# Fletcher v. City of Madison

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · February 17, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991539

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** February 17, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
CHERELLE FLETCHER, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 5:21-cv-1432-LCB
)
CITY OF MADISON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION & ORDER

On October 27, 2019, in the parking lot of a shopping center in Madison,
Alabama, the Fletcher family had an altercation with police officers that, tragically,
ended with the death of the father, Dana Fletcher. Fletcher’s wife, Cherelle, and his
minor daughter, V.F., have brought this action against the City of Madison; the
mayor of Madison, Paul Finley; the former chief of the Madison Police Department,
David Jernigan; seven Madison City Councilmembers;1 and five police officers.2
(Doc. 58 at 1−7.)
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 60 and 62) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 65) are now before the Court. After
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint (Doc. 1), Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss

1 These individuals are Maura Wroblewski, Steve Smith, Teddy Powell, Greg Shaw, Tommy
Overcash, Gerald Clark, and John Seifert (collectively, “the Councilmembers”).
2 Plaintiffs identify the police officers as John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, John Doe 4, and
Jane Doe 5.
(Docs. 11 and 13), arguing, among other things, that Plaintiffs had filed a shotgun
pleading. Plaintiffs then filed their First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19), before the

Court ruled on Defendants’ Motions. The Court then dismissed Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading and instructed Plaintiffs to ensure their
Second Amended Complaint satisfied the pleading standards of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to do so
and that it would be futile to allow them to file a Third Amended Complaint. The
Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 60 and 62), DENIES
Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 65), and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. 58).
I. BACKGROUND
The Court pulls the following facts from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 58.) At this stage in the litigation, the district court must accept a
complaint’s factual assertions as true and construe those assertions in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246
(11th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges it was late afternoon on
October 27, 2019, when Cherelle Fletcher was working out at the Planet Fitness
located at 8050 Hwy 72 W, Madison, Alabama 35738. (Doc. 58 at 7.) Her vehicle

was parked in the lot, and her husband, Dana Fletcher, was sitting in the passenger
seat, and their eight-year-old daughter, V.F., was seated behind him. (Doc. 58 at 7.)
Fletcher and V.F. were waiting on Cherelle, so Fletcher had his door open to allow

for air circulation. (Doc. 58 at 7.)
After Cherelle finished her workout, she walked across the parking lot and
climbed into the driver’s seat of the vehicle. (Doc. 58 at 8.) Shortly thereafter, a

Madison Police Department (“MPD”) patrol car pulled up. (Doc. 58 at 8.) At the
time, the Fletcher family was still just sitting in the vehicle. (Doc. 58 at 8.) A police
officer (“Officer 1”) exited the patrol car and approached the vehicle, walking to the
passenger side. (Doc. 58 at 8.) It was approximately 4:43 P.M. (Doc. 58 at 9.)

Fletcher ignored Officer 1’s presence. (Doc. 58 at 9.) Cherelle asked Officer 1 to
come talk to her, but he refused to do so. (Doc. 58 at 9.) Officer 1 appeared to be
angry, and around 4:44 P.M., he grabbed Fletcher’s arm. (Doc. 58 at 10.) Officer 1

then radioed for backup. (Doc. 58 at 10.) At that time, after telling Officer 1 that he
had done nothing wrong, Fletcher tried to ask Officer 1 why Officer 1 was there.
(Doc. 58 at 10.) Officer 1 did not supply an explanation, and he then drew his firearm
and aimed it at Fletcher’s head. (Doc. 58 at 10.) V.F. saw this and began screaming

hysterically. (Doc. 58 at 10.)
According to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, at approximately 4:47
P.M., a second police officer arrived on the scene (“Officer 2”). (Doc. 58 at 11.) He

approached the vehicle with his firearm drawn. (Doc. 58 at 11.) Cherelle became
frightened, so she locked her door. (Doc. 58 at 11.) Officer 2 aimed his firearm at
Cherelle’s head, yelling at her to open the door. (Doc. 58 at 11.) Officer 1 yelled at

Cherelle to keep her hands up and visible to him. (Doc. 58 at 11.)
A minute later, three more police officers showed up (“Officer 3,” “Officer
4,” and “Officer 5”). (Doc. 58 at 11.) Officer 3 brought a K-9 Officer. (Doc. 58 at

11.) Though no Officer gave a reason for his/her presence, the Officers began
ordering Fletcher out of the vehicle. (Doc. 58 at 12.) Officer 3 commanded the K-9
Officer to attack Fletcher while he was still seated in the vehicle. (Doc. 58 at 12.)
The K-9 Officer began mauling and biting Fletcher, who tried to restrain and hold

off the dog. (Doc. 58 at 12.) Officer 3 then pulled back the K-9 Officer and began
personally beating Fletcher. (Doc. 58 at 12.) Simultaneously, Officer 2 smashed the
driver side window, unlocked the door, and yanked Cherelle and V.F. out of the

vehicle and onto the pavement with the broken glass, injuring them in the process.
(Doc. 58 at 12.)
Plaintiffs allege that Officer 1 then moved to the driver side and used a Taser
on Fletcher, incapacitating him. (Doc. 58 at 12.) As Fletcher fell to the ground,

Officer 3 discharged his firearm. (Doc. 58 at 13.) One or more bullets hit Fletcher.
(Doc. 58 at 13.) Fletcher moaned and clutched himself with his right arm. (Doc. 58
at 13.) Officer 4 then aimed his firearm at Fletcher and discharged it. (Doc. 58 at
13.) Following the shots, none of the Officers rendered aid to Fletcher, and he died
on the scene. (Doc. 58 at 13−14.)

The Officers then seized Cherelle’s vehicle and took her cell phone. (Doc. 58
at 14.) They also threatened to take Cherelle to an undisclosed location. (Doc. 58 at
14.)

On October 26, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this Court. (Doc. 1.)
On November 23, 2021, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss, arguing, in part, that
Plaintiffs’ Complaint was a shotgun pleading. (Docs. 11 and 13). On December 14,
2021, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 19.) On April 14, 2022,

the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, informing
them that they needed to correct their shotgun pleading deficiencies. (Doc. 57.) On
April 29, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 58.) The

Second Amended Complaint is fifty-three pages long, and Plaintiffs bring twenty-
four counts:
Count 1. Declaratory Judgment that Defendants’ Invocation of the
Eleventh Circuit’s Formulation of Qualified Immunity is
Unconstitutional as Applied to this Case;
Count 2. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure at 4:44 P.M. against Officer 1;
Count 3. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of
unlawful seizure at 4:44 P.M. against Officer 1;
Count 4. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure at 4:44-4:47 P.M. against Officer 1;
Count 5. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure at 4:44-4:47 P.M. against Officer 1;
Count 6. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of
unlawful seizure at 4:44-4:47 P.M. against Officer 1;
Count 7. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of
unlawful seizure at 4:47 P.M. against Officers 1 and 2;
Count 8. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure against Officers 1 and 3;
Count 9. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure at 4:49 P.M. against Officer 1;
Count 10. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure against Officers 1 and 4;
Count 11. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of excessive
force against Officers 1, 3, and 4;
Count 12. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of
excessive force against Officer 2;
Count 13. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of failure to
protect against Officers 2, 3, 4, and 5;
Count 14. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of failure to
protect against Officers 1, 2, 4, and 5;
Count 15. Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of failure to
protect against Officers 1, 2, 4, and 5;
Count 16. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of
unlawful detention and false imprisonment against Officers 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5;
Count 17. Plaintiff Estate brings an Alabama wrongful death claim against
Officers 1, 3, and 4;
Count 18. All Plaintiffs bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal liability claim
against City of Madison;
Count 19. All Plaintiffs bring an Alabama outrage/intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim against Officers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5;
Count 20. Plaintiff Estate brings an Alabama assault and battery claim
against Officers 1, 3, and 4;
Count 21. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring Alabama assault and battery
claims against Officers 1 and 2;
Count 22. Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring Alabama false arrest/false
imprisonment claims against Officers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5;
Count 23. All Plaintiffs bring an Alabama municipal liability claim against
the City of Madison; and
Count 24. All Plaintiffs bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for
attorney’s fees.
(Doc. 58 at 25−52.)3 Defendants City of Madison, Finley, Jernigan, and the
Councilmembers filed Motions to Dismiss, reraising the argument that Plaintiffs

filed a shotgun pleading. (Doc. 60 and Doc. 62). Following those Motions, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 65).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the general standard
for pleading civil claims in federal court. E.g., Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708
(11th Cir. 2010). The Rule requires that a complaint contains “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not demand “detailed factual allegations,” but it does require
something beyond “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rule

10(b) further requires that a plaintiff “state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs,
each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(b). “If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.” Id.

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss a complaint that fails
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts, accepted as

3 Plaintiffs do not bring any claims against Defendants Finley, Jernigan, or the Councilmembers.
true, to assert a facially plausible claim for relief. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp.,
693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). A claim is facially plausible

when it raises “‘a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
defendant’s liability.” Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Allegations “merely consistent” with a

defendant’s liability are insufficient to push “claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 570. When reviewing a motion to dismiss,
the district court accepts a complaint’s factual assertions as true and construes those
assertions in the light most favorable to the pleader. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase &

Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Shotgun Pleading

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often
disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit in Weiland
stated:

The purpose of these rules is self-evident, to require the pleader to present his
claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is
claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts
support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon
which relief can be granted, and at trial, the court can determine that evidence
which is relevant and that which is not.
Id. (internal citation omitted). “Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance
for shotgun pleadings,” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th

Cir. 2018), and district courts may dismiss complaints with prejudice on shotgun
pleading grounds, provided that the plaintiff has had at least one opportunity to
“remedy such deficiencies.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358

(11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
In Weiland, the Eleventh Circuit identified four categories wherein shotgun
pleadings generally fall: (1) where the complaint contains “multiple counts where
each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts”; (2) where the complaint

is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to
any particular cause of action”; (3) where the complaint fails to separate each cause
of action or claim for relief into a separate count; and (4) where the complaint asserts

multiple claims against multiple defendants “without specifying which of the
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions.” 792 F.3d at 1322−23. “The
unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree
or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the

claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
Here, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint violates Rules 8(a)(2) and
10(b). While Plaintiffs adequately describe the interactions that allegedly occurred

between the Fletcher family and the MPD Officers, they interweave their factual
allegations with irrelevant information and conclusory statements, and they fail to
properly connect their factual allegations to their claims against Defendants.

Moreover, the Complaint does not sufficiently separate Plaintiffs’ claims into
different counts, and it thus lacks short, plain statements showing that Plaintiffs are
entitled to relief. Specifically, the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint falls into

the last three Weiland categories for shotgun pleadings.
1. Second Weiland Category
The facts section in the Second Amended Complaint is rife with conclusory
allegations that are mixed haphazardly with facts which, at a minimum, makes it

difficult for the Court to determine what facts support what claims for relief and
whether Plaintiffs have stated claims upon which relief can be granted. For instance,
in Paragraph 44, Plaintiffs write that the MPD, the Madison County Sheriff’s

Department (“MCSO”), and the Huntsville Police Department (“HPD”) have a
“reputation for working together, for harassing people, and for being overly
aggressive” without citing any factual bases to support such conclusions. (Doc. 58
at 9.) Of note, the City of Huntsville and the MCSO are non-parties. And yet,

Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraph 44 in Counts 4, 5, 6, 9, 19, 20, and 24 while failing
to properly connect the statements in the Paragraph to each claim. As a result, those
seven counts include information immaterial to the underlying causes of action. In

Count 4, for example, Plaintiff Estate brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of unlawful
seizure from 4:44 to 4:47 P.M. against Officer 1. Count 4 incorporates the factual
allegations related to Officer 1 arriving at Cherelle’s vehicle, approaching Fletcher,

and eventually grabbing his arm. (Doc. 58 at 7−10.) But Plaintiffs fail to explain
how the extraneous references to the HPD and the MCSO connect to the unlawful
seizure claim against Officer 1 for his actions during that three-minute period.

Similarly, Paragraph 48 alleges that Officer 1 radioed for backup “to increase
the intimidation factor caused by a larger police presence and to apply even more
violent and depraved means to coerce the Fletchers’ compliance and cooperation.”
(Doc. 58 at 10.) Beyond the act of calling for backup itself, Plaintiffs do not make

any factual allegations that support the conclusion that Officer 1’s purpose for
radioing for backup was to “increase the intimidation factor” and “apply even more
violent and depraved means.” Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraph 48 in Counts 7, 8, 10,

13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 24, while, again, failing to properly connect
the Paragraph’s allegations to each claim.
For instance, in Count 7, Plaintiffs Cherelle and V.F. bring a § 1983 claim of
unlawful seizure at 4:47 PM against Officers 1 and 2. The factual allegations

incorporated into Count 7 describe Officer 2 arriving on the scene, Cherelle locking
her door, and Officer 2 pointing his firearm at Cherelle and yelling at her to open the
door. (Doc. 58 at 11.) Plaintiffs state that Officer 2’s “misconduct was carried out at

the instigation” of Officer 1. (Doc. 58 at 32.) In other words, Plaintiffs try to frame
their “conclusion” regarding Officer 1’s reasons behind calling for backup as the
cause of Officer 2’s actions at the scene, which is, at best, confusing, and, at worst,

misleading for Defendants. As an aside, none of the factual allegations incorporated
in Count 7 describe any interaction between Officer 2 and V.F. On the whole, the
problems with Count 7 make it difficult, if not impossible, for Defendants to discern

what Plaintiffs are claiming and frame a responsive pleading.
Lastly, Plaintiffs devote a chunk of their Second Amended Complaint to what
appears to be commentary on the qualified immunity doctrine and altercations
between citizens and law enforcement in the general area surrounding Madison,

Alabama. Paragraphs 80 to 92 in the facts section further discuss the unrelated
entities of the HPD and the MCSO. (Doc. 58 at 15−16.) Plaintiffs attempt to group
the MPD, MCSO, and HPD by coining them “the Sister Agencies,” claiming that

there are personnel, such as Defendant Jernigan, who have worked at more than one
entity (albeit, not at the same time) and that the entities train at the same facilities
and have the same training curricula. (Doc. 58 at 15). Regardless of whether all that
is true, Plaintiffs do not allege that the MPD, HPD, and MCSO operate

interdependently or share leadership. As such, it is vague and potentially deceptive
for Plaintiffs to state that the three entities “consider themselves one body in many
respects.” (Doc. 58 at 16.) Plaintiffs go on to describe alleged uses of excessive force

by HPD officers while failing to link their significance to alleged constitutional
violations by MPD officers. (Doc. 58 15−16.) But Plaintiffs incorporate these
paragraphs into their claims against the City of Madison: Count 18 is a § 1983

municipality claim, and Count 23 is state law municipality claim. (Doc. 58 at 43,
50.) And the issues with Counts 18 and 23 do not end there: the paragraphs
incorporated in those Counts do not include any factual allegations of the altercation

between the Fletcher family and the MPD Officers. As such, the Court cannot
determine which facts support Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant City of Madison is
liable.
2. Third Weiland Category

Many of Plaintiffs’ counts present more than one discrete claim for relief. In
Count 5, for example, Plaintiff Estate brings a § 1983 unlawful seizure claim against
Officer 1, claiming that Fletcher’s First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

(Doc. 58 at 31.) Plaintiffs repeat this error in several other counts. (Doc. 58 at
25−51.) In thirteen of the twenty-four counts, Plaintiffs bring a single claim against
multiple Defendant Officers. In Count 11, for example, Plaintiff Estate brings a §
1983 claim of excessive force against Officers 1, 3, and 4. Plaintiffs describe how

Officer 1 tased Fletcher, how Officer 3 punched Fletcher and released the K-9
Officer on Fletcher, and how Officer 4 used lethal force against Fletcher. (Doc. 58
at 36.) Those are three, separate theories upon which a plaintiff may recover for a

Fourth Amendment violation—not one.
In Count 18, all Plaintiffs bring a § 1983 municipal liability claim against
Defendant City of Madison. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff

must prove two elements: (1) his constitutional rights were violated; and (2) the
municipality had a policy that caused the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d
1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). The issue here is with the first element. Over a dozen

of Plaintiffs’ counts allege that someone’s constitutional rights were violated.
Plaintiffs thus appear to be bringing multiple theories of § 1983 liability against
Defendant City of Madison as a sort of omnibus liability claim. Moreover, Fletcher,
Cherelle, and V.F. did not share identical experiences on October 27, 2019, so they

cannot lump their claims together as the facts supporting a claim for relief would be
individual to each Plaintiff. Thus, because Count 18 brings more than one discrete
claim for relief, it is difficult for Defendant City of Madison to discern what

Plaintiffs are claiming.
3. Fourth Weiland Category
Plaintiffs assert multiple claims against multiple Defendants without
adequately specifying which Defendant is responsible for which act. In Count 19,

all Plaintiffs bring an outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under
Alabama tort law against Defendant Officers 1 thru 5. Plaintiffs state that the
Officers intended to “make Plaintiffs have great fear for their safety and life [sic].”

(Doc. 58 at 46.) Plaintiffs then list various actions: “pointing firearms at [Fletcher’s
and Cherelle’s] heads; physically seizing and dragging [Cherelle] and V.F. out of
the vehicle . . . ; releasing an attack dog on [Fletcher] . . . ; Tasing [Fletcher];

punching and beating [Fletcher] and ultimately shooting [Fletcher] unnecessarily.”
(Doc. 58 at 46.) Rather than differentiate which Defendant Officer is responsible for
which act, Plaintiffs instead appear to be imputing the individual Officers’ actions

on the group, as a whole, which does not adequately give Defendants notice of the
claims against them.
B. Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs have already failed to cure the deficiencies in their pleading.

Plaintiffs have twice amended their Complaint. In its previous Order granting
Plaintiffs leave to amend, the Court specifically told Plaintiffs that their First
Amended Complaint bared the hallmarks of a shotgun pleading as exemplified in at

least the third Weiland category. (Doc. 57 at 2.) The Court even ordered Plaintiffs to
confer with Defendants’ counsel in person before filing the Second Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 57 at 3.) Lastly, the Court warned Plaintiffs that they would not
have another chance to amend. (Doc. 57 at 2.)

Even if the Court were to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend, an amendment
would be futile. Plaintiffs attached their Proposed Third Amended Complaint (Doc.
65−1) to their Motion (Doc. 65). Not only do Plaintiffs fail to correct any of the

shotgun pleading deficiencies previously discussed, but also the only proposed
change of substance to the pleading is Count 24, which adds a claim against
Defendants Finley, Jernigan, and the Councilmembers. (Doc. 65−1 at 52.) However,

the proposed change to Count 24 does not give Defendants notice of the claims
against them and the grounds upon which those claims rest as the Count fails to
reference a statute or law under which Plaintiffs are requesting relief. (Doc. 65−1 at

52.)
Based on the totality of circumstances, this Court finds that granting Plaintiffs
a third opportunity to amend their complaint would be futile.
C. Statutes of Limitations for Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

If federal claims are dismissed before trial, “a district court should typically
dismiss the pendant state claims as well.” Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1296. When a district
court dismisses those state law claims, it should do so without prejudice as to refiling

in state court. Id. It is possible, however, for the court to maintain jurisdiction over
those state law claims. Id. When considering whether to maintain jurisdiction,
whether “a plaintiff’s state law claims will be time-barred if dismissed is certainly a
factor, if not a determinative factor” the court should consider. Pharo v. Smith, 625

F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curium). However, if a plaintiff filed a defective
complaint after the statute of limitations had run on their state law claims, then the
plaintiff jeopardized their recovery on those claims, and the court is within its
discretion to dismiss them with prejudice. See McMahan v. Cleveland Clinic Found.
Dept., 455 Fed. App’x 874, 877 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011).

In this case, Plaintiffs bring several causes of action under Alabama state law:
wrongful death; outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress; assault and
battery; false arrest and false imprisonment; and municipal liability. (Doc. 58 at

45−50.) The statute of limitations for wrongful death is two years. ALA. CODE § 6-
5-410 (1975). An action to recover for outrage or intentional infliction of emotional
must be filed within two years. Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 567 So.2d 1208,
1215 (Ala. 1990) (citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-38 (1975)). If an individual wants to bring

a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, or battery, then the action must
be commenced within six years. ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (1975). Lastly, the statute of
limitations for municipal liability for damages growing out of torts is six months.

ALA. CODE § 11-4-23 (1975). The altercation between the Fletcher family and the
MPD Officers took place on October 27, 2019. (Doc. 58 at 4.) Plaintiffs filed this
action on October 26, 2021, within the statute of limitations.4 (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs
filed their Second Amended Complaint on April 29, 2022, well past when the

statutes of limitations would have run for the claims for wrongful death,
outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress, and municipal liability.

4 When Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (Doc. 1), their municipal liability claim under Alabama
law was technically time-barred.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, as the Court previously found, is a shotgun
pleading. As such, the Plaintiffs jeopardized their chances for recovery for those

causes of action, and the Court will dismiss those claims with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to present their claims discretely and
succinctly. Because Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading,
and because granting Plaintiffs a third opportunity to amend would be futile, the
Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 60 and 62), DENIES
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 65), and

DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims. The federal claims and those state law claims now
barred by statutes of limitations are dismissed with prejudice. The rest of the state
law claims are dismissed without prejudice as to refiling in state court. The Court

will enter a final judgment separately.
The Court also notes that just hours prior to the entry of this Order, Cherelle
Fletcher filed a letter with the Court, which appears to be a Motion to Dismiss this
matter. (Doc. 83.) However, because the document was not filed by Ms. Fletcher’s

attorney of record, and because it is unclear whether it was filed with her attorney’s
knowledge, the Court did not consider the letter/Motion in the above analysis.
DONE and ORDERED February 17, 2023.

Lo SZ Sha
LILES C. BURKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991539. Public record. Not legal advice.