# Littleton v. T-Mobile USA Inc

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · September 19, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991820

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** September 19, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991820

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “individual liability is precluded for violations of the ADA’s employment discrimination provision”
- explaining that the determination of whether an entity is an “employer” under Title VII “concentrate[s] on the degree of control an entity has over the adverse employment decision on which the Title VII suit is based”
- noting the “strong presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

REBA LITTLETON, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
v. } Case No.: 2:23-cv-00045-RDP
}
T-MOBILE USA, INC., et al., }
}
Defendants. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on the Order reassigning this case to the undersigned.
I. Background
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings employment discrimination claims against
Defendants T-Mobile USA, Inc., Timotheus Hoettges, Mike Sievert, Deutsche Telekom AG, and
John Legere. (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(“PDA”). (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and received a Notice of Right to Sue on October 13, 2022.
(Id. at 8, 11-12). In her Complaint, she seeks:
punitive damage[s of] $500 million due to T-Mobile allowing other employees to
go through my HIPPA protected data, for T-Mobile allowing me to get assaulted[1]
at work by a conspiracy with Dana Taylor, et al., and for T-Mobile to afford me
compensatory damages as well as stock awards for forcing me to give up my stock
shares under duress.
(Id. at 9).

1 The alleged assault occurred on October 5th, 2018, but the Complaint was not filed until over four years
later on January 12, 2023. (Id. at 7).
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her prior employment with T-Mobile. She claims that she
was discriminated against based on her gender and race. (Id. at 7). She contends that she was
denied raises and promotions and was taunted and harassed because of her pregnancy and
disability. (Id.). With the exception of an alleged 2018 assault, the Complaint does not reference
the dates on which certain events or actions took place. However, the court notes that many of the

same assertions Plaintiff makes in her Complaint in this case appear to also have been the subject
of a prior lawsuit she filed against T-Mobile and others. (Compare Doc. # 1 with Littleton v. T-
Mobile/Sprint, et al., N.D. Ala. Case No. 2:20-cv-01671-ACA, Doc. # 1-6).
II. Procedural History
After filing her Complaint on January 12, 2023, Plaintiff did not serve any of the defendants
with the summons and complaint within the 90-day time limit provided by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m). (Doc. # 3). The Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed pursuant to that Rule. (Id.). When Plaintiff responded, she detailed efforts
to serve Defendants and indicated that she intended to make additional efforts to serve them. (Doc.

# 5). On May 8, 2023, the Magistrate Judge extended Plaintiff’s service deadline to May 26, 2023,
and ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing by May 30, 2023, if she had not been able to serve
Defendants. (Doc. # 7). On May 16, 2023, the Clerk of Court issued summonses to each named
Defendant and provided them to Plaintiff for service. (Doc. # 8). The form summons contains a
section requiring “Defendant’s name and address.” (See, e.g., Doc. # 8). Although Plaintiff
requested summonses directed to each named Defendant, she apparently did not request the
issuance of a summons addressed to T-Mobile in care of any agent authorized to receive service
of process. (Id.).
On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff informed the court that she was having additional difficulties
serving some of the defendants and requested additional time to serve them. (Doc. # 10). The
Magistrate Judge again extended Plaintiff’s time limit for service to the extent that that any service
made by June 22, 2023 would be considered timely. (Doc. # 11). The Magistrate Judge also ordered
Plaintiff to file a status report regarding her efforts to serve Defendants. (Id.).

On July 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a status report stating that she had served all Defendants
except one and requesting permission to serve the remaining Defendant, John Legere, by regular
USPS mail because, she asserted, he was avoiding service. (Doc. # 13). The Magistrate Judge
denied the request for service by regular mail as inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(e) and ordered Plaintiff to submit proof of service by September 11, 2023. (Doc. # 15).
On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a status report claiming that Defendants Sievert,
T-Mobile USA, and Legere had all been “served numerous times,” but that Defendants Deutsche
Telekom AG and Hoettges had not yet been served due to various issues with international service.
(Doc. # 16). Plaintiff’s status report asserted that T-Mobile was served (1) on May 25, 2023 via

USPS First Class Mail at a Bellevue, Washington address, (2) on April 10, 2023 via USPS (with
a tracking number) at a Birmingham, Alabama address, and (3) through its attorney Lindsey Kolar
on January 18, 2023, at a Bellevue, Washington address. (Id. at 2, 4, 8-32, 103-05). Plaintiff states
that Defendant Sievert has been served by USPS First Class Mail “by Certified status” at a
Bellevue, Washington address. (Id. at 3, 42-67). Plaintiff contends that Defendants John Legere
was served on June 6, 2023, via USPS mail (with a tracking number) at a New York, New York
address. (Id. at 4, 76-102). Plaintiff also details unsuccessful attempts to serve Defendants
Deutsche Telekom AG and Hoettges. (Id. at 2-3). Based on these efforts, Plaintiff requests a default
judgment against all Defendants. (Id. at 4).2
III. Applicable Law
“The first principle governing the jurisdiction of the federal courts is that federal courts are
courts of limited rather than general jurisdiction.” Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir.

2003). Therefore, a federal court is always obligated to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte before reaching the merits of any claim. Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d
1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The court recognizes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se, that filings by pro se litigants are to
be more leniently construed, and that such litigants are “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). However, notions of

leniency do not excuse a plaintiff from compliance with threshold requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1998). “[O]nce a
pro se [ ] litigant is in court, he[ or she] is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon, 863 F.2d at 837; see also Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490
F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). (“[A]lthough we are to give liberal construction to
the pleadings of pro se litigants, ‘we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural
rules.’”) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)).

2 Interestingly, in her Certification of Proof of Service, the only summons that it appears Plaintiff attempted
to serve with the Complaint was the one directed to “T-Mobile USA, Inc., 12920 South East 38th Street, Bellevue WA
98006.” (Doc. # 16 at 25, 28, 62, 65, 97, 100).
“Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement: a court lacks jurisdiction over the person
of a defendant when that defendant has not been served.” Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v.
Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the
complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss

the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Notably, a plaintiff’s unfamiliarity of the procedural rules is not an
excuse for insufficiency of service. See Nelson v. Barden, 145 F. App’x 303, 311 n. 10 (11th Cir.
2005).
Furthermore, a complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009).
As noted above, the Magistrate Judge allowed Plaintiff two extensions to time to serve
Defendants. And, despite what appear to be her diligent efforts, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient
proof to establish that she has served any Defendant consistent with the requirements of Rule 4.
And, in any event, regardless of whether Plaintiff adequately served Defendants, her Complaint
fails to state a claim against certain of the Defendants.
A. The Individual Defendants
The three individual defendants named in Plaintiff’s Complaint for Employment
Discrimination are (1) Timotheus Hoettges, who Plaintiff identifies as the CEO of Deutsche
Telecom AG; (2) Mike Sievert, who Plaintiff identifies as the President and CEO of T-Mobile;
and (3) John Legere, who Plaintiff identifies as the former CEO of T-Mobile. (Doc. # 1 at 2-4).
However, whether these individual defendants were served is not the most pressing issue before
the court.
Rather, Title VII, the PDA, and the ADA do not permit individual liability in employment

discrimination cases; instead, relief is available only against an employer. Hinson v. Clinch Cnty.,
Ga. Bd. of Edu., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The relief granted under Title VII is against
the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.”)3
(citation omitted); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (individuals “cannot be
held liable under [] Title VII”); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting
that “individual liability is precluded for violations of the ADA’s employment discrimination
provision”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims against the individual
Defendant are due to be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.4
B. Deutsche Telekom AG

Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge against Defendant T-Mobile and in her Complaint she
references T-Mobile as her employer. (Doc. # 1 at 5, 7, 10-12). Nonetheless, she has also named
Deutsche Telekom AG as a Defendant in this action. (Id. at 3). Apparently, Deutsche Telekom
now holds a majority stake in T-Mobile, but that was acquired after the filing of Plaintiff’s EEOC
charge and after the filing of her judicial complaint.5

3 In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the PDA, which specifically provided that the prohibition
against sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k)); see also Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

4 This makes moot any issues about proper service on the Individual Defendants.

5 https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/deutsche-telekom-reaches-majority-stake-t-mobile-us-
ceo-2023-04-05/ (last visited September 14, 2023).
Generally, to bring an employment discrimination claim under Title VII, the PDA, or the
ADA, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that a defendant was her employer or
prospective employer. See MackMuhammad v. Cagle’s Inc, 379 F. App’x 801, 804 (11th Cir.
2010) (“[R]elief under Title VII is available against only the employer[.]”) (citation omitted);
Udoinyion v. The Guardian Security, 440 F. App’x 731, 734 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[B]oth Title VII

and the ADA require that suits be brought only against employer-entities [].”).
An entity is not considered an employer in the employment discrimination context unless
it exercised control over the alleged adverse employment decisions on which the suit is based. See
Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
the determination of whether an entity is an “employer” under Title VII “concentrate[s] on the
degree of control an entity has over the adverse employment decision on which the Title VII suit
is based”); see also Brown v. Fred’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting the “strong
presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees”) (citing
Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Flowers Indus. Inc., 814

F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1987)). Absent special circumstances, a parent company is not liable for
discrimination by its subsidiary. See Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1244-45; Brown, 494 F.3d at 739.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged in any manner how Deutsche Telekom was involved in her
employment. And, other than naming Deutsche Telekom as a Defendant, Plaintiff has not alleged
any unlawful actions taken by it. (Doc. # 1). Moreover, it appears that Deutsche Telekom only
became a majority stakeholder in T-Mobile as of April 2023.6

6 https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/deutsche-telekom-reaches-majority-stake-t-mobile-us-
ceo-2023-04-05/ (last visited September 14, 2023).
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Deutsche Telekom are due to be dismissed
because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Deutsche Telekom was her employer and/or that
Deutsche Telekom exercised control over the discrimination alleged by Plaintiff. (Doc. # 1).
C. T-Mobile
Plaintiff has alleged that T-Mobile was her employer. (Id.). Therefore, the question before

this court is whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that she properly served T-Mobile under Rule 4.
Rule 4(h)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for serving a domestic
corporation, partnership or association. The Rule states that the entity “must be served [] in a
judicial district of the United States: A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an
individual; or B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). Rule 4(e)(1)(C), which applies to corporations,
provides that service may be effected by “delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Alabama law provides for service of process

by certified mail. Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(B). But, Alabama Rule 4(c)(6) provides that service of
process on a corporation shall be made “by serving an officer, a partner (other than a limited
partner), a managing or general agent, or any agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(6).
In her Certification of Proof of Service, Plaintiff claims that she has served T-Mobile twice.
First, she states that she sent the Summons and Complaint via “USPS First Class Mail” “at the
office of record.” (Doc. # 16 at 2). Next, she states that she sent the Summons and Complaint via
“a USPS with tracking number 92148902358909000020689325” and asserts that it was “left with
authoritative individual manning the T-Mobile front desk.” (Id.). Plaintiff also states that she
served the “Attorney of Record for Defendant T-Mobile et al., Lindsey Kolar [] at her Washington
office address [] via USPS mail with Tracking Number 9400111899562181210411.” (Id. at 4).
The problem is that, even accepting as true that a copy of the summons and complaint were
delivered to T-Mobile at its office (and to one of its attorneys at the attorney’s office), there is no
evidence that any service documents were received by anyone authorized to accept service on

behalf of T-Mobile. There are no return of service cards signed by anyone authorized to accept
service on behalf of T-Mobile on the court’s docket. Nor is there an affidavit completed by a person
serving process indicating that T-Mobile was properly served with the summons and complaint.
Plaintiff’s method of service was ineffective because (1) the summons directed to T-Mobile was
not addressed to or served on T-Mobile’s president, any vice president, or its registered agent, (2)
it was not addressed to or served on any other agent authorized to receive service of process for T-
Mobile, and (3) it was not personally served on an officer of T-Mobile, a managing or general
agent of T-Mobile, or any other agent authorized to receive service of process for T-Mobile. (Doc.
# 16 at 25, 28, 62, 65, 97, 100).7

Because a summons directed to T-Mobile and a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint was not
addressed to or served on T-Mobile through an agent authorized to receive service of process on
its behalf, Plaintiff’s service of process was ineffective under Rule 4(c)(1) of the Alabama Rules
of Civil Procedure and therefore ineffective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1). See
Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1); see also Heaton v. Geico Ins. Co. of Alabama, 2015 WL 7424322, at *3
(S.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 7430799 (S.D. Ala.
Nov. 20, 2015) (“service on [a corporate] entity would not be proper under Alabama law because

7 The form summons contains a section requiring “Defendant’s name and address.” (See, e.g., Doc. # 8).
Although Plaintiffs requested summonses directed to each named Defendant (Id.), Plaintiff apparently did not request
the issuance of a summons addressed to T-Mobile in care of its president, any vice president, registered agent, nor any
other agent authorized to receive service of process. (Id.).
the certified mail was not addressed to a human being affiliated with [the entity] as an officer,
partner or agent as described in Rule 4(c)(6) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against T-Mobile are due to be dismissed without prejudice for
insufficient service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5).
D. Default Judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the entry of a default if a defendant fails
to timely respond to a complaint seeking affirmative relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, before
directing the clerk to enter a default, the court must first determine that a plaintiff has properly
effected service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that service
occurred, and if a plaintiff has failed to properly serve the defendant with process, then the plaintiff
is not entitled to the entry of a default. See Onpower, Inc. v. United Power Line Contractors, LLC,
2016 WL 9049315, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2016) (“While Defendants have failed to file any
documents in this case or otherwise defend this action as required by Rule 55(a), absent a showing
by Plaintiffs that they properly effectuated service of process, an entry of default by the Clerk is

not appropriate against Defendant.”); 10A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2682 (4th
ed. 2020) (“Before a default can be entered, the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction and
jurisdiction over the party against whom the judgment is sought, which also means that the party
must have been effectively served with process.”).
Because, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that she properly served T-
Mobile, her request for default or default judgment is due to be denied. Moreover, “a default
judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against
both the Individual Defendants and against Deutsche Telekom AG. Therefore, Plaintiff's request
for default judgment against those Defendants is due to be denied for that additional reason.
E. Motion for Reassignment Back to the Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff has also requested that this case be reassigned back to the Magistrate Judge. (Doc.
# 17). Normally such an assignment would require the consent of all parties. However, because
her Complaint is due to be dismissed, Plaintiff's request is due to be denied as moot.
IV. Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint is due to be dismissed. A separate
order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this September 19, 2023.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991820. Public record. Not legal advice.