# Lowe v. Day & Zimmerman

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · April 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991068

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** April 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL L. LOWE,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:21-cv-1070-CLM

DAY & ZIMMERMAN, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael L. Lowe, proceeding pro se, sues Day & Zimmerman,
Kalkreuth Roofing, Plant Vogtle, Plant Farley, Savannah River Site,
Michael Steins Local 136 Roofing & Cable Proofers, Laborers Local Union
559, C.E. Bourne, Equifax Workforce Solution, National Labor Relations
Board, and Champion Roofing Company. In his Complaint, Lowe asserts
that one or more defendants: (1) violated his Equal Protection rights in
hiring, promotions, equal pay, and on-the-job training; (2) conspired to
deprive him of his right to equal employment under the law; (3) retaliated
against him for his union activities; and (4) discriminated against him
because of his age. (Doc. 1.) These defendants moved to dismiss:
Kalkreuth Roofing (doc. 11), C.E. Bourne (doc. 14), Day & Zimmerman
(doc. 16), Laborers Local Union 559 (doc. 17), and Michael Steins (doc. 32).
These defendants have not appeared in the lawsuit: Plant Vogtle, Plant
Farley, Savannah River Site, Equifax Workforce Solution, National Labor
Relations Board, and Champion Roofing Company.
Lowe also filed a document titled “Notice of Sovereign Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.” (Doc. 40.) Kalkreuth Roofing moved to
Strike this filing (doc. 41).
For the reasons stated within, the court will GRANT Kalkreuth
Roofing’s Motion to Strike Lowe’s extraneous filing (doc. 41) and will
GRANT the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (docs. 11, 14, 16, 17, 32).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court will also DISMISS the claims against
the defendants who have not appeared in the case. (“Notwithstanding any
filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”)
BACKGROUND
Through his membership with the United Union of Roofers,
Waterproofers, and Allied Workers Local 136, AFL-CIO, Lowe obtained
employment with Kalkreuth Roofing, working on a roofing project at the
Vogtle Nuclear Plant in Waynesboro, Georgia. Lowe began working for
Kalkreuth Roofing at the Vogtle Plant in January 2020. In February 2020,
Lowe complained to a manager that a fire-watch employee should be
overseeing the safety of employees engaged in torching the roof. The
project ended in April 2020. Lowe was the only union member that worked
on the job until the project ended.
Around July 2020, Lowe learned that every other employee who had
worked on the Plant Vogtle project was called back to work on other
projects; Lowe was not called back. In fall of 2020, the Union filed a
grievance against Kalkreuth Roofing, asserting that Kalkreuth Roofing
refused to return Lowe to work. Around December 16, 2020, Lowe
attended a grievance meeting where Nick Fiore—a company
representative—told him that the grievance was untimely. The Union
argued that the grievance was not untimely. In February 2021, the
company formally denied the grievance. Michael Steins, the Union’s
International Vice President, informed Lowe that he (Steins) and the
International President determined that the grievance was untimely, and
they declined to proceed with the grievance process.
In early October 2020, Laborers Local Union 559 referred Lowe to
Day & Zimmerman. Lowe sought employment with Day & Zimmerman to
work on a project at the Farley Nuclear Plant in Alabama.
Day & Zimmerman made Lowe a conditional offer of employment. But
Day & Zimmerman terminated Lowe’s employment on October 13, 2020,
citing the results of Lowe’s background check as the reason for
termination. Laborers Local Union 559 did not pursue a grievance on
Lowe’s behalf. Lowe filed a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), asserting Title VII, Age
Discrimination, and Retaliation claims against Day & Zimmerman and
Laborers Local Union 559. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on April
13, 2021, granting Lowe the right to file a Title VII, Age Discrimination,
and Retaliation lawsuit against Day & Zimmerman and Laborers Local
Union 559 within 90 days of receipt of the notice. (Doc. 1, p. 15.) Lowe filed
this lawsuit on August 4, 2021.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On Rule 12 motions to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in
Lowe’s complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable
to Lowe. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 697 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir.
2012). Lowe is a pro se litigant, so his pleadings are to be “liberally
construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted).
But the court need not accept legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The ultimate question is whether all of Lowe’s allegations, when
accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at
678–79. If the facts as pleaded could entitle Lowe to relief, then the court
must deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss. If, however, the court
accepts all of Lowe’s pleaded facts as true, and Lowe still would not be
entitled to relief, then the court must grant the motions.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Strike Pleading
Lowe filed a document titled “Notice of Sovereign Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction,” asserting that Kalkreuth Roofing’s attorneys
lack jurisdiction to file a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 40.) Kalkreuth Roofing
moved to strike Lowe’s filing as an impermissible sur-reply. (Doc. 41.)
Sur-replies “can only be filed with leave of court and are ordinarily
stricken if no such leave is requested or received.” Fisher v. Ciba Specialty
Chemicals Corp., 2007 WL 2995525, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2007); see
also Staten v. Federal Ins. Co., 2021 WL 4458875, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept.
29, 2021) (concluding that the court “will not consider” arguments
presented in a sur-reply filed without seeking leave of court). Lowe filed
this notice without leave of the court. Though not labelled a sur-reply,
Lowe’s filing is an impermissible sur-reply. So the court will grant
Kalkreuth Roofing’s motion to strike this filing.
II. Motions to Dismiss
The court will now address the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Rather than address the motions separately, the court will discuss the
common bases for the motions to dismiss. The defendants argue that the
court should dismiss Lowe’s Complaint because: (A) Lowe’s Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (B) Lowe’s
Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading; (C) the court lacks
personal jurisdiction over some defendants; (D) this is not the proper
venue; (E) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action;
(F) Lowe failed to timely file his Complaint; and (G) Lowe cannot hold a
union official personally liable. (Docs. 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 32, 33.) As
described below, there are several independent bases sufficient to dismiss
this case. The court will address the defendants’ arguments in favor of
dismissal. The court will also address the validity of the claims against
the defendants who have not appeared in this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
But the court will not address the claims and factual allegations that Lowe
raised for the first time in his response to the defendants’ motions to
dismiss. See Boyd v. Peet, 249 F. App’x 155, 157 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)).
A. Lowe’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a demand for the relief sought.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint
must also provide “a short and plain statement of the claim . . . [to] give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must include
“enough [factual allegations] to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level. Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Lowe labelled his Complaint “Certificate of Service.” The Complaint
lists Lowe as the claimant and lists the defendants as wrongdoers. Then
it states:
(1) This certifies that I will serve a copy of this claim against
all parties of violating Equal Protection Rights In Hiring &
Promotions & Equal Pay, & On The Job Training.
(2) Also conspiring to deprive Lowe under 18 USC § 241 &
242 by injuring, oppressing & threatening him to the free
exercise of his rights to Equal Employment under the
Common Law & U.S. Fed & State Const.
For Retaliation of Him For His Union Activities. See Also
Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Age Discrimination In
Employment).
(Doc. 1, pp. 1–3) (no alterations made to original text).
Then Lowe’s Complaint lists the defendants’ mailing addresses. The
Complaint does not state causes of action, plead elements, include factual
allegations, or include a prayer for relief. The court will dismiss Lowe’s
Complaint in its entirety because it “fail[s] to plead any of the essential
elements” of a cause of action. See Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC,
2018 WL 6446643, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 2018); Perry v. Matrix Fin.
Servs. Corp., 2019 WL 1597883, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2019).
Lowe also included several attachments to his Complaint: (1) a
“Confidential Witness Affidavit”; (2) two “Affidavits of Facts/Statements
of Facts”; (3) correspondence between Lowe and the EEOC; (4) a document
titled “Notice of Attachment & Amendment to Supreme Ct. Title VII
Retaliation Proof But-For Causation”; (5) Day & Zimmerman’s electronic
Personal History Questionnaire Notice; (6) the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) dismissal and right-to-sue letter;
and (7) Day & Zimmerman’s Employee Information Form. Even if the
court were to consider the documents that Lowe attached to the
Complaint and try to decipher claims from the attached documents, Lowe
still fails to state a claim against the defendants:
• Lowe identifies defendants C.E. Bourne, Equifax Workforce
Solutions, and Champion Roofing Company as wrongdoers in the
Complaint. After that initial identification, neither the Complaint
nor any of the attached documents mention these defendants at all.
So the court will dismiss all claims against C.E. Bourne, Equifax
Workforce Solutions, and Champion Roofing Company.
• Lowe identifies the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) as a
wrongdoer in the Complaint. But other than identifying the NLRB
as a wrongdoer in the initial caption, Lowe only refers to the NLRB
in one other place throughout his submitted documents. Lowe
submitted a Confidential Witness Affidavit that states, “I have been
given assurance by an agent of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) that this Confidential Witness Affidavit will be considered
a confidential law enforcement record by the NLRB and will not be
disclosed unless it becomes necessary to produce this Confidential
Witness Affidavit in connection with a formal proceeding.” (Doc. 1,
p. 4.) Lowe does not make any claims or provide any factual
allegations to support that the NLRB engaged in any wrongful
conduct. So the court will dismiss all claims against the NLRB.
• Lowe identifies Plant Vogtle, Plant Farley, and Savannah River Site
as wrongdoers in the Complaint. In Lowe’s document titled “Notice
of Attachment & Amendment To Supreme Ct. Title VII Retaliation
Proof But-For Causation,” Lowe states that he was “blackballed to
never be allowed to work at . . . Plant[] Farley, Savannah River Site,
Plant Vogtle or any other sites.” (Doc. 1, p. 13.) This is the only
reference—other than the initial identification—to Savannah River
Site. This statement does not suggest who allegedly blackballed
Lowe from working at these sites and is insufficient to state a claim
against any of the plants. In the other documents, Lowe also states
that Kalkreuth Roofing hired him to work on a roofing project at
Plant Vogtle and that Day & Zimmerman conditionally hired him
to work on a roofing project at Plant Farley. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 9.) Lowe
does not make any claims or factual assertions to support that the
plants took any discriminatory action against him, retaliated
against him, or engaged in any other wrongful conduct. So the court
will dismiss all claims against Plant Vogtle, Plant Farley, and
Savannah River Site.
• Lowe identifies Kalkreuth Roofing, Michael Steins, Day &
Zimmerman, and Laborers Local Union 559 as wrongdoers in his
Complaint. These claims fail because even though Lowe’s additional
documents do reference these parties: (1) Lowe does not identify any
claims or causes of action; and (2) Lowe fails to plead facts to
support the claims that the court thinks Lowe may have intended
to claim.
o Courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, but a court need
not rewrite a deficient pleading to sustain an action. GJR
Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369
(11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009) (“Yet even in the case of
pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to
serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”). Lowe’s
Complaint and attached documents identify no claims or
causes of action, and the court declines to rewrite Lowe’s
Complaint to identify causes of action.
o “[C]omplaints in all [civil] cases . . . [must] contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707, n. 2 (11th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286
(10th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). It seems to the
court that Lowe may have intended to assert claims for
national origin, race, sex, or age discrimination, and that
Lowe may have intended to assert claims for retaliation
against some or all of these defendants. In the Eleventh
Circuit, a discrimination plaintiff must provide factual detail
in the complaint that, if true, would establish that the
plaintiff was treated less favorably than comparator
employees based on the protected characteristic(s) at issue.
Uppal v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 482 F. App'x 394, 396 (11th
Cir. 2012). Even if Lowe intended to assert discrimination
claims, Lowe failed to allege any facts about how he was
treated less favorably than non-Native American, non-black,
younger, or female employees. To state a claim for retaliation,
a plaintiff must plead that he engaged in protected activity—
i.e., that he opposed race-based, age, sex, or national origin
discrimination. Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d
1405, 1412–13 (11th Cir. 1998). Lowe failed to allege any facts
that he engaged in protected activity.
Because Lowe’s Complaint and associated documents fail to identify
claims or causes of action and contain no factual allegations to support
the elements of the presumed claims, the court will dismiss all claims
against the defendants.
B. Lowe’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading.
Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures and Eleventh Circuit
precedent prohibit the use of shotgun pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2);
FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b); Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356
(11th Cir. 2018); Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,
1321 (11th Cir. 2015). A complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types of shotgun
pleadings: (1) a complaint that contains multiple counts where each
adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, (2) a complaint that is
“replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action,” (3) a complaint that does not
separate “into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief,”
and (4) a complaint that asserts “multiple claims against multiple
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought
against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23.
Even if the court considers the documents that Lowe attached to his
Complaint and tries to decipher claims from the attached documents, the
Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading that fails to “give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1320. Lowe’s Complaint and attached
documents are not separated into distinct counts or causes of action. The
attached documents are filled with conclusory language—e.g., “[B]eing of
Origee African American descent [Lowe] was discriminated against by his
White employer’s [sic] . . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 12.) Further, the Complaint and
attached documents do not specify which defendant took which action,
which facts apply to which defendant, and which claims are brought
against which defendant. Thus, Lowe’s Complaint—even if construed to
include the attached documents—is an impermissible shotgun pleading.
Because there are other independent bases on which the court will dismiss
this action, the court need not grant Lowe an opportunity to amend his
Complaint to remedy the shotgun-pleading issues.
C. The court lacks personal jurisdiction over several
defendants.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires the plaintiff to
include a jurisdictional statement that sets forth the grounds for
jurisdiction. Lowe failed to include a jurisdictional statement in his
Complaint. Day & Zimmerman, Plant Farley, and Laborers Local Union
559 appear to be based in Alabama. But as far as the court can tell, all
other defendants are nonresident defendants. “[T]he plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant.” Id. (citing Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir.
1988)).
Not only did Lowe fail to establish a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction over the nonresidents, but some defendants provided their
residency information and stated that they lack sufficient contacts with
Alabama to support personal jurisdiction. Lowe did not refute these
assertions, so these facts are not in dispute:
• Kalkreuth Roofing participated in a construction project at Plant
Vogtle in Georgia. Kalkreuth Roofing is a West Virginia corporation
with its principal place of business in Wheeling, West Virginia.
Kalkreuth Roofing does not have office or warehouse space in
Alabama, does not own real property in Alabama, did not do
business in Alabama, and committed no acts in Alabama related to
Lowe’s claims.
• C.E. Bourne is incorporated and has its principal place of business
in South Carolina. C.E. Bourne does not do business in Alabama,
has no employees in Alabama, and has no contacts with Alabama
related to Lowe’s claims.
• Michael Steins resides in Georgia. He has never performed work in
Alabama. Steins does not have a presence in Alabama or contacts
with Alabama related to Lowe’s claims.
Lowe’s Complaint does not show (or even allege) that the court has
personal jurisdiction over any of the nonresident defendants. Because
Lowe fails to establish a prima facie case that this court has personal
jurisdiction over any of the nonresident defendants, the court must
dismiss the claims against the defendants who provided evidence to show
that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. Accordingly,
the court will dismiss the claims against Kalkreuth Roofing, C.E. Bourne,
and Michael Steins for lack of personal jurisdiction.
D. This is not the proper venue for claims associated with
work at Plant Vogtle.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in these districts:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or
a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Here, all defendants are not residents of Alabama. It appears to the
court that Lowe is complaining about two distinct sets of transactions or
occurrences: (1) that he was not called back for additional work on projects
after he completed the project at Plant Vogtle in Georgia; and (2) that he
was terminated because he failed a background check after being granted
conditional employment status at Plant Farley in Alabama. Though a
substantial part of the events or omissions related to Lowe’s termination
from employment at Plant Farley occurred in Alabama, the events or
omissions related to Lowe not being called back for work after completing
the project at Plant Vogtle occurred outside Alabama.
Because Lowe’s grievances are about two unrelated sets of events,
they should not be combined into one lawsuit. The court agrees that claims
related to Lowe’s dispute following his work at Plant Vogtle in Georgia
are not in the proper venue. But the court need not consider a transfer of
venue because the court is dismissing the action on other grounds.
E. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
action.
There are two primary sources for subject-matter jurisdiction:
diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Diversity
jurisdiction exists where every plaintiff is a citizen of a different state than
every defendant and the claim exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal
question jurisdiction exists when a litigant brings a claim that arises
under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include a ‘short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.’” Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians v. Kraus-Anderson Const. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir.
2010). Lowe’s Complaint does not include information about his
citizenship and the citizenship of all Defendants and does not state
whether the relief he is seeking exceeds $75,000. So Lowe failed to
establish diversity jurisdiction.
The court now turns to whether Lowe’s Complaint properly
establishes federal question jurisdiction. Lowe’s Complaint alludes to
federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution. But a plaintiff does not
establish federal question jurisdiction “merely by citing the federal statute
[the defendants have] allegedly violated.” Gardner v. First Am. Title Ins.
Co., 294 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2002). “[A] plaintiff's complaint still must
‘claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.’” Miccosukee Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 681 (1946). The Defendants assert that though Lowe references
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242,1 Title VII, and the U.S. Constitution, his
Complaint does not properly plead federal question jurisdiction because
he does not identify which sections of these laws were allegedly violated
or specify how, when, or by whom the laws were allegedly violated. The
court agrees that Lowe failed to state the basis for the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1 Lowe’s effort to state a cause of action based on a purported conspiracy violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
is misplaced. These statutes are criminal statutes and do not provide a civil cause of action. Butler v. Morgan,
562 F. App'x 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960).
and Eleventh Circuit precedent. So the court will dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
F. Lowe’s Title VII and Age Discrimination claims against
Zimmerman & Day and Laborers Local Union 559 are
untimely.
“An employee must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a
complaint of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act . . . .”
Stamper v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017).
“When the employee receives a notice of dismissal from the Commission,
[h]e has 90 days to file a civil action against the employer.” Id. at 1340
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)); see also Cornett v. Alabama Dep't of
Transp., 828 F. App’x 565, 567 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of a
pro se litigant’s complaint where his “suit was untimely, as it was filed
long after the 90-day deadline for bringing a civil action had expired”). A
plaintiff is presumed to have received the mailing three days after its
issuance. Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1
(1984).
On April 7, 2021, Lowe filed an EEOC charge against Day &
Zimmerman and Laborers Local Union 559, alleging that these
defendants: (1) discriminated against him because of his race, sex, age,
and national origin; and (2) retaliated against him. The EEOC issued
Lowe a notice of dismissal and a right to sue on April 13, 2021; under the
right-to-sue, Lowe had 90 days from receipt of the right to sue letter to file
a lawsuit. (Doc. 1, p. 15.) Lowe filed this lawsuit on August 4, 2021.
Because Lowe did not timely file this lawsuit, the court will dismiss the
claims against Day & Zimmerman and Laborers Local Union 559. See
Robbins v. Vonage Bus., Inc., 819 F. App'x 863, 867 (11th Cir. 2020).
G. The Claims Against Michael Steins Fail Because Union
Officials Cannot Be Held Personally Liable for Union
Activities.
Under 29 U.S.C. §185(b), “[a]ny money judgment against a labor
organization ... shall not be enforceable against any individual member
or his assets.” Lowe sued Steins in his personal capacity as an officer of
Local 186 Roofers and Cable Proofers. As federal law prohibits union
officers from being held personally liable for union actions, the court will
dismiss all claims against Michael Steins. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refin.
Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons listed above, the court will GRANT Kalkreuth
Roofing’s Motion to Strike Lowe’s Extraneous Filing (doc. 41) and will
GRANT the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (docs. 11, 14, 16, 17, 32) the
plaintiffs’ complaint (doc. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court will sua
sponte DISMISS the claims against all Defendants who have not
appeared in the case.
The court will enter a separate order that carries out this ruling.
DONE on April 20, 2022.
Leregl Pe
COREY'L. MAZE ©
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991068. Public record. Not legal advice.