# Franks v. City of Jasper

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · September 7, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991300

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** September 7, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION

CORY FRANKS, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
7:20-cv-00077-LSC
v. )
)
CITY OF JASPER et al.,
)

Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Cory Franks, a former Jasper police officer, brings this action against the City
of Jasper, Jasper Police Chief J.C. Poe, Assistant Chief Paul Tucker, and Mayor
David O’Mary. Invoking the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Franks seeks to
recover for racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and
constructive discharge. He also brings a state law claim for assault and battery against
O’Mary. For the following reasons, Franks cannot prevail on his federal claims.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted as to
these claims. The Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claim and remands this claim to the state court from which it was removed.
I. Background1
In 2012, the city hired Franks as a police officer and promoted him to detective

several years later. (Doc. 39-2 at 12.) In early 2017, Poe and Tucker became apprised
of disconcerting allegations concerning Franks’ behavior at a Jasper Holiday Inn
Express—namely that Franks improperly used his position as an officer to obtain a

free hotel room. (Doc. 39-7 at 89.) In response to the city’s concerns, Franks
provided a written statement in which he denied obtaining a free room under color
of authority. (Doc. 39-2 at 39.) He claimed that he offered to pay for the room and

told hotel employees that the room was solely for personal use. (Id.)
On February 15, 2017 (several days after receiving Franks’ written statement),
Poe issued a notice of potential discipline, which detailed the allegations against

Franks and gave Franks a week to respond. (Id. at 40.) On February 22, 2017, Franks
responded to the notice through a letter from his attorney. (Id. at 42.) In the letter,
Franks denied the allegations and complained of racial discrimination for the first

time. (See id.) He alleged that white employees received better treatment. (Id. at 43.)
On March 1, 2017, Poe told Franks to “disregard” the notice of potential discipline.

1 The facts set out in this opinion are gleaned from the parties’ submissions of facts claimed to be undisputed, their
respective responses to those submissions, and the Court’s own examination of the evidentiary record. These are the
“facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the actual facts. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie
Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994). The Court is not required to identify unreferenced evidence
supporting a party's position. As such, review is limited to exhibits and specific portions of the exhibits specifically
cited by the parties. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict court
judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record . . .”).
(Id. at 46.) Around this time, the city referred the matter to the Alabama Ethics
Commission, which independently questioned Franks about the hotel incident.

(Doc. 39-5 at 14.) On December 5, 2017, the Commission found probable cause that
Franks violated the Alabama Ethics Act and referred the matter to the district

attorney for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit for review. (Doc. 39-2 at 47.) On
December 12, Poe issued another notice of potential discipline, which informed
Franks of the Commission’s decision. (Doc. 39-2 at 48.) As before, Poe allowed

Franks a week-long period to reply. (Id. at 49.) On December 20, Franks responded
and again denied the allegations. (Id. at 50.) The following day, Poe dismissed
Franks. (Id. at 52.)

On December 28, Franks appealed his decision to the Civil Service Board. (Id.
at 54.) In April 2018, the Board held a two-day hearing. (See id. at 21.) In addition to
Franks’ account of events, the Board heard the testimony of two Holiday Inn

employees. (Doc. 39-2 at 22.) The Board ultimately concluded “that Mr. Franks
intentionally misrepresented the facts to the Holiday Inn Express employees
regarding his presence . . . and intentionally misrepresented facts during the

investigation to the Jasper Police Department.” (Id. at 24.) Notwithstanding these
findings, the Board decided that termination was “too severe a punishment under
the facts in this case.” (Id.) Instead, the Board deemed a fifteen-day suspension
(without pay) and a demotion to patrolman (for a minimum of one year) more
appropriate measures.2 (Id.)

As decreed by the Board, Franks resumed employment with the Jasper police
department, but he claims that an atmosphere of suspicion prevailed. He alleges the

city began improperly investigating his conduct. In one instance, Tucker looked into
allegations involving a reputedly lascivious video of Franks and an unidentified
female, which Franks denied. (Doc. 39-1 at 84.) After interviewing several officers

whose narratives were inconsistent, Tucker did not punish Franks. (Id.) On another
occasion, an off-duty officer from a different city reported Franks for drinking a beer
with his gun visible while dining at a teppanyaki-style restaurant with his family.

(Doc. 39-7 at 87.) Tucker investigated the report but found no wrongdoing. (Doc.
39-6 at 20.) Franks also emphasizes an acrimonious encounter with O’Mary. Franks
originally alleged that O’Mary intentionally spat upon him amidst a heated

argument. (Doc. 43 at 58.) In his deposition, Franks characterized it differently:
“saliva was coming out of his mouth because he was yelling at me.” (Doc. 39-1 at
56.)

When asked if any city employee ever said anything racially derogatory,
Franks replied: “I don’t recall anybody saying anything directly to me racially.”

2 Franks appealed the Board’s decision to the Walker County Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board’s decision in
June 2021. (Doc. 39-2 at 38.)
(Doc. 39-1 at 95.) Franks did mention, however, a meeting at which a supervisor
referenced slavery. Several officers were in attendance, all of whom were white

except Franks. (Id.) The supervisor made this comment: “So, let’s do the best we
can do while we’re here those eight hours because . . . I don’t want to get religious

on you but that’s what the Bible tells you. I believe it was Paul that was talking about
even if you was a slave, you do the best job that you could . . ..” (Doc. 39-8 at 48.)
On September, 26, 2019, Franks asked a superior if he could be absent from

work the following day, but his superior replied no. (Doc. 39-1 at 41.) Franks was
nonetheless absent the following day; however, he admits in his deposition that he
worked another job and likely attended a homecoming parade that day. (Id.) When

he returned, Franks supplied a doctor’s note explaining his absence, but his superior
thought it appeared fraudulent. (Id.) On October 18, Poe sent Franks another notice
of potential discipline. (Doc. 39-2 at 19.) The notice alleged that Franks falsely

claimed illness to avoid work. (Id.) As with prior notices, it gave Franks a right to
respond and a right to appeal any adverse decision to the Civil Service Board. (Id. at
20.) Franks did not avail himself of these rights and instead resigned on November

4. (Id. at 18.)
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the record taken as a
whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Hickson

Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). A genuine
dispute as to a material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence
such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v.

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell v.
Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The trial judge
should not weigh the evidence, but should determine whether there are any genuine

issues of fact that should be resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give

deference to the non-moving party by “view[ing] the materials presented and all
factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However, “unsubstantiated
assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”
Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). Conclusory
allegations and “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will
not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d

1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358
F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the

moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary
to the nonmoving party's case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d

1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the trial courts must use caution when granting
motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the

Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
III. Analysis
A. Discrimination3
Section 1981 forbids “intentional race discrimination in the making and

enforcement of public and private contracts, including employment contracts.”
Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs can marshal
direct or circumstantial evidence to show discrimination. Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th

3 See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Standard alleges that he was terminated
on the basis of his race and national origin (Caucasian-American), in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Both
of these statutes have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework . . .”).
1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022). To withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff can 1) meet
the requirements of McDonnell Douglas, 2) “demonstrate a ‘convincing mosaic’ of

circumstantial evidence that warrants an inference of intentional discrimination,” or
3) “present direct evidence of discriminatory intent.” Lewis v. City of Union City,
918 F.3d 1213, 1220 n.6 (11th Cir. 2019).4

“Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he

belongs to a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he
was qualified to perform the job in question; and (4) his employer treated ‘similarly
situated’ employees outside his class more favorably.” Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1249. For

years, “similarly situated” has confounded federal courts, and various Circuits have
devised different formulations of this essential phrase. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1224.
In the Eleventh Circuit, “similarly situated” means “similarly situated in all material

respects.” Id. at 1226. Normally, a similarly situated comparator “will have engaged
in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff,” “will have been subject
to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff,” “will ordinarily

(although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as

4 In a footnote to his brief, Franks refers to the “convincing mosaic” standard but does not argue how it allows him to
survive summary judgment on these facts. Based on the court’s understanding of the record, Franks cannot adduce
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prevail on this alternative standard. Franks also does not present direct evidence
of discriminatory intent.
the plaintiff,” and “will share the plaintiff's employment or disciplinary history.” Id.
at 1227–28. Nonetheless, these guideposts can only take us so far, and the necessary

degree of similarity must be “worked out on a case-by-case basis, in the context of
individual circumstances.” Id. at 1227.

If the plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden
then falls on the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the

defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that the defendant's
proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Lewis, 918 F.3d
at 1221. To establish pretext, a plaintiff must “show[] both that the reason was false,

and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 515 (1993).
In his brief opposing summary judgment, Franks proposes two comparators:

officers Will Wickwire and Eric Hendrix. However, neither of these men are
“similarly situated in all material respects.” Franks argues that Wickwire gave
inconsistent statements to his superiors during an investigation yet suffered no

rebuke. However, Wickwire’s alleged misconduct is not sufficiently similar to that
of Franks. Wickwire’s superiors wanted to know if he had seen a lascivious video
involving Franks. (Doc. 39-7 at 101.) Apparently, Wickwire first denied having seen
Franks in the video but later claimed that Franks was in the video. (Id. at 102.) One
can readily discern material differences between the potential misconduct of

Wickwire and Franks. Notably, Wickwire did not improperly use his position in
pursuit of personal gain. Further, the contents of a video depicting legal, off-site

events would naturally be less alarming to a supervisor than an officer’s potentially
improper use of his official capacity to obtain a free hotel room (as well as Franks’
alleged deceptive behavior during the initial investigation of this incident).

Although Hendrix is closer to the mark, he is not a proper comparator either.
In an arrest report, Hendrix allegedly wrote that a police vehicle had been inspected
prior to a shift despite being told otherwise by the officer who had driven the vehicle.

(Doc. 43-3 at 2.) He also charged a suspect with possession of drug paraphernalia in
apparent violation of a superior’s order. (Id.) For these transgressions, the
department suspended Hendrix for ten days without pay. (Doc. 43-2 at 36.) But like

Wickwire, Hendrix’s deceit, though serious, did not result in an improper personal
benefit. Nor does Franks suggest that Hendrix lied about his actions when the
department investigated the matter. Given these considerations, Franks has not

identified a proper comparator and cannot make a prima facie showing of
discrimination.
Even if Franks could establish a prima facie case, the defendants have provided
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination of Franks. The

allegations against Franks certainly merited the department’s investigation.
Moreover, after reviewing Franks’ alleged misconduct, the Alabama Ethics

Commission found probable cause that Franks violated the Alabama Ethics Act and
referred the case to a district attorney for review. This independent assessment
provided legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds to terminate Franks.5

B. Retaliation
Section 1981 also provides an avenue for retaliation claims. See CBOCS W.,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008). “To make a prima facie case for a claim

of retaliation . . ., a plaintiff must first show (1) that she engaged in statutorily
protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse action, and (3) that the adverse
action was causally related to the protected activity.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga.,

Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). “If the plaintiff can
establish that, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-

5 Also, Franks has not shown that the city’s proffered reason is pretextual. Granted, as Franks highlights, the Civil
Service Board deemed termination too harsh and imposed lesser (though still severe) penalties, but the Board’s
decision only shows a difference in judgment as to the proper degree of punishment. The Board expressly concluded
that Franks had engaged in the wrongdoing of which the city accused him. Franks also claims that the ten-month gap
between the city’s initial investigation and his termination is evidence of pretext. This argument suggests that the city
would have fired Franks earlier if the city’s true reason was not discriminatory. However, if the city’s true motives
were malign, it would have been illogical for the city to refer the matter to a neutral third-party like the Alabama Ethics
Commission, so the court cannot see how the ten-month gap indicates pretext.
discriminatory reason or reasons for the retaliation.” Patterson v. Ga. Pacific, 38 F.4th
1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022). “After the defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff

has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason
was merely a pretext to mask discriminatory actions.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,

1308 (11th Cir. 2009).
For the causation element, the protected activity must be “a but-for cause of
the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). “Stated another way, a plaintiff must prove that had she
not complained, she would not have been fired.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891
F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018).

In this case, Franks cannot satisfy the causation prong of retaliation. Before
Franks first complained of racial discrimination on February 22, 2017, the
department had already commenced an investigation and had sent a notice of

proposed discipline. Clearly then, the initial investigation could not have been
retaliatory as Franks had not yet complained. Furthermore, the city did not
terminate Franks until the decision of the Alabama Ethics Commission in December

2017. This ten-month interval attenuates an inference of retaliation. See Thomas v.
Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ere temporal
proximity, without more, must be very close.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 926 (“[W]e have explained that an employee's
termination within days—or at the most within two weeks—of his protected activity

can be circumstantial evidence of a causal connection between the two.”). In sum,
the city contemplated disciplinary action prior to Franks’ first complaint, suspended

judgment on the matter for ten months, and made a final decision when the Alabama
Ethics Commission rendered its conclusion. This sequence of events bespeaks the
absence of a causal relationship.

During the ten-month interval, Franks contends he was the target of various
unfair investigations. Yet Franks himself concedes that such allegations merited
attention, and he received no punishment. As a result, these “investigations” are

not evidence of retaliation. Franks also argues that there is a “close temporal
proximity” because he made a second complaint of race discrimination the day
before his termination. Franks, however, fails to note that he was not terminated

until the decision of the Alabama Ethics Commission, and that the city gave him a
week to respond to the decision. His second complaint of discrimination was made
during the response period, and he was only terminated after the close of the week-

long response period. As before, this sequence of events does not indicate a causal
relationship between protected activity and adverse action because he made his
second complaint in response to the second notice of proposed discipline and the
decision of the Alabama Ethics Commission.6

C. Hostile Work Environment
For a successful claim of hostile work environment, discriminatory

harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). One

can infer the required degree of hostility by looking to several factors: “the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee's work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993).
Franks cannot prevail on his hostile work environment claim as he did not

suffer racial harassment of a “sufficiently severe or pervasive” nature. Aside from
subjective perception and speculation, Franks offers little proof of behavior that is
even arguably discriminatory. Franks argues that the investigation into the hotel

6 As with Franks’ discrimination claim, defendants have provided a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their actions.
The allegations surrounding the hotel room incident merited the attention of Franks’ superiors, and the city’s belief
that Franks had engaged in wrongdoing gave legitimate grounds for dismissal. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall
Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Nor does the statute require the employer to have good cause for its
decisions. The employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or
for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.”).
room incident is evidence of discriminatory harassment because white officers
accepted free food and drinks from local businesses without reprimand. The record

does suggest that officers sometimes accepted such items but does not indicate that
these gratuities were limited to white officers. Also, Franks provides no evidence

that officers obtained the free items under color of duty or engaged in any deception,
and a clear qualitative distinction exists between a free Coke Icee and a free hotel
room.7 In any event, the investigation into the hotel room incident is not evidence of

a hostile work environment.
Franks again argues that he was subjected to frivolous and arbitrary
investigations (apart from the hotel incident). As already noted, these other

investigations did not result in punishment, and the city was justified in investigating
such allegations. Franks also claims the city promoted a less experienced white
officer, but at his deposition, he conceded that he was not eligible for a promotion at

the time because of the Civil Service Board’s decision.
In his brief, Franks emphasizes a meeting in which, he claims, a superior
officer told him to “be like a ‘good slave’ who takes pleasure in his labor.” (Doc. 43

at 55.) But in his deposition, Franks did not say he was called a slave. (See Doc. 39-1
at 95.) Rather, at a meeting with numerous officers, a superior referenced slavery in

7 Granted, over the course of a year, small gifts add up and could potentially violate ethical rules, but Franks offers no
proof of such violations.
the context of the Apostle Paul’s New Testament epistles.8 (Doc. 39-8 at 48.) As an
audio recording of the meeting makes clear, the comment did not pertain to race and

was an exhortation for all the officers to work diligently. (See id.) When asked if he
remembered any racially pejorative language, Franks only identified this incident but

also prefaced his account by saying: “I don’t recall anybody saying anything directly
to me racially.” (Doc. 39-1 at 95.) Viewed in context, this reference to slavery was
not racial, but even if it had been, a single instance would be insufficient to establish

a hostile work environment.9 See McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Although offensive, such instances of racially derogatory language alone,
extending over a period of more than two years, are too sporadic and isolated to

establish that her employers' conduct was so objectively severe or pervasive as to
alter the terms and conditions of her employment.”).
D. Constructive Discharge

An employee’s decision to resign is tantamount to an actual discharge when
“working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the

8 As noted by the defendants, the Apostle Paul refers to slavery in several different books of the New Testament, often
calling himself and other believers slaves (or servants) of Christ and righteousness (depending on the English
translation of the original texts in Koine Greek). See Romans 1:1 & 6:18; 1 Corinthians 9:19–23. He also encourages
slaves in the Ancient Roman world to “be obedient to those who are your masters according to the flesh” and to
“render service, as to the Lord, and not to people, knowing that whatever good thing each one does, he will receive
this back from the Lord, whether slave or free.” See Ephesians 6:5–8 (NASB).
9 Similarly, Franks’ heated meeting with Mayor O’Mary is insufficient to establish a hostile work environment as it
was an isolated encounter.
employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.” Pa. State Police v. Suders,
542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). “Establishing a constructive discharge claim is a more

onerous task than establishing a hostile work environment claim.” Bryant v. Jones,
575 F.3d 1281, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009).

Because Franks’ claim for hostile work environment cannot survive summary
judgment, his claim for constructive discharge must also fail. The two claims are
largely based on the same factual tapestry, so it is evident that Franks cannot

complete the “more onerous task” of establishing constructive discharge. Franks
voluntarily resigned after the final notice of proposed discipline, which accused him
of falsely claiming illness to avoid work. In his deposition, Franks admits that he

worked at his other place of employment on the day in question and likely attended
a homecoming parade. No one disputes the city’s interest in investigating Franks’
alleged misconduct, and Franks was aware that he had an opportunity to respond,

the right to a hearing, and the right to appeal to the Civil Service Board. Franks
decided to forgo these rights and resigned rather than respond. As such, Franks
cannot prevail on his constructive discharge claim.

E. State Law Assault and Battery
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if “the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.” This decision is “purely discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). In the interests of
comity and fairness, this court therefore declines to consider the merits of Franks’

state law claim for assault and battery. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining
state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”’).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is due

to be granted as to all federal claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claim of assault and battery and remands this claim
only to state court. The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum
of Opinion.
DONE and ORDERED on September 7, 2022.

United States District Judge
211211

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991300. Public record. Not legal advice.