# Tai Hang v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.

> District Court, C.D. California · May 14, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9986738

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** May 14, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9986738

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that the plaintiffs’ counsel “survived two motions to dismiss”
- noting that the list of factors is “by no means an exhaustive list”
- affirming $5,000 service awards but rejecting $20,000 awards as unreasonable
- noting that “district judges naturally arrive at a reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood of a plaintiffs’ or defense verdict, the potential recovery, and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to present value”

## Opinion text

O

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAI HANG and Case No. 5:21-cv-00287-JWH-DTBx
ROBERT CANALES, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly
situated, ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
Plaintiffs, CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
[ECF No. 51]
v.

OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE,
INC., a Virginia corporation; and
DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,

Defendants.
I. SUMMARY OF DECISION
Before the Court is the unopposed motion of Plaintiffs Tai Hang and Robert
Canales, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), in this class action case. In their motion, Plaintiffs seek final approval of the
class action settlement, attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of attorneys’ and administration
costs, and a service award for each named Plaintiff.1 The Court conducted a hearing on
the Motion in December 2023. After considering the Motion papers and the arguments
that counsel during the hearing, the Court orders that the Motion is GRANTED for the
reasons set forth herein.
II. BACKGROUND
This is a wage and hour class action. In the operative Fifth Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. violated wage and hour
laws in the following ways:
• failing to pay minimum wages;
• failing to pay overtime wages;
• failing to provide legally compliant rest periods;
• failing to authorize and permit all paid rest periods;
• failing to provide legally compliant meal periods;
• failing to reimburse for necessary business expenses;
• failing to timely furnish accurate itemized wage statements;
• violating Cal. Labor Code § 203;
• incurring penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 2699; and
• violating the Unfair Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et
seq.2
A. Factual Allegations
Hang worked for Old Dominion “as an hourly-paid, non-exempt ‘dock worker’
employee from approximately August 2007 to August 11, 2020.”3 Canales worked for
Old Dominion “as an hourly-paid, non-exempt ‘dock worker’ employee from

1 Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 51].
2 See generally Fifth Am. Compl. (the “Amended Complaint”) [ECF No. 50].
3 Amended Complaint ¶ 6.
approximately January 28, 2018, to October 2, 2020.”4 Plaintiffs allege that during their
employment, Old Dominion failed to pay minimum wages and overtime,5 deprived them
of lawful rest and meal periods,6 failed to reimburse for necessary business expenses,7 and
failed to provide them in a timely manner with accurate and legally compliant itemized
wage statements.8 Plaintiffs assert that those failures were the result of Old Dominions’s
consistent policies, which violate wage and hour laws and laws against unfair business
practices.9 Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all class members, seek compensatory
relief with interest, penalties, equitable relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to
wage and hour laws.10 They also seek injunctive relief, restitution, and disgorgement of
Defendants’ illegally obtained benefits.11 Finally, they seek unpaid compensation,
penalties, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under PAGA.12
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their original Class Action Complaint in San Bernadino County
Superior Court in November 202013 and their First Amended Complaint, also in state
court, in December 2020.14 Old Dominion was served in the state court action later that
month,15 and Old Dominion removed the action to this Court in February 2021.16
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in March 2021,17 which Old Dominion
moved to dismiss.18 The Court granted Old Dominion’s motion, dismissing Plaintiffs’
pleading with leave to amend.19 Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint in July

4 Id. at ¶ 9.
5 Id. at ¶¶ 34-50.
6 Id. at ¶¶ 51-83.
7 Id. at ¶¶ 84-89.
8 Id. at ¶¶ 90-111.
9 Id. at ¶¶ 112-134.
10 See id. at 39:12-43:12.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1] ¶ 1.
14 Id. at ¶ 2.
15 Id. at ¶ 4.
16 See generally id.
17 Second Am. Compl. [ECF No. 9].
18 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and/or Strike Pls.’ Second Am. Compl. Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(6) and/or 12(f) [ECF No. 12].
19 Order on Mot. of Def. to Dismiss and/or Strike Second Am. Compl. [ECF No. 17].
2021.20 Old Dominion again moved to dismiss,21 and the Court granted in part and
denied in part that motion.22 Pursuant to the Court’s order, Plaintiffs filed their Fourth
Amended Complaint in August 2022,23 and Old Dominion answered.24
The parties engaged in “extensive factual and legal research, formal discovery
including propounding and responding to written interrogatories, the production of
documents, and a full-day [m]ediation with David Rotman.”25 Although the parties did
not reach a settlement during the mediation, further negotiations with the assistance of
Mr. Rotman proved fruitful:26 the parties informed the Court of their settlement and
moved for its approval in July 2022.27 Defendants served a copy of the settlement
agreement on the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of
each state in which a class member resides, in compliance with the Class Action Fairness
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715.28
The Court preliminarily approved the settlement agreement in August 2023.29
Pursuant to the settlement agreement and the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order,
Plaintiffs filed their Fifth Amended Complaint in November 2023.30 They filed the
instant Motion for Final Approval the same day.31

20 Third Am. Compl. [ECF No. 18].
21 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and/or Strike Pls.’ Third Am. Compl. Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(6) and/or 12(f) [ECF No. 20].
22 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Mot. of Def. Old Dominion Freight Line,
Inc. to Dismiss and/or Strike Portion of Pls.’ Third Am. Compl. [ECF No. 34].
23 Fourth Am. Compl. [ECF No. 35].
24 Answer to Fourth Am. Compl. [ECF No. 36].
25 Motion 8:21-23.
26 Id. at 3:15-20.
27 Mot. for Order Granting Prelim. Approval for Class and Representative Action
Settlement [ECF No. 46]; Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement [ECF No. 47].
28 Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement Pursuant to Class Action Fairness Action
[ECF No. 47].
29 Order Granting Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Class and Representative Action
Settlement (the “Preliminary Approval Order”) [ECF No. 49].
30 See Amended Complaint.
31 See Motion.
III. FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A. Overview
As summarized in the Motion, the settlement agreement establishes a non-
reversionary settlement amount of $2,850,000 for the benefit of the settlement class.32
That figure equates to an average recovery of approximately $823.53 per class member;
the highest recovery will be approximately $3,799.61.33 The settlement amount includes
$50,000 for PAGA claims—$37,500 will be allocated to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency and $12,500 will be payable to PAGA members.34
Individualized class notices were circulated to class members, which informed
them of the following:
• the nature of the action;
• the definition of the settlement class certified;
• the class claims, issues, or defenses, and the class period;
• that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so
desires;
• that the Court will exclude from the settlement any class member who requests
exclusion;
• the time and manner for requesting exclusion;
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
• that they have a right to object, and how to do so.35
Each class notice included an individualized estimated recovery, assuming 100%
participation, and the number of workweeks attributable to that class member.36 As of the
time of the hearing on the instant Motion, the administrator had received no objections to
the settlement, no workweek disputes, and no requests for exclusion.37

32 Id. at 3:23-25.
33 Id. at 4:2-3.
34 Id. at 4:16-19.
35 See Decl. of Lisa Pavlik for Rust Consulting, Inc. & Ex. A (the “Pavlik Declaration and
Class Notice”) [ECF No. 51-2 Exs. 1 & 1.A].
36 See id.
37 See id.; see also Minutes of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Hearing on
the Motion”) [ECF No. 52] (confirming the same as of the morning of December 14, 2023).
B. Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require court approval for class-action
settlements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). When the parties reach a settlement agreement
before class certification, district courts use a two-step process to approve a class-action
settlement. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). First, the Court
must certify the proposed settlement class. See id. Second, the Court may finally approve
a class action settlement “only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement . . . is
fair, reasonable and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); see also Staton, 327 F.3d. at 952.
The Rules instruct the Court to consider the following factors:
(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented
the class;
(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;
(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to
the class, including the method of processing class-member claims;
(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorneys’ fees, including
timing of payment; and
(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and
(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Additionally, with respect to Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii), the Ninth
Circuit directs district courts to undertake an additional search for more “subtle signs
that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain class
members to infect the negotiations,” regardless of “whether a settlement agreement has
been negotiated before a class has been certified or after.” Westfall v. Ball Metal Beverage
Container Corp., 2021 WL 4206851, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021) (citing Briseño v.
Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2021)). The purpose of scrutinizing the fee
arrangement is to look for “potential collusion or unfairness to the class.” Briseño, 998
F.3d at 1026. The Ninth Circuit instructs the district court to analyze three factors:
(1) whether counsel “receive[d] a disproportionate distribution of the settlement”;
(2) whether the parties agreed to a “clear sailing arrangement”; and (3) whether the
settlement includes a “kicker” or “reverter” clause. Id. at 1026-27.
In the Ninth Circuit, courts also consider the eight “Churchill factors”:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and
likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action
status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the
extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the
experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members of the proposed
settlement.
Kim v. Allison, 8 F.4th 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prod.
Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011), which was citing Churchill Vill. v. Gen.
Elec., 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of
S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the list of factors is “by no means an
exhaustive list”).
Lastly, the district court must approve or reject the settlement as a whole. See
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“It is the settlement taken
as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall
fairness.”). The Court may not delete, modify, or rewrite particular provisions of the
settlement. See id. The Court must remain cognizant that the settlement “is the
offspring of compromise; the question . . . is not whether the final product could be
prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” Id.
In determining whether a proposed settlement should be approved, the Ninth Circuit has
a “strong judicial policy that favors settlement, particularly where complex class action
litigation is concerned.” Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).
C. Analysis
1. Settlement Class Certification and Heightened Rule 23(e) Inquiry
This Court preliminarily certified the proposed settlement class in its prior order,38
although formal class certification had not yet occurred. Because the parties reached a
settlement before formal class certification, this Court applies “a higher standard of
fairness and a more probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e)” to
its final approval. Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2022). Because the Court
finds that a “probing inquiry” of the Rule 23(e) criteria and the Ninth Circuit factors, as
discussed below, favors approval, the Court certifies the settlement class for final
approval of the settlement. See id.

38 See Preliminary Approval Order.
2. Rule 23(e)(2) Factors
a. Adequacy of Representation by Class Representatives and Class
Counsel
Under Rule 23(e)(2)(A), the first factor to be considered is whether the class
representative and class counsel have adequately represented the class. That analysis
includes, for example, “the nature and amount of discovery” undertaken in the litigation,
or “the actual outcomes of other cases.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A), 2018 Advisory
Comm. Notes.
In this case, several aspects of the litigation suggest that this factor weighs in favor
of approval. First, Class Counsel—the Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes, the Law Offices
of Raphael A. Katri, and Stonebrook Law (collectively, “Class Counsel”)39—have
extensive experience with wage and hour class action litigation, and they actively litigated
this case for three years.40 Second, the parties reached settlement only after vigorous
litigation, through two orders on motions to dismiss and five versions of the complaint in
this Court, including “extensive research for and during the litigation, review of hundreds
of pages of documents, a full-day [m]ediation with David Rotman, Esq., . . . and after
consultation with an [expert] economist regarding potential damage exposure.”41 The
Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have adequately represented the
proposed settlement class, which weighs in favor of final approval of the settlement
agreement.
b. Arm’s Length Negotiations
The Court must next consider whether the settlement agreement “was negotiated
at arm’s length.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B). As with the preceding consideration, this
factor can be “described as [a] ‘procedural’ concern . . . looking to the conduct of the
litigation and of the negotiations leading up to the proposed settlement.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), 2018 Advisory Comm. Notes.
Although the Court was not involved in the negotiations directly, mediator David
Rotman is “very experienced in wage and hour class action cases.”42 The parties reached

39 See id. at ¶ 3.
40 See Decl. of Kevin T. Barnes (the “Barnes Declaration”) [ECF No. 51-2]; Decl. of
Raphael A. Katri (the “Katri Declaration”) [ECF No. 51-3]; Decl. of Joseph Tojarieh (the
“Tojarieh Declaration”) [ECF No. 51-4]; Motion 10:5-12 & 12:27-13:2.
41 Motion 12:7-10.
42 Id. at 7:20; see also David A. Rotman—Mediated Negotiations,
https://davidrotman.net/html/mediators-david-rotman.html.
a settlement after a full-day mediation before Mr. Rotman and follow-on negotiations with
his assistance.43 The presence and assistance of an experienced mediator in the
settlement process strongly suggests “that the settlement is non-collusive.” Satchell v.
Fed. Express Corp., 2007 WL 1114010, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007); see also Goodwin v.
Winn Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 2017 WL 3173006, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2017) (concluding
that that the settlement was the product of informed, arm’s length negotiations by the
parties where settlement resulted from, among other things, a full day of mediation);
Pederson v. Airport Terminal Services, 2018 WL 2138457, at *7 (C.D. Cal. April 5, 2018)
(approving preliminary settlement where oversight “of an experienced mediator”
reflected non-collusive negotiations). In sum, because it appears that the parties
negotiated at arm’s length, this factor weighs in favor of final approval.
c. Adequacy of Relief Provided for the Class
The third factor assesses whether “the relief provided for the class is adequate,
taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness
of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of
processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorneys’ fees,
including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under
Rule 23(e)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C). Under this factor, the relief “to class
members is a central concern.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C), 2018 Advisory Comm.
Notes.
i. Costs, Risks, and Delay of Further Litigation
“A[] central concern [when evaluating a proposed class action settlement] . . .
relate[s] to the cost and risk involved in pursuing a litigated outcome.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), 2018 Advisory Comm. Notes. In this regard, the test of a
settlement is not the maximum amount that the plaintiffs might have recovered, but,
rather, whether the settlement is within a reasonable range. See Rodriguez v. West
Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “district judges
naturally arrive at a reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood of a
plaintiffs’ or defense verdict, the potential recovery, and the chances of obtaining it,
discounted to present value”).
As Plaintiffs note, they “had not yet prevailed on class certification when the
Parties reached [settlement].”44 Continuing to litigate these issues would involve
substantial risks—“including the risk that the Court might not certify the class, or

43 Id. at 3:15-20.
44 Motion 10:9-10.
decertify it at a later time, the risk of proving liability and damages at trial, and keeping
the verdict through appeal”45—and would likely take multiple years and represent an
enormous expense without certainty that the class members would receive a remedy.
Additionally, subsequent review by district courts could jeopardize any chance of
recovery for the class, as the law continues to evolve. This Court therefore finds that the
settlement amount of $2,850,000—out of Defendant’s estimated $5,026,891 class
exposure—is adequate given the costs, risks, and delay of continued litigation.
ii. Effectiveness of the Method of Distributing Relief
The Court must next consider “the effectiveness of any proposed method of
distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C). “Often it will be important for the court to scrutinize the
method of claims processing to ensure that it facilitates filing legitimate claims.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 2018 Advisory Comm. Notes. “A claims processing method should
deter or defeat unjustified claims, but the court should be alert to whether the claims
process is unduly demanding.” Id.
The Court finds that the method for distributing relief is adequate, as the funds
will be distributed to the class members with no claim form requirement.46 Thus, the
Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of final approval.
iii. Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and the Briseño Flags
The third prong that the Court must consider when assessing the adequacy of the
relief relates to “the terms of any proposed award of attorneys’ fees, including timing of
payment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(c). In considering the proposed award of attorneys’
fees, the Court must be on watch for three “red flags” that tend to show collusion. See
Westfall, 2021 WL 4206851, at *4.
The first flag is raised “when counsel receives a disproportionate distribution of
the settlement[.]” Kaupelis v. Harbor Freight Tools, 2021 WL 4816833, at *10 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 11, 2021). Here, Class Counsel request $832,199.67—approximately 29.2% of the
$2,850,000 Settlement Fund—in attorneys’ fees and $20,038.30 in attorney expenses;47
Class Counsel would thus net just under 30% of the Settlement Fund in total.
The Court finds that these fees are “on the higher side,” but still reasonable. See
Westfall, 2021 WL 4206851, at *5 (“While 33 percent is on the higher side, it is a far cry

45 Id. at 11:11-13.
46 Id. at 3:18-19 & 3:24.
47 Id. at 4:10-12.
from the concerning 88 percent fee in Briseño.”). Moreover, because the Court finds that
the fees and expenses are not unreasonable on the whole, see infra Part IV.A.-B., this flag
is not triggered. Accord Ochinero v. Ladera Lending, Inc., 2021 WL 4460334, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. July 19, 2021) (giving final approval of a settlement where the court found to be
reasonable a request for attorneys’ fees—equivalent to 33% of the settlement—and
$20,000 in out-of-pocket expenses).
The second red flag is raised when the parties negotiate a “clear sailing
arrangement,” under which the defendant agrees not to challenge a request for an agreed-
upon attorney’s fee. See Kaupelis, 2021 WL 4816833, at *10. “A clear sailing provision
signals the potential that a defendant agreed to pay class counsel excessive fees in
exchange for counsel accepting a lower amount for the class members.” Briseño, 998 F.3d
at 1026–27. Although the instant Motion is unopposed, the settlement agreement has no
clause explicitly requiring Defendants to refrain from challenging a fee request.48
Additionally, the settlement agreement includes language making it binding on the
parties, even if the Court declines the requested attorneys’ fees.49 Therefore, the second
flag is not triggered.
Lastly, the third flag is raised when the agreement contains a “kicker” or
“reverter” clause that “returns unawarded fees to the defendant, rather than the class.”
Kaupelis, 2021 WL 4816833, at *10. Here, there is no reverter clause.50 Thus, the third
flag is similarly not triggered, such that none of the Briseño flags is clearly raised.
iv. Agreement Identification Requirement
The Court must also evaluate any agreement made in connection with the
proposed settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv) & (e)(3). Here, the settlement
agreement presently before the Court is the only agreement. Thus, the Court need not
evaluate any additional agreements outside of the settlement agreement. Accord Alvarez,
2021 WL 1234878, at *8. Thus, all four prongs under Rule 23(e)(2)(C) favor granting
final approval.
d. Equitable Treatment of Class Members
The final Rule 23(e)(2) factor turns on whether the proposed settlement “treats
class members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). “Matters
of concern could include whether the apportionment of relief among class members takes

48 See Preliminary Approval Order, Ex. 1 (Stipulation for Leave to File Fifth Am. Compl.
and for Settlement and Release of Class Action and PAGA Claims).
49 Id.
50 Motion 3:19-20.
appropriate account of differences among their claims, and whether the scope of the
release may affect class members in different ways that bear on the apportionment of
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D), 2018 Advisory Comm. Notes.
The Court finds the treatment of the class members to be equitable because
recovery by each individual class member is dependent on the number of workweeks and
PAGA pay periods credited to them.51 Moreover, the service awards for Hang and
Canales—discussed below, see infra Part IV.C.—do not disturb that finding, in view of
the evidence submitted that speaks to their level of involvement through the life of this
case and the risk that they have taken through their participation. Therefore, this factor
weighs in favor of granting final approval.
3. The Ninth Circuit’s “Churchill Factors”
Having found that all four factors under Rule 23(e)(2) favor granting final
approval, the Court now turns to the eight “Churchill factors” that the Ninth Circuit uses
to evaluate the fairness of a settlement agreement.
a. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case
“An important consideration in judging the reasonableness of a settlement is the
strength of plaintiffs’ case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the
settlement.” Vasquez, 266 F.R.D. at 488. The proposed settlement is “not to be judged
against . . . what might have been awarded in a judgment in favor of the class.” Id. This
factor is generally satisfied when plaintiffs overcame barriers to make their case. See
Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
The Court has presided over this case through two motions to dismiss and five
versions of the Complaint. Based upon that perspective alone, the Court is comfortable
finding that Plaintiffs advanced a strong case that would continue to be litigated
vigorously in the absence of this settlement agreement. Furthermore, with respect to the
individualized issues, the settlement agreement takes the individualized claims into
account; those claims would likely be vigorously litigated in the absence of a settlement
agreement. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor supports final approval.
b. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further
Litigation
The second factor in assessing the fairness of the proposed settlement is the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the lawsuit if the parties had not reached a

51 See Pavlik Declaration and Class Notice.
settlement agreement. See Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625. Because this factor closely
mirrors the requirement in Rule 23(e) concerning “the costs, risks, and delay of trial and
appeal,” the Court concludes that it need not duplicate its analysis.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(i); see also id., 2018 Advisory Comm. Notes (noting that many
of these factors “focus on comparable considerations”). As discussed above, see supra
Part III.C.2.c.i., this factor weighs in favor of granting final approval.
c. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status through Trial
Although the Court had preliminarily certified the class, the certification was for
settlement purposes only.52 An “order that grants or denies class certification may be
altered or amended before the final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ argument in their Motion on this factor: “the
risks of obtaining class certification and a subsequent motion by Defendant to decertify all
or parts of the case prior to trial and throughout the trial itself are substantial.”53 The
Court thus finds that the complexity of the class certification process and Defendant’s
likely opposition, as forecasted by their multiple motions to dismiss, pose a risk to
maintaining the class through trial. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of final
approval.
d. Amount Offered in Settlement
The fourth factor in assessing the fairness of the proposed settlement is the
amount offered. “Of course, the very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding
of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.’” Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 624
(citing Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977)). The Ninth Circuit has
explained that “the proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or
speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.” Id. at 625.
Rather, any analysis of a fair settlement amount must account for the risks of further
litigation and trial, as well as expenses and delays associated with continued litigation.
Here, the parties agreed to settle all claims for a total sum of $2,850,000.54 That
figure equates to an average individual recovery of approximately $823.53 and a maximum
individual recovery of approximately $3,799.61.55 The Court continues to find that the
settlement amount is appropriate. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Atria Mgmt. Co., LLC, 2019 WL

52 See Preliminary Approval Order.
53 Motion 10:10-12.
54 Id. at 3:23-25.
55 Id. at 4:2-3.
13295795, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (approving a wage and hour class settlement
with an average individual recovery of $51.22 per class member). In view of the risks of
continued litigation and the substantial recovery for the class, this factor favors final
approval of the settlement agreement. See Aarons v. BMW of N. Amer., LLC, 2014 WL
4090564, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2014) (noting that while settlements will not make
most class members completely whole, class members will “discount their claims to
obtain a certain and timely recovery, rather than bear the significant risk and delay
associated with further litigation”); Vasquez, 266 F.R.D. at 489 (noting that “the risk of
continued litigation balanced against the certainty and immediacy of recovery from the
[s]ettlement” is a relevant factor).
e. Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings
The fifth factor requires the Court to gauge whether Plaintiffs had sufficient
information to make an informed decision about the merits of their case. See In re Mego,
213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000). The more discovery that has been completed, the
more likely it is that the parties have “a clear view of the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases.” Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, 2007 WL 951821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue that the parties reached a settlement only after
they “aggressively litigated this matter for over three years, which allowed the Parties to
base their assessment of the matter on extensive research for and during the litigation,
review of hundreds of pages of documents, a full-day Mediation with David Rotman,
Esq., multiple Motions to Dismiss and the Court’s rulings thereto and after consultation
with an economist regarding potential damage exposure.”56 That history gives the Court
confidence that Plaintiffs possessed sufficient information to make an informed decision
about the settlement. See Young, 2007 WL 951821, at *4. Additionally, because the
parties conducted settlement negotiations with the assistance of a mediator, the Court has
further reason to conclude that the parties possessed “a clear view of the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases.” Vasquez, 266 F.R.D. at 489 (quoting In re Warner Commc’ns
Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986)). As
such, this factor weighs in favor of granting final approval of the settlement agreement.
f. Experience and View of Counsel
The sixth factor that the Court considers is the experience of counsel, because
“[t]hey are the ones who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying
litigation.” Vasquez, 266 F.R.D. at 489. “Parties represented by competent counsel are

56 Id. at 12:5-10.
better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s
expected outcome in litigation.” In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir.
1995). However, while counsel’s views are instructive, they do not entitle the plaintiff to
a presumption of fairness. See Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1049 (9th
Cir. 2019).
Here, Class Counsel have extensive experience handling class action cases.57 The
Court is satisfied that their experience has allowed them to evaluate the merits of the
claims and the risks associated with prosecuting them. Class Counsel also support the
final outcome as fair and reasonable.58 The Court accordingly credits Class Counsel’s
determination and finds that this factor weighs in favor of final approval.
g. Presence of a Governmental Participant
Because no government entity participated in litigating this case,59 the seventh
factor is irrelevant. See Klee v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2015 WL 4538426, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
July 7, 2015), aff’d (Dec. 9, 2015).
h. Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement
Finally, in evaluating the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement,
the eighth factor that courts consider is the reaction of the class to the settlement. See
Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003). “It is established that the absence of a
large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong
presumption that the terms of a proposed class action settlement are favorable to the class
members.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 528–29
(C.D. Cal. 2004); see also Arnold v. Fitflop USA, LLC, 2014 WL 1670133, at *8 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 28, 2014) (concluding that the class members’ reaction to the settlement “presents
the most compelling argument favoring settlement”). Here, no class member has opted
out or objected to the settlement agreement.60 That fact weighs strongly in favor of final
approval.

57 See id. at 12:27-13:2.
58 Id. at 13:2-5.
59 The Labor Workforce Development Agency will receive payment upon final approval of
the settlement, but it did not participate in the case. See id. at 13:7-12.
60 See id. at 2:9-10; see also Hearing on the Motion (confirming the same as of the morning of
December 14, 2023).
4. Conclusion on Final Settlement Approval
In conclusion, all factors used to assess the adequacy, fairness, and reasonableness
of a class settlement—including both the factors prescribed to the Court under
Rule 23(e)(2) and the additional Ninth Circuit “Churchill factors”—point in favor of
granting final approval. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Final Approval
of the settlement.
IV. ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, SERVICE AWARDS, AND
ADMINISTRATION COSTS
A. Attorneys’ Fees
Under the settlement agreement, Class Counsel are permitted to seek the Court’s
approval of attorneys’ fees and any documented and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.
Class Counsel have requested approval of attorneys’ fees totaling $832,199.67, which
represents approximately 29.2% of the settlement fund.61
In the Ninth Circuit, “the fee applicant bears the burden of submitting ‘evidence
supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.’” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115,
1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The Ninth
Circuit has “a ‘preference’ for contemporaneous records” but has “never held that they
are absolutely necessary.” Id. Rather, “fee requests can be based on ‘reconstructed
records developed by reference to litigation files.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1542 (9th Cir. 1992), opinion vacated in part on denial of
reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993)).
“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and
nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). “Where a settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of
the entire class, courts have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the
percentage-of-recovery method” when determining the reasonableness of a request for
attorneys’ fees. In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir.
2011). Each method is discussed below.
1. Percentage-of-the-Recovery Method
Applying the percentage-of-recovery method, district courts within the Ninth
Circuit typically calculate “25% of the fund” as the “benchmark” for a reasonable fee

61 Id. at 4:10-12.
award. Id.; see also In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir.
2015). A departure from the 25% benchmark requires an “adequate explanation in the
record for any ‘special circumstances’ justifying [the] departure.” In re Optical Disk
Drive Prods. Liab. Antitrust Litig., 959 F.3d 922, 942 (9th Cir. 2020).
Here, Class Counsel request that the Court approve a fee award of $832,199.67,
which is equivalent to approximately 29.2% of the settlement amount. The standard 25%
award would earn Class Counsel $712,500. Because Class Counsel’s request departs
from the 25% benchmark, the Ninth Circuit instructs the Court to consider the following
five factors to determine whether the fees reasonably compensate counsel for their efforts
in creating the common fund: “(1) the results achieved; (2) the risk of litigation; (3) the
skill required and the quality of work; (4) the contingent nature of the fee and the
financial burden carried by the plaintiffs; and (5) awards made in similar cases.” In re
Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2002)). “The mere fact that the
defendant agrees to pay the fees does not detract from the need to carefully scrutinize the
fee award.” Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co., 2017 WL 10541431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21,
2017) (internal quotations omitted).
a. Results Achieved
“The overall result and benefit to the class from the litigation is the most critical
factor in granting a fee award.” Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. Class Counsel
argue that the settlement is “outstanding.”62 The average individual recovery
(approximately $823.53)63 achieved for the class members possibly falls in the range of
awards considered by this Court to be deserving of a rate higher than 25%. Compare
Howard Fan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2020 WL 5044614, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2020)
(finding that an expected recovery of $636.52 per class member was not “so exceptional
as to support an upward adjustment to the fee award” above the 25% benchmark) with
Pagh v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 2021 WL 3017517, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23,
2021) (finding an average award of $1,029.73 per class member to be “excellent”). But
the Court sees no strong evidence that “counsel pursued this case in the absence of
supporting precedents” or “in the face of agreements signed by the class members
forsaking benefits”—the presence of which influenced other courts to deem a settlement
outcome exceptional. See, e.g., Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048. The wage and hour laws are
not novel, and class action lawsuits arising under them are not new—although, during the
hearing on the Motion, Class Counsel argued convincingly that Augustus v. ABM Sec.
Servs., Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257 (2016), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 15, 2017), created

62 Id. at 18:5.
63 Id. at 4:2-3.
ambiguous precedent with respect to wage and hour class action lawsuits for rest periods
greater than 10 minutes.64 On balance, those findings suggest that Class Counsel
achieved a strong result for the class, but not necessarily an exceptional one. Thus, this
factor does not plainly justify departing from the Ninth Circuit’s 25% benchmark.
b. Risk of Litigation
Class Counsel argue that the award is justified in view of the risk of further
litigation.65 Here, the Court agrees. “The risk that further litigation might result in
Plaintiffs not recovering at all, particularly a case involving complicated legal issues, is a
significant factor in the award of fees.” Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-47. The
Court looks at how continuing the litigation could jeopardize chances of recovery, as well
as the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048; Thomas v.
Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp., 2017 WL 11633508, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017).
In view of the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of continued litigation, see
supra Parts III.C.2.c.i. & III.C.3.b., the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of
granting the requested fees.
c. Skill Required and Quality of Work
The Court next considers the skill required to prosecute and manage this litigation,
as well as Class Counsel’s overall performance. See Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
A fee award of one-third of the settlement fund is justified where class counsel “has
significant experience in the particular type of litigation at issue.” Marshall v. Northrop
Grumman Corp., 2020 WL 5668935, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020), appeal dismissed,
2021 WL 1546069 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021) (awarding 33% of settlement fund where the
law firm “actually pioneer[d] complex ERISA 401(k) excessive fee litigation”).
Class Counsel aver that they have “substantial experience in wage and hour and
class action cases.”66 They list numerous such cases in which they have successfully
represented the plaintiff class.67 And Class Counsel assert that they expended
“substantial effort” and faced “substantial obstacles” in prosecuting the case.68 Here,
Plaintiffs’ case survived two motions to dismiss, which weighs in Class Counsel’s favor.
See Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (observing that the plaintiffs’ counsel “survived
two motions to dismiss”). However, because the action here never went to trial, the

64 See Hearing on the Motion.
65 Motion 17:16-18:11.
66 Id. at 7:13-14; see also id. at 12:27-13:2.
67 See generally Barnes Declaration; Katri Declaration; Tojarieh Declaration.
68 Motion 18:4-7.
Court has had limited opportunity to gauge Class Counsel’s performance first-hand
beyond those two motions. Cf. Boyd v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2014 WL 6473804, at *10
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014) (noting that the attorneys’ “experience was demonstrated . . .
over 3,000 hours litigating the case”). Furthermore, the Court had little insight into the
mediation process and any skill demonstrated therein. Nonetheless, during the hearing
on the Motion, Class Counsel noted that The Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes was the
first in the country to bring this type of class action lawsuit, and counsel argued
convincingly that Augustus created ambiguous precedent with respect to wage and hour
class action lawsuits for rest periods longer than 10 minutes—precedent that demanded
great skill to litigate this case successfully.69 Therefore, the Court finds that this factor
weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’ attorneys.
d. Contingent Nature of the Fee
“It is an established practice in the private legal market to reward attorneys for
taking the risk of non-payment by paying them a premium over their normal hourly rates
for winning contingency cases.” In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19
F.3d 1291, 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). As such, departing from the benchmark 25% may be
warranted when attorneys work on a contingency basis, especially for protracted periods
of time. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050.
Here, Class Counsel argue that they worked on a “wholly contingent [basis] and
the case presented far more risk that the usual contingent fee case.”70 They invested
$20,038.30 upfront.71 While it is not clear precisely when the attorneys began work, it is
apparent from the docket that they filed this lawsuit in November 2020.72
Taking those facts into account, the Court finds that Class Counsel certainly
assumed risk, although the risk was not as great as in other cases where an upward
departure from the benchmark was warranted. On one hand, because Class Counsel took
the case on contingency, they inherently faced the risk of walking away with nothing after
investing substantial resources in this matter. That fact favors an upward departure. On
the other hand, cases in which this factor justifies an upward departure tend to be more
protracted. See, e.g., Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (finding that a 28% contingency fee was
warranted where the lawsuit “extended over eleven years, entailed hundreds of thousands
of dollars of expense, and required counsel to forgo significant other work, resulting in a
decline in the firm’s annual income”) (emphasis added); Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at

69 See Hearing on the Motion.
70 Motion 16:4-5.
71 Id. at 23:16.
72 Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1] ¶ 1.
1047 (lawsuit spanned three years and lawyers worked “7,500 uncompensated hours”)
(emphasis added). Here, the case has been ongoing for approximately three years at the
time of the hearing.73 And the three attorneys comprising Class Counsel say that they will
have invested “at least 392.8 hours” in total, which equates to just over three 40-hour
work weeks per attorney.74 In view of those facts, this factor weighs slightly against
granting an upward departure.
e. Awards Made in Similar Cases
The requested award in this settlement is on par with awards authorized in similar
cases, in which other district courts have approved fee awards in excess of the 25%
benchmark in wage and hour class actions. See, e.g., Pagh, 2021 WL 3017517, at *2
(finding that an award of 30% of the gross settlement amount was reasonable); Howell v.
Advantage RN, LLC, 2020 WL 5847565, at *4–*5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020) (approving an
award of 33.33% of total settlement amount); Contreras v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc.,
2020 WL 2083017, at *6–*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020) (same); Brown v. CVS Pharmacy,
Inc., 2017 WL 3494297, at *6-*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017) (awarding 30% of the common
fund in attorneys’ fees in a wage and hour class action settlement); Hightower v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 9664959, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015)
(approving attorneys’ fees of 30% of the settlement fund). The Court concludes, then,
that similar cases establish that some upward departure from the benchmark may be
appropriate here.
2. The Lodestar Method and Lodestar Cross-Check
Under the lodestar method, the Court “multipl[ies] the number of hours the
prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate for
the region and for the experience of the lawyer.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig.,
654 F.3d at 941. Although the lodestar figure is “presumptively reasonable,” the Court
may adjust it upward or downward reflecting a host of “reasonableness” factors,
“including the quality of representation, the benefit obtained for the class, the complexity
and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment.” Id. at 941-42.
Here, Class Counsel allege that they worked approximately 392.8 hours
collectively:75

73 See id.; see also infra Part IV.A.2., calling Class Counsel’s claimed hours into question.
74 Motion 19:1-2.
75 Id.
• The Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes: Attorney Kevin Barnes asserts that he
worked 192.6 hours at a rate of $825/hour.76 He avers that his former partner,
Gregg Lander, incurred an additional 97.1 hours on behalf of his firm, for a total of
289.7 attorney hours (the vast majority of all hours claimed by Class Counsel).77
• The Law Offices of Raphael A. Katri: Attorney Raphael Katri asserts that he
worked 39.8 hours at a rate of $700/hour.78
• Stonebrook Law: Attorney Joseph Tojarieh states that he did not keep
contemporaneous billing records in this case, but he estimates that he worked
63.3 hours at a rate of $675/hour.79
Class Counsel’s alleged hours billed and resulting lodestar calculation are summarized in
the table below:
Timekeeper Hourly Rate Total Hours Total Lodestar
(including
estimated)
Kevin Barnes $825 192.6 $158,895.00
(named partner)
Gregg Lander $750 97.1 $72,825.00
(partner)
Raphael Katri $700 39.8 $27,860.00
(named partner)
Joseph Tojarieh $675 63.3 $42,727.50
(founding partner)80
TOTAL 392.8 $302,307.50

76 Barnes Declaration ¶ 15; see also Supp. Decl. of Kevin T. Barnes (the “Barnes
Supplemental Declaration”) [ECF No. 53].
77 See Barnes Declaration ¶¶ 15 & 16; see also Barnes Supplemental Declaration.
78 Katri Declaration ¶ 7.
79 Tojarieh Declaration ¶¶ 8-11.
80 See Our Founder, Stonebrook Labor & Employment Law,
https://www.laborlawfirm.com/about/joseph-tojarieh/.
The Court turns to the 2022 Real Rate Report: An Analysis of Law Firm Rates,
Trends, and Practices, WOLTERS KLUWER (2022 ed.) (the “Real Rate Report”), as a
useful guidepost to assess the reasonableness of these hourly rates in the Central District.
See Mann v. FCA US LLC, 2020 WL 7978500, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2020). The Real
Rate Report offers several relevant data points for fees in the Central District. In Los
Angeles, partners who practice labor and employment law at mid-sized firms have an
hourly rate ranging from $567 (first quartile) to $870 (third quartile), with a median rate
of $677. See Real Rate Report 178. Labor and employment associates in Los Angeles
have an hourly rate ranging from $335 (first quartile) to $525 (third quartile), with a
median rate of $380. Id. at 27. Employment litigation paralegals generally have an hourly
rate ranging from $180 (first quartile) to $290 (third quartile), with a median rate of $234.
Id. at 49.
Here, the charging attorneys are (or were, in the case of Mr. Lander) all partners in
their respective firms. Their rates all fall within the range outlined in the Real Rate
Report, although Mr. Barnes’ rate is at the very high end and Mr. Lander’s rate is also on
the high end.
The Court now turns to the lodestar cross check, which entails an evaluation of the
multiplier implied by Class Counsel’s requested fees ($832,199.67) and Class Counsel’s
lodestar fees (computed above as $302,307.50). The lodestar calculation results in a
multiplier of approximately 2.75. If the Court were to award the standard 25% ($712,500)
instead, then the resulting multiplier would be approximately 2.36. Those multipliers are
each squarely in the range of lodestar multipliers awarded in wage and hour class actions.
See, e.g., Reyes v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F. App’x 108, 110 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding
that a 25% award with a 2.88 multiplier was similar to awards “routinely approved” by
courts in the Ninth Circuit); Attia v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 2019 WL 13089601, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2019) (quoting Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 796 F. Supp. 2d
1160, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2010)) (“multipliers may range from 1.2 to 4 or even higher”);
Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1051–54 (affirming a 25% fee recovery, explaining that the 3.65
multiplier “was within the range of multipliers applied in common fund cases,” and
recognizing that courts applied multipliers of 1.0 to 4.0 in 83% of 23 class action suits
surveyed).
3. Conclusion on Attorneys’ Fees
In this case, Class Counsel obtained strong, but not exceptional, results for the
class; the risk of non-recovery at the outset of litigation was equivalent to the risk in any
other wage and hour class action cases (because obtaining class certification is sometimes
difficult in wage and hour cases); and the efforts of Class Counsel throughout this
litigation appear to have been satisfactory, although the Court has only limited first-hand
experience with the excellence that they claim. In summary, the Court finds that three of
the five factors evaluated in the percentage-of-recovery method justify some upward
departure, whereas the other two do not. Balancing those factors and exercising its
discretion, the Court GRANTS Class Counsel’s request for $832,199.67 in attorneys’
fees (approximately 29.2% of the settlement fund).
B. Costs
In their Motion, Class Counsel state that they incurred litigation costs totaling
$20,038.30.81 Those costs represent only 0.7% of the total settlement award. Because the
costs appear to be reasonable and incurred for the benefit of the class, see In re United
Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Sec. Litig., 1989 WL 73211, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 9, 1989), the Court APPROVES the cost reimbursement request.
C. Service Awards
Class Counsel request that this Court grant two service awards, one each to Hang
and Canales, for serving as the class representatives. Service awards, also known as
“[i]ncentive awards,” are “fairly typical” in class action cases. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009). They are discretionary in nature and are
“intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to
make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and . . . to
recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” Id. at 958-59. “[D]istrict
courts . . . evaluate the propriety of requested incentive payments ‘using relevant factors
includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the
degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . the amount of time and
effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonabl[e] fear[s of]
workplace retaliation.’” Roes, 1-2, 944 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Staton, 327 F.3d at 977
(affirming $5,000 service awards but rejecting $20,000 awards as unreasonable)).
“Generally, in the Ninth Circuit, a $5,000 incentive award is presumed
reasonable.” Lee v. Glob. Tel*link Corp., 2018 WL 4625677, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
2018); Bravo v. Gale Triangle, Inc., 2017 WL 708766, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017)
(finding a $5,000 award reasonable for the class representatives’ participation throughout
the litigation and the risk to their reputation); see also Roes, 1-2, 944 F.3d at 1057. When
the incentive award is unusually large, especially “relative to the size of the cash
payments that can be claimed by class members,” courts consider this discrepancy a
“serious red flag[] that the defendants may have tacitly bargained for the named
plaintiffs’ support for the settlement by offering them significant additional cash awards.”
Id. (citing Staton, 327 F.3d at 975) (“finding that payments to certain identified class

81 Motion 23:15-16.
members that were ‘on average, sixteen times greater’ than the damages that other
unnamed class members would receive, and together made up roughly 6% of the total
settlement, ‘raise[d] serious concerns as to [the settlement’s] fairness, adequacy and
reasonableness,’ particularly because there was ‘no sufficient justification in the record
for this differential in the amount of damage awards and the process for awarding
them’”) (emphasis added).
Class Counsel declare that Hang and Canales spent many hours in support of
litigating this case82 and that they “risk being blackballed from their work” for their
participation.83 For that effort, Class Counsel ask for a $10,000 award to each.84 $10,000
is roughly 12-times the average individual award that class members will receive, and
together, the requested service awards represent roughly 0.7% of the overall Settlement
Award.
In view of the named Plaintiffs’ engagement in this litigation over the past three
years, the Court finds service awards fair and reasonable. But given the gaping delta
between Class Counsel’s proposed service award and the average individual award for
class members, the Court finds that a lower service award is more appropriate for
Canales, where Hang’s name appears in the caption and he therefore faces more risk to
his job prospects by virtue of his participation in this case. Accordingly, the Court
APPROVES a $10,000 service award for Hang and a $7,500 service award for Canales
and DIRECTS that the awards be paid pursuant to the terms of the settlement
agreement.
D. Administration Costs
Finally, Class Counsel request $26,000 in administration costs for Rust
Consulting, the claims administrator.85 That request “appears to be reasonable, as those
costs relate to designing and executing the administration of the settlement agreement,
including mailing notices and processing correspondence from members of the class.”
Brooks v. Life Care Centers of Am., Inc., 2015 WL 13298569, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
2015). Thus, the Court APPROVES these costs.

82 Id. at 23:28-24:7.
83 Id. at 24:20-22.
84 Id. at 23:24-25.
85 Id. at 23:16-18.
V. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. Final approval of the class action settlement is GRANTED.
2. An award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $832,199.67 is GRANTED.
3. An award of litigation costs in the amount of $20,038.30 is GRANTED.
4. A service award for each of the two named Plaintiffs, Tai Hang and Robert
Canales is GRANTED. Specifically, Hang is awarded $10,000, and Canales is awarded
$7,500.
5, An award of administration costs for Rust Consulting in the amount of
$26,000 is GRANTED.
6. Judgment will issue accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2024
John . Holcomb
NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Ar

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9986738. Public record. Not legal advice.