# Sutton v. Marshall

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · November 7, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9989050

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** November 7, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9989050

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that courts of equity should not enjoin state criminal proceedings pursuant to the notions of comity and respect

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION

LENA SUTTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:19-CV-660-KOB
)
STEVE MARSHALL, in his official )
capacity as Attorney General of the State )
of Alabama, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
In one of the most enduring songs from the 1960s, Aretha Franklin sang, “R-E-S-P-E-C-
T find out what it means to me.” ARETHA FRANKLIN, Respect, I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY
I LOVE YOU (Atlantic Records 1967). To federal courts, respect—as memorialized in the
Younger abstention doctrine—means refraining from interfering with ongoing state court
proceedings that implicate important state interests. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45
(1971) (stating that courts of equity should not enjoin state criminal proceedings pursuant to the
notions of comity and respect). In this case, respect means abstaining from interfering with state
forfeiture proceedings about which Ms. Sutton complains.
This matter comes before the court on Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff Lena Sutton’s amended complaint. (Doc. 17). In her amended
complaint, Ms. Sutton seeks to instigate a class action to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional
actions by the state during civil forfeiture proceedings. (Doc. 14). Attorney General Marshall
moves to dismiss Ms. Sutton’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), arguing that Younger abstention applies and that Ms. Sutton fails to state a claim for
which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the court will GRANT Attorney
General Marshall’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.
I. Standard of Review
The law lacks clarity regarding whether courts should analyze the Younger abstention

doctrine under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), challenging jurisdiction, or 12(b)(6),
attacking the sufficiency of the complaint. Compare Fairfield Cmty. Clean Up Crew, Inc. v.
Hale, 2:17-CV-308-LSC, 2017 WL 4865545, at *2–3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2017) (Coogler, J.)
(applying Rule 12(b)(1) standard), with Cano-Diaz v. City of Leeds, Ala., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1280,
1284–85 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (Hopkins, J.) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard). But, the choice of
which rule to apply makes little practical difference because the court applies a standard of
review akin to that of Rule 12(b)(6) when a defendant makes a facial, rather than a factual, attack
on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root
Services, Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). The Attorney General’s motion to dismiss
references both Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), and his argument against the court exercising jurisdiction

presents a facial attack, so the court applies Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards to the motion.
The Supreme Court explained that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).
In considering a Rule 12(b) motion, the rules generally limit the court to assessing the
face of the complaint and its attachments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272,
1275–76 (11th Cir. 2005). Where a court properly takes judicial notice of exhibits attached to
the pleadings, it may consider matters outside of the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b) motion
without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)–(d);
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1276-79 (11th Cir. 1999). The court may take

judicial notice of state court proceedings. Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1984).
As reflected in this Memorandum Opinion, Alabama state court proceedings influence
the considerations in this case. Attorney General Marshall provided the relevant state court
documents along with his motion to dismiss. The court takes judicial notice of the records of the
state court proceedings without converting his motion to a motion for summary judgment.
II. Factual Background
On February 20, 2019, Ms. Sutton loaned her car to a friend of hers, Roger Maze; police
pulled Mr. Maze over while he was driving Ms. Sutton’s car. (Doc. 14). During the traffic stop,
law enforcement found a trafficking amount of methamphetamine in Ms. Sutton’s car. Ms.
Sutton had no knowledge of the methamphetamine and faces no criminal charges. Nevertheless,

the state seized Ms. Sutton’s car because it was used to transport drugs and then instituted a civil
forfeiture action pursuant to Alabama’s Civil Forfeiture Act, Ala. Code § 20-2-93.
State court records show that the state served Ms. Sutton with a complaint in the civil
forfeiture action on March 12, 2019. (Doc. 17-3 at 14–28). After Ms. Sutton failed to
adequately respond to the complaint, the state entered a default judgement in April of 2019. (Id.
at 44). Ms. Sutton then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, in which she stated that
she was not accused of any crime and that the seizure of her car was unconstitutional. (Id. at 57–
58). In support of her motion to set aside the default, Ms. Sutton filed a memorandum in which
she argued that the default should be set aside because she had a meritorious defense to the case,
namely that the seizure and continued custody of her vehicle without a prompt post-deprivation
hearing violated her Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 17-4 at 21–
24). The state court set aside the default and Ms. Sutton filed an answer in July 2019, raising
claims that the seizure of her car violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 103).

She did not raise her claims regarding the constitutionality of the retention of her vehicle. The
forfeiture proceedings have yet to go to trial.
In her amended complaint in this court, Ms. Sutton asserts that Alabama’s seizure of her
car and the subsequent civil forfeiture proceedings deprive her—and other similarly situated
putative class members—of her rights. Ms. Sutton seeks to bring a class action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. She argues that the state’s failure to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing after it
seizes property violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. She
further asserts that Alabama’s procedures do not provide defendants in civil forfeiture
proceedings with an opportunity to contest the deprivation of their property during the pendency
of the forfeiture litigation, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Ms.

Sutton also argues that Alabama’s civil forfeiture proceedings violate the Eighth Amendment.
Ms. Sutton requests multiple forms of relief. She requests that the court certify this
action as a class action, enter a declaratory judgment stating that Alabama’s civil forfeiture
proceedings are unconstitutional, hold the state liable for unconstitutional practices, enter
injunctions prohibiting the state from engaging in unconstitutional forfeiture practices, enter a
judgment requiring the state to immediately institute hearings in all similar civil forfeiture
proceedings, and award attorney’s fees.
III. Discussion
In his motion to dismiss, Attorney General Marshall argues that the court should refrain
from exercising jurisdiction over Ms. Sutton’s complaint pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine. (Docs. 17, 18). Of course, abstaining from exercising jurisdiction first requires the

court to have jurisdiction. While the Defendant does not challenge the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, the court notes that Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and multiple
constitutional amendments, giving this court federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
The Attorney General asserts that the court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
because the Plaintiff asks this court to interfere in state court proceedings. The Attorney General
also asserts that Younger abstention applies because Ms. Sutton can raise her constitutional
claims in her state forfeiture proceedings, and, in fact, already has raised some of her
constitutional claims. The Attorney General notes that Ms. Sutton could pay a bond to have her
vehicle released or could file a motion in state court for the release of her seized vehicle, neither

of which she has done. He attaches an example motion for release of a vehicle that comes from
the Alabama Criminal Trial Practice Forms. Alternatively, Attorney General Marshall argues
that Ms. Sutton has not stated any claim for which relief can be granted. The Attorney General
attaches to his motion to dismiss documents from relevant state court proceedings, which show
that Ms. Sutton’s forfeiture action has yet to be resolved.
In her response in opposition to the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Sutton
argues that Younger abstention does not apply. (Doc. 20). Although she concedes that the
second prong of Younger abstention—the involvement of important state interests—applies, Ms.
Sutton narrowly focuses on the deprivation of her car during the pendency of the forfeiture
proceedings and asserts that Younger abstention does not apply to that specific issue. She
contends that federal relief will not interfere with an ongoing state proceeding and that she does
not have an opportunity to raise her constitutional claims in state court. In support of her
arguments, Ms. Sutton relies heavily on a case from the Southern District of New York,

Krimstock v. Safir, No. 99 CIV. 12041 MBM, 2000 WL 1702035 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000),
reversed on other grounds by Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002). Ms. Sutton also
argues that she has sufficiently pled her claims to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Attorney General replies that Krimstock does not apply to the case at hand and that
Ms. Sutton’s case meets the requirements for Younger abstention, as her requested relief would
interfere with ongoing state court proceedings and she could raise her constitutional claims in
state court. Attorney General Marshall also reasserts his argument that Ms. Sutton’s complaint
fails on the merits.
Under Alabama law, a conveyance used to transport drugs is subject to forfeiture. Ala.
Code § 20-2-93(a)(5). The state can seize property subject to forfeiture without process where

the seizure is instant to arrest. Id. § 20-2-93(b)(1). Where property is seized without process,
civil forfeiture proceedings must be instituted “promptly.” Id. § 20-2-93(c), (d). Owners can
reclaim their property if they can show that they did not know about and could not have
prevented the acts or omissions that led to the seizure of the property. Id. § 20-2-93(h). An
owner can also execute a bond to reclaim her vehicle during the pendency of the forfeiture
action. Id. § 20-2-93(h), 28-4-287.
Federal courts act circumspectly when dealing with state court proceedings. When first
setting forth the Younger abstention doctrine, the Supreme Court recognized “the national policy
forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. While abstention is the exception rather than the rule
when determining whether a federal court should exercise jurisdiction, federal courts “may and
should withhold equitable relief to avoid interference in state proceedings” out of respect for the
principle of comity between state and federal governments. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329

F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).
Although Younger itself dealt with state criminal proceedings, “its principles are ‘fully
applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.’” Id.
(quoting Middlesex Ct. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized—while narrowing Younger’s general
applicability—that state-initiated civil enforcement proceedings are one of the “exceptional”
circumstances that fall within the Younger abstention doctrine. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
571 U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013). Accordingly, Younger abstention potentially extends to the state-
initiated forfeiture proceedings in this case.
In determining whether to apply the Younger doctrine, a court must ask three questions:

“first, do the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the
proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the
state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274
(citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432).
Ms. Sutton argues that Younger abstention does not apply because her federal
proceedings would not interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding, as no ongoing state
proceeding exists regarding the specific issue of whether the state can retain her car during the
pendency of her forfeiture proceeding. She also argues that relief in this case will not interfere
with an ongoing state court proceeding, in part because the relief she requests would not
terminate the state forfeiture proceeding. In support of her argument that her case would not
interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding, Ms. Sutton cites Belevich v. Thomas, No. 2:17-
CV-01193-AKK, 2018 WL 1244493 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2018).
Ms. Sutton’s arguments fail to persuade the court. As an initial matter, the court finds

unconvincing Ms. Sutton’s argument that no ongoing state proceedings exist dealing with the
continued retention of her car during her forfeiture proceedings. Ms. Sutton construes the issue
too narrowly. While neither Ms. Sutton nor the state has instigated proceedings dealing
explicitly and solely with the issue of whether the state can retain her car during her forfeiture
proceedings without certain procedural measures, the forfeiture proceedings completely
encompass the issue of whether the state has a right to hold Ms. Sutton’s car, either permanently
or temporarily. Further, Ms. Sutton could take advantage of available methods within the state
court proceeding to challenge the state’s retention of her vehicle. Accordingly, she has not
shown that no ongoing state court proceeding exists.
Ms. Sutton also fails to show that federal relief will not interfere with the ongoing state

court proceeding. To assess whether a federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state
proceeding, the court must look at the effect that the relief requested would have on the state
proceeding. 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274. The federal proceeding need not directly
affect or terminate the state court proceedings to interfere with it; disruption of the state court
proceedings can suffice to show interference. Id. at 1276. Therefore, Ms. Sutton cannot rely on
the assertion that Younger does not apply because relief in this case would not terminate the
enforcement proceedings. See id. Rather, Ms. Sutton’s requested relief—which includes a
request that this court compel the state court to conduct hearings in cases like Ms. Sutton’s—
would change the course of state forfeiture proceedings, and, thus, would interfere. See id.
Additionally, Belevich does not preclude the application of Younger in this case. In
Belevich, the court determined that Younger abstention did not apply to a contract dispute where
relief could potentially have affected alimony in an ongoing state divorce proceeding because the
contract dispute was only “tangentially related” to the divorce proceeding. Belevich, No. 2:17-

CV-01193-AKK, 2018 WL 1244493, at *5. The court elaborated that nothing about deciding the
contract dispute would require the court to become a “grand overseer” of the divorce
proceedings. Id.
This court has no difficulty distinguishing Ms. Sutton’s case from Belevich. Unlike the
“tangentially related” proceedings in Belevich, this case directly involves the seizure and
retention of Ms. Sutton’s car at issue in state court. Although Ms. Sutton attempts to separate the
issue of retention from the issue of the seizure of her car and the ultimate outcome of the
forfeiture proceedings, she merely identifies one part of a chain of interrelated proceedings that
are inextricably intertwined. The seizure of her car, the subsequent forfeiture proceeding, and
the continued retention of the car—all at issue in state court—have far more than a tangential

connection with the case she seeks to bring in federal court.
Further, the relief that Ms. Sutton requests would require precisely the kind of oversight
of the state courts that Belevich conscientiously avoided. See Belevich, No. 2:17-CV-01193-
AKK, 2018 WL 1244493, at *5. Ms. Sutton requests that the court require the state to
immediately institute hearings in her own and all similar civil forfeiture proceedings. Issuing
and enforcing that sort of injunctive relief would “result in meticulous and burdensome federal
oversight of state court or court-like functions” or force the federal courts to become a “grand
overseer” of state court proceedings, both of which the Eleventh Circuit has proscribed. Wexler
v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, Ms. Sutton fails to show that her
requested relief will not interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.
Ms. Sutton also argues that Younger abstention does not apply because she does not have
an opportunity to raise her constitutional issues in the state court. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at

432. A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that state procedural law bars the presentation of
her claims. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987). Further, “when a litigant has
not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court
should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Id. at 15. In this case, Ms. Sutton only raised her
claims regarding the retention of her car as potential defenses in her motion to set aside default;
she has not actually presented those claims in state court. Further, she cannot overcome the
assumption of an adequate state remedy. See id.
In this case, no unambiguous authority suggests that state procedures would not afford
Ms. Sutton an adequate remedy. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “Alabama

state procedural law does not ‘clearly bar the interposition of the constitutional claims.’” Old
Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has recently stated in a case
involving civil forfeiture that “Alabama case law shows that the proper avenue for seeking
redress for alleged constitutional injuries is in the state civil-forfeiture proceeding.” Fairfield
Cmty. Clean Up Crew Inc. v. Hale, 735 F. App’x 602, 606 (11th Cir. 2018). In fact, Alabama
case law shows that defendants in civil forfeiture cases have raised constitutional claims during
their forfeiture proceedings. See Ex parte Kelley, 766 So. 2d 837, 837 (Ala. 1999) (forfeiture
proceeding in which defendant argued that the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment).
Ms. Sutton argues that she cannot raise her claims because of a lack of prompt post-
deprivation process. In support of her position, Ms. Sutton relies almost exclusively on the
Southern District of New York’s decision in Krimstock. That case is not binding upon this court
and the court does not find it persuasive.

In Krimstock, the Southern District of New York found that Younger did not apply in a
case challenging the seizure of cars after DWI arrests in New York. Krimstock v. Safir, No. 99
CIV. 12041 MBM, 2000 WL 1702035, at *1. The New York City regulation at issue required
that, if a seized vehicle’s owner demanded its return, the police had to either return the vehicle or
institute forfeiture proceedings within 25 days. Id. Relying on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975), the Krimstock court found that the forfeiture proceedings at issue did not “provide an
adequate opportunity for plaintiffs to claim a due process right to a prompt probable cause
hearing” because the forfeiture proceedings were not instituted until 25 days later—after the time
for a prompt probable cause hearing had passed. Id. at 3. As explained by the Second Circuit,
which overruled Krimstock on grounds unrelated to Younger abstention, “neither New York

criminal procedure nor the City’s civil forfeiture law allow[ed] a DWI defendant or the owner of
a vehicle driven by a DWI defendant to challenge promptly the legitimacy of the City’s
continued custody of the vehicle.” Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 2002). The
Second Circuit also emphasized that much of the infirmity in New York’s process sprung from
the lack of an opportunity for defendants to post bond for their property. Id. at 56.
This court finds Krimstock’s reliance on Gerstein unconvincing. In Gerstein, the
Supreme Court held that a prompt determination of probable cause is a constitutionally required
prerequisite for pretrial detention. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126. The Supreme Court also affirmed
the lower court’s holding that Younger abstention did not apply because the only issue in the case
was “the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised
in defense of the criminal prosecution.” Id. at 108 n.9.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recently applied Gerstein and held—while emphasizing
the applicable abuse-of-discretion standard of review—that a district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that Younger abstention did not apply where a class of plaintiffs did not seek
to enjoin a criminal prosecution, but, rather, only sought prompt bail determinations. Walker v.
City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. City
of Calhoun, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). The Eleventh Circuit stated that the relief requested did not
require pervasive oversight of state criminal proceedings and that the plaintiffs asked for “a
prompt pretrial determination of a distinct issue, which will not interfere with subsequent
prosecution.” Walker, 901 F.3d at 1255 (emphasis added).
The facts in Gerstein and Walker differ from the type of facts involved in Krimstock and
in Ms. Sutton’s case. Gerstein and Walker dealt with the plaintiffs’ challenges to their pretrial
detention and bail. Bail and pretrial detention challenges fall under the purview of habeas corpus

proceedings, not criminal prosecutions. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)
(stating that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release
or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus”). The issues were so distinct from the ongoing prosecutions that they would have
required separate proceedings. Accordingly, a federal court hearing the bail or pretrial detention
issues could not interfere with the ongoing criminal prosecution.
But, unlike in Gerstein and Walker, no indication exists in this case that Ms. Sutton
cannot challenge the continued retention of her car within her state forfeiture proceedings
without instituting a separate action. The Attorney General even included an example of a
motion to do just that. Thus, Krimstock’s application of Gerstein does not convince the court
that Younger does not apply in this case.
Moreover, the court sees key differences between the Alabama legal framework at issue

in this case and the legal framework in Krimstock. Unlike the New York regulation in
Krimstock, Alabama law requires that civil forfeiture actions be instituted “promptly” and
provides defendants in forfeiture proceedings with the opportunity to post bond for their vehicle.
Ala. Code §§ 20-2-93(c), (h). Ms. Sutton argues that the bond provision does not comport with
due process because it does not require the state to show that it has a continued right to retain her
property and because the arbitrary amount of the required bond violates the Eighth Amendment.
However, Ms. Sutton fails to show why she cannot file a motion challenging the retention of her
car and/or challenge the statutory bail provision in state court. In fact, the law suggests that the
forfeiture proceedings are exactly the proper venue for such a challenge. See Fairfield Cmty.
Clean Up Crew Inc., 735 F. App’x at 606.

Finally, in light of the lack of factually similar caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit, the
court finds a case from the Sixth Circuit illuminating. In Loch v. Watkins, the Sixth Circuit held
that Younger foreclosed consideration of a suit about the constitutionality of a forfeiture while
the state proceedings were ongoing. 337 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2003). Like this case, Loch
dealt with the seizure and forfeiture of a vehicle belonging to an innocent owner. Id. at 577.
Although the plaintiff in Loch did not specifically raise the issue of the lack of a prompt hearing,
she did argue that, based on the specific law at issue, she was being deprived of a forfeiture
hearing and extorted for a settlement in violation of her due process rights. Id. The Sixth Circuit
found “no impediment to Loch raising the constitutional issues of this case in the state
proceedings,” which rendered Younger abstention appropriate. Id. at 579.
Ms. Sutton’s complaint is similar to the plaintiff’s complaint in Loch; they both raise an
issue about the lack of an adequate hearing. Like the plaintiff in Loch, Ms. Sutton has not shown

any actual impediment to raising her constitutional issues in her state forfeiture proceedings. In
fact, she has raised some constitutional claims challenging the seizure of her vehicle in her state
court proceedings. Thus, she has not met her burden of showing that she cannot effectively raise
her constitutional claims in state court. See Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. Accordingly, the court
finds that all three Middlesex factors exist in this case and that Younger abstention applies. See
31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the court will give the state court more than “a little
respect” and abstain from hearing this case under the Younger abstention doctrine. ARETHA
FRANKLIN, Respect, I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY I LOVE YOU (Atlantic Records 1967).

Accordingly, the court will GRANT, by separate order, Attorney General Marshall’s motion to
dismiss.
DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2019.

____________________________________
KARON OWEN BOWDRE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9989050. Public record. Not legal advice.