# Michael Lebow v. Huston Buick GMC Cadillac Inc

> District Court, C.D. California · October 13, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9981422

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** October 13, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9981422

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the standard for establishing general jurisdiction is “fairly high” and requires 2 contacts “that approximate physical presence”

## Opinion text

Case 2:22-cv-01062-MEMF-KS Document 21 Filed 10/13/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:226

1 JS-6, O
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
Case No.: 2:22-cv-01062-MEMF(KSx)
11 MICHAEL LEBOW,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
13 v. WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND [ECF NO.
15]
14

15 HUSTON BUICK GMC CADILLAC, INC.,

Defendants.
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17

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20 Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer filed by
21 Defendant Huston Buick GMC Cadillac, Inc. ECF No. 15. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
22 GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
23
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27 / / /
28 / / /

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1 BACKGROUND
2 I. Factual Background
3
a. Michael Lebow’s identity was used to purchase vehicles from Huston Buick
4 GMC Cadillac, Inc.1
5
In January 2020, Defendant Huston Buick GMC Cadillac, Inc. (“Huston Buick”) allowed a
6
third party to commit identity theft by purchasing one or more vehicles from Huston Buick using
7
Plaintiff Michael Lebow’s (“Lebow”) identity. SAC ¶ 10. Huston Buick ran Lebow’s credit report
8
seven times without his permission from January 18 to January 20, 2020, resulting in thirteen
9
inquiries made on his credit history. Id. ¶¶ 12–15. When Huston Buick ran Lebow’s credit report, it
10
possessed a copy of his California driver’s license, which listed his residence in California. Lebow
11
Decl. ¶ 6. Moreover, the first time Huston Buick ran his credit report, the report listed his address as
12
being within California. Id. ¶ 7. On or about September 15, 2020, Lebow discovered that his credit
13
score had dropped over fifty points and contained various inquiries and loans that did not belong to
14
him. Id. ¶ 19. The credit application submitted by the identity thief listed a Florida address and
15
contained a 561 area code that differed from Lebow’s 310 area code. Id. ¶ 29. Lebow has never lived
16
in Florida. Id. He has also never been to Huston Buick’s place of business nor conducted business
17
with Huston Buick. Id. ¶ 3.
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b. Huston Buick GMC Cadillac, Inc. conducts its business almost solely in Florida.2
19
20 Huston Buick’s principal place of business has always been in Lake Wales, Florida. Huston
21 Decl. ¶ 4. Huston Buick currently operates four automobile dealerships, all of which are in Florida.
22 Id. Huston Buick holds an automobile license issued by the Florida Department of Highway Safety
23 and Motor Vehicles and operates under federal and Florida law. Id. Huston Buick has never operated
24
25
1 The factual allegations set forth in this section are taken from the Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 14
(“Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”), as well as Michael Lebow’s allegations in the declaration
26 attached to his Opposition, ECF No. 16-1 (“Lebow Decl.”). The SAC is substantially similar to the FAC, with
the addition of the following: (1) one sentence at the end of ¶ 20; (2) one sentence at the end of ¶ 21; (3) ¶¶
27 43–56; and (4) a statement in ¶ 82 noting that Plaintiff reserves the right to a trial by jury per the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America.
28 2 The facts set forth below are taken from Huston Buick’s allegations in the declaration attached to its Motion.
ECF No. 15-2 (“Huston Decl.”).

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1 any locations in California, held any licenses issued by the state of California, or been authorized to
2 do business within the state of California. Id. ¶ 5. Huston Buick has not, since the current owner
3 bought the company in 2004, paid for any advertising targeting California markets and focuses its
4 marketing and sales efforts in Florida. Id. ¶ 6. Huston Buick’s website allows for online automobile
5 purchases; however, the majority of Huston Buick’s customers are Florida residents, and any sales
6 made to non-Florida residents are “exceedingly rare and incidental” and transacted under federal and
7 Florida law. Id. ¶ 7.
8 II. Procedural History
9 On January 11, 2022, Lebow filed his First Amended Complaint in the Superior Court of
10 California, County of Los Angeles. See generally ECF No. 1-1 (“FAC”). Huston Buick was served
11 on January 19, 2022, and removed this action to federal court on February 16, 2022, citing diversity
12 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). ECF No. 1. On February 23, 2022, Huston Buick filed a
13 Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Transfer. ECF No. 8. On April 22, 2022, the
14 Court granted the Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction with leave to amend. ECF No.
15 13. On May 15, 2022, Lebow filed his Second Amended Complaint, asserting the same three causes
16 of action previously alleged in the FAC: (1) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practice
17 Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788, et seq.; (2) violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting
18 Agencies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.25(a); and (3) violation of the California Identity Theft Law,
19 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.92, et seq. See generally SAC. The SAC included the following additional
20 information:
21
20. Plaintiff had not purchased or been shopping for any vehicles at any time between
22 2020 and 2021 with Defendant or ever at all. Specifically on the dates of the
purchased purportedly made by Plaintiff, Plaintiff was also present in California
23 where he made bank withdrawals.
21. The information that Defendant reported about Plaintiff is derogatory as it was
24 inaccurate and caused and continues to cause Plaintiff damages. Plaintiffs [sic]
damages were not only actual but in the information itself and its accuracy which are
25
demonstrable.
26 . . .
43. Moreover, the harm that Plaintiff that Defendant caused through the conduct herein
27 described was immediate upon assisting the identity theft in using Plaintiff’s identity
in purchasing an automobile and obtaining financing as Plaintiff’s credit was
28 substantially diminished in the State of California the moment Defendant made

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several unauthorized hard inquiries into his credit and proceeded to report said
1
inquiries on his credit.
2 44. Also, Defendant continued to report on Plaintiff’s credit well after the initial January
of 2020 inquiries.
3 45. Plaintiff is currently seventy-seven (77) years of age, and he was seventy-five (75)
years of age at the time that Defendant first facilitated the illegal use of his identity to
4
purchase the automobile from Defendant and obtain financing, and Plaintiff therefore
qualifies as “elderly” as that term is defined in every State in the Union as well as
5
under the Laws of the United States of America.
6 46. Persons over the age of sixty (60) years are the most common Identity Theft victims.
47. It is well-known and open, publicly available information that California Residents
7 are the most common Identity Theft victims with 147,382 reported instances of
Identity Theft of the identities of California Residents.
8
48. Defendant knew both that Plaintiff was a California Resident and that Plaintiff was 75
9 years of age at the time that it facilitated the identity thief’s illegal purchase of a
vehicle from Defendant and financing thereof as the identity thief used a driver’s
10 license that showed both Plaintiff’s state of residence and age to Defendant.
49. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant failed to maintain
11 policies and procedures reasonably calculated to protect identity theft victims and
avoid facilitating the purchase and financing of its automobiles from identity thieves
12
and consequent harm.
13 50. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant willfully, with extreme
gross recklessness, and/or with complete disregard for the truth of the matter
14 disregarded all red flags and went forward with the transaction with the identity thief
and did so because it was more profitable for Defendant.
15 51. But for Plaintiff’s residence in the State of California, he would not have become a
victim of Identity Theft or he would have been substantially less likely to become a
16
victim of Identity Theft as such residents pose the most attractive victims to identity
17 thieves in Florida because the physical distance makes it prohibitively difficult for
victims to stop transactions in their wake as well as assist in the coordination of
18 effective law enforcement efforts.
52. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief including without limitation Defendant’s
19 own admissions that Defendant sells and facilitates the financing of automobiles to
California Residents.
20
53. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant is a franchise dealership
21 and financier of GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY aka GENERAL MOTORS LLC
which is a registered business entity in the State of California and that Defendant
22 expressly avails itself of the Laws of the State of California governing consumer
purchases and financing transactions including those transacted through or in
23 connection with Defendant’s website.
54. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief, including without limitation the fact that
24
anyone would immediately recognize that the person purchasing and applying for
25 financing for the vehicle is not the person on Plaintiff’s driver’s license, that
Defendant facilitated the identity thief’s illegal purchase and financing completely or
26 substantially online.
55. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant specifically
27 transacts with California Residents as well as residents of other similarly situated
States via online purchases because residents of such States are commonly willing to
28
pay a premium for vehicles and commonly pay a price for vehicles in Defendant’s

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vehicles that is over and above the price that local consumers are willing and/or able
1
to pay, and Defendant therefore reaps a substantial benefit from transacting online
2 with California Residents and the residents of other states.
56. Defendant ignored any and all red flags clearly indicating that the person making the
3 purchase was not actually Plaintiff and did so all for the sake of profit.
4
Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 43–56. On May 27, 2022, Huston Buick filed the instant Motion to Dismiss or, in the
5
Alternative, Motion to Transfer regarding the Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 15 (“Motion”
6
or “Mot.”). The Motion was fully briefed on June 16, 2022. See ECF No. 16 (“Opposition” or
7
“Opp’n”), 17 (“Reply”). On June 30, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on this matter.
8
MOTION TO DISMISS
9
I. Applicable Law
10
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may file a motion to dismiss a
11
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). In the face of a 12(b)(2) motion,
12
“the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction.” In re W. States
13
Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig. (Western States), 715 F.3d 716, 741 (9th Cir. 2013). In
14
determining whether a complaint lacks personal jurisdiction, a court may consider evidence
15
presented in affidavits and may order discovery on the jurisdictional issues. Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
16
248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds as discussed in Williams v. Yamaha
17
Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2017).
18
“However, ‘when a district court acts on a defendant’s motion to dismiss without holding an
19
evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to
20
withstand the motion to dismiss. That is, the plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that if true would
21
support jurisdiction over the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th
22
Cir. 1995)).3 Under such circumstances, a district court must accept the uncontroverted allegations in
23
the plaintiff’s complaint as true. Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127
24
(9th Cir. 2010). Although the court may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are
25
contradicted by affidavit, conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be
26
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal
27

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3 Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing or jurisdictional discovery with respect to the instant motion.

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1 jurisdiction exists. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011);
2 Unocal, 248 F.3d at 922.
3 Moreover, when no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction exists, as is the
4 case here, the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits. Picot v.
5 Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125
6 (2014)). Accordingly, the Court looks to “California’s longarm statute [which] allows courts to
7 exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of
8 the United States Constitution.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125); see also
9 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10.
10 Due process allows courts to exercise jurisdiction only over a defendant who has “certain
11 minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
12 notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. See Picot,
14 780 F.3d at 1211; Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2017); see also
15 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984).
16 A district court should generally grant leave to amend freely. Cervantes v. Countrywide
17 Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). However, “a district court may dismiss
18 without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies
19 and amendment would be futile.” Id.
20 a. General Jurisdiction
21 “General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities
22 there are ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic.’” Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toppen, 141 F.3d
23 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414–16), modified, Yahoo! Inc. v. La
24 Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth
25 Circuit has recognized this as “an exacting standard, as it should be, because a finding of general
26 jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its
27 activities anywhere in the world.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801
28 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th

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1 Cir. 2000) (noting that the standard for establishing general jurisdiction is “fairly high” and requires
2 contacts “that approximate physical presence”).
3 b. Specific Jurisdiction
4 Even if a defendant has not had continuous and systematic contacts with the state sufficient
5 to confer general jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Picot,
6 780 F.3d at 1211. Specific jurisdiction exists where the claim for relief arises directly from a
7 defendant’s contacts with the forum state. AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586,
8 588 (9th Cir. 1996). For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant:
9
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate
10 some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum,
11 thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one
which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the
12 exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must
be reasonable.
13
14 Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211.
15 The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of this test. Schwarzenegger,
16 374 F.3d at 802. If the plaintiff is able to do so, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show why
17 the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not be reasonable and fair under the third prong. Id.
18 i. Purposeful Direction or Availment
19 In tort cases, the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of purposeful direction, rather than
20 purposeful availment. Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1228. Purposeful direction is analyzed under the
21 Calder “effects” test, which requires the defendant to have “(1) committed an intentional act, (2)
22 expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered
23 in the forum state.” Id. at 1228 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
24 II. Discussion
25 Huston Buick argues that Lebow’s SAC should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
26 Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction because Lebow cannot establish that the Court
27 has: (1) general jurisdiction over Huston Buick; or (2) specific jurisdiction over Huston Buick. Mot.
28

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1 at 9–13. Lebow does not dispute that the Court lacks general jurisdiction over Huston Buick,4 but
2 rather contends that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Huston Buick. Opp’n at 9–11.
3 a. The Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Huston Buick.
4 Huston Buick alleges that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Huston Buick because
5 Huston Buick has no sufficient contacts with California. Mot. at 12–13. Huston Buick contends that
6 Lebow has failed to satisfy the three-prong test requiring (1) that the defendant purposefully avail
7 themselves of the forum state; (2) that the claim arises out of the defendant’s forum-related
8 activities; and (3) that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comport with fair play and substantial
9 justice. Id.
10
i. Lebow has not adequately pleaded that Huston Buick purposefully directed
11 itself toward California.
12
Lebow’s SAC contains new allegations relevant to our analysis under this prong, which
13
requires the Court to reconsider its analysis. As with the prior motion, Huston Buick contends that it
14
has never expressly aimed its actions toward the state of California under the second prong of the
15
purposeful direction test. Id. Lebow again alleges, to the contrary, that Huston Buick engaged in a
16
course of conduct that negatively impacted him while he resided in California and that Huston Buick
17
should have known that its actions would impact a California resident. Opp’n at 9–10. As in the
18
FAC, Lebow’s SAC alleges that Huston Buick has contact with California because its alleged
19
conduct was against a California resident in violation of California law. Opp’n at 9–10.
20
The Ninth Circuit has held that under some circumstances, a defendant’s transaction with a
21
resident of the forum may be a sufficient basis for specific jurisdiction. For example, in Dole Food
22
Company, Inc. v. Watts, the court found that the defendants’ conduct gave rise to specific
23
jurisdiction in California where (1) they “communicated directly” with the plaintiff’s California
24
managers to induce them to “enter into significant and detrimental contractual arrangements” and (2)
25
the plaintiff’s principal place of business was in California, meaning that the harm caused by
26

27
4 Because Lebow does not dispute that the Court lacks general jurisdiction over Huston Buick, the Court need
28 not consider Huston Buick’s argument that general jurisdiction does not exist because Huston Buick has no
contacts with California that could support general jurisdiction.

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1 defendants’ conduct was suffered in California. 303 F.3d 1104, 1112–14 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly,
2 in Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., the court found that the defendant’s
3 alleged tortious acts aimed at a plaintiff—interference in the plaintiff’s contractual and economic
4 relationships—whom the defendant knew was a resident of the forum state satisfied the “express
5 aiming” requirement of the effects test and therefore gave rise to specific jurisdiction. 328 F.3d
6 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003).
7 Since those cases were decided, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that even
8 when a nonresident’s conduct might have caused an effect on a plaintiff who happens to be in the
9 forum state and the defendant knew the plaintiff resided therein, that alone is insufficient to satisfy
10 the “purposeful direction” test. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014) (“Due process requires
11 that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not
12 based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons
13 affiliated with the State.”). In Walden, the Court held that it is “impermissibl[e]” to “allow[] a
14 plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis.” Id. at 289.
15 Accordingly, the focus should be on the defendant’s own contacts with the forum, not on the
16 defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s strong forum connections. See id. The Court explained that
17 in that case: “Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with Nevada simply
18 because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections.” Id.
19 This is the crux of Lebow’s SAC: that Huston Buick created sufficient contacts with California
20 because it intentionally directed its conduct at a plaintiff who he knew was a California resident. See
21 SAC ¶ 48 (“Defendant knew both that Plaintiff was a California Resident and that Plaintiff was 75
22 years of age at the time that it facilitated the identity thief’s illegal purchase of a vehicle . . . as the
23 identity thief used a driver’s license that showed both Plaintiff’s state of residence and age to
24 Defendant.”). For this reason, Lebow’s new allegation that Huston Buick knew Lebow was a
25 California resident is insufficient to establish sufficient contacts.5
26
27 5 As before, Huston Buick submitted an affidavit by Samuel Huston asserting: “[A]ccording to my review of
sales records regarding the sale of the Vehicle, the alleged identity thief provided proof of residence in Florida
28

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1 Lebow’s SAC presents other new allegations as well. The only new allegations that go to
2 Huston Buick’s contacts with California rather than its contacts with Lebow are the following: (1)
3 Huston Buick “expressly avails itself of the Laws of the State of California governing purchases and
4 financing transactions including those transacted through or in connection with Defendant’s
5 website,” SAC ¶ 53; and (2) Huston Buick “specifically transacts with California Residents . . . via
6 online purchases because residents of such States are commonly willing to pay a premium for
7 vehicles and commonly pay a price for vehicles in Defendant’s vehicles that is over and above the
8 price that local consumers are willing and/or able to pay,” id. ¶ 55.
9 Just as before, Huston Buick submitted a declaration asserting that “[t]he vast majority of
10 Huston Buick’s sales are to Florida residents, and any sales to out-of-state residents are exceedingly
11 rare and incidental and transacted under federal and Florida law.” Huston Decl. ¶ 7. Accordingly,
12 Lebow’s allegations to the contrary remain controverted and are unsupported by anything in the
13 Lebow declaration or any other evidence. As stated previously, the Court may not assume the truth
14 of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit. Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1223.
15
16
17 and took delivery of the Vehicle in Orlando, Florida.” Huston Decl. ¶ 8. Lebow thereafter submitted an
affidavit from himself stating:
18
6. At the time that Defendant made hard enquiries into my credit, they possessed a copy of
19 my driver’s license which is a California Driver’s License and lists my residence in
the State of California;
20 7. The first time Defendant ran my credit, my credit report listed my address as being in
the State of California, and there was nothing on my credit to indicate to them that I
21 resided anywhere other than the State of California and that were I to be the person
attempting to purchase, and finance said purchase, a vehicle from Defendant, then I would
22
naturally be making said purchase from the State of California . . . .
23
Lebow Decl. ¶¶ 6–7 (emphasis added).
As discussed previously, although the court may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading
24
which are contradicted by affidavit, conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be
25 resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction
exists. Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1223; Unocal, 248 F.3d at 922.
26 Here, the Court resolves this factual dispute between conflicting affidavits in favor of Lebow. Huston
Buick, given that it had access to a copy of Lebow’s California Driver’s License listing his state of residence
27 in California and his credit report listed his address as residing in California, should at least have known or
been cognizant of the possibility that it was dealing with a California resident. However, as discussed, the
28 Court finds this knowledge of Lebow’s residence insufficient to create sufficient contacts between Huston
Buick and California.

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1 And even if the Court did assume the truth of these allegations, they do not allege the sort of conduct
2 which connects Huston Buick to California in a meaningful way. Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 (“The
3 proper question is not whether the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the
4 defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”).
5 Finally, it is worth noting that in Lebow’s case, just as in Walden, his injury does not evince
6 a connection between Huston Buick and California. His injury is “not the sort of effect that is
7 tethered to [California] in any meaningful way.” Id. To the extent that he was injured, Lebow would
8 have experienced this same injury in any other place where he happened to be.
9 As a result, the Court finds that Lebow does not pleads facts sufficient to establish that
10 Huston Buick expressly aimed conduct at, or purposefully directed itself at, California.
11 Because the Court finds that Huston Buick did not purposefully direct itself at California
12 under governing law, the Court may not exercise specific jurisdiction over Huston Buick. The Court
13 therefore GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.6
14 b. Leave to Amend
15 Huston Buick contends that the Court should dismiss the SAC without leave to amend
16 because Lebow was already granted leave to amend his complaint once, made only minor
17 amendments that failed to remedy the jurisdictional defects present in the FAC, and any further
18 efforts would be futile because personal jurisdiction does not exist. Mot. at 16. Although a district
19 court should generally grant leave to amend freely, “a district court may dismiss without leave
20 where . . . amendment would be futile.” Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041.
21 “Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be
22 saved by amendment.” Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
23 leave to amend futile where appellants “had already been put on notice once before of the same
24 defects that led to the dismissal of their First Amended Complaint” but nonetheless submitted a First
25

26 6 Because the Court finds that Lebow’s claims do not arise out of Huston Buick’s activities in California, it
need not consider whether, under the second prong, the claim is one which arises out of or relates to the
27
defendant’s forum-related activities, or whether, under the third prong, the exercise of jurisdiction
“comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice” or is reasonable. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. Moreover, the
28
Court need not consider Huston Buick’s alternative argument, that the case should be transferred.

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1 Amended Complaint that “contained the same defects as their original complaint”). Based on
2 Lebow’s SAC, Opposition, and discussion during the June 30, 2022 hearing, the Court believes that
3 granting leave to amend would be futile. Lebow has already been put on notice once before of the
4 same defects for which the Court is dismissing his SAC today—namely the absence of sufficient
5 contacts between Huston Buick and California outside of the allegations regarding the plaintiff;
6 however, the SAC nonetheless contains the same defects as the FAC. Moreover, during the hearing,
7 Lebow failed to state what additional facts he would plead if given leave to amend. Accordingly, the
8 Court finds amendment to be futile.
9 CONCLUSION
10 In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss WITHOUT
11 LEAVE TO AMEND.
12
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
14
15 Dated: October 13, 2022 ___________________________________
16 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG
17 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9981422. Public record. Not legal advice.