# Reeves v. Hamm (DEATH PENALTY)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · January 7, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9987620

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** January 7, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9987620

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the “ADA does not require clairvoyance”
- explaining that to bring a valid Title II claim, a plaintiff “must specify a benefit to which he was denied meaningful access based on his disability”
- explaining that, “to give effect to the ADA’s purpose of eliminating discrimination . . . most courts have given a broad reading to the term ‘service.’” (citations omitted)
- stating that the ADA “requires only those accommodations that are necessary to ameliorate a disability’s effect of preventing meaningful access to the benefits of, or participation in, the program at issue.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

MATTHEW REEVES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:20-cv-027-RAH
) [WO]
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Matthew Reeves is an Alabama death row inmate in the custody of
the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) at Holman Correctional Facility.1
On January 10, 2020, Reeves filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA) against
Defendants Jefferson Dunn, the Commissioner of the ADOC, and Terry Raybon, the
Warden at Holman (collectively, the ADOC). Both defendants are sued in their
official capacities.

1 Holman is the primary correctional facility for housing death row inmates in Alabama and is the only facility in the
state that performs executions.
1
In his Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), Reeves alleges the ADOC violated his
rights under the ADA.2 He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

This matter is before the Court on Reeves’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(Doc. 27), wherein Reeves seeks to enjoin the ADOC from executing him by any
method other than nitrogen hypoxia before the conclusion of this litigation. The

motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 42, 48), and the parties have submitted over
two thousand pages of evidence. On December 9, 2021, the Court conducted an
evidentiary hearing, during which it heard over seven hours of testimony and oral
argument on the motion. Following this hearing, the parties submitted supplemental

briefing in support of their respective positions. (Docs. 81, 82.) This matter is ripe
for review.
For the following reasons, Reeves’s motion for preliminary injunction is due

to be granted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Reeves’s Capital Litigation History
In 1998, Reeves was convicted of murdering Willie Johnson during a robbery

in the first degree. By a vote of 10–2, the jury recommended that Reeves be
sentenced to death. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation.

2 Reeves’s Amended Complaint also alleged a violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. On
November 24, 2021, the Court dismissed this claim. (Doc. 41.)
On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Reeves’s
conviction and sentence. Reeves v. State, 807 So. 2d 18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). The

Alabama Supreme Court denied Reeves’s petition for certiorari review and on June
8, 2001, the appeals court issued a certificate of judgment. Id. Reeves’s direct appeal
concluded on November 13, 2001, when the United States Supreme Court denied

his petition for a writ of certiorari. Reeves v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 1026 (2001).
In October 2002, Reeves filed a petition in the trial court for collateral relief
pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Reeves raised an
Atkins claim in this petition. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that

executing a person with an intellectual disability violates the Eighth Amendment.
536 U.S. 304 (2002). In his petition, Reeves claimed that the Atkins decision
prohibited his execution because he is intellectually disabled. In November 2006,

the state circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Reeves’s claims. See Reeves v.
State, 226 So. 3d 711, 722 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016). At this hearing, Reeves’s
medical expert, Dr. John Goff, testified that Reeves suffered from significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, while the State’s expert, Dr. Glen King, testified

that Reeves falls within the borderline range of intellectual functioning. The circuit
court found that Reeves’s intellectual functioning, while subaverage, was not so low
that he would meet the first prong of his Atkins intellectual disability claim. It also

found that Reeves failed to prove that he suffered from significant deficits in at least
two areas of adaptative functioning. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision. Reeves, 226 So. 3d at 741. The

Alabama Supreme Court denied Reeves’s petition for a writ of certiorari, as did the
United States Supreme Court. Reeves v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct. 22 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).

Reeves then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254, again raising an Atkins claim. Ultimately, the district court denied Reeves’s
habeas petition, concluding that he was not entitled to relief on any of his claims.
The district court did, however, grant Reeves a Certificate of Appealability with

respect to the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert
to investigate his intellectual disability. Reeves v. Dunn, Case No. 1:17-cv-061-KD-
MU, 2019 WL 12469769 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2019).

In May 2019, Reeves appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the Eleventh
Circuit. See Reeves v. Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-11779-P (11th Cir. 2019).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Reeves’s intellectual disability claim,
but reversed on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase.

Reeves v. Comm’r, 836 F. App’x 733 (11th Cir. 2020). The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case
for further proceedings. See Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S. Ct. 2405 (2021). Thereafter,

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, concluding
Reeves’s appeals. See Reeves v. Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F. App’x 657
(Mem) (11th Cir. 2021).

B. Backdrop of the Present Action
1. Nitrogen Hypoxia Becomes an Alternative Method of Execution
On June 1, 2018, Alabama Act 2018-353 went into effect. See 2018 Ala. Laws

Act 2018-353; ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(b). This law grants death row inmates a
single opportunity to elect that their execution be carried out by a new method called
nitrogen hypoxia, in lieu of Alabama’s default method, lethal injection. ALA. CODE
§ 15-18-82.1(b). The process requires any inmate who wants to elect nitrogen

hypoxia to notify his or her warden of that choice in writing within thirty days after
a certificate of judgment is issued affirming the inmate’s conviction. Id. Inmates,
like Reeves, whose certificates of judgment issued prior to June 1, 2018, had from

June 1 until June 30, 2018, to elect nitrogen hypoxia in writing. Id. at § 15-18-
82.1(b)(2).
Any writing from the inmate is sufficient under the statute. An inmate’s
failure to elect nitrogen hypoxia within the thirty-day period operates as a waiver of

that method of execution. Other than requiring that a warden accept written elections
from death row inmates during the statutory election period, the statutory language
imposes no other duty—or restriction—on the ADOC. The statute’s language does

not preclude the ADOC from honoring a late election. Indeed, in its Answer to
Reeves’s Amended Complaint, the ADOC admits that “Commissioner Dunn has the
authority to alter, amend, or make exceptions to the protocol and procedures

governing the execution of death-sentenced prisoners in the State of Alabama.”
(Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 52 at 3.)
2. Distribution of the Election Form

On June 26, 2018, the attorneys with the Federal Defenders for the Middle
District of Alabama’s Capital Habeas Unit traveled to Holman to meet with their
clients, notify them of the change in the law, and answer questions regarding
nitrogen hypoxia. (Doc. 21 at 4.) During this meeting, the Federal Defenders

provided a typewritten form that their clients could sign and submit to the warden to
effectuate a nitrogen hypoxia election. (Id.) This “election form” read as follows:
ELECTION TO BE EXECUTED BY NITROGEN HYPOXIA

Pursuant to Act No. 2018-353, if I am to be executed, I elect that it be
by nitrogen hypoxia rather than by lethal injection.
This election is not intended to affect the status of any challenge(s)
(current or future) to my conviction(s) or sentence(s), nor waive my right
to challenge the constitutionality of any protocol adopted for carrying out
execution by nitrogen hypoxia.
Dated this ______ day of June, 2018.
________________________ ________________________
Name/Inmate Number Signature
(Doc. 70-5.) After this meeting, many of the Federal Defenders’ clients opted into
nitrogen hypoxia. Some of them did not.
Sometime after this June 26, 2018 meeting, but before the statutory deadline
of June 30, 2018, Holman’s then-warden, Cynthia Stewart, obtained the Federal

Defenders’ election form and, at the direction of someone above her at the ADOC,
instructed Correctional Captain Jeff Emberton to distribute a copy of the form along
with an envelope to every inmate on Holman’s death row. (Doc. 27 at 15; Doc. 42

at 33.) As he handed out the forms, Emberton claims he told inmates that the law
had changed and that if they wanted to elect nitrogen hypoxia, they needed to fill out
the form, put it in the envelope, and that he would return later to collect any signed
forms. (Doc. 21 at 4; Doc. 42-4 at 124, 193–94.) Numerous inmates used the form

to elect nitrogen hypoxia. A few others elected nitrogen hypoxia by a different
writing. Many inmates, including Reeves, made no election at all.
3. No Execution Protocol Developed for Nitrogen Hypoxia

When the Alabama Code was amended to add nitrogen hypoxia as an
alternative method of execution, and throughout the June 2018 election period, the
ADOC had not yet developed a protocol for performing nitrogen hypoxia
executions. And as of the date of this order, “[a]lthough the ADOC has been

working on a hypoxia protocol for more than three years, there is still no working
protocol in place . . . .” (Doc. 23 at 37.) During oral argument on the pending
motion, counsel for the ADOC represented that she expects to “have everything

completely ready to go” within “the first three or four months” of 2022. (Doc. 78 at
219.) Based on this representation, the Court understands that the ADOC expects to
be able to perform executions by nitrogen hypoxia by the end of April 2022.

4. Reeves’s ADA Claim
It is undisputed that Reeves did not elect, or attempt to elect, nitrogen hypoxia
during the 30-day statutory opt-in period. In his Amended Complaint, Reeves claims

his “cognitive deficiencies” rendered him unable to “personally make the decision
to elect a method of execution” because he could not read and understand the
election form provided to him by the ADOC “absent reasonable accommodation.”
(Doc. 21 at 5.)

Reeves claims that, with IQ scores in the upper 60s and low 70s, his general
cognitive limitations and severely limited reading abilities rendered him unable to
read and understand the election form without assistance. (Id. at 6.) His inability to

understand, Reeves alleges, prevented him from enjoying the benefits of the form
and left him unable to elect nitrogen hypoxia before the statutory deadline. (Id. at 7–
8.) Because Reeves asserts he could not receive the benefit of the form without a
reasonable accommodation, he brings a claim against the ADOC under Title II of

the ADA.
Title II bars discrimination by reason of disability from the “benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Reeves

alleges that in handing out the election form, the ADOC established a public program
or service, the benefits from which he was excluded due to his intellectual disability.
(Doc. 21 at 7–8.) Reeves contends that the ADOC should have provided reasonable

accommodations to aid Reeves in understanding the form and its implications. (Id.
at 11–12.) He asserts that the ADOC could have, among other things, read the form
to him, given him more time to understand it, performed a comprehension check, or

used assistive technology. (Id. at 7.)
Reeves seeks two kinds of relief. The first is declaratory: he asks the Court
to declare the ADOC “in violation of the ADA for failing to develop and implement
reasonable accommodations concerning the nitrogen hypoxia opt-in and Election

Form, for disabled death-sentenced prisoners.” (Doc. 21 at 14.) The second is
equitable: he asks the Court to order the ADOC to implement a reasonable
accommodation for the opt-in, and to enjoin the ADOC from executing him “by

lethal injection to permit him time to avail himself of the reasonable
accommodations developed and implemented as to the nitrogen hypoxia opt-in and
the Election Form.” (Id.)
On September 9, 2021, the ADOC moved to dismiss Reeves’s Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 23.) Days later, the Alabama Attorney General moved the
Alabama Supreme Court to set Reeves’s execution date. (Doc. 25.) Reeves filed the
pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction on November 4, 2021, asking this Court

to enjoin the ADOC from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia
while his ADA claim remains pending. (Doc. 27 at 2.) On November 18, 2021, the
Alabama Supreme Court scheduled Reeves’s execution for January 27, 2022. (Doc.

37 at 3–4.) The Court turns now to Reeves’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has original subject matter jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), 2201, and 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court concludes that
venue properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standing
As an initial matter, the Court will address the ADOC’s argument that Reeves
lacks Article III standing to bring his ADA claim. (Doc. 42 at 5.) In its opposition
to Reeves’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the ADOC asserts that Reeves has

not established an injury-in-fact, fails to show that any alleged injury was caused by
the ADOC, and that this Court lacks the authority to redress Reeves’s claimed injury.
(Id. at 5–17.)

In his reply to the ADOC’s opposition, Reeves appears perplexed by the
ADOC’s contention that he lacks standing given that the Eleventh Circuit held
otherwise in a similar case several months ago. Reeves and the ADOC agree, as
does this Court, that the standing issues in this lawsuit are nearly identical to those
in the Willie B. Smith III litigation, wherein Smith advanced the same ADA claims
regarding the ADOC’s distribution of the election form. See Smith v. Dunn, Case

No. 19-CV-00927-ECM (M.D. Ala. 2021). Yet, the ADOC asks this Court to adopt
the factual findings of the district court in the Smith litigation, and in turn, ignore the
holding made by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal.

In Smith, the district court sua sponte dismissed Smith’s ADA lawsuit after
finding he lacked Article III standing to bring his claim. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit unanimously vacated the district court’s decision, holding that Smith had
sufficiently alleged an injury, established causation, and that his injury was

redressable by an order from the district court. Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,
Case No. 21-13298, 2021 WL 4817748 (11th Cir. 2021). The ADOC chose not to
seek a rehearing or appeal to the United States Supreme Court.

The ADOC urges this Court to disregard the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in
Smith because the unpublished opinion is not binding (Doc. 42 at 17), it offers “little
. . . persuasive value” (Doc. 81 at 7), and was issued following an “extremely
compressed time schedule” (Doc. 42 at 17–18). Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit’s

Smith decision is, at a minimum, persuasive to this Court and is factually
indistinguishable. The Court sees no reason to depart from that holding. Reeves,
like Smith, has alleged an injury, established causation, and his alleged injury is
redressable by an order from this Court.3 Now on to the matter of a preliminary
injunction.

B. Preliminary Injunction
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to “preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. Lambert, 695

F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983). A preliminary injunction “is meant to keep the status
quo for a merits decision, not replace it.” Brown v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 4 F.4th 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2021).
Reeves is entitled to a preliminary injunction if he demonstrates that: (1) he

has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm the
injunction would cause the other litigant; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not

be adverse to the public interest. Chavez v. Fla. SP Warden, 742 F.3d 1267, 1271
(11th Cir. 2014). However, “when the [State] is the party opposing the preliminary
injunction, its interest and harm merge with the public interest,” and so the third and
fourth elements are the same. Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1091 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citing Nken v. Holder 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

3 As in Smith, Reeves’s alleged injury is his being excluded from the benefit of electing what he believes is a less
painful method of execution. (Doc. 21 at 7-8.) And like Smith, Reeves has alleged that his injury is the result of the
ADOC developing and implementing a program without providing an accommodation for Reeves’s cognitive
disability. (Id. at 7.) As to redressability, the Eleventh Circuit held in Smith that the ability of this Court to “fashion
effective relief for a violation of federal law is not limited by what state law permits.” Smith, 2021 WL 4817748 at
*4.
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be
granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion for each

prong of the analysis.” America’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319, 1329
(11th Cir. 2014) (quotations and citation omitted). Reeves, as the movant, must
satisfy his burden on all requirements “by a clear showing.” Mazurek v. Armstrong,

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam).
For the following reasons, Reeves has successfully demonstrated he is entitled
to a preliminary injunction.
1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Reeves alleges that the ADOC violated Title II of the ADA by failing to
reasonably accommodate his disability in the distribution and use of the election
form. As a result, Reeves argues that he was unable to utilize the form to exercise

his statutory right to elect nitrogen hypoxia as his preferred method of execution.
Title II of the ADA bars discrimination by reason of disability from the
“benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. Title II supports claims under three theories of discrimination: intentional

discrimination, disparate treatment, or a failure to make reasonable
accommodations. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6
(11th Cir. 2008); see also Friedson v. Shoar, 479 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1263 n.6 (M.D.

Fla. 2020) (citing the same). To succeed on a Title II claim under a failure to
reasonably accommodate theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) he lacked meaningful access to the benefits

of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities by reason of his disability; and
(3) the public entity failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability.
Todd v. Carstarphen, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (citing Nadler

v. Harvey, 2007 WL 2404705, at *5 (11th Cir. 2007)); Redding v. Nova Se. Univ.,
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (stating that the ADA “requires
only those accommodations that are necessary to ameliorate a disability’s effect of
preventing meaningful access to the benefits of, or participation in, the program at

issue.”).
Reeves argues that he has satisfied his burden and shown by clear evidence
that he is substantially likely to succeed on all three elements. The ADOC disputes

Reeves’s ability to prove any of these elements. The Court addresses each element
in turn.
a. Qualified Individual with a Disability
To sustain an ADA claim, Reeves must demonstrate that he is a (1) qualified

individual with (2) a disability cognizable under the statute. There is a substantial
likelihood that he is both.
The ADA defines “disability” as a “physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Such activities include “speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communication, and working.” Id. at § 12102(2)(A). The term “disability”

is to be construed broadly. Id. at § 12102(4)(A).
Although the ADOC contests that Reeves suffers from a disability, the record
contains evidence that he is indeed disabled under the broad construction of the

ADA. Previous neurological testing found Reeves’s IQ to be between 68 and 71.
(Doc. 44-3 at 1; Doc. 44-4 at 1.) Because he raised an Atkins claim in both his state
post-conviction and federal habeas litigation, Reeves was independently assessed by
a neuropsychologist retained by his own counsel as well as one retained by the State

of Alabama.
In 2006, when Reeves was 28 years old, Dr. John Goff administered numerous
tests, including, among others, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Speech

Sounds Perception Test. (Doc. 27 at 9.) Dr. Goff determined that Reeves had an IQ
of 71, was “essentially illiterate,” and that it was “quite apparent” Reeves had never
adequately learned to read or write. (Doc. 27-28.) Dr. Goff ranked Reeves in the 5th
percentile for vocabulary, the 1st percentile for letter sequencing, and the 0.4th

percentile for comprehension. (Id.) The State’s expert, Dr. Glenn King, performed
similar testing and determined that Reeves had a full-scale IQ score of 68, could read
and spell at a 5th grade level, and had borderline intellectual functioning, but opined
that he did not believe Reeves was “mentally retarded.”4 (Doc. 27-5 at 10.)

More recently, in support of his ADA claim, Reeves retained Dr. Kathleen
Fahey, a speech pathologist who conducted a three-hour, in-person evaluation of
Reeves on December 1, 2021. Dr. Fahey likewise evaluated the election form itself,

running its text through software programs designed to calculate the readability of
the language used in the form. Dr. Fahey testified at the December 9, 2021
evidentiary hearing as to her findings and opinions.
Following her evaluation of Reeves, Dr. Fahey determined that Reeves has “a

significant and severe language disorder.” (Doc. 78 at 38.) She testified that
Reeves’s language competency was that of someone between the ages of 4 and 10.
(Id. at 39.) She also determined that his reading accuracy was at the 4th grade level

and his reading comprehension was at the 1st grade level. (Id.) The election form,
on the other hand, required an 11th grade reading level to be understood. (Id. at 33–
34.) All told, Dr. Fahey testified that in her professional opinion, Reeves’s language
disorder rendered him unable to comprehend the election form. (Id. at 39.)

4 As the Supreme Court noted in Hall v. Florida, both law and medicine have now moved away from the terms
‘mentally retarded’ and ‘mental retardation.’” Kilgore v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 805 F.3d 1301, 1303 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2015) (citing Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704–05 (2014)).
For its part, the ADOC presented no evidence to contradict the opinions of
Dr. Fahey.5 In its supplemental brief on the pending motion, the ADOC calls Dr.

Fahey’s conclusions “incredible,” pointing out that her opinion of Reeves remained
unchanged even after hearing a recording of Reeves reading aloud to his mother a
letter that was scored at a 5th grade reading level. (Doc. 81 at 20–22.) But the ADOC

did not retain its own expert to rebut Dr. Fahey’s conclusions, or offer expert
testimony of any sort, and does not contest the findings of Dr. Goff or Dr. King.6
Instead, the ADOC repeatedly points out that, despite the opinions of these doctors,
no court has ever found Reeves to be intellectually disabled under the standard set

out in Atkins v. Virginia. This argument, however, improperly conflates Alabama’s
Atkins standard7 with that of the ADA’s rather broad, and much lower, standard.
The bar to be considered “disabled” under the ADA is not a high one. See,

e.g., Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1268 & n.2 (11th Cir.

5 During her cross examination of Dr. Fahey, counsel for the ADOC attempted to dispute Dr. Fahey’s findings as to
the readability of the election form. Counsel indicated that she had performed her own evaluation using the same
software programs and the results showed the form read at a 10th grade level, rather than 11th grade as Dr. Fahey
found. (Doc. 78 at 51-52.) This assertion within a question presented by counsel is not evidence.

6 The ADOC cites to numerous medical request forms it claims were filled out by Reeves as evidence that he is not
disabled. Because these records have not been interpreted by an expert or given context as to the circumstances in
which they were completed, they are more appropriately weighed as evidence regarding whether or not Reeves’s
disability was obvious to the ADOC rather than evidence that he was not, in fact, disabled.

7 “[T]o be intellectually disabled under Atkins, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
‘significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below),’ (2) ‘significant or substantial deficits in
adaptive behavior,’ and (3) that both the subaverage intellectual functioning and the deficits in adaptive functioning
manifested before the age of eighteen.” Smith v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 924 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002)).
2014) (explaining that Congress instructed that “the establishment of coverage under
the ADA should not be overly complex nor difficult” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 110-

730, at 9 (2008))). Given the broad construction the ADA demands, Reeves is likely
to win on this point. Though he may not have been found to be so severely impaired
to qualify for relief under Atkins, the ADA’s disability standard is much lower. The

evidence presented at this stage demonstrates that Reeves’s cognitive impairments
and low intellectual functioning affect several major life activities, such as reading,
writing, and comprehension, placing Reeves under the ambit of the ADA.
Although he is likely to succeed in demonstrating his disability, Reeves must

also demonstrate that he is a qualified individual under the ADA. A “qualified
individual,” as defined by the ADA, is one who “with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies or practices, . . . or the provision of auxiliary aids and

services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. §
12131(2). To be a qualified individual, Reeves must demonstrate that the prison was
offering a program, service, or activity in which he was eligible to participate.8

The parties disagree on whether a program, service, or activity was offered
here. Reeves maintains that then-Warden Stewart established a “policy, protocol,

8 Prisons are “public entities,” which the statute defines as “any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a
State . . . or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); see also Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (holding that state prisons are
“public entit[ies]” under Title II of the ADA).
and program whereby corrections staff were instructed to distribute the Election
Forms . . . to all death row prisoners.” (Doc. 21 at 4). The ADOC disagrees that its

distribution of the election form constituted a public benefit or service under the
ADA, noting that although then-Warden Stewart directed that the forms be handed
out, she “does not recall who told her to pass out the forms, when that instruction

was given, or the circumstances of that conversation.” (Doc. 42 at 33.) In briefing
and during oral argument, counsel for the ADOC argued that use of the election form
was not required to effectuate a nitrogen hypoxia election under the statute and that
the form’s distribution was not “a formalized process” (Doc. 78 at 207), but rather

was merely a “courtesy at the end of the election period” (Doc. 42 at 31).
The ADOC’s framing of what constitutes a program, service, or activity under
the ADA is far too narrow. As courts across the country have long emphasized,

“[t]he ADA, as a remedial statute, must be broadly construed to effectuate its
purpose.” Soto v. City of Newark, 72 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (D.N.J. 1999) (citations
omitted); see also Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(explaining that, “to give effect to the ADA’s purpose of eliminating

discrimination . . . most courts have given a broad reading to the term ‘service.’”
(citations omitted)). Activities as diverse as planning municipal weddings,9

9 Soto, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
facilitating prisoner access to phone calls,10 or holding county quorum meetings11
have all been found to constitute “services” under the ADA.

Department of Justice regulations, promulgated pursuant to the ADA, are
similarly expansive.12 The Department instructs that Title II and its own regulations
apply “to all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by public

entities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a). At least one court interpreted this “broad language
[as] intended to ‘appl[y] to anything a public entity does.’” Yeskey v. Penn. Dep’t of
Corrs., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (second alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quotation and citations omitted).

The record here makes clear the non-trivial nature of the ADOC’s decision to
distribute the election form. Captain Emberton took over one hundred copies of this
form, with over one hundred envelopes, and gave every inmate on death row one of

each. (Doc. 42-4 at 128-131.) Emberton says he made an “announcement on each
tier” of the area where death row inmates are housed that the law had changed and
that they now had a new choice of execution method. (Doc. 78 at 194.) He was
directed to do this by Holman’s then-warden, who herself was directed by someone

above her in the ADOC’s chain of command, reasoning that the form’s distribution

10 Niece, 922 F. Supp. at 1218–19.
11 Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472–73 (8th Cir. 1998).
12 Title II of the ADA directs the Attorney General to “promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement
[that Title].” 42 U.S.C. § 12134.
was in the “best interest” of the inmates. (Doc. 42-4 at 176.) Whether formal or
informal, or merely a courtesy, the record at this stage sufficiently establishes that

the ADOC’s distribution of the election form was just the sort of “service,”
“program,” or “activity” the ADA, in its broad sweep, was intended to include.
Treating the form’s distribution as a “service,” Reeves must still demonstrate

that he was eligible to receive that service. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining a
qualified individual as one who “meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services”). Reeves argues that he meets the eligibility requirements
because the election form “was provided to all death row inmates,” and he is a death

row inmate. (Doc. 27 at 14.)
The record confirms Reeves’s contention. Captain Emberton handed out a
form to every inmate on death row. Nothing in the record indicates that Emberton

attempted to discern whether a particular inmate wanted to opt into nitrogen hypoxia
before handing him a form. His only criterion, and thus the only apparent eligibility
requirement for this service, was whether an inmate was on death row at Holman at
the time of the form’s distribution. Reeves, a death row inmate in June 2018, was

clearly eligible to receive an election form and participate in the benefits tied to the
form and its distribution. Reeves is likely to succeed in showing that he is a qualified
individual with a disability under the ADA.
b. Lack of Meaningful Access Due to Disability
Though the Court agrees that Reeves can likely show he is a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA, he must still demonstrate that he lacked
meaningful access to the benefits of the service for which he was eligible. Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (“[A]n otherwise qualified handicapped

individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee
offers.”); see also Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir.
2009) (explaining that to bring a valid Title II claim, a plaintiff “must specify a
benefit to which he was denied meaningful access based on his disability”).

“However, mere difficulty in accessing a benefit is not, by itself, a violation
of the ADA.” People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1216 (N.D. Ala.
2020) (citing Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1088 (11th Cir. 2007)).

Indeed, “equal access is not the standard under the law.” Medina v. City of Cape
Coral, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2014); see also A.M. ex rel. J.M. v.
NYC Dep’t of Educ., 840 F. Supp. 2d 660, 680 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“‘Meaningful
access’ . . . does not mean ‘equal access’ or preferential treatment.”).

Here, Reeves must identify a specific benefit the form provided, and then
demonstrate that he lacked meaningful access to that benefit. Mason, 559 F.3d at
888. Reeves is substantially likely to satisfy both requirements.
First, Reeves can likely demonstrate that the election form provided specific
benefits. Reeves argues that those benefits include (1) notice of the new method of

execution to the inmates (Doc. 21 at 4), (2) ease and ability of electing the new
method of execution, (3) “avoiding a substantially painful execution via lethal
injection” (Doc. 27 at 16), and (4) reservation of an inmate’s right to “challenge the

constitutionality of any [execution] protocol” (Doc. 27 at 15–16).
While there is general agreement between the parties that the form at least
made a nitrogen hypoxia election easier, the ADOC argues that the form itself
provided no benefit to Reeves because the benefits of notice and choosing one’s

method of execution were provided by the state statute, not by the form. Reeves’s
statutory right to elect nitrogen hypoxia vested on June 1, 2018, the day ALA. CODE
§ 15-18-82.1 became effective. That right continued, unimpeded, until the statutory

period expired. During that time, the ADOC asserts, Reeves had the ability to elect
nitrogen hypoxia by submitting any writing he wished. (Doc. 42 at 31.)
True enough, the form was not required to effectuate an election. But also
true is that the statute did not require the ADOC to distribute the election form. After

Alabama law was amended to add nitrogen hypoxia as a method of execution, had
the ADOC simply done nothing, it would have had no duty or obligation to inform
inmates of the law or facilitate their ability to elect a new method of execution. But

when the ADOC voluntarily made the decision to distribute a form which not only
made electing nitrogen hypoxia easier, but also included notice about the change in
the law and reservation of rights language beyond what the state statute required, the

ADOC provided a service subject to the requirements of the ADA and imposed upon
itself a duty to ensure that all inmates were able to meaningfully access benefits tied
to that service.

But even where Reeves adequately defines the form’s benefits, he must also
demonstrate that he lacked meaningful access to those benefits. To do so, Reeves
relies on Dr. Fahey’s testimony to show that his cognitive disability rendered him
unable to understand the election form. Dr. Fahey evaluated the readability of the

form at an 11th grade level (Doc. 78 at 33–34) and testified that Reeves’s “severe”
language disorder prevented him from comprehending the form’s language (Id. at
39). She also determined Reeves’s literacy abilities to fall between the 1st and 4th

grade levels. (Id.) Other experts have evaluated Reeves’s reading ability as high as
5th grade level. No matter his true ability, all evaluations fall far below the 11th
grade readability level Dr. Fahey determined the form to require. And this evidence
is largely unrebutted—the ADOC denies that the form’s required reading level was

that high, but it produced no actual evidence to contradict Dr. Fahey’s findings.13

13 The ADOC produced no evidence that the form read at any level below the 11th grade level other than ADOC
counsel’s aforementioned assertion that her own testing revealed the form read at a 10th grade level.
Despite Reeves’s inability to comprehend the election form, the ADOC notes
that the record contains support for the proposition that Reeves did receive

information about the form sufficient to satisfy the ADOC’s obligation to provide
him meaningful access. When he distributed the election forms, Captain Emberton
says that he explained the form’s purpose and notified the inmates that because the

law had changed, they now had a new choice of execution method. (Doc. 42-4 at
148.)
Although the ADOC argues that Emberton’s explanation made clear what the
form was for and how it was to be utilized, there is no evidence that Emberton’s

explanation was directed at or heard by Reeves. During the December 9, 2021
evidentiary hearing, Emberton testified that he announced the form’s purpose to
groups of inmates on “each tier” of the death row housing area, not to each inmate

individually. In fact, when deposed, he testified that if an inmate was not present
during the form’s distribution, that inmate would not have received a copy or heard
his explanation. (Doc. 78 at 189.) Or if an inmate was sleeping, Emberton says he
simply slipped the form through the bars of the cell, knocked the bars, and told the

inmate he had something to fill out. (Doc. 42-4 at 151.) Contrary to the ADOC’s
suggestion, this is not the sort of “explanation” that would have provided meaningful
access to the form’s benefits.
What’s more, Reeves stated in his sworn declaration that it was not actually
Emberton who gave him the election form, but rather a “hall runner,” and that he

never spoke to Emberton about the form or the new law. (Doc. 27-14.) Instead,
Reeves avers, had he understood the form’s language, he would have signed and
timely submitted it in June 2018. (Id.)

Although true that Reeves was not entitled to a more comprehensive
explanation of the form’s legal or factual implications than his fellow inmates
received, see A.M. ex rel. J.M., 840 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (“‘Meaningful access’ . . .
does not mean . . . preferential treatment.”), he was entitled to a basic understanding

of the form such that he could actually utilize it and meaningfully access its benefits.
Regardless of the efficacy of Emberton’s “explanation,” and whether or not Reeves
even heard it, an inmate who could read and comprehend the election form would

have been able to utilize and benefit from the form. But Reeves, because of his
disability, avers that he did not have even a rudimentary understanding of the form’s
language or its purpose. As a result, it appears likely Reeves could prove that he
lacked meaningful access to the form’s benefits of notice, ease and ability of

election, and reservation of rights.
c. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation
Having found that Reeves is likely to succeed in showing that he was denied

meaningful access to the election form’s benefits, Reeves must now establish that
he was denied a reasonable accommodation as required by the ADA. If Reeves’s
disability prevented him from receiving the form’s benefits, the ADOC is required

to “provide reasonable accommodations to ensure that [he] is permitted access to the
same benefits and services as others.” Arenas v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., Case No.
CV416-320, 2020 WL 1849362, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2020). However, no duty

to provide such accommodations is triggered before a claimant makes a specific
demand for one. Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363
(11th Cir. 1999). The claimant himself must explain what it is that he requires—
public entities are not required to “guess at what accommodation they should

provide.” Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Hedberg
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the “ADA does not
require clairvoyance”).

It is undisputed that Reeves did not make any such request of the ADOC.
(Doc. 27 at 18, 19.) Absent a request, Reeves can only succeed if his disability,
limitations, and need for an accommodation were “open, obvious, and apparent.”
Arenas, 2020 WL 1849362, at *12; see also Nattiel v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2017 WL

5774143, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2017) (explaining a plaintiff does not have to
request an accommodation if “the defendant otherwise had knowledge of an
individual’s disability and needs but took no action”).
Reeves argues that the ADOC could have accommodated his disability by,
among other things, reading the form to him, giving him more time to understand it,

performing a comprehension check, or using assistive technology. (Doc. 21 at 7.)
But because Reeves did not request an accommodation, his need for one must have
been obvious to the ADOC. Reeves is likely to successfully demonstrate that it was.

Reeves builds his argument on three key assertions: (1) the ADOC was on
notice that Reeves was cognitively disabled and struggled to read based on numerous
records in his prison file, dating back to his first week in custody (Doc. 27 at 10, 21),
(2) Reeves had made a prior request for reading assistance (Doc. 27-1), and (3) the

ADOC was on notice of his low IQ scores and inability to read because one of the
defendants here, Commissioner Jefferson Dunn, was the defendant in Reeves’s
federal habeas litigation. See Reeves, 2019 WL 12469769 at *1.

The ADOC attempts to rebut these assertions by pointing to Reeves’s inmate
record and his behavior while incarcerated to show that Reeves knew how to read,
write, and effectively communicate. The ADOC notes that for years, its staff
evaluated Reeves’s intellectual functioning, memory, speech, and concentration as

“normal” and “good,” and his behavior as “rational.” (Doc. 42 at 35; Doc. 42-5 at
111, 112, 122.) The ADOC argues the record also proves Reeves’s history of
understanding and completing forms and other paperwork. During his time at

Holman, Reeves signed numerous forms, many containing legal jargon and
complicated medical terminology (id. at 36; Doc. 42-5 at 7, 10),14 and filled out
numerous medical request forms (Doc. 42-5 at 27, 49, 71, 80, 85, 193, 226).15

Completing and signing these forms, the ADOC argues, could not have given ADOC
staff the impression that Reeves could not read, write, or communicate his needs.
(Doc. 42 at 38–39.)

To further support its position, the ADOC presented testimony at the
December 9, 2021 evidentiary hearing from several of its non-medical staff members
who stated they had no reason to believe Reeves suffered from a cognitive disability.
Captain Emberton, Deputy Commissioner Cheryl Price, Holman ADA Coordinator

Richard Lewis, and Correctional Officer Issac Moody each testified that there was
no indication that Reeves struggled to read things, that he spoke and communicated
clearly, and that he had never requested help with understanding a document. (Doc.

78 at 84, 98, 121, 138–39, 178–79.) They further testified that if Reeves needed an

14 Worth noting is that many of these forms also include notations that the document was reviewed with the patient
(Doc. 42-5 at 40, 42, 87) or that the inmate confirms he had been “fully informed” about what he was signing (E.g.,
Id. at 132). Still others include notations that Reeves refused to sign the form (Doc. 42-6 at 64, 65, 87, 90, 98, 99,
100, 110), or the form had no signature (Id. at 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 101) or was filled out by another person and signed
by Reeves (Id. at 97, 102, 107, 138, 139, 140, 149, 150).

15 Although the ADOC cites to dozens of forms it purports were filled out by Reeves, there is a question as to whether
all of these forms were written by Reeves himself. The parties agree that the 2015 inmate request slip (Doc. 27-1)
was drafted by Reeves. When comparing numerous other request forms with the handwriting on the inmate request
slip, it appears that Reeves may not have been the one who drafted those forms. (Compare Doc. 42-5 at 14, 15, 16,
29, 31, 38, 52, 97, 129 with Doc. 42-5 at 27, 49, 50, 71, 180, 185, 193, 226.) Reeves having another inmate fill out
prison forms on his behalf is consistent with testimony from Captain Emberton in the Smith litigation that death row
inmates often “help each other out” because they see it as “demeaning and degrading” to ask staff for help. (Doc. 42-
4 at 133.) Neither party has made an argument or presented evidence that these forms were or were not drafted by
Reeves, but with the benefit of additional discovery, some light could be shed on this observed discrepancy.
accommodation, he could have found information on how to request one in the
prison’s ADA Handbook; a copy of which was kept in the prison library and was

also available online. (Doc. 78 at 123, 179.)16
Although records in Reeves’s inmate file do indeed show that he was routinely
evaluated as normal, Reeves points to numerous other documents in his file as

evidence that ADOC staff had repeated concerns about his mental health,17
intellectual abilities, and literacy, dating back to his first days in custody and
continuing throughout his incarceration. For example, in July 1998, during a mental
health intake screening, ADOC staff commented that Reeves had “poor

communication,” was “fragile and easily confused,” had “trouble processing
information,” and “may have limited intel[ectual] abilities.” (Doc. 42-1 at 126.)
Following Reeves’s placement in segregation later that year, a mental health review

form evaluates Reeves’s intellectual functioning as “slow” and indicates that Reeves
“possibly cannot read.” (Doc. 27-37.) The next year, in March 1999, following an
inmate interview, ADOC staff noted that Reeves suffered from “mild retardation”
and was a “special education prospect.” (Doc. 27-36.) Later in 1999, following a

16 This testimony fails to recognize that if Reeves struggles to read, he could not have read and understood this
handbook in order to educate himself on how to properly request assistance.

17 Reeves’s inmate file includes numerous records documenting his mental health struggles while incarcerated.
Various records indicate Reeves suffers from a mood disorder (Doc. 42-1 at 241, 244, 245), hears voices (Id. at 231),
was placed on suicide watch (Id. at 227), “remains psychotic” (Id. at 242), and once set fire to his cell, burning himself
in the process (Doc. 42-5 at 38). Although Reeves refers to his mental health issues in support of his ADA claim, the
evidence he has presented appears to focus on his cognitive disability and reading difficulties.
psychological interview, an ADOC counselor listed recommendations for Reeves
that included “reading” and “special education” and remarked that Reeves reads at

“probably 4th - 5th grade level.” (Doc. 42-6 at 178.) And in 2003, on a mental health
referral form, ADOC staff noted that Reeves had a “learning disability.” (Doc. 27-
37 at 1.)

The most informative record that his disability was obvious, Reeves asserts,
is an inmate request slip he submitted in 2015. On this form, Reeves wrote “I would
like to have those papers to sign. I did not know what they were and wanted to have
it read to me but Sgt. said he did not have time. So will you bring the papers back

to me?” (Doc. 27-2.) This document, Reeves argues, proves that not only had he
previously requested a reading accommodation, but that his request was denied.
(Doc. 27 at 21–22.) However, the ADOC disagrees, arguing that “a single document

indicating that Reeves once asked a single ADOC employee to read a document to
him . . . does not indicate any likelihood of establishing an ‘obvious’ need for
accommodation . . . .” (Doc. 42 at 38 n. 177.)
To bolster this contention, the ADOC relies on Holman ADA Coordinator

Lewis’s testimony regarding this request slip. At the December 9, 2021 evidentiary
hearing, Lewis testified that he would not consider this document a formal request
because it was not written on an actual accommodation form.18 (Doc. 78 at 118.)
But when asked to identify what request was written in the form, Lewis confirmed

that Reeves was “making a statement saying that an officer did not accommodate a
request he asked of him.” (Id. at 121.) Lewis then testified, had a request like
Reeves’s been brought to his attention, he would have gone to speak with the inmate

to “see what does he need” (Id. at 119) and agreed that if an inmate said he could
not read a document, Lewis would have found a way to assist him. (Id.) At the
conclusion of his testimony, when asked by the Court if “that exact same language
was put by Mr. Reeves on a form that said ‘ADA request form,’ would you have

treated that as an accommodation request,” Lewis answered “yes.” (Id. at 126.)
The Court agrees that this inmate request slip does not make a formal request
for an ADA accommodation. But importantly, this form memorializes Reeves’s

verbal request for a reading accommodation which ADOC staff either ignored or
denied. This request slip, along with numerous other ADOC records in which staff
express concerns regarding Reeves’s ability to read and his intellectual functioning,
support Reeves’s contention that the ADOC should have known Reeves required a

reasonable accommodation to utilize the election form “had they just looked.” (Doc.
27 at 20.)

18 Reeves’s inmate request form was submitted in 2015. Holman’s ADA program, and the forms to request an
accommodation, were not implemented until 2016. (Doc. 78 at 157.) Therefore, Reeves’s 2015 request to have
documents read to him could not have been on an official ADA accommodation request form.
What’s more, Reeves asserts, is that in the months preceding the election
form’s distribution, the ADOC was aware of his low IQ scores and inability to read

because ADOC Commissioner Dunn was the defendant in Reeves’s federal habeas
litigation.19 During this litigation, Reeves asserted an Atkins claim and was
evaluated by Dr. Goff and Dr. King, both of whom found Reeves had impaired

intellectual functioning and limited reading abilities. The ADOC was clearly aware
of these findings because Commissioner Dunn cited to them in his April 2018
response to Reeves’s habeas petition. Reeves v. Dunn, Case No. 1:17-cv-00061-KD-
MU, Doc. 25 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2018). Specifically, this response cites to the results

of Reeves’s neurological testing, including Dr. Goff’s finding that Reeves was
“functionally illiterate,” had an IQ of 71, and could read at only a 3rd grade level.
Id. The brief also highlighted Dr. King’s determination that Reeves could read at

only a 5th grade level, had an IQ of 68, and fell within the borderline range of
intellectual functioning. Id. Dunn likewise cited to the state circuit court’s finding
that Reeves’s intellectual functioning was “subaverage.” Id. Although this evidence
was insufficient to support Reeves’s Atkins claim, in the present case, under the

ADA, it demonstrates that the ADOC was on notice that Reeves had IQ scores in the
high 60s or low 70s, subaverage intellectual functioning, and had been found to be

19 Evidence submitted during Reeves’s habeas litigation also included his primary school records, which show that
Reeves repeated the 1st, 4th, and 5th grades and was placed into special education classes. Although the ADOC argues
that Reeves’s academic problems were due to behavioral issues, not disability, no evidence has been presented as to
whether or not these childhood behavioral struggles were the result of Reeves’s subaverage intellectual functioning.
functionally illiterate a mere two months before it handed him the election form and
expected him to comprehend and utilize it without accommodation.

All told, ADOC records reflect repeated concerns regarding Reeves’s
cognitive abilities and literacy in 1998, 1999, and 2003. In 2015, Reeves asked
prison staff for assistance reading documents, a request that Holman’s ADA

Coordinator would today consider a request for an accommodation. And in 2018,
Commissioner Dunn filed a brief acknowledging Reeves’s low IQ scores and
functional illiteracy. Weighing all of this evidence against the documents and
testimony cited by the ADOC, the Court finds that Reeves is likely to succeed in

proving his need for an accommodation was open and obvious to the ADOC.
2. Equitable Factors
The remaining considerations in deciding whether to grant a preliminary

injunction involve the equities. This Court must (1) weigh whether the moving party
will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, in addition to (2) “assessing the
harm to the opposing party,” and (3) “weighing the public interest.” Nken, 556 U.S.
at 435. The last two factors “merge when the [State] is the opposing party.” Id.

“[E]quity must be sensitive to the [State’s] strong interest in enforcing its criminal
judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.” Hill v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).
Without an injunction, in less than three weeks, Reeves would face execution
by lethal injection, a method he expects would be “torturous.” (Doc. 27 at 23.)

Reeves avers that absent the alleged ADA violation at issue here, he would have
instead chosen his death be by nitrogen hypoxia. He urges that his execution by
lethal injection would prematurely moot his ADA claim before it can be decided on

the merits, a harm Reeves contends is “real and irreparable.” (Id.)
Reeves further argues that an injunction will not harm the opposing party
because the ADOC has represented, on multiple occasions, that it is in the final days
of developing a protocol for nitrogen hypoxia executions. (Doc. 27 at 25.) Reeves

notes that should the ADOC finalize a constitutionally acceptable protocol, it can
execute him by nitrogen hypoxia. If the ADOC fails to do so, Reeves’s claim can
instead be resolved at trial. Either way, Reeves points out, any injunction issued by

this Court would eventually be dissolved, Reeves would be executed, and the ADOC
would not be harmed. (Id.)
In response, the ADOC counters that lethal injection is a constitutional
method of execution, and therefore what Reeves claims would be an irreparable

injury is merely his lawful execution. (Doc. 42 at 40.) The ADOC further notes that
Reeves has been on death row for over twenty-five years (Id. at 42) and argues that
a preliminary injunction would harm the public interest because “[b]oth the State
and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a
sentence.” (Id. at 41).

On balance, the equities favor Reeves. Although an injunction that further
delays his execution “impose[s] a cost on the State and the family and friends of the
murder victim,” Bowles v. DeSantis, 934 F.3d 1230, 1248 (11th Cir. 2019), counsel

for the ADOC represented to this Court that a final nitrogen hypoxia protocol is only
weeks away. (Doc. 78 at 219.) Balancing this arguably short delay against the
irreparable harm to Reeves if he is forced to face execution by a method he so greatly
fears—and one he would not have chosen absent the ADOC’s alleged ADA

violation—the equitable scales tip in favor of Reeves.
After all, Reeves is correct that the “public has an interest in persons aggrieved
by ADA violations receiving judicial review.” (Doc. 27 at 26.) Congress enacted

the ADA to, among other things, “provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
42 U.S.C. § 12101(6)(1). If it did violate the ADA, the ADOC has no interest in
conducting an execution that contravenes the statute’s intent to protect individuals

with disabilities.
Reeves has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his ADA
claim and the equities weigh in his favor. Reeves has therefore established his right

to a preliminary injunction that prevents the ADOC from executing him by any
method other than nitrogen hypoxia before his ADA claim can be decided on its
merits.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 27) is GRANTED; and

2. Defendants Jefferson Dunn and Terry Raybon are hereby ENJOINED from
executing Matthew Reeves by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia until
further order from this Court.
DONE on this the 7th day of January, 2022.

/s/ R. Austin Huffaker, Jr.
R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9987620. Public record. Not legal advice.