# Henson v. Walker County

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · March 7, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9990929

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** March 7, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION

)
AMY HENSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 7:20-cv-00071-LSC
)
WALKER COUNTY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Plaintiff Amy Henson (“Henson”) brings this action against Defendants
former Walker County Sheriff Jim Underwood (“Underwood”) and current Walker
County Sheriff Nick Smith (“Smith”). In Counts One and Three of her Second
Amended Complaint, Henson asserts violations of the 4th Amendment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against Defendant Underwood. In Count Two, Henson
asserts a failure to supervise claim under § 1983 against Defendant Underwood
without identifying a specific constitutional provision.1 Henson seeks leave of this
Court to add Count Four to assert an unlawful discrimination claim under § 1557 of

1 This Court assumes, based on the facts and elements alleged, that Henson is bringing a claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (“§ 1557”). In Count Five, Henson
attempts to seek injunctive relief against Smith. Presently before the Court are

Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint (Doc. 50), Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 56), and Defendants’ Motion

to Strike Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 58). The motions are fully briefed and
ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is due to
be DENIED, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART, and Defendants’ Motion to Strike is due to be TERMINATED
AS MOOT.
I. Procedural History

In the first two iterations of her complaint, Henson claimed to have been a
victim of kidnapping and a consumer of “multiple illicit drugs.” (Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 16–
17.) Henson claimed she was then taken to the Walker County Jail and deprived of

medical treatment. Based upon those allegations, Henson brought § 1983 claims
against Walker County, former Walker County Jail Administrator Trent McCluskey,
Walker County Sheriff Nick Smith, former Walker County Sheriff Jim Underwood,

and Deputy Sheriff Joshua Dill. Four of those defendants (Walker County,
McCluskey, Smith, and Dill) filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. 10, 9, 14, and 12.) Underwood and McCluskey moved to
dismiss for improper service. (Docs. 28 and 8.)

After extensive briefing the Court entered a twenty-four-page Memorandum
of Opinion on December 7, 2020. The Memorandum and its accompanying Order

dismissed Henson’s claim against Walker County for failure to state a plausible claim
for relief; dismissed her claim against Sheriff Smith for a lack of standing; and

dismissed her claims against Joshua Dill—both in his official and individual
capacities. Furthermore, the Court (1) directed Henson to serve McCluskey within
fourteen days and (2) mooted Underwood’s motion to dismiss. (Docs. 39 and 40.)

On December 21, 2020, Henson sought to amend her Complaint for a second time.
(Doc. 41). On May 7, 2021, this Court granted that motion in part and denied the
motion in part. (Doc. 47). On May 25, 2021, Henson filed her Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 49).
II. Henson’s Allegations
At this stage, the Court accepts a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and

draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)). Without ruling on their veracity, Henson’s

allegations are the same as the allegations described in this Court’s Memorandum of
Opinion dated December 7, 2020. (See Doc. 39). The only substantial difference is
that Henson now claims mental illness—not kidnapping and abuse of illicit drugs—

caused her arrest and confinement. Henson asserts that “[o]n January 14, 2018, prior
to her arrest, Plaintiff was having a severe crisis of mental health. While Plaintiff has

used drugs other than prescription drugs, she had not done so for many days prior to
that day.” (Doc. 49 at 4). Henson further claims that she knew she was suffering
from severe emotional trauma and knew that she needed medical treatment. (Id. at

4–5).
III. Standards of Review
A. Leave to Amend
A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint is severely

restricted” by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019). Rule 15(a)(2) instructs district courts to
freely allow amendments “when justice so requires,” and justice normally requires

that plaintiffs be “given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the
district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161,
1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991)). The

lone exception is futility; a district court “need not allow any amendment where
amendment would be futile.” See Lee v. Alachua Cnty., Fla., 461 F. App’x 859, 860
(11th Cir. 2012). “Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as
amended would still be properly dismissed or be immediately subject to summary

judgment for the defendant.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310–11 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions for Failure to State a Claim

To withstand a 12(b)(6) motion a complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Lord

Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Tyson, 671 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “begin[s] by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Court next “assume[s] the
veracity” of all well-pleaded factual allegations and determines whether those
allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Only the complaint

itself and any attachments thereto may be considered, even when the parties attempt
to present additional evidence. See Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161,
1168 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

C. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Standing
“Because a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is one attacking the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).” Region 8
Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 807 n.8 (11th Cir.
1993). A 12(b)(1) motion takes one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack.

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990). Sheriff Smith’s
12(b)(1) motion is a facial attack on Henson’s standing. To evaluate Sheriff Smith’s

facial attack, the Court “examines whether [Henson’s] complaint has sufficiently
alleged subject matter jurisdiction.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252,
1260 (11th Cir. 2009). This looks much like the 12(b)(6) analysis. “[T]he Court

construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all
well-pled factual allegations as true.” Id.
D. Rule 12(b)(5) Motion for Insufficient Process

“Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement: a court lacks jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant when that defendant has not been served.” Pardazi v.
Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990). Pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service must be made either “pursuant to the law
of the state in which the district court is located, or in which service is effected,” or
“by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally or

by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) and (2).

IV. Discussion
A. Leave to Amend

Henson seeks leave of this Court to add Count Four asserting an unlawful
discrimination claim under § 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. This request is due to
be denied based on futility. Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1310–11. Section 1557 only applies

to specific health programs or activities that are receiving Federal financial
assistance. If an entity is not principally engaged in the business of providing
healthcare, it is only covered if its health programs or activities themselves receive

Federal financial assistance. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.3. Plaintiff has not alleged that the
Walker County Sheriff’s Office operates a health program that receives Federal
financial assistance. Instead, she claims that Sheriff Underwood is covered by the

statute merely “by virtue of his statutory obligations under Alabama law, and by
virtue of the fact that he did provide health care.” (Doc. 49 at 20). Therefore, even
if this Court were to grant Henson leave to amend, Count Four would be due to be

dismissed for failure to state a claim.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Second Motion to

2 This Court questions whether a private cause of action even exists under § 1557. However, this
Court need not make that determination because even if a cause of action exists, Henson has not
properly plead the required elements.
Amend/Correct Complaint (Doc. 50) is due to be DENIED. As a result,
Defendant’s Defendants’ Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 58),

which seeks to strike Count Four, is due to be TERMINATED AS MOOT.
B. Service of Process

Defendant Underwood claims that Henson’s service of process was
insufficient. (Doc. 57 at 9). Because service of process is a jurisdictional requirement,
this Court must address this argument before turning to Underwood’s remaining

arguments. Pardazi, 896 F.2d at 1317. Here, Henson submitted an affidavit of Lance
McDade (“McDade”), the process server, describing the service of process.
McDade stated that he went to the home of James Underwood on May 11, 2020.

(Doc 37–1). When McDade arrived, he saw two people in the yard and recognized
one of them as James Underwood. (Id.). McDade told Underwood that he had a
summons and complaint for a Larry Underwood. (Id.). James Underwood then said

that no one by that name lived there. (Id.). However, McDade told Underwood that
the complaint and summons were for him, despite the name mix up. (Id.). McDade
told Underwood that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, he was going to leave the

complaint and summons on the bumper of his truck. (Id.). McDade did so, took
pictures of the scene, and left the property. (Id.). Considering the circumstances
surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic and the actual service itself, this Court
determines that Underwood was served personally. McDade delivered a copy of the
summons and complaint to Underwood and satisfied the requirements of Rule 4(e).

C. Henson’s Capacity to Sue
Defendant Underwood argues that Henson lacks mental capacity to bring this

suit and this case should be dismissed until a personal representative is appointed for
her by the Walker County Probate Court. (Doc. 57 at 23). A plaintiff’s capacity to
sue in federal district court is governed by state law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1). Alabama

law defines an “incapacitated person” within its chapter on guardianship as:
Any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, physical or mental infirmities
accompanying advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication,
or other cause (except minority) to the extent of lacking sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions.

Ala. Code § 26-2A-20(8). The critical question is thus whether a person “lack[s]
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions.” Id. Although Alabama state courts have not directly held that this
definition applies to determining a person's capacity to litigate, some federal courts
have employed it for that purpose. See United States v. One Parcel of Prop. Located at
9607 Lee Rd. 72, Waverly, Lee Cty., Ala., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1271 (M.D. Ala.
2012); Brown v. Williamson, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
Ultimately, the relevant inquiry is whether ‘there is sufficient evidence in the record
to determine that [Henson] is mentally impaired to the extent that [s]he cannot
understand the nature and effect of this litigation.” 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.

Here, Henson’s complaint alleges she was experiencing an episode of mental
illness while at the Walker County Jail. However, no evidence has been presented

that demonstrates that Henson is currently experiencing or was experiencing an
episode of mental illness at the time this lawsuit was filed. Accordingly, this Court
determines that, as of now, there is nothing that would show Henson lacks capacity

to bring this lawsuit.
D. Relation Back
Defendant Underwood argues that the Second Amended Complaint is due to

be dismissed because Henson’s claims are time barred. Henson asserts that the
Second Amended Complaint relates back to the original complaint. State law
dictates the applicable statute of limitations when a claim is brought pursuant to §

1983. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Because Alabama law provides the
statute of limitations, this Court looks to Alabama civil procedure rules to determine
whether relation back is allowed. Estate of West v. Smith, 9 F.4th 1361, 1366 n.3 (11th

Cir. 2021). Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) states:
(c) Relation back of amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to
the date of the original pleading when
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of
limitations applicable to the action, or

(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, except as may be otherwise provided in
Rule 13(c) for counterclaims maturing or acquired after pleading, or

(3) the amendment, other than one naming a party under the party’s true
name after having been initially sued under a fictitious name, changes
the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if
the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the applicable period
of limitations or one hundred twenty (120) days of the commencement
of the action, whichever comes later, the party to be brought in by
amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action
that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against the party, or

(4) relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party
practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).

Thus, in order for relation back to apply, Henson’s Second Amended Complaint
must (1) arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading and (2) be served within the applicable period
of limitations or one hundred twenty days from the commencement of the action.
Ala. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2 & 3). Here, both are satisfied.
First, Henson’s Second Amended Complaint arises out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading. Henson still alleges that she was strapped to a restraint chair and denied
basic medical and mental health treatment. This alleged failure on the part of Walker
County Jail employees provides the basis of Henson’s claim against Underwood. As

a result, this Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint arises out of the same
conduct set forth in the original pleading.

Second, Underwood was served within one hundred twenty days of the
commencement of this action. This action was initiated on January 14, 2020. (See
Doc. 1). Underwood was served on May 11, 2020. (Doc. 37–1).3 Thus, Underwood

was served 118 days after the commencement of this action. Accordingly,
Underwood received notice of the action within the proscribed time to allow relation
back. As a result, Henson’s claims are not time barred as the relation back doctrine

applies.
E. Qualified Immunity
In Count One, Two and Three of Henson’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 15.),

she brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count One, Henson asserts that
Underwood violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

3 Generally, “[o]nly the complaint itself and any attachments thereto may be considered, even
when the parties attempt to present additional evidence.” See Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1168.
However, this Court converted the Defendants Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 on February 8, 2022. (Doc. 65). Accordingly, this Court considers the
evidence presented regarding this issue.
Constitution.4 In Count Two, Henson asserts that Underwood failed to adequately
train Walker County Jail staff to provide adequate healthcare for mental illness. In

Count Three, Henson asserts a failure to provide adequate medical treatment by
Underwood.5 Underwood asserts qualified immunity as a complete defense.

“The purpose of [qualified] immunity is to allow government officials to carry
out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing
litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is

knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002). “Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

4“A pretrial detainee’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need falls under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Watkins v. Pinnock, 802 F. App’x 450, 454 (11th
Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Henson mistakenly brought her claims under the Fourth
Amendment. Upon review, the Court found other cases where litigants mislabeled a serious-
medical-need claim. See, e.g., Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (pretrial
detainee mistakenly brought claim under the Eighth Amendment); Andujar, 486 F.3d at 1203 n.3
(same). In those, the Eleventh Circuit overlooked the error and analyzed the claim under the
proper amendment. This Court does the same here.
5 There are no facts which suggest that Underwood personally participated in the alleged
constitutional violations. Accordingly, this Court treats Count Three as a claim for supervisory
liability.
Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535,
546 (2012). The qualified immunity analysis does not take into account an officer’s

alleged subjective intent; instead, it “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of
the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time
it was taken.” Id. Thus, to overcome a public official’s entitlement to qualified

immunity, a plaintiff must be able to establish not only that the public official acted
wrongfully, but also be able to point the court to law existing at the time of the alleged
violation that provided “fair warning” that the conduct of the defendants was illegal.

Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
To be eligible for qualified immunity, the officers must demonstrate that they
were acting in the scope of their discretionary authority. O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d

1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004). “To determine whether an official was engaged in a
discretionary function, [courts] consider whether the acts the official undertook ‘are
of a type that fell within the employee’s job responsibilities.’” Crosby v. Monroe

County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he determination that an officer
was acting within his discretionary authority is quite a low hurdle to clear.” Godby v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390, 1401 (M.D. Ala. 1999). The
incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims arise from Sheriff Underwood’s statutory

duty to operate a jail. See Ala. Code § 14-6-1. Because Underwood was carrying out
his statutory duty of operating the jail, he was acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority.
Since Underwood was acting within his discretionary authority, the following
two-part test determines whether qualified immunity applies: first, the court

determines whether there was a constitutional violation; second, the court
determines whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court

abandoned the rigid order of analysis enunciated in Saucier and left it to the district
courts “to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in

the particular case at hand.” 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
a. Deliberate Indifference
An official violates a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights if he or she is

deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical need(s). Andujar v.
Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2007). A deliberate indifference claimant
must satisfy three “components.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2007). “First, she must satisfy the objective component by showing that she had
a serious medical need. Second, she must satisfy the subjective component by

showing that the . . . official acted with deliberate indifference to her serious medical
need. Third, as with any tort claim, she must show that the injury [or deprivation]
was caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Id. (citations omitted).

The parties do not dispute, for the purpose of this decision, that Henson had
a serious medical need while in custody at Walker County Jail. Thus, the first prong

is satisfied. Henson alleges that Underwood’s deliberate indifference caused her
injuries. Thus, the third prong is satisfied. To satisfy the second prong and show
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege enough facts to raise three elements

above the speculative level: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)
disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.” Goebert,
510 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005)).

With respect to Defendant Underwood, Henson’s claims are not based upon his
personal participation but are based upon his position as Sheriff of Walker County.
Ultimately, Henson’s claims can be boiled down to two theories: failure to supervise

and failure to train.
i. Failure to Supervise

“[S]upervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor
personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a
causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged
constitutional depravation.” Cottone, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff establishes a

causal relationship between a supervisory official’s acts and the acts of his
subordinates in one of three ways: (1) the supervisor had notice of a widespread

history of abuse which he neglected to correct, (2) the supervisor implemented a
custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or
(3) the facts support “the inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to

act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop
them from doing so.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F. 3d 1228, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2003); see
also Harper v. Lawrence County, 592 F. 3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010).

Here, no allegations were made of a widespread history of abuse in Henson’s
Second Amended Complaint. Further, no facts support the inference that
Underwood directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew the subordinates

would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Henson does state
several conclusions about Underwood’s knowledge. She says, “Underwood knew
or should have known that an inmate such as Plaintiff, who was vomiting and
suffering diarrhea for days, would become dangerously dehydrated without medical
intervention.” The Court ignores these conclusions. See Harper v. Lawrence Cnty.

Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (the Eleventh Circuit ignored the legal
conclusion that jail officials “had full knowledge that [the plaintiff] was an alcoholic

who would experience delirium tremens due to alcohol withdrawal if left
untreated”). Only well-pled factual allegations deserve the presumption of truth.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Regardless, Henson has sufficiently alleged that Underwood implemented a
custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights.

Specifically, Henson alleges that:
Without limitation of the foregoing, the policy of the Sheriff when
Plaintiff was booked is that a mentally ill detainee should not be treated
at the Jail or allowed to be treated elsewhere, because the Sheriff gets
money for housing prisoners but is forced to pay money for medical
care, which care is especially expensive for persons with acute
psychiatric illness because such treatment necessarily comes from
specialists. This continues to be the policy of the Sheriff today. As a
result of that policy, Plaintiff suffered severe bodily injuries then and
she is still suffering injury today.

(Doc. 49 at 11–12). Thus, Henson has alleged a custom or policy that resulted in a
deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights. Accordingly, Henson has
sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference on a supervisory liability theory.
ii. Failure to Train
A sheriff’s decision not to train employees to not violate citizens’ rights may

rise to the level of an official government policy for § 1983 purposes. Weiland v. Palm
Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th Cir. 2015). However, liability

for a failure to train will only arise when the need for such training is “plainly
obvious” to policymakers. Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990). A
claim regarding an isolated incident is generally insufficient to sustain a failure to

train cause of action because the officials in charge of training policies must be on
notice of constitutional deficiencies. McMurry v. Moore, 242 F. Supp. 2d. 1167 (N.D.
Fla. 2002). If a sheriff has no actual notice of unconstitutional practices by the

offending subordinate or if there is no “history of widespread abuse by [d]epartment
personnel that would have put the sheriff on notice of the need for improved training
or supervision” the sheriff will not be held liable for a failure to train or supervise.

See Id. “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect,
decision makers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program
that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

72 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring). Here, no allegations were made of a widespread
history of abuse in Henson’s Second Amended Complaint. Ultimately, no
allegations were made that Underwood was on notice of the need for improved
training or supervision. Accordingly, Henson has failed to sufficiently establish
deliberate indifference to survive a motion to dismiss on a failure to train theory.

b. Constitutional violation
Next, the Court turns to the second step of qualified immunity—that is,

whether the rights that Henson’s alleges were clearly established. A constitutional
right is clearly established only if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). To show that the conduct was unconstitutional
with obvious clarity, “the unlawfulness must have been apparent.” Willingham v.

Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003). “Unless a government agent’s act
is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent
officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing, the

government actor has immunity from suit.” Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d
1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). Henson must demonstrate violations of clearly
established law in either of two ways. First, Plaintiff can point to a case with

materially similar facts holding that the conduct engaged in was illegal. Storck, 354
F.3d at 1317. Second, in absence of case law, Plaintiff must demonstrate that a
pertinent federal statute or constitutional provision is specific enough to

demonstrate the Defendants’ conduct was illegal. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “pretrial detainees ... plainly have a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to receive medical treatment for illness

and injuries, which encompass a right to psychiatric and mental health care, and a
right to be protected from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide.’” Cook v. Sheriff
of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cagle v. Sutherland,

334 F.3d 980, 985 (11th Cir. 2003)). Further, “[t]he knowledge of the need for
medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care has consistently been held

to surpass negligence and constitute deliberate indifference.” Patel v. Lanier Cnty.
Ga, 969 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc.,
769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Thus, at the time of Henson's arrest, it was clearly established that an officer's
deliberate indifference to the need for medical care is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here, Henson has alleged that she was suffering from a mental health

and medical crisis during her time at Walker County Jail. Henson has also alleged
that she was not provided with medical care. Because it was clear that failure to
provide care in the face of a known serious need is unconstitutional, Underwood is

not entitled to qualified immunity. This Court does not address whether the
constitutional violation was clear for failure to train as this Court finds no deliberate
indifference as to Underwood in Count Two.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is due to be DENIED as to
Count One to the extent it asserts a failure to supervise claim and is due to be

GRANTED as to Count One to the extent it asserts a failure to train claim. The
motion is also due to be GRANTED as to Count Two and due to be DENIED as to

Count Three based on qualified immunity.
F. Injunctive Relief
Nick Smith became Walker County’s sheriff after Henson’s arrest and time

at jail. Jim Underwood, not Nick Smith, was sheriff “[a]t all times relevant to this
lawsuit.” (Doc. 2 at ¶ 4.) She therefore sued Smith only in his official capacity and
only for injunctive relief. Smith contends that Henson lacks standing to seek her

requested injunctive relief. This Court previously dismissed all claims against Smith
on December 7, 2020. (Docs. 39 & 40). Henson then sought leave to amend her
complaint. (Doc. 41). Henson attached her proposed Second Amended Complaint

to that motion. (Doc. 41–1). This Court said that “two allegations within the
proposed complaint might … change the standing analysis.” (Doc. 47 at 4).
However, after a careful review of the allegations in the Second Amended

Complaint, this Court concludes that Henson lacks standing to seek injunctive relief
against Smith.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction
to cases and controversies, U.S. Const. art. III § 2, and “standing is an essential . . .

part of the case or controversy requirement.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992). A standing analysis asks “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Sims v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway

Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989). To have standing, the
party asserting federal jurisdiction must establish three elements.

First, [he or she] must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant and not . . . the result of the independent action
of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Because injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek
injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and
immediate—as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical—threat of future
injury.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
in original). Stated differently, the plaintiff must show “a sufficient likelihood that
[she] will be affected by the allegedly wrongful conduct [again] in the future.”
Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson
v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Former jail inmates generally don’t have standing to enjoin future jail actions
or future jail conditions. See Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1984);
McKinnon v. Talladega, 745 F.2d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 1984); Holland v. Purdy, 457

F.2d 802, 803 (5th Cir. 1972) (“Since Holland was no longer subjected to the
complained-of conditions at the time this litigation was instituted, nor is he at the

present time, the petition should have been dismissed on the ground of mootness.”).
The narrow holding of Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984) does not, in
this case, override the general rule—that former jail inmates cannot sue a jail or jail

officials for prospective injunctive relief. In Lynch, a mentally ill plaintiff challenged
Alabama’s practice of holding an individual in county jail pending his or her civil
commitment hearing. Id. at 1455–57. Although the plaintiff was not incarcerated

when he brought the suit, he was incarcerated twice in the three years before. Id.
Based on (1) that pattern of incarceration, (2) the plaintiff’s “mental problems”
which were “subject to reoccurrence,” and (3) the high likelihood that “state

officials [would] continue to employ the county jails to detain . . . mentally ill
individuals awaiting final commitment hearings,” the plaintiff “was realistically
threatened by a repetition of his experiences and therefore [had] standing.” Id.
According to the Court, the plaintiff was “at risk of [again] being detained in jail not
because of volitional acts on his part but because his mental condition would prompt

his family, as it [had] done on two previous occasions, to petition for involuntary
commitment.” Id. at 1457. The Court ultimately found that the plaintiff’s claims
were “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id.

Henson claims to have been confined at Walker County Jail on a second
occasion—sometime in the summer of 2020. (Doc. 49 at ¶ 57.) A pattern of

confinement, in some scenarios, might suggest future confinement is more likely and
less speculative. Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1456–57. Henson also claims that mental illness
(and not a kidnapping) caused her January 2018 arrest and confinement. If true—if

Henson has suffered and continues to suffer major psychotic breakdowns—then the
threat of future confinement at Walker County Jail, in some scenarios, may be
sufficient to justify standing. Id. (holding that a mentally ill former county-jail inmate

had standing to sue for injunctive relief because there was “every indication that [he]
would continue to be the subject of involuntary commitment petitions” and re-
confined in the same jail).

However, Lynch is distinguishable from the case at hand. The plaintiffs in
Lynch sought to enjoin the defendant officials of the state of Alabama from detaining
in county jails persons awaiting mental illness involuntary commitment proceedings.
Id. at 1454. Here, Henson has certainly alleged that she has been reincarcerated and
has a mental illness that makes reincarceration likely in the future. While the issue in

Lynch was whether it was likely that the plaintiffs would be reincarcerated, that is not
the issue here. Instead, the issue is whether Henson will be again placed in a restraint

chair and denied medical care, including mental health treatment. No allegations
supporting such a conclusion have been made. In fact, when Henson was
reincarcerated in 2020, she apparently was not placed in a restraint chair or denied

medical treatment. Thus, Henson’s threats of future harm are more speculative and
less actual or imminent than the plaintiff’s injury in Lynch. Her claim against Smith
is therefore due to be dismissed due to her lack of standing.

V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 50) is due
to be DENIED, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 56) is due to be GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 58) is
due to be TERMINATED AS MOOT. An Order consistent with this opinion will
be entered contemporaneously herewith.
DONE and ORDERED on March 7, 2022.

L. Scott G
United States Distct Judge
206770

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9990929. Public record. Not legal advice.