# Scott v. McClain

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · March 14, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9988226

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** March 14, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9988226

## Opinion text

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

DARRYL ELTON SCOTT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. ) 2:21cv573-MHT
) (WO)
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )
official capacity as the )
Commissioner of the )
Alabama Department of )
Corrections, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Darryl Elton Scott, a prisoner in the
custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC),
filed this lawsuit naming as defendants former ADOC
Commissioner Jefferson S. Dunn in his ‘official’ capacity
and the following ADOC employees at Bullock County
Correctional Facility in both their ‘official’ and
‘individual’ capacities: Antonio McClain, Chermaine
Baskin, Terrell Holcey, Brandon Boyd, and Jacquelyn
Urquhart. He asserts claims under the First, Fourth
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as enforced through 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The court has jurisdiction over these
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This lawsuit is now before the court on the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons explained
below, the motion will be denied as to Scott’s Eighth
Amendment claims to the extent he has sued McClain,

Holcey, and Baskin in their individual capacities for
allegedly failing to protect him from being repeatedly
raped by another prisoner, and to the extent he has sued
Holcey and Baskin in their individual capacities for

allegedly using excessive force against him. The motion
will be granted in all other respects.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At this stage of the litigation, this court confines
itself to Scott’s amended complaint and accepts his
allegations, and the inferences that could be reasonably

drawn from them, as true. This “court may dismiss [the]
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved
consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

In September 2019, Scott, a non-violent prisoner at
Bullock County Correctional Facility, told Warden McClain
that another prisoner, Larry White, had threatened to
hurt him. At that time, White, a gang member who had

allegedly raped other inmates, was categorized as posing
a credible threat to other inmates. However, McClain
laughed when he received Scott’s report and transferred
Scott out of his cell and into the dormitory where White

resided.
Officers Holcey and Baskin, while transferring
Scott, repeatedly kicked him for no reason. Holcey told

Scott that he was going to be “fucked in the ass and
stabbed white boy, and maybe they will kill your retarded
cracker ass.” First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) at 5.
Baskin laughed. Then, Holcey threatened to spray Scott

with mace. A witness observing Scott’s transfer
confirmed that Holcey and Baskin were laughing at Scott,
saying they were going to watch him get abused, and that
there was nothing Scott’s “stupid white ass could do
about it.” Id. at 5.

Inside the dormitory, as Officers Holcey and Baskin
had portended, White made good on his threats. While
being observed by Holcey and Baskin, White dragged Scott
to a bunkbed. The bunk was covered with a sheet to

obstruct what happened inside. There, White forcibly
raped Scott.
After the rape, Scott was taken to an outside
facility for treatment. After being treated, he was then

brought back to Bullock, where he was placed in the same
dormitory as before. There, he was beaten and raped by
White a second time.

As a result, Scott suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, Chronic Depression, tears in his rectum from
being raped, hearing loss from being kicked, chronic
pain, flashbacks, and nightmares.
II. DISCUSSION

A. Official-Capacity Claims
As stated, Scott sues McClain, Holcey, Baskin, Boyd,
and Urquhart in both their individual and official
capacities, and he sues Dunn in only his official

capacity. Because the defendants have been sued in their
official capacities, the court will take up the Eleventh
Amendment issue first.
To the extent that Scott seeks monetary damages from

defendants in their official capacities, such relief is
unavailable because his claims are considered as being
against the State, and the Supreme Court has held that

the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages
against the State. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
169 (1985). However, the Eleventh Amendment poses no
obstacle to Scott’s claims for damages against a

defendant in his individual capacity. Therefore, Scott’s
claims to the extent his seeks money damages from the
defendants in their official capacities must be
dismissed.

However, Scott also seeks injunctive and declaratory
relief from the defendants in their official capacities.
Because Dunn no longer serves as ADOC Commissioner, the
court cannot order him to “do something or refrain from

doing something in [his] capacity as a government actor.”
Mitchell v. Town of Hayneville, Alabama, 2020 WL 7480551,
at *10 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 18, 2020) (Thompson, J.) (noting
that “[o]fficial-capacity claims are used to seek

equitable relief against current government
officials.”). And, because Dunn is sued in only his
official capacity and because no relief is available

against Dunn in that capacity, Dunn is due to be dismissed
altogether.
The remaining defendants are also due to be dismissed
to the extent Scott seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief from them in their official capacities. Scott
asks that they be required to take and refrain from taking
many actions, including that he “be moved forever from
Bullock County Correctional Facility.” First Amended
Complaint (Doc. 46) at 15. Defendants assert that Scott

“lack[s] standing to prevail on any injunctive relief,”
because he is no longer at the Bullock facility and his
amended complaint does not establish that there is a
“strong likelihood that the injury he suffered previously

will be repeated in a very similar manner by the same
actors in the future.” Brief in Support (Doc. 55) at 13.
“In order to demonstrate that a case or controversy
exists to meet the Article III standing requirement when

a plaintiff is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief,
a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there
is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury

in the future.” Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit
Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999). Because
Scott is no longer at Bullock and because there is nothing
in the amended complaint indicating that defendants will

injure him again under similar circumstances, he lacks
standing to pursue his official-capacity claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against McClain, Boyd,
Urquhart, Holcey, and Baskin. Accordingly, Scott’s
claims to the extent his seeks injunctive and declaratory

relief from these defendants in their official capacities
must be dismissed.
In conclusion, Dunn, McClain, Boyd, Urquhart,
Holcey, and Baskin will be dismissed to the extent they

have been sued in their official capacities, and, because
Dunn has been sued in only his official capacity, he will
be dismissed altogether.

B. Shotgun Pleading
The remaining defendants--McClain, Boyd, Urquhart,
Holcey, and Baskin--further argue that the amended

complaint violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) and 10(b). They contend that the complaint is
an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” A complaint
violates pleading rules when it presents claims in a

manner where the defendant cannot “discern what [the
plaintiff] is claiming and frame a responsive pleading.”
T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1544
n.14 (11th Cir. 1985). At bottom, the complaint “must
give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against

them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d
1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, as defendants point out, Scott’s amended

complaint commits several of the “sins” that define a
shotgun pleading, including, “not separating into a
different count each cause of action” and “asserting
multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
which acts or omissions.” Id. at 1322–23.
In Count I, the amended complaint’s only denominated

count, Scott alleges violations of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as unconstitutional race
discrimination.1 See First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46)

1. The court notes that, as explained later, Scott
also asserts Eighth Amendment claims, which would be
brought through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687
(2019) (“With only a handful of exceptions, [the Supreme
Court] has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause incorporates the protections in the Bill
at 11–13. To be sure, after careful review of Count I,
the court cannot discern specifically what causes of

action Scott is alleging under these amendments, and even
whom Scott is alleging them against. Indeed, “it is
virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact
are intended to support which claims” brought under the

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted). However, rather than
require Scott to replead claims under the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, the court will dismiss his

amended complaint to this extent, for one simple reason:
the factual allegations in the complaint do no set forth
claims under these amendments, so as to survive Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, if Scott
still wants to pursue claims under these amendments, he
can file a motion to amend, with a proposed new amended

of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.”).
However, the court understands Scott to also be asserting
Fourteenth Amendment violations separate from the Eighth
Amendment. Therefore, when the court refers to the
Fourteenth Amendment in this opinion, it is not referring
to Scott’s Eighth Amendment claims.
complaint attached that not only cures the
shotgun-pleading defect but also sets forth factual

allegations that would support a finding of one or more
violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
However, Scott’s amended complaint’s allegations,

while not explicitly employing the legal terms of art,
do clearly set forth two causes of action against these
defendants under the Eighth Amendment: failure to protect
and excessive force. Indeed, defendants respond to both

these types of claims. Because the complaint is
“informative enough to permit [the] court to readily
determine if [these causes of action] state a claim upon

which relief can be granted,” the court must make such a
determination, and dismissal under Rules 8(a)(2) and
10(b) is inappropriate. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1326.
Accordingly, the court will take up the defendants’

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim as to Scott’s Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect and excessive-force claims; all other
claims are dismissed without prejudice as indicated
above.

C. Statute of Limitations
Before turning to Scott’s failure-to-protect and
excessive-force claims individually, the court will first

address McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and Baskin’s
argument that the applicable two-year statute of
limitations under 42 U.S.C § 1983 bars these damages
claims against them in their individual capacities,

because, according to these defendants, “the original
complaint was filed on August 27, 2021” and “[i]t appears
that the conduct complained of by [Scott] might have

occurred prior to August 27, 2019.” Brief in Support
(Doc. 55) at 18. However, Scott alleges that he reported
White’s threats in September 2019 (after August 27, 2019)
and was then transferred into the dormitory where he was

raped by White for the first time. Accordingly, the
statute of limitations does not clearly bar White’s
§ 1983 claims, and dismissal on statute-of-limitations
grounds is inappropriate at this stage.

D. Individual-Capacity Claims
As a result of the above discussion, Scott has only

two remaining claims: Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect and excessive-force claims. And they
are against only McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and
Baskin in their individual capacities.

1. Individual-Capacity Failure-to-Protect Claim
Scott alleges that McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey,

and Baskin unconstitutionally failed to protect him. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits state governments from
inflicting “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. The prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishments requires prison officials to “take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The duty to protect encompasses
“protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal quotation marks
omitted). When a plaintiff invokes this principle in a
lawsuit against prison officials, plaintiff's claims are
referred to as “failure-to-protect” claims. See Cox v.

Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2021).
To succeed on his failure-to-protect claim, Scott
must satisfy three elements. See id. at 1358. First,
he must show that he was “incarcerated under conditions

posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Second, he must show that the
“prison official [had] a sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” amounting to “deliberate indifference.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Third, and finally,
he must demonstrate causation, that is, that the
constitutional violation caused his injuries. Id.

(citing Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090,
1099 (11th Cir. 2014)).
In response, McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and
Baskin invoke qualified immunity. Qualified immunity

“protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Once the
defendant officials establish that they were acting
within their discretionary authority, the court engages

in two distinct inquiries to determine if qualified
immunity applies: (1) whether the plaintiff’s allegations
“make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2)

whether “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at
the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at
232 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
A right is clearly established if there is: (1) factually

indistinguishable caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit or
Supreme Court, (2) broad statements of legal principles
that apply with “obvious clarity to the circumstances,”
or (3) “conduct so egregious that a constitutional right
was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case

law.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.
2021).
Applying this qualified-immunity framework, and for
the following reasons, Scott’s Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim will proceed against McClain,
Holcey, and Baskin; it will be dismissed without
prejudice as to Boyd and Urquhart.

a. McClain, Holcey, and Baskin
Scott’s allegations state a clearly established
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against

McClain, Holcey, and Baskin.
First, Scott sufficiently pleads that White
specifically posed a substantial risk of serious harm to
him. He alleges that he reported to McClain that White

had threatened his safety multiple times, that White was
known to pose a danger to vulnerable inmates like him,
and that White had performed acts of violence on other
inmates. Additionally, Holcey and Baskin essentially
told Scott that he was going to be raped in the dormitory

they were transferring him to (and that they were not
going to do anything about it). These allegations are
sufficient to establish objectively that the risk White
specifically posed to Scott constituted the requisite

“strong likelihood” of injury necessary to establish a
substantial risk of serious harm. Brown v. Hughes, 894
F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990).
Second, Scott alleges facts sufficient to establish

deliberate difference. Deliberate indifference has both
a subjective and objective component. Marbury v. Warden,
936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019). Subjectively, the

“official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and ... also draw the inference.”
Id. Objectively, the official must have responded to the

known risk in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she
“knew of ways to reduce the harm” but knowingly or
recklessly declined to act. Id.
McClain, Holcey, and Baskin were all subjectively
aware of the risk posed to Scott. McClain was expressly

informed of White’s repeated threats to Scott. Holcey
and Baskin, as they transferred Scott to White’s
dormitory, not only laughed at Scott, they threatened to
stand by and watch Scott be raped, and they told him that

there was nothing his “stupid white ass could do about
it.” First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) at 5. If true,
Holcey and Baskin’s own statements evidence that they
were subjectively aware of the threat of rape posed

against Scott, a threat that became reality.
Additionally, McClain’s response to the known risk
of harm was objectively reckless--he laughed in Scott’s

face and then transferred Scott to reside with the very
person Scott said was threatening him. Similarly, Holcey
and Baskin responded to the known risk by executing the
transfer, while beating Scott, and laughing while Holcey

said that Scott was going to be “fucked in the ass and
stabbed white boy, and maybe they will kill your retarded
cracker ass.” Id. Further, Holcey and Baskin observed-
-or, at least, were aware of--the first rape and did
nothing to stop it. Finally, McClain placed Scott back

into the dormitory after he was treated for the initial
rape, where he was raped by White again. All of which,
if true, constitutes deliberate indifference and a
reckless disregard to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Third, and finally, Scott sufficiently alleges
causation. Causation is met in the failure-to-protect
context where a defendant is “in a position to take steps
that could have averted [the serious injury] ... but,

through [deliberate] indifference, failed to do so.”
Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 622
(11th Cir. 2007). Here, McClain could have averted the

injury by not transferring Scott to live with the very
person Scott told McClain was threatening him. Moreover,
McClain could have transferred Scott out of the dormitory
after the first rape. Meanwhile, Holcey and Baskin could

have attempted to stop the initial transfer, they could
have not executed the transfer while beating and
threatening to watch Scott be raped, and they could have
intervened instead of standing by and observing while
White forced Scott into a covered bunk.2

Accordingly, because Scott pled facts that clearly
show all elements of a failure-to-protect claim, both as
a matter of binding caselaw and obvious clarity, McClain,
Holcey, and Baskin are not entitled to qualified immunity

at this stage and the motion to dismiss this claim will
be denied to this extent.

b. Boyd and Urquhart

To the extent that Scott brings an Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim against Boyd and Urquhart, the

2. Courts often separately denominate deliberate
indifference failure-to-protect and failure-to-intervene
claims; however, the elements are the same, and a
failure-to-intervene claim is a type of
failure-to-protect claim. See Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F.
App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005). Failing to intervene
is just one way in which an official can recklessly
respond to a substantial risk of serious harm so as to
constitute deliberate indifference. Here, Scott
sufficiently alleges that Holcey and Baskin responded
recklessly to the threat posed by White in multiple ways,
including by failing to intervene once Scott was forced
to the bunk by White.
claim will be dismissed without prejudice. Unlike the
other defendants, Scott does not specifically allege that

Boyd or Urquhart were aware of Scott’s initial or
subsequent placement in the dormitory with White.
Indeed, Boyd is not identified whatsoever in Scott’s
factual allegations. And Urquhart is mentioned only

once, when Scott alleges that “[d]efendant Urquhart was
warned and aware that [Scott] could or would be
attacked.” First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) at 6.
However, this bare allegation does not specify when

Urquhart was aware that Scott could be attacked or who
might attack him, nor does it allege that Urquhart
participated in the decision to transfer Scott or in the

execution of the transfer itself, or that Urquhart
observed White attacking Scott. Accordingly, Boyd and
Urquhart are entitled to qualified immunity, and Scott’s
failure-to-protect claim will be dismissed without

prejudice as to them.
c. Another Matter
There are generally two categories of threats for

failure-to-protect claims: ‘individualized threats’ and
‘general threats.’ See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233–36
(delineating between types of threat).
Individualized-threat claims deal with specific threats

made against a plaintiff, while general-threat claims
deal with factual allegations that conditions of
confinement generally create a substantial risk of
serious harm from inmate-on-inmate violence to the

plaintiff. Here, as explained above, the amended
complaint’s framing clearly advances an individualized
claim against McClain, Holcey, and Baskin based on

specific threats. However, while it appears in his
amended complaint that Scott seeks systemic relief for
inmate-on-inmate violence, it does not sufficiently
allege a “general threat posed by inmate-on-inmate

violence” resulting from the conditions of confinement
at the Bullock facility, the dormitory, or any other
prison. Id. at 1233. Accordingly, to the extent that
Scott seeks relief for general threats of
inmate-on-inmate violence due to conditions of

confinement, his failure-to-protect claim will be
dismissed without prejudice.

2. Individual-Capacity Excessive-Force Claim
Scott also alleges that he was “beaten [and]
humiliated” with deliberate indifference by McClain,
Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and Baskin. First Amended

Complaint (Doc. 46) at 10. However, the amended
complaint factually alleges that only Holcey and Baskin
beat him. Accordingly, McClain, Boyd, and Urquhart will

be dismissed as to this claim.
As to the excessive-force claim to the extent it is
against Holcey and Baskin, Scott alleges that, while he
was being transferred from a cell to a dormitory, they

repeatedly kicked him while laughing at him and saying
that they were going to watch him get “fucked in the ass
and stabbed white boy,” and saying that there was nothing
his “stupid white ass could do about it.” Id. at 5.
Scott further alleges that the kicks caused hearing loss

in his right ear. Id. at 8.
These allegations sufficiently state a clearly
established violation of the Eighth Amendment right to
be free from excessive force. Eighth Amendment

excessive-force claims have two components. First,
objectively, the force used must be “sufficiently
serious” to “offend[] contemporary standards of decency.”
Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir.

2020). Second, the force must “have been sadistically
and maliciously applied for the very purpose of causing
harm.” Id.

Scott’s allegations, if true, clearly satisfy both
prongs. He alleges that he was sadistically beaten for
no plausible reason and that the assaulters taunted him
with racial epithets while threatening to stand by and

do nothing while another prisoner raped him. He also
alleges that the beating resulted in hearing loss. This
alleged use of force is precisely the type that is
“repugnant to the conscience of mankind” as can state a
clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010)).
Accordingly, accepting the complaint’s allegations
as true, Holcey and Baskin are not entitled to qualified
immunity as to Scott’s Eighth Amendment excessive-force

claim against them and their motion to dismiss will be
denied as to these claims. However, as discussed, the
excessive-force claim to the extent it is brought against
the other defendants will be dismissed without prejudice.

***
Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, only
the following claims will proceed: Scott’s Eighth

Amendment claim for failure to protect against McClain,
Holcey, and Baskin in their individual capacities, and
his Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against
Holcey and Baskin in their individual capacities.

All other claims and defendants will be dismissed as
follows: all claims to the extent they seek damages from
defendants in their official-capacities will be dismissed
with prejudice; all claims to the extent they seek
injunctive and declaratory relief from defendants in

their official capacities will be dismissed without
prejudice; all claims to the extent they are based on the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments will be
dismissed without prejudice; the Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim will be dismissed as to Boyd and
Urquhart without prejudice; the Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim, to the extent relief is sought
for a “general threat,” will be dismissed without

prejudice; the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim
will be dismissed as to McCain, Boyd, and Urquhart
without prejudice; and, because no claims remain against

Dunn, Boyd, and Urquhart, these defendants will be
dismissed entirely.
An judgment consistent with this opinion will be
entered separately.

DONE, this the 14th day of March, 2023.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9988226. Public record. Not legal advice.