated attempt to provide discovery responses responsive to the Court’s 2023 order. As stated in the order granting
the motion for sanctions, the discovery responses were extraordinarily tardy and presented without good cause for the
delay. Complainant’s response to the motion for sanctions is similarly tardy. The General Litigation Order explained
that responses to motions must be filed within 14 days after receiving the motion. Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions
was filed on December 20, 2023. Complainant argued against sanctions in a filing submitted on September 9, 2024,
roughly one year after the motion was sent. Complainant offers no explanation for his failure to respond for nearly a
year. Accordingly, the Court will not consider these arguments in evaluating the present motion for summary decision.

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OCAHO no. 1443c, 5 n.5 (2024); United States v. Four Seasons Earthworks, Inc., 10 OCAHO no.
1150, 3 9201) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).
A. Facts
Respondent is a staffing agency based in Illinois; it employs more than 15 employees.
Compl. 6, Answer ¶¶ 5, 13, Brief Mot. Summ. Dec. 2. Respondent provides temporary
employment to skilled and unskilled laborers in the Chicagoland area. Answer ¶ 13.
Printing Arts 4 is a client of Respondent. Brief Mot. Summ. Dec., Declaration of Samantha
Kruger ¶ 2.
Complainant was born in America and is consequently a United States citizen. Compl. 4.
He asserts that he was a citizen of the “U.S.A. Republic” at the time of the alleged discrimination.5
Id.
Respondent hired Complainant on February 1, 2022. IER Charge 2; Answer ¶ 14; Brief
Mot. Summ. Dec. 2.
As part of Complainant’s onboarding process, Respondent requested that he fill out an I-9
form indicating his eligibility to work in the United States. Answer ¶ 14. The form requires
Complainant to produce a select category of documents confirming his identity, and to attest to his
eligibility to work. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1), (b)(2). The form also requires Respondent to attest
to having seen the identification and to assert that it does not appear to be fraudulent. 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(b)(1)(A).
Complainant submitted a driver’s license issued by the “United States of America
Republic, Province of Missouri.” Answer., Ex. A at 1. He also provided Respondent with a birth
certificate that was issued by the “United States of America Republic.” Id., Ex. A at 2.
Respondent’s Staffing Coordinator Sandra Salinas sent Complainant’s completed Form I-9 and
supporting documents to Respondent File Clerk Doreen Wenzel. Ms. Wenzel accepted the form
and supporting documents. Answer ¶¶ 14-16.

Complainant refers to the company as “Printers Arts,” Compl. 11; Respondent refers to it as “Printing Arts.” Answer
¶ 10. For the sake of clarity, the Court refers to the company as Printing Arts.
4

In the IER Charge attached to his Complaint, Complainant also states that he is “a National of the United States of
America Republic” and that he is “not a United States Citizen[.]” IER Charge 3, Compl. 10. Complainant presents
no evidence that he ever undertook to renounce his United States citizenship, or that the United States government
ever acknowledged his apparent denaturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (loss of nationality by native-born or
naturalized citizens). As described in more detail below, the Court presumes that Complainant continues to be,
notwithstanding his representations, a United States citizen. A contrary inference would put an immediate end to his
claim of citizenship-based employment discrimination under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, in that Complainant offers no
argument or evidence that he meets the other definitions of a “protected individual” under the statute. 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(3).
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On February 24, 2022, Respondent assigned Complainant to work at Printing Arts. Compl.
11; Answer ¶ 10, ¶ 17. There, he worked as a forklift operator on the third shift. Compl. 11;
Answer ¶ 10. He was qualified for the jobs that he assigned. Compl. 8, 10; Answer ¶ 8.
Complainant understood that he was required to work at Printing Arts for 90 days as a
temporary employee before he was eligible to be hired by Printing Arts as a permanent employee.
Compl. 11.
In April 2022, Respondent’s Compliance Officer Samantha Kruger reviewed
Complainant’s application and concluded that the documents he produced did not comply with the
Form I-9 regulations. Answer ¶¶ 19-20.
She determined that Complainant’s driver’s license and birth certificate were not lawfully
issued by a state, county, territory, or municipality of the United States as the regulation requires.
Answer ¶¶ 19-20.
Ms. Kruger contacted Complainant to advise that the documents were invalid for the
purposes of the I-9 form. She asked him to submit I-9 approved documents to continue his
employment. Answer ¶ 21, Compl. 10, 12. Ms. Kruger gave Complainant a copy of the last page
of the Form I-9, which identified the appropriate documents, for reference. Answer ¶ 21.
Complainant responded that his documents were issued “by the U.S.A.
Republic/Morocco.” Compl. 10. He thereafter submitted “a letter from the Internal Revenue
Service . . . rejecting Complainant’s request that the United States of American Republic
Corporation . . . be treated as exempt from taxation; and . . . the Articles of Incorporation of the
United States of America Republic Corporation.” Answer ¶ 22, Compl. 10.
Respondent informed Complainant that the documents were not accepted and asked him
to provide appropriate documentation. Answer ¶ 22. Complainant did not do so. Id.
Respondent fired Complainant shortly thereafter. 6 Answer ¶ 23. Complainant asserts that
he was hired at Printing Arts on or around the same time, but he was terminated after one shift.
Compl. 11.

The date of Complainant’s termination from Respondent and employment at Printing Arts has not been clearly set
out by either party. Complainant asserts that he was hired as a permanent employee at Printing Arts. Compl. 11.
Complainant asserts that he was retaliated against on April 15, 2022; he describes the nature of his retaliation as
Respondent terminating Complainant and advising Printing Arts not to release him from Respondent’s employment
to be hired by Printing Arts. Id. This statement conflicts with Complainant’s account of Respondent requiring
employees to serve at least 90 days as temporary employees before being hired by the company where the temporary
worker was assigned. Id. Complainant does not answer the part of the Complaint questionnaire asking when he was
terminated, but presuming that it was the date he identified as the date of the retaliation, April 15, 2022, it was 50 days
between the date of his assignment at Printing Arts to the date of his termination from both Respondent and Printing
Arts. Complainant asserts that he seeks backpay from Respondent beginning on May 15, 2022 — presuming that this
is the date of his termination, that is 80 days from the date of his first assignment at Printing Arts.
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III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Decision

Under OCAHO’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 28 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2024), an
“Administrative Law Judge shall enter a summary decision for either party if the pleadings,
affidavits, material obtained . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
a party is entitled to summary decision.” 28 C.F.R. § 68.38(c). 7 OCAHO’s regulation on summary
decision mirrors Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), so the Court may “look[] to federal case
law interpreting Rule 56(c) for guidance . . . .” Brown v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 14 OCAHO no.
1379a, 11 (2022) (citing Martinez v. Superior Linen, 10 OCAHO no. 1180, 5 (2023)); see also 28
C.F.R. § 68.1.
“‘An issue of material fact is genuine only if it has a real basis in the record’ and ‘[a]
genuine issue of material fact is material if, under the governing law, it might affect the outcome
of the suit.’” Sharma v. Lattice Semiconductor, 14 OCAHO no. 1362d, 8 (2023) (quoting
Sepahpour v. Unisys, Inc., 3 OCAHO no. 500, 1012, 104 (1993)). The moving party has the
“initial burden of demonstrating both the absence of a material factual issue and that the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . .” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a, at 11 (quoting United
States v. Four Seasons Earthworks, Inc., 10 OCAHO no. 1150, 3 (2012)). At that point, the
“nonmoving party must come forward with contravening evidence to avoid summary resolution.”
Id. However, the “party opposing the motion” for summary decision “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of” its pleadings but must instead “set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue of fact for the hearing.” 28 C.F.R. § 68.38(b); see also United States v. 3679
Com. Place, Inc., 12 OCAHO no. 1296, 4 (2017). Without proof, “the Court will not assume that
the non-moving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a
at 11 (citing Crespo v. Famsa, Inc., 13 OCAHO no. 1337, 3 (2019)). The Court “views all facts
and inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.’” Sharma, 14 OCAHO no.
1362d at 8 (quoting United States v. Primera Enters., 4 OCAHO no. 615, 249, 261 (1994)).
B. Burdens of Proof
To prove a § 1324b discrimination case, complainants “may use direct or circumstantial
evidence . . . .” Sharma, 14 OCAHO no. 1362d, at 9 (citing United States v. Diversified Tech. &
Servs. Of Va., Inc., 9 OCAHO no. 1095, 13 (2003)). “Direct evidence is evidence that, on its face,
establishes discriminatory intent.” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a, at 12. Complainants, however,
rarely present direct evidence. Id. (citing Nguyen v. ADT Eng’g, Inc., 3 OCAHO no. 489, 915,
922 (1993)). For cases relying on circumstantial evidence, OCAHO utilizes the burden shifting
framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, (1973), and
subsequent cases. See Reed v. Dupont Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 13 OCAHO no. 1321a, 3 (2019).
Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, a complainant must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. Then the respondent must “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory
OCAHO Rules of Practice and Procedure, 28 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2024). The rules are also available through OCAHO’s
webpage on the United States Department of Justice’s website. See https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chiefadministrative-hearing-officer-regulations.
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reason for the challenged employment action[.]” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a, at 12. If the
respondent succeeds, then the complainant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
proffered reason is “false and that Respondent intentionally discriminated[.]” Sharma, 14 OCAHO
no. 1362d, at 9.
Complainant may also prove retaliation claims “through direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test.” Ndzerre v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 13 OCAHO no. 1306a, 8-9 (2018) (citing Breda v. Kindred Braintree
Hosp., LLC, 10 OCAHO no. 1202, 7 (2013)).
Similarly, “the facts in a[n unfair documentary practices] case must . . . be examined in the
same manner and with the same approach as is taken in any other intentional discrimination case”
so that “[w]here a case rests on circumstantial evidence . . . the employer must be afforded the
opportunity to respond to a prima facie showing by proffering a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment practice complained of.” United States v. Diversified Tech. & Servs.
of Va., Inc., 9 OCAHO no. 1095, 18 (2003).
C. National Origin Discrimination
“It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate” in hiring or
discharge “because of . . . national origin . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(A). For an employer to
be covered by the national origin discrimination prohibition in 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, the employer
must have between four and fourteen employees during the relevant period. See 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(2)(A) (excepting employers with three or fewer employees from coverage); 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(2)(B) (excepting from coverage claims of national origin discrimination for entities
covered under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer for Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act as one that “has fifteen or more employees[.]”).
D. Citizenship Status Discrimination
It is also “an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate” in hiring or
discharge “because of . . . citizenship status” for protected individuals. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(B).
A protected individual is defined as “a citizen or national of the United States,” or an alien who is
appropriately work authorized, subject to certain exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3). However,
“discrimination because of citizenship status which is otherwise required in order to comply with
law, regulation, or executive order” is excepted from coverage. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C).
To show a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, a complainant must demonstrate:
1) that they belong to a protected class; 2) are qualified for the position held; 3) were discharged,
and 4) were replaced by a person not in the complainant’s protected class, or, alternatively, that
others similarly situated but not belonging to the protected group were treated more favorably.
See, e.g., Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a at 12; Santiglia v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 9 OCAHO no.
1110, 7 (2004); Wilson v. Waste Connections, Inc., 13 OCAHO no. 1315, 4 (2019); Sanchez
Molina v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 11 OCAHO no. 1261, 6 (2015). “To make a comparison
of the plaintiff’s treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show an employee

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who is similarly situated to the [complainant] in all relevant respects[.]” Beal v. Convergys Corp.,
489 Fed. Appx. 421, 423 (11th Cir. 2012).
E. Retaliation
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5), employers are prohibited from intimidating or retaliating
“against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured under [§
1324b] or because the individual intends to file or has filed a charge or complaint, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under [§ 1324b].”
To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, a complainant must show: 1) the complainant
engaged in protected activity under § 1324b; 2) the respondent was aware of the protected activity;
3) the complainant suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) “there was a causal link between
the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct by” the employer. Gig Partners., 14 OCAHO no.
1363c, 7 (2021); see also Shortt v. Dick Clark’s AB Theatre, LLC, 10 OCAHO no. 1130, 6 (2009).
If the Complainant establishes a prima facie case, the Respondent may produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, which the Complainant may show is pretextual. Gig
Partners, 14 OCAHO no. 1363c, at 7.
“To qualify as protected conduct in this forum, the conduct must implicate some right or
privilege specifically secured under § 1324b, or a proceeding under that section.” Paz-Martinez
v. Securitas Security Servs. USA, Inc., 11 OCAHO no. 1260, 6 (2015); see also Patel v. USCIS
Boston, 14 OCAHO no. 1353a, 3-4 (2020) (accord).
“There must be proof that the decisionmaker knew of the protected conduct at the time the
decision was made before an inference of causation may arise.” Rainwater v. Doctor’s Hospice
of Ga., Inc., 12 OCAHO no. 1300, 17 (2017).
“The causal link between the protected activity and the respondent’s employment decision
or intimidating, threatening, or coercive behavior must rise to the level of ‘but for’ causation.” Gig
Partners, 14 OCAHO no. 1363c, at 8. It is strong circumstantial evidence of but for causation if
the adverse action happens soon after the protected action. See Sperandio v. United Parcel Servs.,
15 OCAHO no. 1400e, 9, 13 (2024). “The paradigmatic circumstantial evidence,” for causation
is close “temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse action[.]” Sperandio
v. United Parcel Servs., 15 OCAHO no. 1400e, 9 (2024). Crucially, a complainant must engage
in the protected activity prior to the adverse action. See id. at 13 (finding no retaliation where the
complainant filed an internal complaint with the employer following his discharge).
F. Unfair Documentary Practices
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6), is it an unfair immigration-related employment practice to
request “more or different documents than are required under [§ 1324a(b)] or [to] refus[e] to honor
documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine . . . if made for the purpose
or with intent of discriminating against an individual” on the basis of national origin or citizenship
status.

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“To establish an unfair documentary practice (document abuse) claim under 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(6), the Complainant must set forth two elements: an act and an intent.” Monty v.
USA2GO Quick Stores, 16 OCAHO no. 1443c, 10 (2024) (citing United States v. Mar-Jac Poultry,
Inc., 12 OCAHO no. 1298, 25 (2017)). To satisfy the act requirement, the complainant must show
that there was “a request by the employer for the [Complainant] to produce documents to satisfy
an employer’s obligations under IRCA, or a refusal to accept valid documents related to
employment eligibility verification procedures.” Id. (citing Jarvis v. AK Steel, 7 OCAHO no. 930,
111, 117 (1997), then citing Costigan v. NYNEX, 6 OCAHO no. 918, 1151, 1161 (1999)). To
demonstrate intent, the Complainant must show that the “action[] was undertaken for the purpose
or with the intent of discriminating against the employee on account of the employee’s national
origin or citizenship status.” Mbitaze v. City of Greenbelt, 13 OCAHO no. 1345a, 9-10 (2020);
see also Monty, 16 OCAHO no. 1443c at 10. Complainant must show “only an intent to act
differently based on a protected characteristic,” rather than specifically “an intent to deny
employment[.]” Id. at 11.
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. National Origin Discrimination

The parties do not dispute that Respondent employs 15 or more people, and the statute
under which Complainant has filed suit directs that national origin claims involving those types of
respondents cannot be adjudicated in this forum. See Compl. 6; Answer ¶ 5; 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(2)(B).
Complainant argues that notwithstanding this representation the national origin claim
should not be dismissed, however, he offers no legal authority to support his contention. Finding
no support for these arguments, the Court must grant the Respondent’s motion.
Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is GRANTED as to the national origin-based claim.
B. Citizenship Status Discrimination
As stated above, Complainant has argued that Respondent did not hire him but the facts in
this case, as adduced by both Respondent and Complainant in their pleadings, make clear that
Respondent hired Complainant and that he worked at the temp agency for roughly three months.
See, e.g. Compl. 11 (“As a temporary employee of Specialized Staffing Solution, I was sent to
work for Printers Arts”); Compl. 10 (“I was fired because of my origin and the origin of the
documents issued”); Compl. 16 (“I applied for employment with specialized staffing solutions
February of 2022. I was allowed to work approximately three months before being terminated
…”). For the purposes of this motion, the Court addresses only Respondent’s adverse employment
action of termination, as there is no evidence of a nonselection.
Complainant did not present any direct evidence of citizenship status discrimination. The
Court therefore utilizes a McDonnell-Douglas analysis.

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Addressing the first element of the prima facie case, the Court must determine whether
Complainant is within the statute’s protected class. The statute protects United States citizens,
many lawful permanent residents, asylees, and persons with certain types of visas. Complainant
has argued that he is not a United States citizen, and instead that he is a citizen of the “U.S.A.
Republic” or “U.S.A. Republic/Morocco” or an “American National,” 8 the last title again being
distinct from a national or citizen of the United States. Complainant also asserts that he was born
in America, and in his Complaint form he checked the box for being a United States Citizen or
National.
For the purposes of the motion, the Court presumes that Complainant was a United States
citizen at the time of the alleged discrimination. This conclusion adheres to the available
information which Complainant has submitted concerning his nationality — that he was born in
America — but it also reflects the Court’s obligation to presume the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party in evaluating a motion for summary decision.
A contrary assumption would immediately end Complainant’s claims of employment
discrimination under the statute. 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(1) provides that only “protected individuals”
are within the statute’s ambit. The statute defines protected individuals as: 1) citizens of the United
States, 2) lawful permanent residents, 3) aliens who are lawfully admitted for temporary residence
under 8 U.S.C. §1160(a)(concerning special agricultural workers), 4) lawfully admitted aliens
under 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(concerning the adjustment of status of aliens present in the country
around 1986), and 5) people who are granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. §1157. The statute further
limits the protections of non-U.S. Citizens to persons who applied for naturalization within 6
months of the date that it was first offered to them. 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(3)(B).
Complainant does not plead any of the other categories outside of a U.S. Citizen — he
leaves the sections of the Complaint questionnaire concerning lawful permanent residents and
naturalized persons blank, and he does not respond to the question about visas with a visa status
which provides protection under the Act. Consequently, if the Court were to take Complainant’s
arguments of being a non-U.S. Citizen at face value, he would fail to establish the first element of
the prima facie case and Respondent’s motion would be summarily granted.
The Court declines to do so, in part because of Complainant’s assertion about his place of
birth being in the United States, and also because Complainant presents no evidence of his attempts
to denaturalize. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizens).

The Court need not address the meaning of “American Nationals” or members of the “U.S.A. Republic/Morocco”
in the context of this decision, as Complainant fails to offer evidence demonstrating that he has renounced his U.S.
citizenship, and Complainant also offers no evidence of a comparator outside his protected class. However, the Court
notes that insofar as Complainant makes a claim of being a “sovereign citizen,” similar arguments have been
summarily rejected by the courts, inclusive of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g. Bey v.
State, 847 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases); Bey v. U.S., 2016 U.S. Dist. WL 6238489, *2 (C.D. Ill. Oct.
25, 2016) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has instructed district courts to ‘summarily
reject’ the ‘worn argument that a defendant is sovereign.’”) (internal citations omitted); Lewis v. LVNV Funding,
LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. WL 4280942, *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 24, 2024) (“[S]overeign citizen legal arguments and theories
‘are not valid in the courts of the United States’ and have been overwhelmingly rejected for years as frivolous and
‘indisputably meritless.’”).
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Presuming that Complainant establishes the first element of the prima facie case, the Court
moves to the second element: that Complainant is otherwise qualified for the position he held.
Respondent stipulates to this element, and accordingly the Court determines that it is fulfilled.
Moving to the third element of the prima facie case, the adverse employment action, the
parties do not dispute that Respondent fired Complainant sometime after Ms. Krueger noted that
Complainant’s I-9 documentation was not in compliance with the statute.
Addressing the fourth and final element of the prima facie case, Complainant need
demonstrate that the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. Put more concretely, Complainant should produce evidence that links his
citizenship status with the termination. Complainant attempts to do so by asserting that a
Demetrius Crawford was hired as a forklift operator, however Complainant does not state that Mr.
Crawford is either a U.S. Citizen or non-U.S. Citizen. Complainant offers no evidence as to Mr.
Crawford’s citizenship status at all; accordingly, it is impossible for this Court to infer that
Respondent terminated Complainant because of his citizenship status. Similarly, Complainant
asserts that “individuals with other nationalities were hired instead, even a person with no
recognized nationality was hired,” Compl. 10., however he fails to identify who these people are,
what are their nationalities, and whether they held sufficiently similar jobs to Complainant such
that they might be regarded as comparators.
Separately, Respondent obtained a discovery related sanction from Complainant that
Respondent never hired a Demetrius Crawford. The combination of Complainant’s failure to plead
evidence creating a causal nexus between his citizenship status and his termination, along with the
discovery related sanction, prevent Complainant from establishing this element of his prima facie
case.
Assuming arguendo that Complainant had established a prima facie case, the Respondent
would be obliged to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action, which
Complainant might rebut through an offer of pretext. The Court will explore these issues in the
following section, which also correspond to Complainant’s arguments that Respondent violated
the law in its demand for more or different identification documents for his Form I-9 than he
provided.
C. Unfair Documentary Practices
Complainant has also alleged that Respondent violated 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(6) by
demanding “more or different documents than are required” for the purposes of the Form I-9, or
by “refusing to honor documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine[.]”
More specifically, Complainant argues that by refusing to accept his driver’s license and birth
certificate Respondent acted contrary to the law.
The flaw in this argument is that the regulations make clear that not just any driver’s license
or birth certificate will meet the requirements of the Form I-9, but instead only a “driver’s license
. . . issued by a state . . . or an outlying possession of the United States” is acceptable. 8 C.F.R. §
274a.2(b)(1). Similarly, only birth certificates which are the “original or certified copy of a birth

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certificate issued by a State, county, municipal authority or outlying possession of the United
States bearing an official seal” may be used for the Form I-9. Id.
Complainant’s driver’s license was issued by the “United States of America Republic,
Province of Missouri,” which (unlike the state of Missouri) is not a state of the United States.
Answer, Exhibit A at 1. 9 Similarly, complainant’s birth certificate, which was issued by the
“United States Republic” is deficient because that entity is also not a state, county, municipality,
or outlying possession of the United States. Compl. 15; Answer, Exhibit A at 2.
Respondent’s demand for a document which meets the statutory and regulatory
requirements of the 8 U.S.C. § 1324a regime is not a violation of the statute. Complainant
unambiguously failed to produce the necessary documents, despite multiple requests. This is both
not a violation of 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(6), and it is the Respondent’s legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for the challenged action — it fired Complainant after he failed to comply with its
instructions, which were predicated on what the statute and regulation require.
To this, Complainant makes no offer of pretext.
In that there is no issue of material fact, Respondent’s motion for summary decision is
GRANTED as to both its documentary practices claim and the citizenship-based discrimination
claims.
D. Retaliation
Complainant appears to raise a two-part retaliation claim. First, he alleges that Respondent
engaged in retaliatory discharge, and second, he alleges that Respondent retaliated by refusing to
allow Respondent’s client, Printing Arts, to hire Complainant. Compl. 11. Complainant has not
offered direct evidence of retaliation in either situation, so the Court engages in a McDonnellDouglas analysis.
1. Retaliatory Discharge
The Court presumes for the purposes of the motion that Complainant establishes the
elements of the prima facie case with regard to the adverse employment action of firing
Complainant. Complainant can show that he engaged in protected activity through his complaints
of discrimination, that his employer knew about his complaints, and that he was subject to adverse
employment actions in that he was terminated. Finally, one can infer a causal nexus in that the
adverse employment actions occurred shortly after his complaints.
Complainant encounters difficulties in the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the
challenged actions and the offer of pretext. They are the same as with the claim of discrimination.
Respondent alleges that it terminated Complainant because he failed to produce identification
compliant with the Forms I-9. To this, Complainant has no response, except to argue that the
Complainant attaches to his Complaint a copy of a driver’s license issued by “Province Illinois,” which is also not
a state.

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documents he produced — which were not issued by a state, municipality, or territory of the United
States — should be accepted notwithstanding the statute and regulation’s specific directive that
they not be. As with the prior analysis, Complainant’s arguments do not carry the day, and his
claim on this matter must be dismissed.
2. Retaliation Concerning Printing Arts
Concerning the claim that Respondent failed to release Complainant from his contract to
retaliate against him for his complaints of discrimination, the Court similarly presumes that
Complainant has established a prima facie case. Complainant complained about discrimination,
his employer knew before it fired him, and the temporal proximity between the complaint and
termination creates a causal nexus. Finally, an employer who interferes with an employee’s
attempts to find subsequent employment may create a cognizable adverse employment action. See
Szymanski v. County of Cook, 468 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is well established that
a former employee … can assert a claim that she was given negative references in retaliation for
engaging in protected activity”) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)).
However, as with the prior retaliation claim, Complainant’s claims of retaliation founder
at the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons and offers of pretext. More specifically, Respondent
offers several reasons for the challenged action, and Complainant presents nothing in the way of
pretext to rebut them.
Respondent asserts that it could not have prevented Complainant from taking the job at
Printing Arts because he was fired from SSSI, and so the 90-day trial period which might normally
occur with SSSI employees working at Printing Arts did not apply. Brief Mot. Summ. Dec., Decl.
Kruger ¶ 4. Respondent argues that there was no obligation which prevented Printing Arts from
hiring Complainant at any time. Id. Decl. Kruger ¶ 5. Complainant offers no evidence or argument
reflecting pretext to this claim. 10
In addition to this, the Court notes that Complainant’s 90-day trial period with Respondent
had not elapsed at the time that he was offered the job at Printing Arts, so absent some variation
from this policy he would not normally be released. To the extent that Complainant believes that
Respondent permits its employees to be released from their employment contract with Respondent

The Court notes that both arguments could be true — Respondent could have terminated Complainant, releasing
him to be hired at Printing Arts, and yet nonetheless have told Printing Arts not to hire Complainant for any number
of reasons, inclusive of one with a retaliatory motive. However, the courts are clear that once Respondent has offered
a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the challenged action, the burden of production is on the Complainant to offer
evidence or argument suggesting pretext. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (“The
burden therefore shifted to respondent ‘to produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’ This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve
no credibility assessment.’”) (internal citations omitted); Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389,
394 (7th Cir. 1998) (“the burden first shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging
the plaintiff and then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered explanation is pretextual”).
Complainant had two opportunities to make an argument of pretext — at the original date for the opposition to the
motion for summary decision, and at the deadline for any supplements to the original briefing. He did not do so on
either occasion.
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early in order to take a position at their client companies, he offers no argument or evidence to
support this claim.
Respondent also repeats its contention that it fired Complainant for the legitimate nonretaliatory reason of his failure to produce identification documents complying with the Form I-9,
and so even if it told Printing Arts not to hire Complainant it was based on a lawful reason, rather
than a retaliatory motive. Again, Complainant offers nothing in the way of a response to this claim.
Consequently, the Court finds that Respondent has met its burden of showing that there is
no material question of fact with regard to the retaliation claims, and it GRANTS Respondent’s
motion with regard to these claims.
V.

ORDERS

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision is GRANTED as to all claims. The case is
therefore DISMISSED.
This is a Final Order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated and entered on May 13, 2025.

__________________________________
Honorable John A. Henderson
Administrative Law Judge

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Appeal Information
This order shall become the final agency order unless modified, vacated, or remanded by the
Attorney General. Provisions governing the Attorney General’s review of this order are set forth
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 68. Within sixty days of the entry of an Administrative Law Judge’s final order,
the Attorney General may direct the CAHO to refer any final order to the Attorney General for
review, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 68.55.
Any person aggrieved by the final order has sixty days from the date of entry of the final order to
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred or in which the employer resides or transacts business. See 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(i)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 68.57. A petition for review must conform to the requirements of Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/agency%3Aeoir%3Aa6eff60bc6045dd9. Public record. Not legal advice.