# Long v. Underwood

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · December 4, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9989095

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** December 4, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9989095

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a sheriff and deputy sheriffs were “immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment for [the plaintiff’s] claims brought against them in their official capacity as state officials”
- stating that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss if the complaint “fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION

JOHN LONG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 6:19-cv-695-GMB
)
JAMES E. UNDERWOOD and )
BRADEN MILES, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike filed by
Defendants James E. Underwood and Braden Miles. Doc. 6. Plaintiff John Long has
filed a response in opposition to the motion. Doc. 11. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. 19. After careful
consideration of the parties’ submissions and the relevant law, the court finds that
the motion (Doc. 6) is due to be granted.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this lawsuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The defendants do not contest personal
jurisdiction or venue in the Northern District of Alabama, and the court finds
adequate allegations to support both.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is a recitation of the facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s state-court
complaint. Doc. 1-1. This lawsuit arises out of motor vehicle accident during a high-
speed police chase on April 14, 2017 in Walker County, Alabama. Doc. 1-1 at 5.

Walker County deputy sheriff Braden Miles attempted to stop the driver of a
motorcycle because he believed that the motorcycle had been stolen and that the
driver had committed a traffic violation. Doc. 1-1 at 5. The driver refused to pull
over, and instead accelerated to more than 100 miles per hour. Doc. 1-1 at 5. Miles

pursued the fleeing motorcyclist in a patrol car on a rural county road for over nine
miles at speeds of up to 115 miles per hour. Doc. 1-1 at 5.
While Miles and the motorcycle were traveling northbound on Alabama

Highway 195, Plaintiff John Long was traveling southbound. Doc. 1-1 at 6. As the
motorcyclist reached a curve at the intersection of Highway 195 and Bennett Road,
he crossed the center line and collided head-on with Long’s vehicle. Doc. 1-1 at 6.
As a result of the accident, Long suffered significant injuries and totaled his vehicle.

Doc. 1-1 at 6. The driver of the motorcycle did not survive the crash. Doc. 1-1 at 6.
Long alleges that Walker County Sheriff James E. Underwood “failed to
develop and implement adequate policies, procedures, customs, or practices, to

protect the public from the foreseeable result that bystanders such as Long would be
harmed by deputies engaged in high-speed chases.” Doc. 1-1 at 6. He also alleges
that both defendants exhibited a “malicious and intentional disregard” of Long’s
“constitutional rights to purposefully inflict harm.” Doc. 1-1 at 7. As a result, “Long

suffered from physical injury, pain, suffering, emotional distress, anxiety, and
duress, as well as a loss of personal property.” Doc. 1-1 at 7.
Long filed suit on April 12, 2019 in the Circuit Court of Walker County,

Alabama, naming Miles and Sheriff Underwood as defendants. The defendants
removed the case to this court on May 7, 2019. Long brings three constitutional
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to
substantive due process against Miles, (2) failure to train and supervise against

Sheriff Underwood, (3) and failure to train and supervise against fictitious
defendants. Doc. 1-1 at 7–12. He also alleges state-law negligence-based claims
against both Miles and Sheriff Underwood. Doc. 1-1 at 12. The defendants seek

dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must “take the factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim
is “plausible on its face” if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint “requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations need not be
detailed, but “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Strike

Long’s third cause of action is a § 1983 failure-to-train claim against any
unnamed defendants who may have “failed to adequately train, supervise, and
discipline Miles on conducting a high-speed pursuit.” Doc. 1-1 at 11. Long

anticipates that he will name these defendants “by amendment when [their identities
are] ascertained.” Doc. 11 at 23.
“As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal
court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). A “limited

exception” to the general rule exists where “the plaintiff’s description of the
defendant is so specific as to be, at the very worst, surplusage.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Long’s description of the fictitious defendants

here falls outside of this limited exception. Far from specific, Long essentially
describes any person who may be subject to liability on a supervisory basis. Doc. 1-
1 at 10–12. Thus, Long’s claims against the fictitious defendants are impermissibly
vague, and the defendants’ motion to strike is due to be granted.1

B. Sovereign Immunity for Official Capacity Claims
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits suits for
money damages against a state by citizens of that state. Carr v. City of Florence,

Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). This immunity has been extended to
suits against state officials in their official capacities where monetary damages
would be paid by the state. Id. To determine whether an official is protected by
Eleventh Amendment immunity, courts look to the laws of the particular state in

question. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016).
The Alabama Constitution provides that sheriffs are members of the state’s
executive branch. Id. (citing Ala. Const. Art. V § 112). Accordingly, “as an

executive officer, a sheriff is immune from being sued in the execution of the duties
of his office under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Const. 1901.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “It is well established in this Circuit that Alabama sheriffs and their
deputies are state officials and are absolutely immune from suit as an officer of the

state under the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. Suits against sheriffs and their deputies
for “actions taken in the line and scope of their employment” constitute suits against
the state, and are therefore prohibited by § 14. Ex Parte Shelley, 53 So. 3d 887, 895

1 These claims, if stated against identified defendants, likely would be dismissed for the same
(Ala. 2009). “The wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly impregnable.”
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).

The Alabama Supreme Court has described five exceptions to § 14 immunity:
Section 14 immunity is not applicable when an action is brought: (1) to
compel state officials to perform their legal duties; (2) to compel state
officials to perform ministerial acts; (3) to enjoin state officials from
enforcing unconstitutional laws; (4) to enjoin state officials from acting
in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond their authority, or under mistaken
interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek construction of a statute under
the Declaratory Judgment Act.

Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 445 (Ala. 1987). None of these exceptions
applies in this case since Long has sued purely for monetary damages. See Doc. 1-1
at 3. Thus, because Long has brought suit against Miles and Sheriff Underwood in
their official capacities for monetary damages, these claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.2 See, e.g., Melton, 841 F.3d at 1234 (holding that a sheriff
and deputy sheriffs were “immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment for [the
plaintiff’s] claims brought against them in their official capacity as state officials”).
C. Individual Capacity Claims
1. Qualified Immunity
Long seeks to hold Miles liable under § 1983 in his individual capacity under
the premise that he “intentionally, maliciously, and purposefully” violated Long’s

2 Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to two limited exceptions: where the state has
statutorily waived its immunity and where Congress has limited the state’s immunity. See Carr,
916 F.2d at 1524. Neither exception applies here because Alabama has not waived its immunity
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by engaging in the
high-speed pursuit. Doc. 1-1 at 7–8. He also asserts a § 1983 claim against Sheriff

Underwood for an alleged failure to train or supervise. Doc. 1-1 at 8–10.
Miles and Sheriff Underwood contend that they are entitled to qualified
immunity against Long’s individual-capacity claims. Doc. 6 at 10–19. Qualified

immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from suit
“in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Its purpose is to hold public officials accountable for
legitimately unlawful conduct while protecting them from burdensome lawsuits
when they have acted reasonably. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, a “public official must first prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). If
the public official has done so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that

qualified immunity is inappropriate. Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995. To satisfy this
burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant committed a violation of a
constitutional right and that this right was “clearly established” at the time of the

alleged violation. Carollo v. Boria, 833 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 2016).
When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the court applies the familiar Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard. See, e.g.,
Bowen v. Warden Baldwin St. Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016); Randall

v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707–10 (11th Cir. 2010); Williams v. Ala. St. Univ., 102 F.3d
1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on a motion to dismiss if the complaint “fails to allege the violation of a

clearly established constitutional right”). The court “begin[s] by identifying
conclusory allegations that are not entitled to an assumption of truth––legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.” Randall, 610 F.3d at 709–10.
As it would on any other motion to dismiss, the court accepts the truth of well-pled

factual allegations “and then determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 710.
There is no indication that Miles and Sheriff Underwood were acting outside

of the scope of their discretionary authority during any of the conduct at issue, and
Long does not argue otherwise. See Doc. 11 at 16–21. Instead, Long focuses his
attention on arguing that he appropriately alleged a constitutional violation. See Doc.
11 at 17–21. The court disagrees.

In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998), the United States
Supreme Court held that a police officer does not violate an individual’s Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights “by causing death through deliberate or

reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending
a suspected offender.” In that case, police chased a motorcycle driven by an 18-
year-old boy with a 16-year-old passenger at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour
through a residential neighborhood. Id. at 836–37. The motorcycle flipped on a

sharp left turn, ejecting both boys. Id. at 837. The trailing patrol car struck and killed
the 16-year-old passenger. Id. The resulting complaint alleged “a variety of culpable
states of mind: ‘negligently responsible in some manner,’ ‘reckless and careless,’

‘recklessness, gross negligence and conscious disregard for [the plaintiff’s] safety,’
and ‘oppression, fraud and malice.’” Id. at 854 (citations omitted). Finding that
liability could stand only where there was a “purpose to cause harm unrelated to the
legitimate object of arrest” such that an officer’s conduct “shocked the conscience,”

the Supreme Court declared that “high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects
physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 836 & 853–54.

Here, Long has not alleged that Miles had a purpose to cause harm unrelated
to the legitimate object of arrest as he pursued the driver of the motorcycle. Instead,
Long alleges that Miles “failed to respond in an objectively reasonable manner” to
the fleeing motorcyclist and “deliberately and recklessly disregarded the risk to

bystanders like Long by continuing to press the suspect to operate the motorcycle at
a high rate of speed.” Doc. 1-1 at 7. In doing so, Long alleges that Miles “acted
intentionally, maliciously, and purposefully to harm Miles in such a manner that is

shocking to the conscience.” Doc. 1-1 at 7–8. While this statement facially conforms
with the Lewis Court’s articulation of a shocks-the-conscience test for high-speed
police pursuits, it is not supported by any plausible factual allegations that Miles
intended to cause harm. Rather, Long’s own allegations sink his claim, as he

concedes in the complaint that Miles pursued the motorcycle because he believed it
was stolen and the driver had committed a traffic violation. Doc. 1-1 at 5. Because
a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient to state a

viable claim, Long has not plausibly alleged a constitutional violation, and Miles
and Sheriff Underwood are entitled to qualified immunity on Long’s § 1983 claims
against them in their individual capacities.
2. Failure-to-Train Claim Against Sheriff Underwood3

Axiomatically, where there is no constitutional violation, a plaintiff “cannot
maintain a § 1983 action for supervisory liability . . . for failure to train.” Hicks v.
Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005). But even if Long had successfully

alleged a constitutional violation, his failure-to-train claim against Sheriff
Underwood in his individual capacity still would fall short.
“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity
for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d

1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Supervisors cannot be held liable on a respondeat
superior basis. Instead, the plaintiff must allege “that the supervisor either directly

3 Long characterizes this claim in the state-court complaint as a “Failure to Train and Supervise
Under the 14th Amendment,” and in the complaint and in briefing he references the legal standards
for both failure-to-train and supervisory liability claims. Doc. 1-1 at 8–10. Accordingly, the court
participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists
between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v.

DeKalb County, Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014). To show a causal
connection, the plaintiff must allege that a “history of widespread abuse” should
have put the supervisor “on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation,”

and the supervisor nevertheless failed to act. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
Alternatively, the plaintiff must identify a “custom or policy” of the supervisor’s that
resulted in “deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. Id. Finally, a plaintiff
could allege that the supervisor either directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or

knew that they would do so and failed to stop them. Id. “In short, the standard by
which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of a
subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
Long has not claimed that Sheriff Underwood either personally participated
in the pursuit or directed Miles to act unlawfully. He has not identified any custom
or policy of Sheriff Underwood’s that resulted in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights. And he has not pled any facts suggesting that Sheriff
Underwood specifically knew that his officers would act unlawfully but failed to
stop them from doing so.

Long also characterizes his claim against Sheriff Underwood as a failure-to-
train claim, which “implicates a different, albeit very similar, rule.” Keith, 749 F.3d
at 1052. “[U]nder § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for failing to train his or
her employees ‘only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to

the rights of persons with whom the [officers] come into contact.’” Id. (quoting City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference is a
“stringent standard of fault,” and exists only when “policymakers are on actual or

constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes . . .
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 62 (2011). To establish actual or constructive notice, “[a] pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary.” Connick,

563 U.S. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must allege that the
supervisor, armed with the knowledge of past constitutional violations, “chose to
retain that training program.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052.

Here, Long’s complaint is long on legal conclusions and short on
corresponding factual support. While he alleges the elements of a § 1983 failure-to-
train claim, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Long alleges

that Sheriff Underwood failed to “adequately train, supervise, and discipline law
enforcement personnel on conducting high-speed pursuit,” and did not “implement
procedural controls to protect innocent bystanders from unrestrained law

enforcement personnel in the conduct of high-speed pursuit.” Doc. 1-1 at 9. But
Long has not identified any past incidents involving high-speed police chases in
Walker County––let alone a pattern of such incidents––that would have put Sheriff
Underwood on notice of the potential for the accident that occurred here. Indeed,

Long does not identify any training program or explain how its deficiency leads to a
deprivation of constitutional rights in Walker County. As a result, even if he had
adequately pled a constitutional violation, Long has not alleged the facts necessary

to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that Sheriff Underwood was
deliberately indifferent to an obvious need to train his employees. Iqbal, 676 U.S. at
678. Instead, he has suggested the mere “possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679.
Nevertheless, as Long points out in briefing, the Supreme Court has

“hypothesized” that “in a narrow range of circumstances, a pattern of similar
violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.” Connick, 563
U.S. at 63. The Supreme Court reasoned in City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10

(citation omitted), that because “city policymakers know to a moral certainty that
their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,” and cities arm their
officers with firearms “in part to allow them to accomplish this task[,] the need to
train officers in constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to

be ‘so obvious[]’ that a failure to do so could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate
indifference’ to constitutional rights.”
Long asserts that he has met this burden by alleging that Sheriff Underwood

had a policy of failing to train his officers to safely conduct high-speed pursuits
despite the fact that such pursuits place bystanders “at a substantial risk of injury.”
Doc. 11 at 20–21. However, guidance in the application of the single-incident
liability exception is scant, “as neither the Supreme Court nor Eleventh Circuit has

ever applied it.” Whitaker v. Miami-Dade County, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1325 (S.D.
Fla. 2015). In Whitaker, a district court applied the single-incident liability
exception where the plaintiffs claimed that a Florida county acted with deliberate

indifference to its citizens’ civil rights by failing to properly train its police officers
on the use of deadly force. See id. at 1323. The plaintiffs argued that they had
identified the existence of a widespread practice of police officers using excessive
force, but that the single-incident exception would have applied even if they had not

done so. See id.
Unlike Long, the two decedents in Whitaker were fatally shot by police
officers after a police chase. Id. at 1317. Citing to Iqbal, the court concluded that

the complaint’s allegations were “not well-pled facts, but rather conclusory
allegations not entitled to the presumption of truth.” Id. at 1327. That is because the
plaintiffs’ factual allegations did “not give rise to the reasonable inference that the
deaths were a result of the County’s deliberate indifference to” the decedents’

constitutional rights. Id. The complaint did not allege that a policymaker for the
county made a conscious decision not to train its officers or that it was obvious that
the failure to do so would result in a violation of citizens’ constitutional rights. Id.

Identically, Long has alleged no actual facts suggesting that there was an
“obvious need” for training in the Walker County Sheriff’s Office that went unmet.
Instead, he relies purely on legal conclusions and boilerplate § 1983 language, which
are insufficient under the Iqbal/Twombly regime. Like the Whitaker plaintiffs, Long

has done little, if anything, to tie the constitutional deprivation alleged in this case
to a specific lack of training. He does not plead any facts showing that Sheriff
Underwood made the conscious decision not to train his officers in the face of an

obvious need, or that this failure would obviously result in a constitutional violation.
For all of these reasons, Long’s failure-to-train claim against Sheriff Underwood is
due to be dismissed.
D. State-Law Claims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Long’s remaining state-law negligence-based claims
because Long’s federal claims will be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating

that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if
“the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).
In fact, where all federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, district courts are
encouraged to dismiss any remaining state claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370

F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”). Before dismissing the remaining state-law claims,
the court must consider the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity. See Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Labs., Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 532 (11th Cir.

2015) (citing City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
“Both comity and economy are served when issues of state law are resolved
by state courts.” Rowe v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir.

2002). “Federal courts are (and should be) loath to wade into uncharted waters of
state law, and should only do so when absolutely necessary to the disposition of a
case.” Ameritox, 803 F.3d at 540. Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that
“[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided as a matter of comity and to

promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
applicable law.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Here,
the court finds no reason to depart from this practice by adjudicating Long’s state-

law claims if his federal claims are dismissed prior to trial. Further, there is nothing
before the court to suggest that the remaining factors––convenience and fairness––
weigh in favor of retaining subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the court can
discern no possibility of significant prejudice to Long, particularly in light of

§ 1367(d)’s provision tolling the statute of limitations for his remaining claims under
state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Accordingly, the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Long’s state-law claims pursuant to § 1367(c)(3).

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
and Motion to Strike (Doc. 5) is GRANTED, and all federal claims asserted by
Plaintiff John Long are DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further ORDERED that
Long’s state-law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
A separate judgment will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED on December 4, 2019.
re AN.
GRAY at oo
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9989095. Public record. Not legal advice.