# Scott v. Kijakazi (CONSENT)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · February 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9988193

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** February 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9988193

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) CASE NO. 1:21-cv-293-JTA
v. ) (WO)
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the claimant, Christopher Scott (“Scott”), brings
this action to review a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”). (Doc. No. 1.)1 The Commissioner denied Scott’s claim for a period of
disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The Court construes Scott’s brief in
support of his Complaint (Doc. No. 15) as a motion for summary judgment and the
Commissioner’s brief in opposition to the Complaint as a motion for summary judgment
(Doc. No. 16). The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
After careful scrutiny of the record and the motions submitted by the parties, the
Court finds that Scott’s motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED, the

1 Document numbers, as they appear on the docket sheet, are designated as “Doc. No.”
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED, and the decision
of the Commissioner is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
Scott was 50 years old at the time of his alleged disability onset date. (R. 706.)2 He
has a high school education and previously worked as a corrections officer and staff officer.
(R. 23, 72.) He alleged a disability onset date of May 31, 2016, due to post-traumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”), chronic cervical strain, bilateral pes planus with planter fasciitis and
heel spurs, coronary artery disease, and lumbar spondylolisthesis with degenerative joint

disease. (R. 72-73, 702.)
On February 22, 2017, Scott protectively applied for a period of disability and DIB
under Title II (42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.). (R. 10, 140-41.) This application was denied
initially on April 27, 2017, and Scott requested an administrative hearing. (R. 10, 71, 92.)
Following an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) returned an

unfavorable decision on June 22, 2018. (R. 10-24, 35.) Scott sought review by the Appeals
Council, and it denied his request. (R. 1-6.) Thus, the hearing decision became the final
decision of the Commissioner.3
Scott sought appellate review in federal district court and the court remanded the
matter for further proceedings. (R. 744.) The Appeals Council remanded the matter to the

2 Citations to the administrative record are consistent with the transcript of administrative
proceedings filed in this case and are designated as “R.” (See Doc. No. 17.)
3 “When, as in this case, the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals Council] denies review, [the
court] review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner's final decision.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
ALJ and the ALJ issued a new decision, after another administrative hearing, denying
Scott’s application. (R. 697-707, 753-754.) The Appeals Council declined jurisdiction of

the ALJ’s new decision. (R. 688.)
On April 19, 2021, Scott filed this civil action for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. No. 1.) The parties have briefed their respective
positions. (Docs. No. 15, 16, 21.) This matter is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of disability claims is limited to whether the Commissioner’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
“The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive” when “supported by substantial
evidence.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). “Substantial
evidence” is more than a mere scintilla and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 1997)). Even if the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, the findings must be affirmed if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 1158-59; see also Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529

(11th Cir. 1990). The court may not find new facts, reweigh evidence, or substitute its own
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bailey v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 791 F. App’x
136, 139 (11th Cir. 2019); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004);
Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. However, the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are not entitled
to the same deference as findings of fact and are reviewed de novo. Ingram v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).

Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes the district court to “enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for
a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court may remand a case to the
Commissioner for a rehearing if the court finds “either . . . the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence, or . . . the Commissioner or the ALJ incorrectly applied the law

relevant to the disability claim.” Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1092 (11th Cir. 1996).
III. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY
An individual who files an application for Social Security DIB must prove that he
is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1505(a).
Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step sequential evaluation
process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The evaluation is made at the hearing conducted by

the ALJ. See Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018).
First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity
that involves significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). If the ALJ
finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim
disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant

has a medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that
significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id. Third,
the ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, and 404.1526. If such criteria are met, then the claimant is declared disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
If the claimant has failed to establish that he is disabled at the third step, the ALJ
may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. At the fourth step, the
ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which refers to
the claimant’s ability to work despite his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ

must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f). If it is determined that the claimant is capable of performing past relevant
work, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth
and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). In this final analytical step, the ALJ must

decide whether the claimant is able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with
his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c). Here, the burden
of proof shifts from the claimant to the ALJ in proving the existence of a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given his RFC, age,
education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c).

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
Within the structure of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Scott
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 31, 2016, the alleged onset date
of disability, and that he suffers from the following impairments that significantly limit his
ability to perform basic work activities: PTSD, depression, back and neck disorder, left
shoulder disorder, obesity and bilateral foot disorder. (R. 699.) Nevertheless, the ALJ

concluded that Scott’s severe impairments do not meet or medically equal the severity of
impairments in 20 C.F.R. § Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 700.)
After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Scott retains the
RFC to perform light work4 as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except
… [he] can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. [He] can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs. [He] can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. [He] can perform simple and routine tasks and some detailed but
uninvolved instructions consistent with reasoning level one and two
occupations. [He] can make simple work related decisions. He can interact
with supervisors and coworkers occasionally. [He] can work around the
public but he should avoid direct interaction with them. [He] can deal with
occasional changes in a routine work setting.

4 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this
category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of
the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of
these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary
work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for
long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R § 404.1567(b).
(R. 701.) In accordance with this RFC and having the benefit of testimony from a
vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that Scott was precluded from performing

any past relevant work. (R. 706.) The ALJ also found that based upon Scott’s age,
education, work experience and RFC, there are jobs that exist in “significant numbers in
the national economy” that he can perform, and thus he was not disabled as defined by the
Act. (R. 706-707.) The ALJ further found that Scott could work as a bench assembler,
bottling line attendant, and office helper. (R. 707.) The ALJ concluded that Scott had not
been under a disability from May 31, 2016, through January 28, 2020, the date of the ALJ’s

decision. (R. 707.) The ALJ found that based on the application for a period of disability
and DIB filed on February 22, 2017, Scott is not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d)
of the Social Security Act. (Id.)
V. DISCUSSION
Scott raises two issues on appeal. (Doc. No. 15.) First, Scott argues the ALJ failed

to properly address the disability determination of the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Second, Scott argues the ALJ failed to account for any
limitations resulting from his left shoulder disorder in the RFC.
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly considered the rating
decision from the VA. (Doc. No. 16.) The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ properly

included limitations for Scott’s shoulder impairment in the RFC. The Commissioner
concludes that substantial evidence supports the final decision, and the proper legal
standards were applied.
The Court addresses each argument below.
A. Disability Determination Made by the Department of Veterans Affairs
Scott argues the ALJ’s evaluation of the VA disability ratings are not based on

substantial evidence. He also argues the ALJ failed to address the specific ratings he
received and the corresponding impairments. The Court disagrees.
It is well-established in the Eleventh Circuit that “the V.A.’s disability rating ... is
evidence that should be given great weight.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). “ ‘Great weight’ does not mean controlling, but ‘the ALJ
must seriously consider and closely scrutinize the VA’s disability determination and must

give specific reasons if the ALJ discounts that determination,’ especially when the VA
gives a 100% disability rating.” Beshia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 328 F. Supp. 3d 1341,
1346-47 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citing Brown-Gaudet-Evans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 673 F.
App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2016)). “[T]he VA’s disability determination relies on different
criteria than the SSA’s determination[,] [b]ut that does not mean that the ALJ can

summarily ignore the VA’s determination nor give it ‘little weight.’ ” Brown-Gaudet-
Evans, 673 F. App’x at 904. “[N]ot addressing the merits of a 100% VA disability rating
– particularly where based on the same underlying medical conditions at issue in the SSA
proceedings”— constitutes legal error. Beshia, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (citing cases).
In this case, Scott received a 90% service connection disability rating on February

22, 2017. (R. 243.) But, in April 2019, he received a 100% service connection disability
rating. (R. 891). The ALJ addressed these ratings in his hearing decision, stating:
[Scott] has a service-connected disability rating from the VA. He currently
has a 100% service connected disability rating due to a combination of
medical and psychiatric conditions (Exhibit 13F). [Scott] was previously
rated at 90% service connected (Exhibit 3F). The undersigned gives
significant weight to the finding of the VA that [Scott]’s impairments can
reasonably be expected to cause some functional limitations. However, the
undersigned gives little weight to any VA opinion that [Scott] is disabled, to
any opinions set forth by the VA in C&P examinations, and to any specific
disability rating (Exhibit 10F). VA opinions are based on a different standard
than is used by the Social Security Administration and they are not consistent
with the objective medical evidence of record, [Scott]’s functioning, or
[Scott]’s positive response to treatment. For example, [Scott] has a 50%
disability rating from the VA for sleep apnea even though his sleep apnea is
well controlled on CPAP and does not cause significant functional
limitations. His mental status examination findings do not support disabling
mental health limitations as well.
(R. 705-706.)
The Court finds the ALJ seriously considered and closely scrutinized the VA
decision rating as required. The ALJ stated the particular weight he gave to the VA’s
findings regarding Scott’s impairments causing some functional limitations, the VA’s
opinion that Scott was disabled, the VA’s opinions set forth in examinations, and any VA
disability ratings. The ALJ correctly noted that a disability decision by the VA is based on
different standards. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (“Because a decision by any other
governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled ... is
based on its rules, it is not binding on us and is not our decision about whether you are
disabled ... under our rules.”). Further, the ALJ found that the VA opinions were not
consistent with the objective medical evidence, Scott’s functioning or Scott’s positive
response to treatment and provided two examples of such inconsistency: Scott’s sleep
apnea and his mental status. The Court finds no reversible error. See Grissett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 695 F. App’x 497, 502 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Because the ALJ considered the VA
decision, expressly stated the weight he was giving to that decision, and adequately
explained his reasons for doing so, we find no error in this regard.”).

B. RFC Assessment

Scott contends the ALJ’s RFC assessment fails to account for any limitations
relating to his left shoulder disorder. Scott asserts that since the ALJ found his left shoulder
disorder was a severe impairment, the ALJ was required to account for it in the RFC by
including a postural limitation on reaching. Scott concludes the ALJ’s failure is reversible
error.
The regulations define medical opinions as “statements from physicians and
psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature
and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms,
diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the
claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).

“The ALJ is required to consider the opinions of non-examining state agency medical and
psychological consultants because they ‘are highly qualified physicians and psychologists,
who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation.’ ” Milner v. Barnhart, 275 F.
App’x 947, 948 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also Social Security Ruling 96-6p
(stating that the ALJ must treat the findings of state agency medical consultants as expert

opinion evidence of non-examining sources).
In addition to assessing a claimant’s medical evidence, the ALJ is responsible for
determining a claimant’s RFC. Moore v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 649 F. App’x 941,
945 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)). A claimant’s RFC is an
administrative finding as to the most the claimant can do despite his limitations and is based
on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the record. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238; 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545. “Once the ALJ has determined the claimant’s RFC, the claimant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Talton v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-00543-B, 2022 WL 822158, at *6 (S.D. Ala.
Mar. 17, 2022) (citing Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 1985)). If the
ALJ’s determination of the claimant’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence, then the
court cannot overturn the conclusion reached by the ALJ. Shue v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

817 F. App’x 906, 908 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The ALJ found Scott’s left shoulder disorder to be a severe impairment, but stated
that it did not meet or medically equal the criteria of a listed impairment. (R. 700.) The
ALJ noted that Scott’s “back, neck, left shoulder, and foot impairments do not meet the

requirements of a musculoskeletal impairment in listing 1.00, including listings 1.02 and
1.04. There is no evidence in the record, for example, of an inability to ambulate effectively
… [nor] an inability to perform fine and gross movement effectively….” (R. 700.) The
ALJ summarized the evidence in the record relating to Scott’s shoulder, noting that Scott
“has a history of intermittent shoulder pain dating back to the 1990s.” (R. 702.)

[Scott] aggravated his shoulder around September 2015 lifting heavy objects.
[Scott]’s shoulder was doing better with conservative treatment (injections
and physical therapy) until he injured it trying to pick up a plow and attaching
it to his tractor. [Scott] was subsequently diagnosed with left shoulder
impingement syndrome and biceps tendinitis. He had surgery on his left
shoulder in January 2016. [Scott] did well post-operatively (Exhibit 4F). By
March 2016, [Scott] had good function in his shoulder and he was allowed
to return to desk/sedentary work. [Scott] continued to improve and he was
released to full activity in May 2016. He was going to the gym and using
machines to strengthen his arm including shoulder presses, bench press and
lateral raises with approximately 40 pounds per arm. [Scott] denied any pain
and he had no other complaints. In June 2016, he reported doing some
remodeling on his home and gardening (Exhibit 9F). [Scott] told his primary
care provider in October 2016 that his shoulder was feeling good (Exhibit
6F). He was working out regularly and working on his backyard. [Scott] did
complain to his primary care provider of some ongoing neck pain in 2016
but this improved with physical therapy. [Scott] has not complained of
persistent neck or shoulder pain since 2016.

(R. 702-03.) Before discussing the evidence of record, including medical findings,
examination results, physicians’ opinions, and lay opinion evidence, the ALJ found Scott
had the RFC to perform light work, except with additional limitations, including in
pertinent part, that Scott “can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds[;]” “can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs[;]” “can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl[;]” and
“can perform simple and routine tasks and some detailed but uninvolved instructions
consistent with reasoning level one and two occupations.” (R. 701.) The ALJ noted that
he limited Scott to
light work with additional postural restrictions to account for his neck, left
shoulder, back, foot disorders, and weight. The ability to perform a reduced
range of light work is supported by [Scott]’s treatment records, which
document a history of sporadic and conservative treatment, and his activities
of daily living. The record documents minimal complaints of pain after 2016.
Although [Scott] did have surgery on his left shoulder in January 2016, he
recovered quickly and he was released to full duty work in May 2016, just a
few months after the surgery. The undersigned gives great weight to the
opinion of [Scott]’s treating providers releasing him to full duty work
(Exhibit 4F), as it is consistent with the objective evidence of record and
other opinions in the record.
(R. 703.) The ALJ also noted that Scott “reported going to the gym and lifting 40 pounds
with each arm, remodeling his house, lifting a plow for his tractor, and gardening.” (R.
703.) The ALJ further noted that “There is no evidence in the record that [Scott] sought
treatment specifically for neck, back, shoulder or foot pain in 2019, he has not recently

requested or been referred to any specialists for treatment of neck, back, shoulder or foot
pain, and he has not required updated imaging.” (R. 703.)
Contrary to Scott’s assertion,5 the ALJ was not required to incorporate limitations
for his left shoulder disorder merely because the ALJ found it to be a severe impairment.
“Severe impairments do not necessarily result in specific functional limitations .... [and i]f
no specific functional limitations from a severe impairment exist, the ALJ need not include

a corresponding limitation for that impairment in the RFC.” Owens v. Colvin, Case No.
3:15-cv-409-J-JBT, 2015 WL 12856780, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2015) (citing Castel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App’x 260, 264 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). See Davis–
Grimplin v. Commr, Soc. Sec. Admin., 556 F. App’x 858, 863 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam)); Mancini v. Commisioner of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-CV-798-JLB-NPM, 2021 WL

1087270, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2021) (“[T]he Court does not accept the proposition
that a specific limitation must always be attributed to a “severe impairment.”); Summerhill
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Case No. 3:20-05055-CV-RK, 2021 WL 4432479, at *4

5 Scott relies on Raduc v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 380 F. App’x 896, 898-99 (11th Cir. 2010) to argue
that “all severe impairments are to be incorporated into the RFC finding.” (Doc. No. 15 at 13.) In
Raduc, the Eleventh Circuit found that an ALJ erred by finding the claimant’s IBS to be a severe
impairment but failing to include limitations caused by the IBS in the RFC assessment and ignoring
treating records for IBS. Id. at 898-99. However, that case does not require remand here. First,
that case does not stand for the conclusion that an ALJ must include limitations in an RFC based
on any particular severe impairment, as explained above. Second, unlike here, there was specific
testimony and an opinion from a treating physician in Raduc that the claimant was limited by her
IBS, all of which that ALJ ignored. Id. There is no such evidence here. Thus, Raduc does not
control here.
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2021) (citation omitted) (finding an ALJ did not err where the ALJ
found the claimant had several impairments, but did not include any limitations related to

those severe impairments in his RFC determination, because “[a]n ALJ is not required to
list and reject every possible limitation”); Fortner v. Astrue, No. 4:12-CV-00986-RDP,
2013 WL 3816551, at *6 (N.D. Ala. July 22, 2013) (citation omitted) (“The ALJ may thus
“incorporate” a claimant’s severe impairments into an RFC by acknowledging and
weighing those impairments in his report, without the impairments necessarily resulting in
an imposition of impairment-specific work limitations in the RFC.”).

This case is procedurally similar to Davis-Grimplin v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
556 F. App’x 858, 860 (11th Cir. 2014). In Davis-Grimplin, the district court had
previously remanded the case in part so the ALJ could identify the functional limitations
caused by Davis’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Davis-Grimplin, 556 F. App’x at 860,
n.3. After the case returned to the district court from the remand, the district court and the

Eleventh Circuit found that the ALJ complied with the Remand Order because “[t]he ALJ
had ample evidence on which to conclude that Davis did not have functional limitations of
her hands notwithstanding that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is a severe
impairment.” Id. at 863. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s denial of Davis’s disability applications. Id.
Likewise, the Court finds here that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by
substantial evidence.6 The ALJ’s specific statement that he “limited Scott to light work

with additional postural restrictions to account for his neck, left shoulder, back, foot
disorders, and weight” (R. 703), demonstrates that the ALJ sufficiently considered Scott’s
left shoulder disorder, singly and in combination, with his other impairments in developing
the RFC. In addition, the ALJ’s decision clearly indicates that he considered the medical
evidence of record regarding Scott’s left shoulder impairment, the minimal complaints of
pain after 2016, and the medical opinions regarding his return “to full activities” in relation

to his left shoulder’s improvement, functioning, and ability to exercise with weights. (R.
703, 704.) The ALJ’s decision further indicates that he considered that no evidence in the
record shows that Scott sought treatment for his shoulder pain in 2019, he had not recently
requested or been referred to any specialists for treatment of his shoulder, and he had not
required updated imaging. (R. 703.) The ALJ stated the weight he gave to the opinion of

Scott’s treating providers “releasing him to full duty work.” (R. 703.)
Moreover, state agency medical and psychological consultants are “highly qualified
and experts in Social Security disability evaluations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1). The
record shows that the ALJ considered the state agency consultants’ opinions pertaining to
Scott’s ability to perform a range of medium work, but “reduced the exertional level from

medium to light to account for [Scott’s] weight and the findings, albeit minimal, in updated

6 Scott does not challenge the ALJ’s recitation of the medical evidence, nor does he challenge the
ALJ’s treatment of his subjective complaints of any opinion evidence. Hence, the substance of
the RFC discussion is unchallenged.
treatment records.” (R. 703-704.) The ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinion of Dr.
George Hall, a state agency medical consultant, because the opinion “is consistent with the

medical evidence of record and he has program knowledge.” (R. 704.) Remarkably, none
of the consultants opined that Scott was unable to reach frequently or was limited in
reaching due to his left shoulder disorder. (R. 72-85.)
“Because the ALJ stated the weight given to the medical opinions and enunciated
the grounds for his decision, his choosing not to mention [Scott’s left shoulder disorder] in
[his discussion of the RFC] did not constitute a failure to create an RFC that was

‘reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.’” Fortner, 2013 WL 3816551, at *7
(citations omitted). The ALJ sufficiently discussed Scott’s left shoulder disorder and his
full recovery after surgery and physical therapy, and it is apparent why no reaching
limitations — aside from limiting Scott to frequent reaching — were included in the RFC.
(R. 703.) Thus, despite Scott’s arguments to the contrary, the Court finds that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding.
The Court is unpersuaded by Scott’s argument that “[s]ince reaching is omitted from
the RFC, the ALJ has implicitly found that [Scott] can constantly reach, as the RFC is the
most [Scott] can do despite his impairments ….” (Doc. No. 15 at 13.) The jobs identified
by the ALJ and VE that Scott would be able to perform are bench assembler, bottling line

attendant, and office helper. (R. 707, 725.) The functional requirements of these jobs
involve only frequent reaching, not constant reaching. See DOT § 706.687-010, 1991 WL
679074 (assembler); DOT § 920.687-042, 1991 WL 687971 (bottling line attendant); DOT
§ 239.567-010, 1991 WL 672232 (office helper). See, e.g. Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
492 F. App’x 70, 73 (11th Cir. 2012) (ALJ’s omission of driving impairment was harmless
because the identified jobs did not involve driving). Markedly, “there is no requirement

that the frequent reaching must be bilateral,” and there was no limitation on Scott’s ability
to reach with his right shoulder which is his dominant side since he testified he is right-
handed.7 Shawn W., v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-1513 (ATB), 2022 WL 4094939, at *20
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2022).
Finally, Scott does not meaningfully argue or present facts demonstrating he had
any allegedly reduced abilities from his left shoulder disorder and does not demonstrate

how such allegedly reduced abilities resulted in functional restrictions omitted from the
ALJ’s RFC determination. See Lenowsky v. Kijakazi, Case No. 8:20-cv-1004-CPT, 2021
WL 3879047, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2021) (citation omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920). Scott “bears the burden of showing ‘the effect of [an] impairment on
[his] ability to work.’ ” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 501 F. App’x 875, 878 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). Scott “must do more than point
to evidence in the record that supports [his] position; [he] must show the absence of
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.” Sims v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 706
F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Scott has failed to carry his burden.

7 (R. 40.)
VI. CONCLUSION
After review of the administrative record, and considering all of the arguments, the
Court finds the Commissioner’s decision to deny Scott disability is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accordance with applicable law. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1. The claimant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED.
2. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 16) 1s
GRANTED.
3. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
A separate judgment will be issued.
DONE this 28th day of February, 2023.

JBRUSHA T. ADAMS
'YUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9988193. Public record. Not legal advice.