# State Farm and Casualty Company v. Broan-Nutone LLC

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · March 31, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991030

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** March 31, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STATE FARM FIRE and CASUALTY }
COMPANY, et al., }
}
Plaintiffs, }
} Case No.: 2:22-CV-58-RDP
v. }
}
BROAN-NUTONE LLC, et al., }
}
Defendants. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendant A.O. Smith Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. # 6). A.O. Smith seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against it for lack of personal
jurisdiction. (Id.). Plaintiffs, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., and Vameshia Carmichael, have
filed a Response to the Motion that indicates that the Motion is unopposed because Plaintiffs do
not have sufficient evidence to establish personal jurisdiction over A.O. Smith. (Doc. # 17). After
careful consideration, and for the reasons explained below, the court concludes A.O. Smith’s
Motion is due to be granted.
I. Background
On or about January 18, 2020, a ventilation fan manufactured by Defendant Broan-Nutone
LLC (“Broan”) and containing an A.O. Smith manufactured fan motor, self-ignited resulting in
substantial damages to Carmichael’s home in Fultondale, Alabama, and personal property located
in the home. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 11). State Farm reimbursed its insured, Carmichael, for the value of the
damaged home and property and became subrogated to the rights of its insured under the applicable
policy. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 13, 15). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert negligence, AEMLD, failure to
warn, and breach of warranty clams against A.O. Smith. (Doc. # 1, generally). Plaintiffs also sued
Broan-Nutone LLC, the manufacturer of the fan. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 3).
A.O. Smith is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. (Doc. # 6-1 ¶¶ 4-5). A.O. Smith has no manufacturing facilities or
administrative offices in Alabama. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7). Further, A.O. Smith did not design, develop,

manufacture, or test any electric motor component supplied for the bathroom exhaust fan at issue
in this case within the State of Alabama. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14). A.O. Smith did not participate in the
final assembly or sale of the subject exhaust fan. (Id. at ¶ 16). A.O. Smith sold its motor division
in 2011, more than ten years ago. (Id. at ¶ 12).
All motors A.O. Smith sold to Broan for inclusion in its ventilation products were custom
made for Broan and were not sold to other customers. (Doc. # 6-2 ¶ 4). A.O. Smith did not design,
develop, or manufacture any of the electric motor component parts it sold to Broan in the state of
Alabama. (Doc. # 6-1 ¶ 13). There is no record of any shipments of motors being made to Broan
within the state of Alabama. (Id. at ¶ 15). A.O. Smith did not participate in the final assembly,

retail sale, or consumer distribution of the subject fan or any Broan products. (Id. at ¶ 16). That is,
A.O. Smith is an out-of-state corporation having no continuous and systematic affiliations or
contacts with Alabama. (Id., generally).
In their Response to A.O. Smith’s Motion, Plaintiffs state:
Plaintiffs conclude that they do not have enough facts to show Defendant has
sufficient affiliations with the forum state in relation to the controversy at hand to
satisfy the purposeful availment prong of the Eleventh Circuit’s due process test
for specific jurisdiction, and therefore concede Defendant’s Motion is due to be
granted.
(Doc. # 17 at 2, ¶ 4).
II. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(2) motion tests the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make
out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th

Cir. 2009); see also Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A plaintiff
seeking to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant initially need only allege sufficient
facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.”). If the plaintiff satisfies his initial burden and
the defendant then challenges personal jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence or deposition
testimony, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction. See
Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Posner,
178 F.3d at 1214 (“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving ‘by affidavit the basis upon which
jurisdiction may be obtained’ only if the defendant challenging jurisdiction files ‘affidavits in
support of his position.’”).

III. Analysis
“A federal district court in [Alabama] may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant to the same extent that [an Alabama] court may, so long as the exercise is
consistent with federal due process requirements.” Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283
(11th Cir. 2008). Under its long-arm statute, “Alabama permits its courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresidents to the fullest extent allowed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.” Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d
1351, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Martin v. Robbins, 628 So.2d 614, 617 (Ala. 1993)); see
also Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2 (permitting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on any basis “not
inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States”). Thus, this
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant so long as jurisdiction is consistent with
federal due process principles.
The Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. See

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923-24 (2011). In considering
whether personal jurisdiction complies with due process, the court must consider “whether the
defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Waite v. All Acquisition Corp.,
901 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). A defendant subject to general jurisdiction in a forum may be sued in that forum on all
claims against it, even if the claims have no connection to the forum. Id. at 919. By contrast, a
defendant that is subject only to specific jurisdiction may only be sued with respect to claims that
arise out of, or relate to, the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. at 923-24. In this case,

Plaintiffs have conceded that they cannot establish either general or specific jurisdiction over A.O.
Smith.
A. General Jurisdiction
For general jurisdiction to exist, the defendant's “affiliations with the State” must be “so
continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). Under Daimler, corporations are subject to general jurisdiction
where they are incorporated or where they have their principal place of business. 571 U.S. at 137.
In this case, A.O. Smith has submitted uncontroverted evidence that it is incorporated in Delaware
and has its principal place of business in Wisconsin. (Doc. # 6-1 at 3, 6). Although Daimler
recognized there may be “an exceptional case” in which a business’s “operations in a forum other
than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial” as to
support general jurisdiction in that forum, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19, the facts in this case do not support
such a finding. A.O. Smith does not have its place of incorporation or its principal place of business
at Alabama, and nor do these facts fit the exceptional circumstance contemplated in Daimler.

Therefore, as Plaintiffs concede, this court lacks general personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
B. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction is present only if an action “aris[es] out of or relat[es] to the
defendant's contact with the forum.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., San
Francisco Cty., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017); see also Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922,
925 (11th Cir. 2007). To determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction comports with the
Due Process Clause, this court must apply a three-part test, which examines whether: (1) “the
plaintiff[] ha[s] established that [her] claims ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of the defendant's
contacts with the forum;” (2) “the plaintiff[] [has] demonstrated that the defendant ‘purposefully

availed’ itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state;” and (3) “the
defendant has ‘made a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Waite., 901 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Louis Vuitton
Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013)) (alteration in original omitted).
i. Arises Out of or Relatedness
Under the first prong, the court must focus on the “direct causal relationship among the
‘defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 850 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The
Eleventh Circuit has previously held that a tort “‘arises out of or relates to’ the defendant’s activity
in a state only if the activity is a ‘but-for’ cause of the tort.” Waite, 901 F.3d at 1314 (quoting
Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 2009)). The Supreme
Court, however, has held that a “strict causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity
and the litigation” is not necessary. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct.
1017, 1026 (2021). In Ford, the Supreme Court clarified that the “relate to” portion of the standard

“contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Id.
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). While this “does not mean that anything goes[,]” specific
personal jurisdiction will exist in cases where “a company . . . serves a market for a product in the
forum State and the product malfunctions there.” Id. at 1026-27.
Here, A.O. Smith asserts that Plaintiff cannot show that it had sufficient contacts with
Alabama because the motor allegedly used in the Broan exhaust fan was not designed, developed,
or manufactured within the state of Alabama. (Doc. # 6 at 8-9). Plaintiff concedes this point. (Doc.
# 17 at 2).
ii. Purposeful Availment

For the second prong, the court must consider whether “the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). “This purposeful
availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or
a third person.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475(1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The contacts “must show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its
home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum State or entering a contractual
relationship centered there.” Ford, 141 S.Ct. at 1025 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285
(2014)).
The record evidence shows that A.O. Smith has no facilities or employees in the state of
Alabama and that the fan motor at issue here was not designed, developed, manufactured, or tested
in the state of Alabama. (Doc. # 6-1 at 3-4). Additionally, A.O. Smith presented evidence that all
motors A.O. Smith sold to Broan for inclusion in its ventilation products were custom made for
Broan and were not sold to other customers. (/d.). Moreover, A.O. Smith also has no record of any
shipments of its motors that were made to Broan within the State of Alabama. (Doc. #6-1 at 4).
Again, Plaintiff concedes it has no contrary evidence.
If the plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, the court must examine the “burden on [the
defendant], the interests of the forum state, and [the plaintiff's] interest in obtaining relief.” World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see also Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food
Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
Because Plaintiff has not satisfied either of the first two prongs, the court need not proceed with
this third prong’s due process analysis.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Defendant A.O. Smith’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6) is
due to be granted. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered
contemporaneously.
DONE and ORDERED this March 31, 2022.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9991030. Public record. Not legal advice.