# Hoaglin v. Duke Univ. Health Sys.

> Court of Appeals of North Carolina · May 7, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9966500

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 7, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9966500

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the fourth element of a failure-to- accommodate claim requires a refusal to make the accommodation

## Opinion text

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-546

Filed 7 May 2024

Durham County, No. 18 CVS 3093

MICHAEL C. HOAGLIN, M.D., Plaintiff,

v.

DUKE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM,
INC. d/b/a DUKE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
and JOSHUA SETH BRODER, M.D., Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 27 October 2022 by Judge Michael J.

O’Foghludha in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28

November 2023.

Bailey & Dixon, LLP, by J. Heydt Philbeck, Sr., BrennerBondourant, by
Lawrence H. Brenner, & Brown, Goldstein & Levy, LLP, by Gregory P. Care,
admitted pro hac vice, & Anthony May, admitted pro hac vice, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., by Robert A. Sar, Jefferson
Palmer Whisenant, Savannah Singletary, & Vanessa Nicole Garrido, for
Defendant-Appellee.

CARPENTER, Judge.

Michael C. Hoaglin, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment to Duke University Health System, Inc., (“Duke”) and Joshua

Seth Broder, M.D. (collectively, “Defendants”). On appeal, Plaintiff argues the trial

court erred by: (1) granting Defendants summary judgment; and (2) denying his

request for attorneys’ fees concerning his successful motion to compel. After careful
HOAGLIN V. DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC.

Opinion of the Court

review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

This case concerns a hospital’s decision to terminate a resident from the

hospital’s emergency-medicine residency program, an educational program for

medical doctors. Defendant Duke is the hospital, and Plaintiff is the terminated

resident. On 3 July 2018, Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract and

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).

On 16 November 2020, Plaintiff moved to compel Defendants to produce

documents for which Defendants claimed privilege. On 31 March 2021, the trial court

granted Plaintiff’s motion. On 26 August 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions

and attorneys’ fees concerning discovery. After conducting an in-camera review of

the documents for which Defendants claimed privilege, the trial court denied

Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees.

On 30 June 2022, both parties moved for summary judgment. The evidence

presented at the summary-judgment hearing tended to show the following. In April

2016, Plaintiff signed a contract outlining the terms of his employment with Duke

(the “Contract”). Among other things, the Contract states that Plaintiff’s sole source

of compensation must be the program stipend, and not from other unapproved work:

“this shall be the Trainee’s sole source of compensation.” The Contract also states

that:

During the term of this Agreement, the Trainee’s

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appointment is conditional upon satisfactory performance
of all Program elements by the Trainee. If the actions,
conduct, or performance, professional, academic, or
otherwise, of the Trainee are deemed by the Hospital,
Office of Graduate Medical Education or Program Director
to be inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement, the
Hospital’s standards of patient care, patient welfare, or the
objectives of the Hospital or Program educational
expectations, or if such actions, conduct, or performance
reflects adversely on the Program or Hospital or disrupts
operations at the Program or Hospital, corrective action
may be taken by the Hospital, Director of Graduate
Medical Education and/or Program Director as set forth in
the Corrective Action and Hearing Procedures for
Associate Medical Staff (a copy of which is available online
at www.gme.duke.edu).

The parenthetical following the Corrective Action and Hearing Procedures for

Associate Medical Staff (the “Procedures”) includes a hyperlink to the Procedures.

The Procedures include various protocols concerning notices, hearings, and appeals

within Duke’s corrective-action process.

By January of 2017, Defendants received several grievances concerning

Plaintiff, including the following: “[Plaintiff] did not listen to concerns, was rude, and

discharged a patient too soon”; Plaintiff made perceived racist comments concerning

hairstyle; Plaintiff asked a patient questions deemed too personal; Plaintiff

performed a pelvic exam that a patient described as an “absolutely unacceptable”

experience; and Plaintiff exhibited “unprofessional behavior.”

Plaintiff, however, points to several instances in which Defendants spoke

highly of Plaintiff’s performance, including: “[Plaintiff] is doing very well”; “[Plaintiff]

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has all of the skills he will ultimately need”; and Plaintiff is on track to “graduate the

program.” Duke employees made these last two statements thirty-one days and

sixteen days, respectively, before Plaintiff’s termination.

In February 2017, Plaintiff saw a counselor at Duke for depression. On 1

March 2017, Plaintiff completed Duke’s Reasonable Accommodation Request Form

concerning his depression. After receiving Plaintiff’s request, Defendants agreed to

“ensure that this need is observed.” Specifically, Defendants committed to Plaintiff

that he would not be “scheduled for more than 5 days in a row.” Plaintiff does not

allege that Defendants failed to meet this assurance.

On 22 March 2017, Defendants documented additional concerns about

Plaintiff’s behavior, including: Plaintiff having a “second job driving for Uber”;

Plaintiff sleeping in hospital call rooms while “rent[ing] his apartment out on

AirBnB”; and Plaintiff “rent[ing] his car out online” and using the hospital fatigue

cab for regular transportation. When asked about his alleged other incomes, Plaintiff

responded, “[n]o, this is all I do. It’s not like I have a secret job or something.”

On 30 March 2017, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of

“institutional policy violations.” Plaintiff appealed his termination to a hearing

panel, and on 1 May 2017, the panel unanimously voted to uphold the termination.

On 23 May 2017, Defendants notified Plaintiff of the final determination. Plaintiff

and Defendants offer competing evidence as to whether Defendants complied with

the Procedures when they terminated Plaintiff.

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On 27 October 2022, the trial court granted Defendants summary judgment,

dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. On 23 November 2022, Plaintiff filed written notice of

appeal.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023).

III. Issues

The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (1) granting

Defendants summary judgment; and (2) denying Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees

concerning his successful motion to compel.

IV. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment

We review appeals from summary judgment de novo. In re Will of Jones, 362

N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008). Under a de novo review, “‘the court

considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the

lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)

(quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316,

319 (2003)).

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact,” and a party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2023). Concerning summary judgment, courts “must view

the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dalton v.

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Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001). “Since this rule provides a

somewhat drastic remedy, it must be used with due regard to its purposes and a

cautious observance of its requirements in order that no person shall be deprived of

a trial on a genuine disputed factual issue.” Kessing v. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 278 N.C.

523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971).

Indeed, receiving summary judgment has the same effect as winning at trial—

without going to trial. See id. at 533, 180 S.E.2d at 829 (“The purpose of summary

judgment can be summarized as being a device to bring litigation to an early decision

on the merits without the delay and expense of a trial where it can be readily

demonstrated that no material facts are in issue.”).

1. Breach of Contract Claims

In his first argument, Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by granting

Defendants summary judgment concerning his breach-of-contract claims. To support

this, Plaintiff argues that (1) the Contract incorporated the Procedures, and (2) he

presented evidence that Defendants breached the Procedures. After careful review,

we agree with Plaintiff.

a. Incorporation

“The elements of a claim for breach of contract are (1) existence of a valid

contract and (2) breach of the terms of that contract.” Poor v. Hill, 138 N.C. App. 19,

26, 530 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2000) (citing Jackson v. Cal. Hardwood Co., 120 N.C. App.

870, 871, 463 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1995)). Contract “construction is a question of law for

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the court.” Story v. Stokes, 178 N.C. 409, 411, 100 S.E. 689, 690 (1919). Incorporation,

the idea that a document referenced in a contract can become part of the contract, see

Incorporation by Reference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), is a question of

construction and thus, a question of law, see Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77

N.C. App. 253, 259, 335 S.E.2d 79, 83–84 (1985).

We considered contract incorporation in Walker, where an employee received

a “handbook” from his employer. 77 N.C. App. at 259, 335 S.E.2d at 84. The

handbook “apparently promised” that it would “become more than a handbook . . . it

w[ould] become an understanding . . . .” Id. at 260, 335 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting the

handbook). The Walker Court was “aware that a growing number of jurisdictions

recognize that employee manuals purporting to set forth causes for termination may

become part of the employment contract even in the absence of an express

agreement.” Id. at 259, 335 S.E.2d at 83.

Nonetheless, we stated that “the law of North Carolina is clear that

unilaterally promulgated employment manuals or policies do not become part of the

employment contract unless expressly included in it.” Id. at 259, 335 S.E.2d at 83–

84. Therefore, the “contract did not, under our law, include the Handbook.” Id. at

260, 335 S.E.2d at 84.

We again considered contract incorporation in Supplee v. Miller-Motte

Business College, Inc. 239 N.C. App. 208, 211, 768 S.E.2d 582, 587 (2015). There, the

plaintiff signed a program-enrollment agreement that was “subject to all terms and

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conditions set forth in the Catalog.” Id. at 211, 768 S.E.2d at 587. We held that the

enrollment agreement “incorporated the terms and conditions set forth in the . . .

student catalog,” which therefore “became a part of the contract between defendants

and [the plaintiff].” Id. at 219–20, 768 S.E.2d at 592.

Here, the Contract states that “corrective action may be taken . . . as set forth

in the [Procedures.]” Because the “conditions set forth in the Catalog” were

incorporated into the Supplee contract, see id. at 219–20, 768 S.E.2d at 592, likewise,

the requirements “set forth in the [Procedures]” were incorporated into the Contract.

The Contract could have incorporated the Procedures with more force: For

example, the Contract could have stated that “the procedures are incorporated into

this contract,” or “the procedures are part of this contract.” Nonetheless, the Contract

incorporated the Procedures because under Supplee, the Procedures were “expressly

included” in the Contract. See id. at 219–20, 768 S.E.2d at 592. Accordingly,

concerning Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims, failure to incorporate the Procedures

was not a basis upon which the trial court could grant Defendants judgment, as a

matter of law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c).

b. Breach of the Procedures

Next, we must discern whether there are any genuine issues of material fact

concerning Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims. See id. A breach-of-contract claim

requires a material breach, see Fletcher v. Fletcher, 123 N.C. App. 744, 752, 474

S.E.2d 802, 807–08 (1996), and whether a breach is material is a question of fact, see

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Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. Tindall Corp., 195 N.C. App. 296, 302, 672 S.E.2d

691, 695 (2009).

Here, the Procedures include various protocols concerning notices, hearings,

and appeals within Duke’s corrective-action process. And concerning Plaintiff’s

breach-of-contract claims, Plaintiff and Defendants offer competing evidence as to

whether Defendants followed the Procedures when they terminated Plaintiff. For

example, Plaintiff offered evidence that Defendants denied him an impartial appeals

panel, as guaranteed by the Procedures, and Defendants offered evidence that

Plaintiff’s appeals panel was indeed impartial.

Because we “must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party,” see Dalton, 353 N.C. at 651, 548 S.E.2d at 707, genuine issues of

material fact remain in this case—specifically, whether Defendants breached the

Procedures and, if so, whether the breaches were material, see Charlotte Motor

Speedway, 195 N.C. App. at 302, 672 S.E.2d at 695. Therefore, the trial court erred

when it granted Defendants the “drastic remedy” of summary judgment concerning

Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claims, as Defendants were not entitled to “judgment as

a matter of law” because genuine issues of material fact remain. See Kessing, 278

N.C. at 534, 180 S.E.2d at 830; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c).

2. ADA Claims

Next, Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

concerning his three ADA claims: one alleging discrimination, one alleging failure to

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accommodate, and one alleging retaliation. We disagree with Plaintiff concerning the

first two claims, but we agree with him concerning his final claim of retaliation.

The ADA prohibits certain employers from discriminating against disabled

employees because of their disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). Courts analyze ADA

claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Haynes v.

Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019); McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677–78 (1973).

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first show a prima-facie ADA

claim. Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995).

If the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a “legitimate,

nondiscriminatory explanation which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a

finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.”

Id. If the defendant is then successful, “the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of

proving that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id.

a. Discrimination Claim

A prima-facie discrimination claim under the ADA requires: (1) a disabled

plaintiff; (2) who was a “qualified individual”; (3) who suffered an adverse

employment action because of a disability. See Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts.,

780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015). Here, there is no dispute about whether Plaintiff

is disabled or whether he suffered an adverse employment action. The parties only

dispute whether Plaintiff is a “qualified individual.”

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A qualified individual is “an individual who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position.”

Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

12111(8)). To establish that he is qualified, Plaintiff must show “(1) that he could

satisfy the essential eligibility requirements of the program, i.e., those requirements

‘that bear more than a marginal relationship to the [program] at issue, and (2) if not,

whether any reasonable accommodation by [Defendants] would enable’ [P]laintiff to

meet these requirements.” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454,

462 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th

Cir. 1994)) (first alteration in original). In making these determinations, courts give

deference to medical schools. See id. at 463 (noting that courts are in poor position to

assess academic performance). We are in an equally poor position to assess medical

practice, so similar deference applies in a medical-residency context. See id.

A qualified-individual analysis is a two-part question: (1) Are the employee’s

obligations “essential”? And (2) can the employee satisfy the obligations, regardless

of employer accommodation? See id. at 462. We will begin Plaintiff’s qualified-

individual inquiry by analyzing his contractual obligations, specifically, his obligation

to work solely for Duke.

i. Essential Function

“Under the ADA, ‘[a]n essential function is a fundamental job duty of the

position at issue. The term does not include marginal tasks, but may encompass

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individual or idiosyncratic characteristics of the job.’” Allen v. City of Raleigh, 140 F.

Supp. 3d 470, 482 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696

F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2012)) (alteration in original). “[C]onsideration shall be given to

the employer’s judgment as to what functions of the job are essential, and if an

employer has prepared a written job description before advertising or interviewing

applicants for the job, the description shall be considered evidence of the essential

functions of the job.” 42 U.S. C. § 12111(8). “[C]ourt[s] give[] a ‘significant degree’ of

deference to an employer’s business judgment about the necessities of a job.” Jones,

696 F.3d at 88 (quoting Jones v. Walgreen Co., 679 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2012)).

Here, the Contract states that Plaintiff’s stipend from Duke “shall be the

Trainee’s sole source of compensation. Except for approved and authorized

extracurricular activities, the Trainee shall not accept from any other fee of any kind

for service.” First, Plaintiff argues that this is a limit on Defendant’s responsibility

to pay, rather than a limit on Plaintiff’s ability to work outside of the Program. We

disagree.

If Plaintiff’s reading was correct, the second sentence would be superfluous; if

the stipend language is simply a limit on Duke, there is no need to double down and

state that “Trainee shall not accept from any other fee of any kind for service.” See

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65, 56 S. Ct. 312, 319, 80 L. Ed. 477, 488 (1936)

(“These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.”); Kungys

v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1550, 99 L. Ed. 2d 839, 857 (1988)

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(plurality opinion) (stating that “no provision should be construed to be entirely

redundant”). Therefore, the Contract’s compensation language limited Plaintiff’s

ability to work outside of the Program because otherwise, the second sentence would

be redundant.

Second, we think adherence to this limitation was an “essential function” of

Plaintiff’s job. Defendants distilled this limitation to a contractual clause, which

tends to show the essential nature of the limitation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Indeed,

if Plaintiff’s obligation to work solely for Duke was merely marginal, why include it

in the Contract? See id. Asked another way, would Defendants have allowed Plaintiff

into the Program if Plaintiff’s participation was contingent on his ability to

simultaneously work elsewhere? That Plaintiff lied to Defendants about driving for

Uber and renting his apartment is instructive. Because Plaintiff’s work limitation

was contractual, see id., and because we give “a ‘significant degree’ of deference to an

employer’s business judgment about the necessities of a job,” see Jones, 696 F.3d at

88, we think Plaintiff’s obligation to work solely for Duke was an essential function

of participating in the Program.

ii. Ability to Perform

Under the second prong of the qualified-individual analysis, we must discern

“whether any reasonable accommodation by [Defendants] would enable [P]laintiff” to

perform his essential functions. See Halpern, 669 F.3d at 462. The Fourth Circuit

has noted that “[a]n employee may be qualified when hired, but could fail either to

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maintain his qualifications or, more commonly, to meet his employer’s legitimate

expectations for job performance.” Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 514

(4th Cir. 2006). So in cases where an employee is fired, “the prima facie case requires

the employee to demonstrate ‘that he was “qualified” in the sense that he was doing

his job well enough to rule out the possibility that he was fired for inadequate job

performance, absolute or relative.” Id. at 514–15 (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600

F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979)).

Here, Plaintiff may have initially satisfied the essential function of working

solely for Duke while in the Program; because Defendants admitted Plaintiff into the

Program, Defendants must have thought so. But that is not the only inquiry. See id.

at 514. The inquiry is also whether Plaintiff “maintain[ed] his qualifications,” i.e.,

continued to honor his obligation to only work for Duke while in the Program.

The parties offer competing evidence concerning Plaintiff’s performance in the

Program—but the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff drove for Uber and rented his

apartment through AirBnB while working at Duke. Then Plaintiff lied to Defendants

about it. And relevant to our analysis, Defendants’ reasonable accommodation—

easing Plaintiff’s workload—would not “enable [P]laintiff to meet” his sole-income

commitment. See Halpern, 669 F.3d at 462. On the contrary, because Plaintiff’s work

hours were limited as an accommodation, he potentially had more time to drive for

Uber.

Because we defer to medical professionals to determine when a person is

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“qualified,” see id. at 463, we agree with Defendants concerning Plaintiff’s ability,

“with or without reasonable accommodation, [to] perform the essential functions of

the employment position,” see Wilson, 717 F.3d at 345. Put differently: Plaintiff did

not perform the essential function of working solely for Duke while in the Program,

and Defendants’ accommodation had no bearing and Plaintiff’s ability to do so. See

id. at 345.

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish an element a prima-facie discrimination

claim because he is not a “qualified individual.” See Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 572. As

Plaintiff cannot establish an element of prima-facie discrimination claim, the trial

court did not err by granting Defendants summary judgment because Defendants

were “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule

56(c); Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 572.

b. Failure to Accommodate Claim

To establish a prima-facie failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA,

Plaintiff must show: “(1) that he was an individual who had a disability within the

meaning of the statute; (2) that [Defendants] had notice of his disability; (3) that with

reasonable accommodation he could perform the essential functions of the position . .

. ; and (4) that [Defendants] refused to make such accommodations.” Wilson, 717 F.3d

at 345 (quoting Rhoads v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir.

2001)).

The ADA does not provide an all-inclusive definition of the term “reasonable

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accommodation.” Rather, it gives examples of what a “‘reasonable accommodation’

may include,” like “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,

reassignment to a vacant position . . . and other similar accommodations.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(9)(B). “[T]he range of reasonable accommodations is broad . . . .” Elledge v.

Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1011 (4th Cir. 2020).

The Fourth Circuit has explained that “what counts as a reasonable

accommodation is not an a priori matter but one that is sensitive to the particular

circumstances of the case.” Id. “[W]hat will serve as a reasonable accommodation in

a particular situation may not have a single solution, but rather, many possible

solutions.” Id. As long as the employer’s chosen accommodation is reasonable, “not

even a well-intentioned court may substitute its own judgment for the employer’s

choice.” Id. at 1012.

Here, Defendants granted Plaintiff’s accommodation request before

terminating his employment. Specifically, Defendants committed to Plaintiff that he

would not be “scheduled for more than 5 days in a row.” Plaintiff does not allege that

Defendants failed to meet their assurance, and “modified work schedules” are one of

the codified examples of a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants’ accommodation was unreasonable.

Rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ accommodation “was inconsequential . . .

because [they] intended to fire” him. Indeed, Plaintiff argues that Defendants “never

implemented the accommodations because they intended to terminate plaintiff

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instead.”

But if we accept Plaintiff’s argument, every employer who fires a qualified

individual after granting an accommodation is subject to a failure-to-accommodate

suit if the employee claims the employer ultimately intended to fire him. This cannot

be so. See Wilson, 717 F.3d at 345 (stating that the fourth element of a failure-to-

accommodate claim requires a refusal to make the accommodation). In our view,

Plaintiff’s argument may support a retaliation claim, but not failure to accommodate.

See id. Concerning Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim, the facts are clear:

Defendants granted Plaintiff’s accommodation request by promising not to schedule

him to work more than five consecutive days. Plaintiff does not allege that

Defendants broke this promise.

Accordingly, there is “no genuine issue” concerning the last element of

Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim. See id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c).

Therefore, the trial court appropriately granted Defendants summary judgment

concerning Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim because Defendants were

“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c).

c. Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima-facie retaliation claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must

show: “(1) he engaged in protected conduct, (2) he suffered an adverse action, and (3)

a causal link exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” Reynolds

v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 154 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing A Soc’y Without a

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Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011)). Here, there is no dispute about

whether Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct by seeking accommodations or

whether he suffered an adverse employment action when Defendants terminated him

from the Program. The parties only dispute whether there is a genuine issue

concerning a “causal link” between the two.

“A temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse

employment action may be sufficient to present a genuine factual issue on

retaliation.” Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 F. App’x 49, 60 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Kiel v.

Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999)). “Indeed, ‘[a] close

temporal connection between the two events is generally enough to satisfy the third

element of the prima facie test.’” Id. (quoting McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108

F.3d 789, 796–97 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Here, on 1 March 2017, Plaintiff completed Duke’s Reasonable Accommodation

Request Form concerning his depression. On 30 March 2017, Defendants terminated

Plaintiff’s employment because of “institutional policy violations.” In other words,

there was less than one month between “the protected conduct and the adverse

employment action,” which is usually “sufficient to present a genuine factual issue on

retaliation.” See id. Because we “must view the presented evidence in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party,” see Dalton, 353 N.C. at 651, 548 S.E.2d at 707, we

believe the “causal link” element of Plaintiff’s prima-facie case is satisfied, see

Reynolds, 701 F.3d at 154.

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Therefore, the burden shifts to Defendants to show a “legitimate,

nondiscriminatory explanation which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a

finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.”

See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 58 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a question of material fact

remains, and the trial court erred by granting Defendants summary judgment

concerning Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c).

B. Attorneys’ Fees

In his final argument, Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by denying

Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees concerning his successful motion to compel. We

disagree.

We review a trial court’s decision to award or deny attorneys’ fees under Rule

37 for abuse of discretion. Graham v. Rogers, 121 N.C. App. 460, 465, 466 S.E.2d 290,

294 (1996). “Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly

unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a

reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

Normally when a motion to compel is granted under Rule 37, the trial court

should award attorneys’ fees to the moving party. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule

37(a)(4) (2023). But a trial court need not award attorneys’ fees if “the court finds

that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.

Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court acted

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HOAGLIN V. DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC.

Opinion of the Court

arbitrarily by denying Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees concerning his successful

motion to compel. The trial court “considered arguments of counsel” and conducted

an in-depth, in-camera review of the documents for which Defendants claimed

privilege, and the trial court decided, in its discretion, not to award attorneys’ fees to

Plaintiff. The trial court’s decision was not “manifestly unsupported by reason,” and

therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285,

372 S.E.2d at 527.

V. Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court erred in granting Defendants summary

judgment concerning Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract and ADA retaliation claims, but

the trial court did not err concerning the remainder of the summary-judgment order.

And the trial court did not err by declining to award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees

concerning his motion to compel. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order in

part, affirm in part, and remand.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

Judges COLLINS and WOOD concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9966500. Public record. Not legal advice.