# Hawkins v. Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations

> Appellate Court of Illinois · April 17, 2020 · 446 Ill. Dec. 586

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9970889

## Case

- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** April 17, 2020
- **Citations:** 446 Ill. Dec. 586; 171 N.E.3d 21; 2020 IL App (1st) 191301
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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by Reporter of
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Illinois Official Reports to the accuracy
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this document
Appellate Court Date: 2021.07.30
09:52:28 -05'00'

Hawkins v. Chicago Comm’n on Human Relations, 2020 IL App (1st) 191301

Appellate Court THOMASINA HAWKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHICAGO
Caption COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS and MAC PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Sixth Division
No. 1-19-1301

Filed April 17, 2020

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CH-5027; the
Review Hon. Michael T. Mullen, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on Donteé Brown, of Tinley Park, for appellant.
Appeal
Stacey L. Smiricky and Sean J. Powell, of Faegre Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP, of Chicago, for appellee Mac Property Management, LLC.

No brief filed for other appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Cunningham and Justice Connors concurred with the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION

¶1 The Chicago Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no substantial
evidence of housing discrimination by defendant Mac Property Management, LLC (Mac),
based on plaintiff Thomasina Hawkins’s use of a housing choice voucher. Plaintiff filed a writ
of certiorari to the circuit court, which was denied. On appeal, plaintiff contends denial was
improper where the Commission raised the affirmative defense of business necessity
sua sponte and plaintiff did not have an opportunity to rebut the affirmative defense with a less
discriminatory alternative. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the case to the
Commission for a new hearing.

¶2 I. JURISDICTION
¶3 Appeal of the Commission’s final order requires a common-law writ of certiorari to the
circuit court. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari on April 18, 2018. The trial court denied the
writ on April 1, 2019. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied on May 29,
2019. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on June 25, 2019. Accordingly, this court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff.
July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments entered below.

¶4 II. BACKGROUND
¶5 Plaintiff is a recipient of a housing choice voucher, commonly known as “Section 8” rental
assistance, which is administered by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). The voucher
enables plaintiff to rent a two-bedroom apartment at a predetermined maximum rent. CHA
rules require voucher holders to sign leases for 12 months or more.
¶6 On January 30, 2015, plaintiff called Mac to inquire about available apartments. Plaintiff
spoke to a leasing agent who told her he would send a list to her e-mail, but plaintiff did not
receive a list. On February 23, 2015, plaintiff went to Mac’s office and spoke with leasing
agent Travis Mahrt. He told plaintiff to fill out an online application, which she did. On
February 27, 2015, plaintiff sent Mahrt a list of apartments she wanted to view. Through an e-
mail, Mahrt responded that plaintiff needed to bring her CHA moving papers before they could
check her credit and that only one of the apartments, located at 5401 S. Drexel Boulevard, was
available. The other properties, 5308 S. Greenwood Avenue, 5326 S. Greenwood Avenue, and
5320 S. Drexel Boulevard, were not available because Mac allowed only nine-month leases
for those units.
¶7 When plaintiff met with Mahrt later that day, he explained that the nine-month leases were
based on the academic school year. Plaintiff offered to lease for more than 12 months to
accommodate the nine-month lease schedule, but Mahrt stated that she could not rent for more
than 12 months.
¶8 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission alleging disparate treatment based on
source of income and that Mac’s nine-month lease policy “may have a disparate impact” on
voucher holders. In response to the complaint, Mac acknowledged that plaintiff was a recipient
of the housing voucher. Mac admitted that Mahrt sent plaintiff an e-mail stating that she needed
to bring her moving papers before her credit check could be completed and that 5401 S. Drexel

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was available for viewing. Mac also acknowledged that plaintiff offered to lease for more than
12 months.
¶9 However, Mac denied that plaintiff completed an application. Mac also denied that Mahrt
told plaintiff that units at 5308 S. Greenwood, 5326 S. Greenwood, and 5320 S. Drexel were
not available because a nine-month lease was required. It denied that Mahrt informed plaintiff
that the nine-month leases were based on the academic school year. Under “Affirmative
Defenses,” Mac stated that it “acted in good faith at all times, and all decisions and actions
regarding [plaintiff’s] housing were legitimate and non-discriminatory, and no unlawful factor
motivated Mac.”
¶ 10 Evidence submitted to the Commission included a recording of a telephone call between
Mahrt and plaintiff. Plaintiff told Mahrt that she “does not know where her credit is” and that
she has been “displaced for a year and 4 months.” Mahrt responded that plaintiff needs to bring
in her moving papers to document her income so that he can process her application. Plaintiff
offered to e-mail the documents. In an e-mail dated February 27, 2015, plaintiff told Mahrt she
would like to view 5308 S. Greenwood, 5326 S. Greenwood, 5320 S. Drexel, 5401 S. Drexel,
and 5118 S. Kimbark. Mahrt responded that he needed plaintiff’s moving papers before he
could run a credit check and that only 5401 S. Drexel was available for showing because “[t]he
others were only available for 9-month leases.” An e-mail from Mahrt to plaintiff stated that
there was a two-bedroom basement apartment available at 47th and Ellis for under $1200. He
was “not sure if basement apartments pass CHA inspection, but if you’d like to see it, please
let me know.”
¶ 11 The Commission issued investigative orders to plaintiff and Mac. The Commission asked
Mac to explain Mahrt’s e-mail that stated, “The others were only available for 9-month leases.”
Mac responded that it “has certain buildings that have shorter lease terms due to business
considerations, including seasonality issues. Historical data shows certain best times to lease
so there are no vacancies at the property.” The Commission also asked Mac to provide the
front page of contracts for eight applicants whom Mac had approved and whose income
derived from housing vouchers.
¶ 12 In its determination, the Commission noted that a housing choice voucher is a source of
income and that a respondent must allow a housing applicant to apply for housing and be
“possibly approved for occupancy.” The Commission found that plaintiff “never viewed any
properties and never submitted documentation that she had a Voucher or any other income.” It
also determined that “[t]here is no evidence that a similarly situated applicant, without a
Housing Choice Voucher, was treated more favorably under similar circumstances.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that [Mac] rented to three Housing Choice Voucher
recipients at 5328 S. Greenwood, 5322 S. Drexel, and 1029 E. 53rd Street.” The Commission
found no substantial evidence “that a similarly situated applicant, without a Housing Choice
Voucher, was treated more favorably under similar circumstances.”
¶ 13 Regarding plaintiff’s disparate impact claim, the Commission noted that plaintiff must
allege that a policy, although neutral on its face, had a disparate impact on voucher holders.
However, “disparate impact can be justified by business necessity.” The Commission found
that “the duration of a lease is a lease term [ ] distinct from a rental screening policy” and
property owners “have a legitimate business interest in setting lease terms.” Mac’s decision to
use a nine-month lease term on certain properties “ensure[d] full occupancy due to the
proximity between the properties and the University of Chicago.”

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¶ 14 For these reasons, the Commission found “no substantial evidence of discrimination based
on source of income” and dismissed the case.
¶ 15 Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Commission. Plaintiff argued that the
Commission erred in raising the affirmative defense of business necessity sua sponte and not
allowing plaintiff to provide a less discriminatory alternative to Mac’s nine-month lease policy.
Plaintiff asserts on appeal that she challenged only the Commission’s disparate impact
determination because, after the dismissal, she gained access to the case file for the first time
and viewed the information Mac provided the Commission on other voucher tenants. As a
result, plaintiff “abandoned” her disparate treatment claim in her request for review.
¶ 16 The Commission denied plaintiff’s request for review. It noted that a request for review is
an opportunity for plaintiff to present newly discovered evidence or new and dispositive legal
precedent not available at the time of the original decision. The Commission reiterated that
plaintiff never actually submitted an application to lease any of Mac’s apartments and that Mac
had indicated “[f]rom the beginning of their correspondence *** that many of its apartments,
particularly those in close proximity to the University of Chicago’s campus, are only available
for leases with 9-month terms.” The Commission stated that, to claim disparate impact,
plaintiff must show that Mac’s policy, although neutral on its face, had a disparate impact on
voucher holders. If plaintiff meets that burden, Mac must show a reasonable business
justification for its policy. If Mac meets its burden, plaintiff “must show that a less restrictive
alternative is available that would not potentially exclude Housing Choice Voucher holders.”
The Commission found that Mac “set forth a legitimate business reason for offering certain
apartments at only a 9-month lease term.”
¶ 17 The Commission then addressed plaintiff’s claim on review that Mac failed to raise the
affirmative defense of business necessity and that the Commission raised the issue sua sponte.
It found plaintiff’s claim without merit. The Commission stated that plaintiff
“was on notice from the time she filed her complaint that [Mac] took the position that
it would only lease certain apartments close to the University of Chicago’s campus for
9-month terms because [Mac] wanted to ensure that those apartments remained
occupied. In its response to the complaint, [Mac] raised the defense that its decisions
with regard to its lease terms were ‘legitimate and non-discriminatory.’ [Mac] argued
that its historical data with regard to apartment occupancy necessities [sic] the use of
9-month leases for properties in close proximity to University of Chicago’s campus. At
no point in the investigation into [plaintiff’s] claims did she raise even the possibility
of a less restrictive alternative to [Mac’s] policy with regard to the terms of certain
leases” even though she “had ample opportunity to present evidence of a less restrictive
alternative.”
Since plaintiff’s request for review “offer[ed] no new rationale as to why her complaint should
not be dismissed for lack of substantial evidence,” the Commission denied the request.
¶ 18 Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari with the circuit court for review of the Commission’s
determination. Therein, plaintiff argued that the Commission violated its regulations by raising
the affirmative defense of business necessity sua sponte. By doing so, plaintiff was deprived
of an opportunity to offer a less discriminatory alternative, which is “a required and vital step
in the disparate impact analysis.” After briefing and oral argument, the court denied the writ.
Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied because “there was no
misapplication of law, there was no newly discovered evidence and there has been no change

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in the law.” Plaintiff filed this appeal.

¶ 19 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 A party may seek judicial review of the Commission’s final determination by filing a
petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery division of the circuit court. Powell v. City of
Chicago Human Rights Comm’n, 389 Ill. App. 3d 45, 53-54 (2009). On appeal, this court
reviews the Commission’s decision, not that of the circuit court. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey,
352 Ill. App. 3d 87, 90 (2004).
¶ 21 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged source-of-income discrimination based on her use of a Section
8 voucher. Section 5-8-030 of the Chicago Municipal Code states that:
“It shall be an unfair housing practice and unlawful for any owner, lessee, sublessee,
assignee, managing agent *** or other person, firm or corporation having the right to
sell, rent, lease, sublease, or establish rules or policies for any housing accommodation,
within the City of Chicago ***:
A. To make any distinction *** or restriction against any person in the price,
terms, conditions or privileges of any kind relating to the sale, rental, lease or
occupancy of any real estate used for residential purposes in the City of Chicago
*** predicated upon the *** source of income of the prospective or actual buyer or
tenant thereof.” Chicago Municipal Code § 5-8-30 (amended Apr. 9, 2008).
The Commission has held that “a complainant can prove source of income discrimination by
showing that they were denied a rental opportunity because they intended to make use of
Section 8 funding.” Sullivan-Lackey v. Godinez, CCHR No. 99-H-89, at 5 (July 18, 2001);
Godinez, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 91.
¶ 22 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged both a disparate treatment and a disparate impact theory of
discrimination. On appeal, however, plaintiff has abandoned disparate treatment and proceeds
on disparate impact theory alone. A prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate
impact is established if a practice, while facially neutral, has a significant discriminatory
impact on a protected group to which the plaintiff belongs. Board of Trustees of Southern
Illinois University v. Knight, 163 Ill. App. 3d 289, 294 (1987). The United States Supreme
Court recognized that disparate impact liability based solely upon a showing of a statistical
disparity raises serious constitutional concerns. Texas Department of Housing & Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 540 (2015). Therefore, in order
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, plaintiff must also point to a policy of
defendant’s causing the disparity. Id. at 542. This causality requirement ensures that defendants
are not held liable for disparities they did not create. Id. “A plaintiff who fails to allege facts at
the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot
make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.” Id. at 543.
¶ 23 Here, plaintiff is a Section 8 voucher holder, and the program requires leases of at least one
year. Mac does not dispute that, for its properties requiring nine-month leases, plaintiff as a
voucher holder is precluded from applying. There is no question that all Section 8 voucher
holders are significantly impacted because they are precluded from leasing these apartments
as a result of Mac’s policy. Mac did not even allow plaintiff to view apartments with nine-
month leases. Therefore, plaintiff has stated facts showing a causal connection between Mac’s
policy and a significant disparate impact on Section 8 voucher holders.

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¶ 24 Mac argues that plaintiff also needs to show that she completed an application as an
element of her prima facie case, because she must have been ready and able to rent the property
at issue. However, the Commission case cited in support refers to the completed application as
an element of a disparate treatment claim. See Gardner v. Olaitan, CCHR No. 10-H-50, at 10
(Dec. 19, 2012). According to the Commission, a completed application is a necessary element
to “establish a prima facie case for intentional housing discrimination under the indirect
method.” Id. Plaintiff’s contentions on appeal involve only her claim of disparate impact. Facts
or statistical evidence showing a causal connection between the challenged policy and a
significant disparity sufficiently establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact. Texas
Department of Housing, 576 U.S. at 543.
¶ 25 Once a prima facie case of disparate impact is shown, the burden shifts to Mac to
demonstrate that the practice is justified by business necessity. Board of Trustees, 163 Ill. App.
3d at 294; see also Walton v. Chicago Department of Streets & Sanitation, CCHR No. 95-E-
271 (May 17, 2000) (where the Commission found that discrimination may be established
under disparate impact theory by showing that the challenged practice has a significant or
substantial statistical impact upon a protected class, which is not justified by business
necessity). The business necessity defense fails if legitimate business concerns “can be served
by a reasonably available alternative system with less discriminatory effects.” Board of
Trustees, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 295.
¶ 26 Business necessity is a defense that Mac must plead and prove. Lewis v. City of Chicago,
560 U.S. 205, 213 (2010). Proof that the challenged policy is necessary to achieve a valid
business interest can defeat plaintiff’s discrimination claim. Texas Department of Housing,
576 U.S. at 541. Since the defense “gives color to [an] opponent’s claim but asserts new matter
which defeats an apparent right in the plaintiff,” business necessity is an affirmative defense.
Raprager v. Allstate Insurance Co., 183 Ill. App. 3d 847, 854-55 (1989).
¶ 27 As an affirmative defense, business necessity and the facts in support of the defense must
be set forth in the response or answer to the complaint. Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 246 Ill.
App. 3d 348, 357 (1993); see also 735 ILCS 5/2-613(d) (West 2016) (facts constituting any
affirmative defense “must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply”). The purpose of section
2-613 is to prevent unfair surprise to plaintiff at trial. Moller v. Lipov, 368 Ill. App. 3d 333,
345-46 (2006). The Commission’s regulations mirror this rule. See Chi. Comm’n on Human
Relations Regulation 210.250(a)(3) (2016) (“Any affirmative defenses must be stated in the
response in order to be considered in determining whether there is substantial evidence of an
ordinance violation.”).
¶ 28 Plaintiff contends that Mac did not properly raise the affirmative defense of business
necessity but rather that the Commission raised the defense sua sponte in violation of its own
regulations. Whether the Commission followed its own rules is a mixed question of fact and
law, in which historical facts are admitted or established and the rule of law is undisputed.
Clerk of the Circuit Court v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 2016 IL App (2d)
150849, ¶ 38. The issue is whether the Commission violated the rule of law as applied to the
established facts. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d
200, 210 (2008). When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, we will reverse the
Commission’s determination only if it was clearly erroneous. Id. at 211. The Commission’s
determination is clearly erroneous if this court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

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¶ 29 Generally, an affirmative defense “must be set out completely in a party’s answer to a
complaint and failure to do so results in waiver of the defense.” Hanley v. City of Chicago, 343
Ill. App. 3d 49, 53-54 (2003); 735 ILCS 5/2-613(d) (West 2016). An exception to the rule
exists where a defendant raises an affirmative defense for the first time in a motion for
summary judgment and the plaintiff has ample time before trial to respond to the defense.
Hanley, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 54. As a result, such a plaintiff is not unfairly prejudiced by the
defendant’s failure to raise the affirmative defense in its answer. See id. (finding that an
affirmative defense could be raised in a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff had 45
days prior to trial to respond to the motion); Rognant v. Palacios, 224 Ill. App. 3d 418, 422
(1991) (finding that defendant could raise his affirmative defense in a motion for summary
judgment where “plaintiff had adequate time to respond to defendant’s assertion of the statute
of limitations”).
¶ 30 However, in cases where defendants raised an affirmative defense for the first time after
the plaintiff completed his or her case-in-chief, courts have been reluctant to consider the
defense even if the plaintiff was aware of it during the proceedings. In Urman v. Walter, 101
Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1096 (1981), the defendants attempted to plead an affirmative defense
following the close of plaintiff’s case. The trial court denied defendants’ motion for leave to
plead the defense as untimely. Id. Defendants argued that the court abused its discretion where
the plaintiff had notice of the defense prior to trial but did not challenge it. Therefore, the
plaintiff waived its right to challenge defendants’ failure to plead the defense. Id.
¶ 31 This court affirmed the denial, finding that, although the plaintiff was not “ ‘totally
surprised’ ” by the affirmative defense, this does not mean “defendants can properly rely on
plaintiff’s awareness of the potential defense as an excuse for their failure to affirmatively
plead it.” Id. at 1096-97. We rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff had the duty to
challenge the potential defense prior to trial, because without an affirmative pleading by
defendants, plaintiff had no defense to attack. Id. at 1097; see also McCall v. Chicago Board
of Education, 228 Ill. App. 3d 803, 811 (1992) (finding that the trial court properly refused
defendant’s request to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense, even though the evidence
presented at trial suggested the appropriateness of the defense, where defendant failed to plead
it).
¶ 32 The Commission determined that business necessity was adequately raised because
plaintiff was on notice at the time she filed her complaint that Mac’s nine-month lease policy
mirrored the academic year and Mac raised the affirmative defense that “all decisions and
actions regarding [plaintiff’s] housing were legitimate and non-discriminatory.” Therefore, the
Commission concluded that plaintiff “had ample opportunity to present evidence of a less
restrictive alternative which she did not do.”
¶ 33 In light of the authority cited above, we find the Commission’s determination clearly
erroneous. It is undisputed that Mac did not explicitly raise the business necessity defense in
its response to plaintiff’s complaint, which violates the Commission’s own regulation.
Although Mac did answer that its decisions regarding plaintiff’s housing were “legitimate and
non-discriminatory,” this defense did not contain sufficient information to notify plaintiff that
she would have to address the business necessity of Mac’s nine-month policy. In fact, Mac’s
answer denied every allegation in the complaint that referred to the nine-month lease policy.
We cannot conclude that plaintiff had notice of business necessity as Mac’s affirmative defense
and, as a result, she should have been prepared to challenge that defense before the

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Commission. See Moller, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 345-46 (finding that a properly raised affirmative
defense contains sufficient information to alert plaintiff of the defense she would need to
prepare for and address).
¶ 34 We also do not agree with the Commission’s determination that plaintiff “had ample
opportunity to present evidence of a less restrictive alternative which she did not do.” Mac’s
answer contained no facts setting forth the affirmative defense of business necessity. The first
time Mac raised the business necessity defense was in its response to the Commission’s
investigative order, which asked Mac to explain an e-mail from Mahrt informing plaintiff that
the other properties “are only available for 9 month leases.” In response to the order, Mac
stated that some properties “have shorter lease terms due to business considerations, including
seasonality issues.” From what we can gather in the record, plaintiff was not given an
opportunity to respond to Mac’s answers to the investigative order. Plaintiff asserts that she
was not even aware of Mac’s response until after the Commission dismissed her complaint and
she was able to access the case file. Furthermore, even if plaintiff was aware of a potential
business necessity defense, she had no duty to attack an affirmative defense that Mac never
raised in the pleadings. Urman, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 1097.
¶ 35 The Commission dismissed plaintiff’s complaint based on business necessity, but Mac
never raised that affirmative defense in its answer. As a result, plaintiff did not have a chance
to challenge it prior to the Commission’s determination. When the defense of business
necessity is properly raised, the Commission has found that presenting evidence of a less
restrictive alternative is an important component of plaintiff’s disparate impact claim. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Brown, CCHR No. 92-FHO-18-5630, at 26 (Dec. 12, 1992). Plaintiff here should
have had the opportunity to make such a showing before the Commission. Accordingly, we
reverse the determination of the circuit court and remand the cause to the Commission for a
new hearing. See Anderson v. Human Rights Comm’n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 35, 52 (2000)
(remanding for a new hearing where the erroneous application of the rules of evidence rendered
the original hearing unfair to the petitioner).

¶ 36 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the Commission for a new hearing.

¶ 38 Reversed and remanded.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9970889. Public record. Not legal advice.