# Archie v. Covington County

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · March 29, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9987261

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** March 29, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9987261

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the three ways described above to show a causal connection for a failure-to-supervise claim
- recognizing that Moulton articulated an exception to State immunity
- noting constitutionally deficient medical care based on failure to provide adequate 21 treatment to inmate with hypertension
- finding deliberate indifference when guards at Covington County Jail “ignored [the decedent’s] cries for help and medical attention”

## Opinion text

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TERRY ARCHIE, as )
Administrator of the )
Estate of Teria C. )
Archie, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
Plaintiff, ) 2:19cv508-MHT
) (WO)
v. )
)
COVINGTON COUNTY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Teria
Archie, who died at age 36 while detained pretrial at the
Covington County Jail. According to the administrator’s
complaint, Archie had hypertension and repeatedly
requested medical assistance for chest pain and shortness
of breath in the weeks before her death. Other than
aspirin, she did not receive medical intervention until
she was found nonresponsive in her cell in July 2017.
For their alleged roles in Archie’s death, the
administrator has named seven defendants in this lawsuit:
Covington County, Alabama; then-county sheriff Dennis
Meeks; Southern Health Partners, the private health-care
provider for the jail; and several jail staff members,

including the jail administrator Alan Syler, a
lower-level officer named Melissa Leslie, a nurse named
Wanda Craft, and the jail’s doctor, Pamela Barber. The
administrator asserts six claims. He asserts three

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Count 1, for deliberate
indifference to Archie’s serious medical needs against
all defendants; Count 5, for failure to provide
constitutionally adequate supervision and training

against all defendants except Leslie; and Count 6, for
failure to act to address known problems with medical
care at the jail against all defendants except Leslie and

Craft. He asserts two claims, Counts 2 and 3, against
only the county, under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. And he

asserts one state-law claim, Count 4, against all
defendants for wrongful death. The court has

2
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction), and 29 U.S.C. § 794a
(Section 504).
This case is now before the court on the partial
motion to dismiss filed by Covington County, former

sheriff Meeks, and jail administrator Syler.1 See Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 41). These defendants move to dismiss
the ADA and Section 504 claims (Counts 2 and 3) against
the county for failure to state a claim; the

wrongful-death claim (Count 4) as barred by state-law
immunity only insofar as it is brought against Meeks; the
failure-to-supervise and failure-to-act claims (Counts 5

and 6) against the county because counties in Alabama are

1. The motion to dismiss asserts in the opening
paragraph that it is also filed on behalf of officer
Leslie. However, in the motion’s body and accompanying
brief, there is no discussion about dismissal of any of
the counts of the complaint as alleged against Leslie.
See Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) and Brief (Doc. 42).
This opinion therefore does not address Leslie in its
discussion.
3
not empowered or obligated to supervise the jails present
therein; and those same two claims against Meeks and

Syler as barred by qualified immunity. No party seeks
dismissal of count 1, the deliberate-indifference claim.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be
granted in part and denied in part. Count 6, the

failure-to-act claim, is not sufficiently established in
law and will be dismissed as against the county, Meeks,
and Syler. In all other respects, the motion will be
denied.

I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD
When considering a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts
the plaintiff’s allegations as true, see Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the
complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, see Duke v. Cleland,

5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). The court may draw
“reasonable inferences” from the facts alleged in the

4
complaint. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th
Cir. 2001).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual allegations of the complaint indicate
that at the time of her death, Archie was detained
pretrial at Covington County Jail after she was arrested
for unpaid child support. She had been at the jail for

about two months when she died in July 2017.
Archie had a “history of high blood pressure” and

5
had been diagnosed with hypertension. Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶¶ 6, 14. According to the

complaint, “In the weeks leading up to her death, Archie
continually requested medical attention because she was
suffering severe chest pains and shortness of breath.”
Id. at ¶ 16. Her blood pressure was checked and found

to be “unusually high at times for someone her age.” Id.
at ¶ 25. She was not taken to a hospital or administered
any diagnostic testing to determine the severity of her
condition; instead, when she requested medical attention,

she would be given aspirin and ordered to return to her
cell. See id. at ¶¶ 17-19. Defendant Barber, the jail’s
doctor, “repeatedly refused to see Archie” when she

sought medical attention, and after several weeks of such
requests, Barber and nurse Craft began simply removing
Archie’s name from lists of inmates to be seen during
Barber’s medical visitations. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.

This denial of medical care was apparently a routine
practice at Covington County Jail. Medical care at the

6
jail was provided through a contract between the county
and Southern Health Partners, which employed Barber and

staffed her to the facility. See id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Barber
was supposed to conduct weekly visits with inmates
requiring medical attention, but “[i]t was a known fact
at the jail” that she “would pick and choose the inmates

she would see on her visits and, many times, would not
show up for the regular weekly visits.” Id. at ¶ 26.
Indeed, she often came to the jail only once a month to
provide medical services. See id. As a result,

“[i]nmates with disabilities who needed to be seen by a
doctor, including Archie, were left untreated or
inadequately treated” as Barber and the other medical

staff “would pick and choose who they wanted to treat and
when.” Id. at ¶ 28.
One day in July 2017, after several weeks of
experiencing severe chest pains and respiratory symptoms

and being refused medical care other than aspirin, Archie
“began experiencing severe and sharp pains in her chest

7
area” while delivering trays as part of her work duties
at the jail. Id. at ¶ 36. She told correctional staff

of her symptoms and asked “if she could either get medical
assistance or return to her cell to lie down.” Id. Aside
from Barber, all of the individual defendants named in
this suit were present during this time and were aware

of Archie’s requests. See id. at ¶ 37. Archie’s requests
were denied, and she was required to finish delivering
trays. See id. at ¶ 36. Immediately after completing
her work, Archie returned to her cell and started

repeatedly pressing an emergency call button for medical
assistance. See id. at ¶¶ 36, 40. By the time a nurse
arrived to check on Archie, she was nonresponsive, and

she was pronounced dead after attempts to resuscitate her
failed. See id. at ¶¶ 36-37.

III. DISCUSSION

The court will address in turn each of the counts
that the moving defendants now seek to dismiss.

8
A. Wrongful-Death Claim

Former sheriff Meeks moves to dismiss the state-law
wrongful-death claim, Count 4, to the extent it is
against him, arguing that he is immune from suit on that
claim. State-law tort actions brought against Alabama

sheriffs for damages in their individual capacities are
subject to the so-called “State immunity” imposed by
Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution
whenever the acts alleged were “performed in the line and

scope of their employment.” Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So.
3d 895, 897 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Suttles v. Roy, 75 So.
3d 90, 94 (Ala. 2010)); see also Ex parte Sumter County,

953 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (Ala. 2006). However, this immunity
does not extend to individual-capacity suits for damages
alleging that such officials “acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken

interpretation of law, subject to the limitation that the
action not be, in effect, one against the State.” Ex

9
parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013).2
Meeks contends that this articulation of the law of

State immunity mistakenly conflates that doctrine with
“State-agent immunity,” a distinct form of more limited
immunity for state officials developed by the Alabama
Supreme Court in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.

2000), and subsequent cases. See Reply in Supp. Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 52) at 4-5. Meeks is wrong. The Alabama
Supreme Court in Ex parte Moulton recognized an exception
to State immunity, not State-agent immunity, for actions

for damages against State officials in their individual
capacities under the conditions described above. See
Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1141. As the court said, “this

Court today restates the sixth ‘exception’ to the bar of
State immunity under § 14 as follows: ... (b) actions for

2. In Todd v. Bailey, No. 3:12-cv-589-MHT, 2018 WL
1674459 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 2018) (Thompson, J.), this
court in a footnote incorrectly indicated that none of
the exceptions to State immunity pertains to suits for
money damages. See id. at *22 n.23. That footnote
overlooked the exception articulated in Moulton.
10
damages brought against State officials in their
individual capacity where it is alleged that they had

acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority,
or in a mistaken interpretation of law.” Id. And the
court expressly distinguished this holding on the scope
of State immunity from any potential application of

State-agent immunity to the case. See id.; see also Ala.
State Univ. v. Danley, 212 So. 3d 112, 122-23 (Ala. 2016)
(recognizing that Moulton articulated an exception to
State immunity).

As noted above, this exception to State immunity is
subject to the caveat that the suit may “not be, in
effect, one against the State.” Moulton, 116 So. 3d at

1141. To determine “whether an action against a state
officer or employee is, in fact, one against the State,”
courts should “consider such factors as the nature of the
action and the relief sought.” Phillips v. Thomas, 555

So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989); see also Moulton, 116 So. 3d
at 1141 (citing Phillips to explain this caveat). So,

11
for instance, a negligence action for personal injury
implicates State interests that are “far too incidental

to supply the requisite nexus for extension of
constitutional immunity.” Phillips, 555 So. 2d at 83
(quoting Barnes v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770, 783 (Ala. 1988)).
A suit is effectively brought against the State when

“a result favorable to the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the State,” when
“the defendant is simply a ‘conduit’ through which the
plaintiff seeks recovery of damages from the State,” or

when “a judgment against the officer would directly
affect the financial status of the State treasury.”
Danley, 212 So. 3d at 124 (quoting Moulton, 116 So. 3d

at 1131). But see Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1131 (explaining
these as limitations on suits against State officers in
their official capacities). At one point, the Alabama
Supreme Court declared that any suit for money damages

brought against an officer in his or her individual
capacity necessarily fails to qualify as a suit against

12
the State because such a suit seeks personal payment from
the officer sued rather than money from the State. See

Ex parte Retirement Sys. of Ala., 182 So. 3d 527, 533 n.4
(Ala. 2015); Barnhart v. Ingalls, 275 So. 3d 1112, 1126
(Ala. 2018). The court has since limited that holding,
explaining that when a “necessary element” of an

individual-capacity claim is met “only because of the
positions” held by the officers, the claim remains barred
by State immunity. Barnhart, 275 So. 3d at 1126-27
(emphasis in original). For example, in an

individual-capacity suit for breach of fiduciary duty, a
State officer may be immune if the fiduciary duty alleged
to have been breached existed only because of the

officer’s official position. See id.
In sum, Meeks, as a former sheriff, may claim the
benefits of State immunity under § 14 on the
administrator’s wrongful-death claim to the extent that

such immunity applies to this case. There are two ways
in which that immunity may be inapplicable: if Meeks’s

13
actions were outside “the line and scope” of his
employment, Donaldson, 80 So. 3d at 899, or if the

administrator alleges that Meeks “acted fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond [his] authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of law,” Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1141. If
the administrator takes the latter approach, the court

must further consider whether the claim is “in effect,
one against the State,” id., which may be the case even
though the claim is brought against Meeks in his
individual capacity if a “necessary element” of the

wrongful-death claim can be established solely because
of Meeks’s former position as sheriff. Barnhart, 275 So.
3d at 1126.

The complaint alleges that former sheriff Meeks was
personally aware of Archie’s growing complaints of severe
chest pain and shortness of breath and that he
deliberately ignored her requests for medical assistance.

See Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶ 38. Because
he undertook these actions in the course of overseeing

14
the jail, they may have fallen within the line and scope
of his role as sheriff. See Ex parte Burnell, 90 So. 3d

708, 711-12 (Ala. 2012). But the complaint adequately
alleges that Meeks “acted fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond [his] authority, or in a mistaken interpretation
of law,” Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1141. There is no

good-faith way to intentionally withhold medical care
from a person until they die. Cf. Taylor v. Hughes, 920
F.3d 729, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2019) (denying § 14 immunity
to guards at Covington County Jail who told detainee who

had been in car crash to “shut up” when he “cr[ied] out
in pain for several hours and stat[ed] that he was ‘dying’
and ‘broke up’ inside,” leading to death from internal

bleeding). As all state officials are bound by the
obligations of the United States Constitution, see U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1, it was not within Meeks’s
authority to deliberately ignore the pleas for help of a

dying inmate in his custody. And to the extent that
Meeks believed his alleged conduct was justified, he

15
acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law.
Nor does the wrongful-death claim, unlike the claim

for breach of fiduciary duty considered in Barnhart,
depend on an element that is met solely because of Meeks’s
position as sheriff. Wrongful death in Alabama is a
statutory claim requiring only that a “wrongful act,

omission, or negligence” of the defendant caused the
decedent’s death and that the decedent would have been
able to sue for that act, omission, or negligence if she
had not died. Ala. Code § 6-5-410(a). Per the

complaint’s allegations, Meeks and his correctional staff
prevented Archie from obtaining medical care on the day
she died by forcing her to finish delivering trays before

letting her return to her cell to start calling for
emergency medical assistance. See Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶¶ 36-38. Causing a person’s
death by stopping her from getting medical care she needs

gives rise to a wrongful-death claim; the statute does
not require a defendant who behaves that way to have a

16
sheriff’s duties in order for liability to attach. See,
e.g., Ex parte Russell, -- So. 3d ---, 2020 WL 3478514,

at *2 (Ala. 2020) (wrongful-death claim against hospital
guard and supervisor where guard was permitted to call
police on emergency room patient, causing the patient’s
meningitis to go untreated). Accordingly, Meeks is not

entitled to State immunity on the administrator’s
wrongful-death claim.

B. Failure to Train and Supervise Claim

Covington County seeks dismissal of Count 5, the
failure-to-train-and-supervise claim. For this
argument, the county relies on the decision of the en

banc Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Turquitt v.
Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998) (en
banc), in which the appellate court held that supervision
of inmates in county jails is delegated to Alabama’s

sheriffs, and that sheriffs act as officers of the State,
rather than of individual counties, when operating the

17
jails they oversee. See id. at 1289.
Covington County seems to have misunderstood the

allegations made in the second amended complaint. The
administrator does not allege that the county is liable
for failing to supervise sheriff Meeks in his oversight
of the Covington County Jail. Instead, the administrator

alleges that the county itself contracted for the
provision of health care at the jail with Southern Health
Partners, the private health-care provider named as a
defendant in this case, and that the county failed to

supervise Southern Health Partners’ performance under
that contract or to afford Southern Health Partners
sufficient resources to ensure constitutionally adequate

medical care at the jail. See Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 40) at ¶¶ 110, 117. The Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Turquitt does not free the county from its
responsibility to supervise the execution of its own

contract for health care at the Covington County Jail.
And the complaint adequately alleges that the county

18
failed to supervise this contract by maintaining policies
or customs of underfunding Southern Health Partners’

staffing levels and services and by declining to monitor
the organization’s work, leading to constitutionally
deficient medical care at the jail. See id. at ¶¶ 31-33.
As such, this claim against Covington County will not be

dismissed.
Former sheriff Meeks and jail administrator Syler
also move to dismiss the failure-to-train-and-supervise
claim against them based on qualified immunity. Claims

for failure to supervise subordinates differ from claims
for failure to train and are subject to different--and
generally broader--liability requirements. See Keith v.

DeKalb County, 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014)
(drawing this distinction). Although the administrator’s
complaint conflates these two theories in discussing
Count 5, the allegations presented in support of that

claim make clear that the count rests, at least in part,
on a theory of failure to supervise, and the court will

19
analyze it accordingly. See, e.g., Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶ 111.

Determining whether qualified immunity bars relief
involves two distinct questions: whether the complaint
adequately alleges a violation of a constitutional right
and whether that right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Courts may “exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in

light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.” Id. at 236.
There are three ways in which a plaintiff in the

Eleventh Circuit can show that a right was clearly
established for the purposes of qualified immunity.
First, “the plaintiff can point to a materially similar
case decided at the time of the relevant conduct by the

Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the relevant
state supreme court”--the case “need not be directly on

20
point,” but it must “have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Patel v. Lanier

County, 969 F.3d 1173, 1186 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting J
W ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d
1248, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2018)). Second, the plaintiff
“can identify a broader, clearly established principle

that should govern the novel facts of the situation.”
Id. Or, third, the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
alleged conduct “so obviously violated the Constitution
that prior case law is unnecessary.” Id.

The constitutional right of inmates under the Eighth
Amendment not to have serious medical needs deliberately
ignored was established in binding case law long before

the events alleged in the administrator’s complaint.
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
(holding unconstitutional “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners”); Brown v. Plata, 563

U.S. 493, 508 (2011) (noting constitutionally deficient
medical care based on failure to provide adequate

21
treatment to inmate with hypertension). While claims
involving the mistreatment of pretrial detainees are

governed by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the
Eighth, the Eleventh Circuit treats the standard for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under
the two amendments as “identical.” Goebert v. Lee

County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).3
More specifically, the Eleventh Circuit long ago

3. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015),
the United States Supreme Court held inapplicable to
pretrial detainees the Eighth Amendment’s requirement
that prisoners show subjective malice on the part of
their jailers--in addition to objective
unreasonableness--to state an excessive-force claim. See
id. at 400-02; see also id. at 403 (finding unlawful a
jury instruction requiring that jailers “recklessly
disregarded” the plaintiff’s safety). Given the
relationship between the deliberateness required for
medical-neglect claims under the Eighth Amendment and the
maliciousness required for excessive-force claims under
that amendment, see, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 320-21 (1986), it is unclear whether subjective
intentionality should remain a necessary element of
medical-neglect claims brought by pretrial detainees
after Kingsley. That said, because the conduct alleged
in this case meets the deliberate-indifference standard,
the court need not consider whether Kingsley lowered that
standard for claims brought by pretrial detainees such
as Archie.
22
explained that an inmate with chest pains and shortness
of breath may have a serious medical need, particularly

when these symptoms are coupled with a life-threatening
underlying condition. See Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537,
1543 (11th Cir. 1995). A serious medical need may be
determined by “whether a delay in treating the need

worsens the condition.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588
F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). It is a medical
condition that “if left unattended, poses a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207,

1222 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307).
Given that delaying treatment of Archie’s severe
hypertension symptoms on the day of her death led to her

demise, it is understandable that Meeks and Syler do not
appear to contest in their motion to dismiss that her
medical need was serious.
Moreover, the allegations of the complaint

sufficiently indicate that the subordinates of Meeks and
Syler at the Covington County Jail were deliberately

23
indifferent to Archie’s serious medical need. On the day
she died, Archie complained to the jail’s correctional

staff about “severe and sharp pains in her chest area”
and pleaded for medical attention. Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶ 36. The officers refused her
requests and ordered her to finish handing out trays

before she could return to her cell to call for emergency
medical aid. See id. Flatly ignoring a detainee’s
serious medical needs constitutes deliberate
indifference. See Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 734

(11th Cir. 2019) (finding deliberate indifference when
guards at Covington County Jail “ignored [the decedent’s]
cries for help and medical attention”).

Finally, the standards by which supervisors may be
held liable under § 1983 for the deliberate indifference
of their subordinates were clearly established by the
time of the instant conduct as well. See, e.g., Cottone

v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). As a
result, the only question left is whether the factual

24
allegations supporting the failure-to-supervise count
succeed in making out a claim that Meeks and Syler

violated this right.
Under the law of the Eleventh Circuit, “to hold a
supervisor liable [under § 1983] a plaintiff must show
that the supervisor either directly participated in the

unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection
exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged
constitutional violation.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1047-48.
The count of the administrator’s complaint alleging that

Meeks and Syler directly participated in deliberate
indifference to Archie’s medical needs is separate from
the failure-to-supervise count. The court will therefore

assess whether the latter claim shows a “causal
connection” between the defendants’ acts and the alleged
constitutional violations. Id. Such a connection may
be shown when “a history of widespread abuse puts the

responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct
the alleged deprivation,” when the supervisor’s “custom

25
or policy ... result[s] in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights,” or when facts indicate “that the

supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully
or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and
failed to stop them from doing so.” Id. at 1048
(alterations in original) (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at

1360).
Meeks and Syler argue that the complaint fails to
show a causal connection between their actions and the
alleged constitutional violations “because it fails to

demonstrate a history of widespread abuse.” Br. in Supp.
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 42) at 17-18. But demonstrating
a history of widespread abuse is only one of three ways

in which a plaintiff may show the “causal connection”
necessary to establish liability on a
failure-to-supervise claim. Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048.
The court need not decide whether the previous incidents

alleged in the complaint are sufficient to demonstrate
that abuse was widespread at the jail if the

26
administrator’s complaint otherwise succeeds in showing
the requisite causal connection.

It does. The facts alleged in the complaint readily
support an inference that Meeks and Syler “knew that
the[ir] subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to
stop them from doing so.” Id. (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d

at 1360). According to the complaint, Meeks and Syler
were aware of Archie’s medical needs before and during
the emergency that ended in her death. See, e.g., Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶¶ 23, 37-40, 59-61.

Moreover, the complaint alleges that the defendants knew
that Archie was not receiving treatment from their
subordinates for her serious medical problems and that

they failed to ensure that their subordinates would
provide such treatment. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 37-40. The
complaint also alleges that it was widely known at the
jail that Dr. Barber routinely skipped visits with

inmates seeking medical attention and often came only
once per month to the jail to provide medical care. See

27
id. at ¶ 26. These allegations--which at this stage must
be accepted as true--support an inference that Meeks and

Syler knew about what the complaint terms Barber’s
“lackadaisical manner of treating inmates,” id. at ¶ 28,
were aware that their subordinates were refusing Archie
treatment for her severe symptoms on the day she died,

see id. at ¶¶ 36-38, and declined to intervene.
Although Meeks and Syler acknowledge that any of the
three approaches listed above is sufficient to establish
the requisite causal connection under Eleventh Circuit

law, see Br. in Supp. Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 42) at 17,
they argue elsewhere that a pattern of previous
violations is nonetheless required to make out the

administrator’s claims here, see id. at 18. They base
this argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011), particularly the Court’s
indication that, “A pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

28
purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62 (quoting Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).

The very terms of the sentence that Meeks and Syler
cite from Connick demonstrate its inapplicability here.
The statement from Connick quoted above applies to claims
for failure to train subordinates, not to claims for

failure to supervise. Compare Keith, 749 F.3d at 1053
(quoting Connick for the failure-to-train standard),
with, id. at 1048 (noting the three ways described above
to show a causal connection for a failure-to-supervise

claim). The Supreme Court’s decision in Connick is
inapposite, and neither Meeks nor Syler is entitled to
qualified immunity on the failure-to-supervise claim.

C. Failure to Act Claim
Covington County, Meeks, and Syler all seek dismissal
of Count 6, the failure-to-act claim, on the same grounds

described above. The allegations in the complaint
pertaining to the failure-to-act claim appear redundant

29
with either Count 5, the failure-to-supervise claim, or
Count 1, the deliberate indifference claim. See Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶¶ 116-21. Indeed, as to
the county, Meeks, and Syler, it is not at all clear what
distinguishes the failure-to-act claim from the
failure-to-supervise claim. And the Supreme Court has

declined to recognize a general failure-to-act claim
under the Due Process Clause, holding that the
Constitution instead imposes more specific and
circumscribed obligations such as the responsibility of

jail officials to provide adequate medical care--a duty
addressed by the administrator’s deliberate indifference
and failure-to-supervise claims. See DeShaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
198-200 (1989).
Accordingly, because the theory of the
administrator’s failure-to-act claim is not sufficiently

established in precedent, Meeks and Syler are entitled
to qualified immunity on that count. Similarly, although

30
the court is unpersuaded by the county’s argument from
Turquitt for the reasons discussed above, the county is

nonetheless entitled to dismissal of Count 6 against it
for failure to state a claim because the count does not
make out allegations sufficient to show a violation of
any established legal duty.

D. ADA and Section 504 Claims
Covington County also moves to dismiss the
administrator’s ADA and Section 504 claims, Counts 2 and

3, for failure to state a claim under those statutes.
For all purposes relevant to the county’s motion to
dismiss, the same standards apply to the ADA and Section

504, so the court will not separately analyze the two
claims at issue. See Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305
(11th Cir. 2000).
Title II of the ADA, the statutory section under

which the administrator’s claim is brought, provides that
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

31
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132;
see also Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir.
2001). The county argues that the factual allegations

supporting the administrator’s ADA and Section 504 claims
may show deliberate indifference to Archie’s medical
needs, but that they do not show discrimination on the
basis of disability. See Br. in Supp. Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 42) at 8. As the county explains, “it is alleged
that the decedent, who suffered from hypertension, was
denied necessary medical treatment for her condition

while detained in the Covington County Jail.” Id. “The
alleged fact that Defendants failed to provide adequate
medical care for the decedent’s hypertension does not,
standing alone, support the claim that they discriminated

32
against her because of her hypertension.” Id. at 7.4
As with the failure-to-supervise claim, the trouble

for the county is that the allegations it points to are
not the ones on which the administrator relies to support
the complaint’s ADA and Section 504 claims. Instead, the
administrator alleges that the county, in contracting for

health care services at the jail, failed to provide
sufficient staff and training of medical personnel for

4. In a footnote in defendants’ reply brief, the
county notes for the first time that “an argument can be
made that the Decedent was not disabled as defined by”
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Reply in Supp. Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 52) at 4 n.1. This is so, the county
says, because the complaint “made no allegation that the
Decedent was in any way limited because of her
hypertension.” Id. This argument, to the extent that
defendants’ footnote endeavors to press it, was not
included in the motion to dismiss and so will not be
addressed at this time. United States v. Evans, 473 F.3d
1115, 1120 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]rguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief are not properly before a
reviewing court.” (quoting Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Corrs., 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005))).
Moreover, it mischaracterizes the allegations of the
complaint, which include, inter alia, that Archie’s
hypertension caused “debilitating” pain that interfered
with her ability to carry out her work at the jail.
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) at ¶¶ 36, 40.
33
inmates with serious medical needs, such as Archie, to
avoid death or other harm due to inadequate medical

assistance. See Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) at
¶¶ 33, 80. In other words, the administrator alleges
that the county, through its contract with Southern
Health Partners, provided adequate medical care for

non-disabled inmates but not for inmates with conditions
serious enough to make them “individual[s] with a
disability” under the ADA, 42 U.S.C § 12131(2).
The United States Supreme Court has held that medical

services provided to inmates are among the “services,
programs, or activities of a public entity” to which the
ADA and Section 504 extend. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v.

Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132). Providing staff and training sufficient to
address the needs of inmates with minor medical issues
but not those of inmates with disabilities discriminates

against disabled inmates in the provision of such
services. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40)

34
at ¶¶ 23-25 (alleging that Archie was repeatedly given
aspirin rather than more significant medical intervention

in response to her high blood pressure and complaints of
severe chest pains). The administrator’s ADA and Section
504 claims will not be dismissed.
* * *

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 41) is
granted to the extent that Count 6 of the complaint, as
alleged against defendants Covington County, Dennis

Meeks, and Alan Syler, is dismissed.
(2) In all other respects, the motion to dismiss
(Doc. 41) is denied.

DONE, this the 29th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9987261. Public record. Not legal advice.