# Martray Reese v. Daikin Comfort Technologies Distribution, Inc.

> District Court, C.D. California · April 10, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9986430

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** April 10, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9986430

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.: 2:24-cv-00050-AB-MAR Date: April 10, 2024

Title: Martray Reese v. Daikin Comfort Technologies Distribution, Inc.

Present: The Honorable ANDRE BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge
Carla Badirian N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
None Appearing None Appearing

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND

Before the Court is Plaintiff Martray Reese’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to
Remand Removed Action to State Court and Request for Expenses and Fees
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 16). Defendant Daikin Comfort
Technologies Distribution, Inc. (“Defendant”) filed an opposition and Plaintiff
filed a reply. (Dkt. Nos. 20, 21.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the
Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a citizen of California and Defendant is a citizen of Texas. See
Compl. (Dkt. No. 1-1) 1-2. Defendant engages in the HVAC distribution
business. Jd. § 3. Plaintiff began working as a warehouse associate for Defendant
in approximately April 2023. Jd. 4 11. Plaintiff earned $19.00 per hour and worked
approximately 40 hours per week. See id. § 11; Mot. at 13. On July 5, 2023,
Plaintiff was using a box cutter when the box cutter fell and pierced his knee. Id. {

CV-90 (12/02) CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk CB

12. Plaintiff informed his manager, who sent him to urgent care, and Plaintiff
returned to work that same day. Id. After the incident, Plaintiff began receiving
regular disciplinary write-ups, including formal write-ups related to his knee injury
and using an unapproved box cutter, tardiness, and forklift operation. See id. ¶¶ 13-
16. On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff was terminated for too many write-ups. See id. ¶ 17.
Plaintiff alleges that he “was left embarrassed, ashamed, emotionally hurt, and in
financial desperation for having been directly discriminated and retaliated against
for having a disability, needing and/or requesting a reasonable accommodation,
and taking a medical leave of absence to treat his disability.” Id. ¶ 18.

On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the California
Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, asserting 6 claims: (1) disability
discrimination, (2) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, (3) failure to
engage in a good faith interactive process, (4) retaliation, (5) failure to prevent
discrimination, and (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See
generally id. Plaintiff seeks damages for lost wages and benefits, emotional
distress, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. Id.

On January 3, 2024, Defendant timely removed the case to this Court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal (“NOR”) (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 6.
Defendant alleges that the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. See id. To establish the amount in controversy,
Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s hourly wage rate and verdicts from other
employment cases to estimate Plaintiff’s potential damages. See id. ¶¶ 17–22.

Plaintiff now moves to remand this case to the California Superior Court.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the amount in
controversy meets the jurisdictional requirement. See Mot. at 9. Plaintiff argues
that (1) Defendant’s calculation of Plaintiff’s economic damages is insufficient and
below $75,000; (2) Defendant’s estimations of emotional distress damages and
punitive damages are based on speculation and its cited cases are factually
distinguishable; and (3) Defendant’s calculation of attorneys’ fees is speculative.
See id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removal statute is strictly construed against removal.
Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). “The ‘strong presumption’
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of
establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1992). Thus, “[i]f it is unclear what amount of damages the plaintiff has
sought, . . . then the defendant bears the burden of actually proving the facts to
support jurisdiction, including the jurisdictional amount.” Id. at 566–67. If any
doubt exists as to the right of removal, federal jurisdiction must be rejected. Id.

Federal diversity jurisdiction exists where the parties are completely diverse
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The
amount in controversy, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is the total “amount
at stake in the underlying litigation.” Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400
F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]his includes any result of the litigation,
excluding interests and costs, that ‘entails a payment’ by the defendant.” Gonzales
v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016). “Among
other items, the amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, punitive,
or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, and attorneys’ fees
awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transportation
Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). “[I]n assessing the amount
in controversy, a court must ‘assume that the allegations of the complaint are true
and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in
the complaint.’” Campbell v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 471 Fed. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir.
2012) (quoting Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).

In determining the amount in controversy, courts first look to the allegations
in the complaint. Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.
2015). But “where it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court
complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled[,]” courts apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires the defendant to provide
evidence showing that it is more likely than not that the $75,000 amount in
controversy is met. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir.
1996)). In considering whether the removing defendant has satisfied its burden, the
court “may consider facts in the removal petition” and “summary-judgment-type
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v.
R & H Oil & Gas. Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). “[A] damages
assessment may require a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions . . . [but]
those assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground
underlying them.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.
III. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff requests the Court to take judicial notice of rulings from other
cases, attached as Exhibit F to the Declaration of Giuliano Dorian in support of
Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Dkt. No. 17):

1. Order Remanding Case on January 5, 2023, in Samuel Ramirez v. Builder
Services Group, Inc., United States District Court Central District of
California, Case No. EDCV 22-1571 JBG (KKx).

2. Order Remanding Case on May 28, 2020, in Paulina Cruz v. Quest
Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, United States District Court, Central
District of California, Case No. 2:20-cv-04337-RGK-SK.

3. Order Remanding Case on April 3, 2019, in Rocio Monarrez v. Walmart
Associates, Inc., United States District Court, Central District of
California, Case No. CV19-00411-RGK (GJSx).

4. Order Remanding Case on July 24, 2015, in Francisco Toral v. Sodexo,
Inc., United States District Court Central District of California, Case No.
CV 15-2385 PA (MRWx).

5. Order Remanding Case on November 12, 2015, in Monica Sevilla v. Life
Care Centers of America, Inc., et al. United States District Court Central
District of California, Case No. CV15-5977 PSG (GJSx).

6. Order Remanding Case on May 6, 2014, in Lilian Jeannette Galeano v.
AMB Janitorial Services, Inc., United States District Court Central
District of California, Case No. CV 14-3117 DSF (MANx).

A court “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is
supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). Federal Rule of
Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of a fact not subject to
reasonable dispute that is either “generally known” in the community, or “can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice of undisputed
matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.
2001). Court orders and filings may be properly noticed. U.S. ex rel. Robinson
Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)
(courts “may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and
without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to
matters at issue”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, as the court orders are
public records and relate to matters before the Court.1

IV. DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that they are citizens of different states, as
required by Section 1332(a). Accordingly, the only issue for the Court to decide is
whether Defendant has established that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks “past and future economic and non-economic
damages,” attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages, but does not specify the amount
of damages.

A. Economic Damages (Lost Wages)

Plaintiff alleges that “as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s
conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other
benefits and will for a period of time in the future be unable to obtain gainful
employment, as his ability to obtain such employment and earning capacity have
been diminished.” See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 83. Defendant contends that Plaintiff could
potentially seek $57,600 in lost wages, exclusive of lost benefits and any future
wages, based on the length of time from Plaintiff’s termination through a trial date
a year after removal (approximately 17 months). See NOR ¶ 17.

Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s calculation of lost wages on two grounds.

First, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s calculation of lost wages fails to
consider Plaintiff’s duty to mitigate. See Mot. at 12. Plaintiff asserts that its
mitigation efforts should be considered in determining the amount in controversy
in this case, and further requests the Court to follow Lamke v. Sunstate Equipment
Co., LLC, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2004), where the court
acknowledged that a plaintiff’s “entitlement to lost wages may be reduced by his
alternative employment.” See Reply at 2-3. However, binding precedent counsels
against considering affirmative defenses such as mitigation in determining the
amount in controversy. See Greene v. Harley-Davidson, 965 F.3d 767, 774 (9th
Cir. 2020) (“The district court erred in considering the merits of … affirmative

1 Plaintiff also requests the Court to take judicial notice of one of these rulings in support of its
Reply. (Dkt. No. 22.) As discussed, Plaintiff’s request is granted.
defense to determine the amount in controversy.”); Arias v. Residence Inn by
Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he amount in controversy reflects
the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.”); Geographic
Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex. rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.
2010) (“[J]ust because a defendant might have a valid defense that will reduce
recovery to below the jurisdictional amount does not mean the defendant will
ultimately prevail on that defense.”). “[I]f a district court had to evaluate every
possible defense that could reduce recovery below the jurisdictional amount the
district court would essentially have to decide the merits of the case before it could
determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d
at 1108. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s duty to mitigate argument
because mitigation is inapplicable to the amount in controversy calculation. See id.;
Jackson v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 2019 WL 3493991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 31,
2019) (“[M]itigation of damages is an affirmative defense, and a potential defense
does not reduce the amount in controversy for purposes of establishing federal
jurisdiction.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Next, the parties dispute the time period over which Plaintiff’s lost wages
should be calculated. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s calculation of lost wages,
from the date of Plaintiff’s termination to a trial date set for a year after removal, is
speculative and overreaching. See Mot. at 12–13. Plaintiff asserts that the
calculation of lost wages should be determined “as of the date of removal.” See
Mot. at 12. Plaintiff estimates lost wages of $15,200, by calculating wages from
Plaintiff’s final paycheck on August 4, 2023 to the date of removal (approximately
5 months)—i.e., $19 per hour x 40 hours per week x 20 weeks. See id. However,
this calculation does not consider Plaintiff’s claim for future wages. See Opp’n at
5–6; Compl. ¶ 83 (alleging that Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer losses
in earnings and other benefits) (emphasis added). Plaintiff fails to address contrary
binding Ninth Circuit precedent, which has been cited by Defendant.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, jurisdiction is ascertained at the time of
removal and “includes all relief claimed … to which the plaintiff would be entitled
if she prevails.” See Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417–18 (9th
Cir. 2018) (“When we say that the amount in controversy is assessed at the time of
removal, we mean that we consider damages that are claimed at the time the case is
removed by the defendant.”).2 “If a plaintiff claims at the time of removal that her

2 In the Notice of Removal, Defendant’s lost wages estimation of $57,760 is for “back wages
alone” and “does not include any future wages.” See NOR ¶ 17. While in its Opposition,
Defendant asserts that its calculation includes “back pay” and “front pay.” See, e.g., Opp’n at 6
termination caused her to lose future wages, and if the law entitles her to recoup
those future wages if she prevails, then there is no question that future wages are
“at stake” in the litigation, whatever the likelihood that she will actually recover
them.” Id. Plaintiff relies on Central District and Northern District cases which pre-
date Chavez and non-binding authority from the Third Circuit to support its
proposition that the Court should not consider wages post-removal. See id. at 12–
13. “Since Chavez, district courts consistently have included as part of the amount
in controversy future wages up to the expected date of trial in this action.” Uloa v.
California Newspaper Partners, 2021 WL 6618815, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21,
2021) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases).

Here, the Complaint at the time of removal claims damages for past and
future earnings. Future lost earnings, or “front pay.” are “at stake” in this case and
are therefore included in the amount in controversy. See id. Where a trial date is
not yet set, courts in employment cases have found that a year from the date of
removal is a conservative estimate for front pay. See Mendoza v. QVC Inc., No.
520CV01595, 2021 WL 633023, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2021); Reyes v. Staples
Office Superstore, LLC, No. 19-CV-07086, 2019 WL 4187847, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 3, 2019) (citing Fisher v. HNTB Corporation, No. 2:18-CV-08173, 2018 WL
6323077, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2018)).

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff earned $19 per hour, worked
approximately 40 hours per week, and was terminated on July 21, 2023. Defendant
removed this action on January 3, 2024. The parties have not set a trial date;
however, one year from the date of removal is a conservative estimate of the trial
date. See NOR ¶ 24; see also Mendoza, at *3. Thus, the Court applying a one-year
prospective trial date, calculates lost wages (back pay and front pay) from the date
of Plaintiff’s termination, July 21, 2023, until a trial date one year from removal, or
January 3, 2025 (a period of 76 weeks). Based on Plaintiff’s hourly rate of $19 and
40-hour work week, over a period of 76 weeks, the total amount of lost wages at
stake is at least $57,760.

While the Court declines to quantify the exact value of Plaintiff’s “other
benefits,” the benefits are more likely than not to be more than nominal. See

n.5 (“$18,240 (backpay at time of removal) + $39,520 (front pay) = $57,760.”) To be clear, the
Court’s lost wages calculation includes back pay (from termination until removal) and front pay
(from removal until trial). See Ulloa, at *6; Olvera v. Quest Diagnostics, No. 219CV06157, 2019
WL 6492246, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2019) (“For purposes of determining the amount in
controversy, courts have considered back pay as the wages lost from the date of termination to
the time of removal, and front pay as the wages lost from the date of removal until trial.”).
Melendez v. HMS Host Family Restaurants, Inc., No. CV 11-3842, 2011 WL
3760058, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (the Court may also include other
benefits in the lost wages analysis). In other words, the benefits are at least $1.

B. Non-Economic Damages (Emotional Distress)

Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks an unspecified amount of damages for emotional
distress.3 See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, 37–38, 48–49, 60–61, 72–73, 84–85. Emotional
distress damages are properly considered in the amount in controversy for
jurisdiction purposes. See, e.g., Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th
Cir. 2005); Cain v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 890 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250
(C.D. Cal. 2012); see also Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029,1034. “To
establish the amount of emotional distress in controversy, a defendant may
introduce evidence of jury verdicts in other cases.” Cain, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 1250
(citing Rivera v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. C 08-02202, 2008 WL 2740399, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2008)).

In the Notice of Removal, Defendant calculates Plaintiff’s emotional distress
damages by “conservatively estimating” the damages “at two times his alleged
back wages owed” and arrives at $115,520. See NOR ¶ 20. In its Opposition,
Defendant cites several wrongful termination cases where emotional distress
damages ranged from $56,881 to $2.25 million. See Opp’n at 7–10.

At least one of the cases Defendant cites is analogous to the present case. In
Spaulding v. Shannon Diversified, Inc., No. CIVDS1609525, JVR No.
1910040037 (Cal. Super. Apr. 25, 2019), the plaintiff was a business development
manager for the defendants and suffered a shoulder injury while performing an
inspection a few months into the job. A doctor released plaintiff to return to work
the same day, with some restrictions which the plaintiff claimed would not affect
his ability to perform his main duties. His employment was terminated later that

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges that he has “suffered general damages as he was
psychologically injured [and] [s]uch injuries have caused, and continue to cause, Plaintiff great
mental pain and suffering in an amount in excess of [the Superior Court’s] minimal jurisdiction.”
See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, 37–38, 48–49, 60–61, 72–73, 84–85. In California Superior Court, a case
with an amount in controversy of $25,000 or below is designated as a “limited” civil action,
while a case where the amount exceeds $25,000 is designated as an “unlimited” civil action. See
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 88; Ytuarte v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 4th 266, 274 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005). Plaintiff indicated in the state court civil case cover sheet that this is an “unlimited” civil
action. See NOR, Ex. A. Therefore, based on the Complaint, emotional distress damages may
more likely than not be at least $25,000.01. See Ulloa, at *7.
evening purportedly for his behavior and attitude. The plaintiff brought an
employment discrimination action against the defendants. The plaintiff received,
among other relief, $56,881 in emotional distress damages. In his Reply, Plaintiff
argues that this case is not analogous to the present case because unlike the
plaintiff in Spaulding, Plaintiff’s primary work was physical labor which was
limited by his injury and Plaintiff was allowed to return to work following his knee
injury. See Reply at 8–9. The Court disagrees. Like the plaintiff in Spaulding, a
few months into the job Plaintiff endured a physical injury on the job, he was
released from urgent care to return to work the same day, and was terminated
shortly thereafter for purported disciplinary issues. Therefore, the Court accepts
Defendant’s contention that emotional distress damages are at least $56,881.

Defendant also raises that Plaintiff has alleged that he “will be required to
employ physicians and incur additional medical and incidental expenses,” but
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence indicating that this is no longer the case and
therefore this will only increase the amount the controversy. See Opp’n at 6–7;
Compl. ¶¶ 27, 38, 49, 61, 73, 85. Defendant does not present any evidence
quantifying these medical expenses, however. The Court therefore cannot
speculate as to the amount of medical expenses that are in dispute and can only
estimate that Plaintiff may be awarded more than a nominal amount.

In sum, considering the lost wages and emotional distress damages, the
Court finds that Defendant has established that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. Because the Court finds that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
with the lost wages and emotional distress damages, alone, it need not determine
the amount at stake with respect to punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.4

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Defendant argues that the Court could follow cases which estimate at least $30,000 in
attorneys’ fees, which is “exceedingly conservative given current hourly rates.” See Opp’n at 14
n.9; see also Sasso v. Noble Utah Long Beach, LLC, No. CV 14-09154, 2015 WL 898468, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015). The Court agrees that this is a reasonable and conservative estimate of
potential attorneys’ fees. Thus, inclusion of $30,000 in attorneys’ fees would push the amount in
controversy in this case well over $75,000.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9986430. Public record. Not legal advice.