# Constance Donovan v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

> Merit Systems Protection Board · May 10, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9968124

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** May 10, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9968124

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the administrative judge “justifiably refused to consider an issue that [the appellant] had not properly raised before [OSC]”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CONSTANCE ANN DONOVAN, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-1221-18-0551-W-1

v.

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY DATE: May 10, 2024
CORPORATION,
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

K. Scott Rocio , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Michael W. Macomber , Esquire, Albany, New York, for the appellant.

Alexander Kopit , Esquire, and Sara Robinson , Esquire, Washington, D.C.,
for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to
clarify that the appellant did not exhaust her specific disclosures with the Office
of Special Counsel (OSC), we VACATE as unnecessary any additional findings
as to disclosures that the appellant did not exhaust, and we otherwise AFFIRM
the initial decision.

BACKGROUND
The appellant has been the Participant and Plan Sponsor Advocate
(Advocate) at the agency since 2013. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 5,
Tab 12 at 185. She was the first person appointed to this statutorily created
position. IAF, Tab 11 at 17-18; see 29 U.S.C. § 1304 (discussing the
appointment, duties, and other employment details regarding the position). The
statute sets forth the duties of the position, which include identifying participants
and plan sponsors’ persistent problems at the agency, proposing changes to
legislation and the practices of the agency to mitigate problems, and referring
instances of fraud, waste, abuse, and violations of law to the Office of the
Inspector General. IAF, Tab 12 at 136-37; see 29 U.S.C. § 1304(b). The
Advocate is required to submit an annual report to Congress, which summarizes
requests for assistance received, identifies significant problems, includes
3

legislative and regulatory proposals to address any identified problems, and
identifies actions taken to correct problems identified in prior reports. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1304(e).
On June 12, 2017, the appellant filed a complaint with OSC, in which she
alleged that she made protected disclosures in her annual reports to Congress
between 2014 and 2016. IAF, Tab 6 at 31-32. Specifically, she asserted that her
reports detailed violations of Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), mismanagement, and abuse of authority. Id. The
appellant asserted to OSC that, because of these disclosures, the agency refused
to issue performance standards for her position and awarded her lower
performance-based bonuses. Id. at 31-32, 44. OSC issued a close-out letter on
March 20, 2018. Id. at 44-46.
On May 23, 2018, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board. IAF,
Tab 1. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, IAF, Tab 3, to
which both parties responded. IAF, Tabs 6, 11, 13, 16.
The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. Specifically, she found that the appellant
had exhausted some of her more general disclosures with OSC. ID at 5-11.
However, the administrative judge found that the appellant did not make a
nonfrivolous allegation that her disclosures were protected. ID at 13.
The appellant has timely filed a petition for review. Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tab 6. The agency has filed a response to the petition. PFR File,
Tab 8.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
she did not nonfrivolously allege that she had a reasonable belief that her
disclosures evidenced any violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, or an abuse of authority. PFR File, Tab 6 at 15, 19-22. We find
4

that this argument provides no basis for reversing the administrative judge’s
dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We affirm the administrative judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s
exhaustion of her disclosures before OSC, except as modified to clarify that the
appellant did not exhaust her specific disclosures.
Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA),
the Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has exhausted her
administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
(1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
(C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 2 Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230,
¶ 5 (2016). The administrative judge properly found that the appellant exhausted
her general disclosures that the agency violated Title IV of ERISA and that plan
sponsors alleged that the agency committed a form of “extortion” in the way that
it enforced section 4062(e) of ERISA. ID at 10-11; IAF, Tab 6 at 31. She then
found that, even if the appellant had exhausted her specific disclosures, i.e., the
contents of the annual reports she submitted to Congress between 2014 and 2016,
they were not protected. ID at 13. The appellant does not dispute the
administrative judge’s findings as to exhaustion on review. PFR File, Tab 6
at 15. We modify the initial decision to clarify that the appellant did not prove
exhaustion over her specific disclosures. 3

2
The appellant has not alleged that she engaged in a protected activity, and thus we will
limit our discussion to whether she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8).
3
On review, the appellant argues that whether her alleged that disclosures were made
during the normal course of her duties pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) is irrelevant to
whether those disclosures are protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 6
at 15. However, the administrative judge did not find that any of the alleged
disclosures were not protected on this basis. ID at 12-22.
5

In Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11, the
Board clarified the substantive requirements of exhaustion. The requirements are
met when an appellant has provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an
investigation. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those issues that were
previously raised with OSC. However, appellants may give a more detailed
account of their whistleblowing activities before the Board than they did to OSC.
Id. Appellants may demonstrate exhaustion through their initial OSC complaint;
evidence that they amended the original complaint, including but not limited to
OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended
allegations; and their written responses to OSC referencing the amended
allegations. Id. Appellants also may establish exhaustion through other
sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or a declaration attesting that
they raised with OSC the substance of the facts in the Board appeal. Id. To
establish Board jurisdiction, the appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC by
preponderant evidence, not just present nonfrivolous allegations of exhaustion.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(1).
Here, the appellant provided, in relevant part, her OSC complaint, OSC’s
preliminary determination letter, her response to the preliminary determination
letter, and OSC’s letter closing her complaint. IAF, Tab 6 at 31-32, 35-46. In her
OSC complaint, the appellant stated that she made protected disclosures in the
annual reports she submitted to Congress between 2014 and 2016. Id. at 31. She
indicated that her 2014 report “noted violations of certain provisions of Title IV
of ERISA . . . by [the agency] in their dealings with both participants and plan
sponsors subject to their regulatory authority.” Id. She indicated that her 2015
and 2016 annual reports included some of the “same violations of laws and
regulations and some additional ones.” Id. She also stated that plan sponsors
described the agency’s efforts to enforce section 4062(e) as a form of “extortion.”
Id. Further, she generally alleged that the agency’s actions constituted
mismanagement and an abuse of authority. Id. at 31. We agree with the
6

administrative judge’s finding that the appellant exhausted these general
allegations with OSC. ID at 11.
The appellant also asserted that the annual reports would be added to her
complaint and “highlighted for ease in identifying the violations of rules, laws
and regulations as the basis of this complaint.” IAF, Tab 6 at 31. However, there
is no indication that these highlighted annual reports were subsequently provided
to OSC. In OSC’s correspondence with the appellant, her disclosures are broadly
categorized as documenting violations of laws, rules, or regulations in her annual
reports to Congress, but OSC does not provide any specifics on the alleged
protected disclosures or reference the highlighted annual reports the appellant
previously stated that she would submit to supplement her complaint. Id. at 35,
37, 44. Additionally, in the appellant’s correspondence with OSC, she does not
provide additional clarifying information regarding her alleged protected
disclosures or reference the purportedly submitted highlighted annual reports. Id.
at 40-43. Moreover, while the appellant provided a sworn declaration in response
to the administrative judge’s order on jurisdiction below, IAF, Tab 11 at 17-26,
she did not provide further information as to what she told OSC regarding her
disclosures or claim she submitted her annual reports to OSC, see Chambers,
2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11 (explaining that an appellant may establish exhaustion
through an affidavit or a declaration attesting that the appellant raised with OSC
the substance of the facts in the Board appeal). Thus, the appellant only proved
that she exhausted her general allegations that the agency violated Title IV of
ERISA and that plan sponsors alleged that the agency’s enforcement of section
4062(e) of ERISA was a form of extortion. IAF, Tab 6 at 31-32.
In the initial decision, the administrative judge observed that the
highlighted annual reports were not provided to the Board and implicitly found
that the appellant did not exhaust her more specific alleged disclosures. ID at 11.
The administrative judge then proceeded to analyze whether the appellant
nonfrivolously alleged that her more specific disclosures were protected. ID
7

at 13-22. However, because the appellant did not prove that she exhausted these
disclosures, we vacate these findings as to an alternative theory of why the
appellant did not meet her jurisdictional burden as unnecessary. Further, we
modify the initial decision to expressly find that the appellant did not prove by
preponderant evidence that she exhausted these specific disclosures. Id. Because
the appellant failed to establish by preponderant evidence that these specific
disclosures were exhausted, the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider them. See
Ward v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(finding that the administrative judge “justifiably refused to consider an issue that
[the appellant] had not properly raised before [OSC]”); see also 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.57(c)(1) (providing that an appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC by
preponderant evidence).

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she reasonably believed her
disclosures evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, or an abuse of authority.
The next jurisdictional inquiry is whether, as to the general disclosures the
appellant exhausted with OSC, she nonfrivolously alleged that they were
protected. See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. A nonfrivolous allegation of a
protected whistleblowing disclosure is an allegation of facts that, if proven,
would show that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in her
position would believe evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing specified
in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id., ¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative
whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective one:
whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to
and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the
actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety. Id. The disclosures must be
specific and detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing regarding broad or
8

imprecise matters. Id.; Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army, 101 M.S.P.R. 616,
¶ 13 (2006). To the extent the administrative judge found that the appellant failed
to nonfrivolously allege that her general disclosures were protected, we agree. ID
at 14-22.

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she reasonably
believed that her disclosure that the agency had violated “certain
provisions of Title IV of ERISA” evidenced a violation of law, rule,
or regulation.
The appellant only raised broad assertions of alleged violations of laws and
regulations to OSC, without describing what the alleged violations were. IAF,
Tab 6 at 31-32. The appellant stated to OSC that she disclosed that the agency
violated Title IV of ERISA “in their dealings with both participants and plan
sponsors subject to their regulatory authority.” Id. at 31. She did not explain
specifically what the purported violations of law and regulation were, and only
made conclusory allegations about the agency’s alleged wrongdoing. We find,
therefore, that the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that these
disclosures were protected. See Rzucidlo, 101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 17 (finding that
the Board requires an appellant to provide more than vague and conclusory
allegations of wrongdoing by others); see also McCorcle v. Department of
Agriculture, 98 M.S.P.R. 363, ¶ 21 (2005) (finding that conclusory allegations
lacking in specificity do not constitute nonfrivolous allegations of IRA
jurisdiction).

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she reasonably
believed her disclosure that plan sponsors described the agency’s
efforts to enforce section 4062(e) as a form of extortion evidenced
gross mismanagement or an abuse of authority.
In her OSC complaint, the appellant also appeared to allege that the
agency’s actions constituted mismanagement and an abuse of authority because
plan sponsors described the agency’s efforts to enforce section 4062(e) of ERISA
as a form of “extortion.” IAF, Tab 6 at 31-32. Gross mismanagement is more
9

than de minimis wrongdoing or negligence; it means a management action or
inaction that creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the
agency’s ability to accomplish its mission. Swanson v. General Services
Administration, 110 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 11 (2008). An abuse of authority is defined
as an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or employee
that adversely affects the rights of any person or that results in personal gain or
advantage to himself or to preferred other persons. Chavez v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 22 (2013). Even under the expanded
protections afforded to whistleblowers under the WPEA, general philosophical or
policy disagreements with agency decisions that “lawfully exercise discretionary
authority” are not protected unless the appellant has a reasonable belief that the
disclosed information separately evidences one of the categories of wrongdoing
listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A). 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D); Webb v. Department of
the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 8 (2015).
In the instant case, the appellant disclosed that plan sponsors described the
agency’s efforts to enforce section 4062(e) of ERISA as a form of “extortion.”
IAF, Tab 6 at 31-32. Section 4062(e) is a provision of ERISA that provides a
formula by which the agency calculates the amount an employer who sponsors its
own pension plan must pay to protect pensions when it ceases operations at a
facility and workers lose their jobs. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4062(e), 88 Stat. 823, 1030 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1362(e)); see 29 C.F.R. § 4062.8(a) (explaining that the formula
applies when “an employer ceases operations at a facility . . . and, as a
result . . . more than 20% of the total number of . . . employees who are
participants under a plan established and maintained by the employer are
separated from employment”). The appellant did not provide additional
information on how the agency’s actions created a substantial risk of significant
adverse impact upon the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission, nor does
she provide sufficient factual information for us to infer such a finding. As the
10

administrative judge observed, the agency’s mission is to protect the retirement
incomes of American workers in specified pension plans. ID at 14; see Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation Mission Statement,
https://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we - are (last visited May 8, 2024). We agree
with the administrative judge that this allegation fails to identify any specific risk
to the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission of protecting retirement incomes,
and that the appellant did not provide any basis for finding that the agency’s
interpretation of its authority was unlawful or unreasonable. ID at 15, 17. Thus,
the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her allegations evidenced a
reasonable belief that the agency’s enforcement of section 4062(e) constituted
gross mismanagement or an abuse of authority.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and affirm, as modified, the
initial decision dismissing the appellant’s IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

4
Because the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her exhausted disclosures
were protected, we decline to address her argument that these disclosures were
contributing factors in the alleged personnel action. PFR File, Tab 6 at 22.
5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
12

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
13

Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
14

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9968124. Public record. Not legal advice.