# State of Tennessee v. Travis Haynes

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · February 23, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9943672

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 23, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9943672

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “by finding the defendant guilty of the highest offense to the exclusion of the immediately lesser offense, second[-]degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected all other lesser offenses”

## Opinion text

02/23/2024
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
January 3, 2024 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TRAVIS HAYNES

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. C1901995 / 19 01494 James M. Lammey, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2022-01573-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Travis Haynes, of first-degree murder,
tampering with evidence, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, for which he
received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions for first-degree murder and tampering with evidence. The defendant also
argues the trial court erred in not allowing the introduction of autopsy photographs through
Ms. Dinkins, in failing to include an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and in denying
the defendant’s motion to continue. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, and
MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Shae Atkinson and Terrell Tooten (on appeal), and John Dolan and Shaun Schielke (at
trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Travis Haynes.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Paul Hagerman and Paige
Munn, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 10, 2018, Tina Dinkins and the defendant,
her fiancé, arrived at the Garden Inn at the corner of American Way and Lamar in Memphis
where Ms. Dinkins was living with her children. Ms. Dinkins and the defendant were at a
nightclub earlier in the evening, but Ms. Dinkins told the defendant they needed to leave
because the defendant was too intoxicated. When they arrived at the hotel, Ms. Dinkins
attempted to get the defendant into her room. However, the defendant stayed in the parking
lot near his car, stating that he was hot, that he would “kill any n****r that moves,” that he
would “shoot a couple rounds,” and that he had already killed two police officers in his
lifetime. A short time later, a woman and two men began walking from their car toward
the hotel’s entrance. Although the defendant did not know them, he walked quickly toward
the group and “bumped” into the victim, Jeremy Robinson. Ms. Dinkins tried to defuse
the situation by telling the victim that the defendant was drunk. According to Ms. Dinkins,
the victim did not threaten the defendant nor did she see the victim with a gun. Ms. Dinkins
and the defendant then walked into the hotel. Initially, the defendant began walking down
the hallway toward Ms. Dinkins’ room; however, he suddenly turned around and sat down
in a chair in the lobby. When Ms. Dinkins approached the defendant to lead him to her
room, he violently pushed her away. The victim and his friends entered the lobby a few
seconds later, and the defendant approached the victim, shooting him nine times at point-
blank range before exiting the hotel through the front door. Jitendra Patel, the owner of
the Garden Inn, heard the shots from the hotel’s office and called 911.

Sergeant Cecil Fowler with the Memphis Police Department (“MPD”) responded to
a shots fired call at the hotel and observed the deceased victim on the floor of the lobby.
Sergeant Fowler spoke with Mr. Patel and discovered that surveillance cameras had
captured the shooting. After reviewing the surveillance footage, Sergeant Fowler broadcast
a description of the defendant and his vehicle for officers in the immediate area.

Officer Alexander Fleites with the MPD was notified to be on the look out for a red
Mitsubishi sedan. At 3:24 a.m., Officer Fleites located an unoccupied vehicle matching
that description with two flat tires parked on the side of American Way near Clearbrook.

Officer Fredrick Reading with the MPD also responded to the hotel and reviewed
the surveillance video footage of the shooting. A short time later, Officer Reading was
notified that the defendant’s vehicle was located approximately two miles from the hotel,
and after driving to that location, Officer Reading located the defendant walking
approximately fifty feet from his vehicle.1 The defendant did not have any weapons on
him at the time of his arrest.

1
Officer Reading later testified that the defendant was fifteen feet from his vehicle.
-2-
Officer Tristan Brown with the MPD Crime Scene Investigation Unit processed the
scene, photographing and collecting all evidence. In particular, Officer Brown collected
seven .40 caliber casings, bullet fragments, and spent projectiles.

Lieutenant Michael Coburn with the MPD Crime Scene Investigation Unit
processed the defendant’s vehicle and recovered a Smith and Wesson chrome magazine on
the right front floorboard with six .40 caliber rounds. Lieutenant Coburn testified that the
magazine originally held fourteen rounds.

Dr. Marco Ross, an expert in forensic pathology and the chief medical examiner at
the West Tennessee Regional Forensic Center, testified that the victim’s autopsy was
performed by Dr. Paul Benson, who is no longer with their office. However, Dr. Ross
reviewed the record, photographs, and report from the victim’s autopsy and agreed with
Dr. Benson’s conclusions. Dr. Ross found that the victim suffered nine gunshot wounds.
The first bullet entered on the left side of the victim’s neck and went through muscular
tissue before exiting on the back of the neck. The second gunshot wound was to left front
part of the victim’s chest. The bullet travelled through both lungs and the aorta before
becoming lodged in the victim’s right upper back. The third bullet entered the left side of
the victim’s back and went through muscle before lodging next to his spine. The fourth
gunshot wound was to the victim’s left torso. The bullet travelled through the victim’s left
kidney, pancreas, liver, and right lung before lodging in his right chest cavity. The fifth
bullet entered the victim’s left pelvic region. The next two bullets entered the back of the
victim’s left thigh. These bullets fractured the victim’s femur, leaving bullet fragments in
the victim’s leg. The eighth gunshot wound was to the back of the victim’s right thigh.
The bullet went through the thigh and exited the front of the leg. The ninth bullet entered
the victim’s left lower leg, where it went through muscular tissue before exiting the leg.
Dr. Ross noted that both the bullet that went through the victim’s aorta as well as the bullet
that travelled through multiple organs could have been lethal. Dr. Ross testified that a
toxicology report revealed the presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine, a
breakdown product of methamphetamine. On cross-examination, Dr. Ross testified that
the toxicology report did not indicate the level of methamphetamine in the victim’s blood,
but he agreed that individuals with methamphetamine levels present may “express
irritability, violent behavior, [and] aggressiveness.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Dinkins testified that in addition to alcohol, the
defendant may have also been intoxicated due to taking a Percocet. She stated that she had
never seen the defendant intoxicated before and that he did not normally drink to excess.
Additionally, the defendant was especially emotional that night, in part because his brother-
in-law had been killed two days prior. On redirect examination, Ms. Dinkins conceded
that the surveillance video showed the defendant tackling her in the parking lot prior to the
defendant bumping into the victim. However, she stated that it was an accident because
-3-
she had the defendant’s phone, and they slipped in some water. On recross-examination,
Ms. Dinkins testified that she heard the victim and his friend talking in the foyer as she was
passing them. The victim asked his friend if he “got that strap.” On further redirect, Ms.
Dinkins admitted that the defendant did not hear the victim make this statement. She
further admitted that she did not see either man with a weapon and that they did not threaten
her or the defendant. She also agreed that she was still engaged to the defendant and that
she was trying to help him.

A stipulation of fact was entered into proof which stated the following:

The defendant, Travis Haynes, was previously convicted of a qualifying
felony offense that prohibits him from possessing a firearm. That conviction
occurred on January 16, 2007, in Division 4 of Criminal Court of Shelby
County, Tennessee under docket number 06-07930.

Therefore, on December 10th of 2018, when this case happened, the
defendant was a convicted felon. The defendant hereby waives any jury
determination of this issue and agrees that this fact that he was a convicted
felon prohibiting him to possess a firearm has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The defendant declined to present evidence. Following deliberations, the jury found
the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and convicted felon
in possession of a firearm, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life
imprisonment plus twenty years. The defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial
court denied. This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to support his convictions for first-degree murder and tampering with evidence.2 The
defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying a motion for continuance to allow the
defendant to obtain an in-person psychological evaluation, in not allowing the introduction
of autopsy photographs through Ms. Dinkins, and in failing to include an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. The State contends that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial
court properly determined an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not supported by
the evidence. The State also contends that any review of the trial court’s ruling on the
victim’s autopsy photographs and denial of the defendant’s motion to continue has been
waived.

2
The defendant does not challenge his conviction for convicted felon in possession of a firearm.
-4-
I. Denial of Motion to Continue3

The defendant asserts the trial court erred when denying his motion for a trial
continuance in order to obtain an in-person competency evaluation. The defendant argues
that the evaluation he received via videoconferencing was insufficient given his “prior
mental health diagnoses and traumatic life experiences.” The State contends the defendant
has waived this issue for failing to include the challenged psychological evaluation report
in the appellate record. The State further contends the trial court acted within its discretion
to deny the defendant’s request for a second evaluation and continuance. Despite the
State’s contention, the appellate record contains the evaluation report, and therefore, we
will review the defendant’s claim on the merits.4

The decision to grant a trial continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). The trial court’s
denial of a motion for continuance will only be overturned where the trial court abused its
discretion, and the denial resulted in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.
3d 361, 392 (Tenn. 2005). “An abuse of discretion is demonstrated by showing that the
failure to grant a continuance denied [the] defendant a fair trial or that it could be
reasonably concluded that a different result would have followed had the continuance been
granted.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

On July 7, 2022, the defendant filed a motion in limine, arguing his due process
rights had been violated when he was forced to participate in a psychological examination
via videoconferencing. Although necessary due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, the
defendant argued that this examination limited the examiner from assessing the defendant’s
“non-verbal expressions, communication, or reaction in sufficient detail.”

During a pretrial hearing, the defendant requested a continuance to allow an
additional in-person evaluation. The trial court denied the request, stating the defendant
would need to show that the initial evaluator “couldn’t really assess [the defendant] well
because of Zoom and [could not] really render any type of opinion or [determined,] well if
we had an in-person contact, we might have a better assessment.” However, as defense
counsel noted, the report from West Tennessee Forensic Services found that the defendant

3
For the sake of clarity, we have reordered and renumbered the issues from the order they appear
in the defendant’s brief.
4
Although the defendant filed a motion to supplement the record with the report from his mental
health evaluation, the supplement contained only the order directing a forensic evaluation and a letter from
West Tennessee Forensic Services summarizing the defendant’s evaluation. Nevertheless, the record filed
in this appeal contained the report from the defendant’s mental health evaluation as an exhibit to his notice
of mitigating factors.
-5-
was “competent to proceed with the disposition of the charges.” Additionally, despite the
defendant’s assertion that the evaluator was unable to accurately assess the defendant’s
non-verbal expressions or reactions in sufficient detail, the report noted that the defendant’s

speech volume, quantity, rate, and clarity were all within normal range. His
speech quality was fluent. His eye contact was appropriate. His motor
activity was within normal range. His affect was congruent with his mood
(sad and depressed). He presented as tearful when appropriate. His
emotional range and stability were normal. His coordination and gait could
not be observed through video. His thought process and thought content
were logical. He was oriented to person, place, time, and situation. He was
attentive throughout the interview. His remote, recent, and immediate
memory were all intact. He was an accurate historian and provided adequate
details. He was of average intellectual functioning. He demonstrated fair
insight and his judgement appeared intact.

The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to continue. Although the defendant suggests an in-person evaluation
might have allowed an examiner to observe him more closely, it is clear that he received a
thorough evaluation and that he has failed to establish “that the defendant might have been
prejudiced in some way by the refusal to grant a continuance.” Moorehead v. State, 409
S.W.2d 357, 358 (Tenn. 1966). Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to relief on this
issue.

II. Autopsy Photographs

The defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to allow defense counsel to
introduce several photographs from the victim’s autopsy through Ms. Dinkins. The
defendant argues the photographs, which the defendant claims depict a tattoo of the word
“Trigga” on the victim’s neck, would “show that [the victim] had an impulsive, explicit,
aggressive, and provocative nature.” The State contends the defendant has waived this
issue for failing to include the challenged photographs in the appellate record. The State
further contends the record supports the trial court’s refusal to admit the photographs
because they could not be authenticated by Ms. Dinkins.

During Ms. Dinkins’ testimony, defense counsel attempted to introduce several
photographs from the victim’s autopsy. The prosecutor objected, and the trial court
sustained the objection, stating that it “would be inappropriate to show this witness the
autopsy photos of this victim.” Although the trial court noted that defense counsel could
recall the medical examiner if he wanted to introduce the photographs, defense counsel
declined to do so.
-6-
On appeal, the State argues the defendant has waived this issue by failing to include
the photographs he wished to introduce in the appellate record, and we agree. The
defendant, as the appellant, has a duty to prepare a record that conveys “a fair, accurate and
complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of
appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, we must
presume that the trial court’s ruling was supported by the evidence.” State v. Bibbs, 806
S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (first citing Smith v. State, 584 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); and then citing Vermilye v. State, 584 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1979)). Although the State raised the issue of the inadequate appellate record
in its brief, the defendant did not file a motion to supplement. Accordingly, the defendant
has waived this issue and is not entitled to relief.

III. Sufficiency

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the
reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.
R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury
shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.
1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions
involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and
all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,
accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of
the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme
Court has stated the following rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the
jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their
demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary
instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given
to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human
atmosphere, and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a
written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523
(Tenn. 1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a
defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted
-7-
defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v.
Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

A. First-Degree Premeditated Murder

The defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated murder.
First-degree murder is “a premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). In this context, premeditation is “an act done after the exercise of
reflection and judgment.” Id. § 39-13-202(d). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-
202(d) further states:

“Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed
prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in
the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of
the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully
considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free
from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

Id. “The element of premeditation is a question for the jury which may be established by
proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing.” State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 108
(Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997)). The Tennessee
Supreme Court has identified certain factors which tend to support a finding of
premeditation, including: “the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the
particular cruelty of the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill; evidence
of procurement of a weapon; preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime,
and calmness immediately after the killing.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660 (first citing State
v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541-42 (Tenn. 1992); and then citing State v. West, 844 S.W.2d
144, 148 (Tenn. 1992)). Bland does not include an exhaustive list of factors for
consideration when finding premeditation. State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 663 (Tenn.
2013). A conclusion the killing was premeditated may also be supported by the nature of
the killing or evidence establishing a motive. Id. Likewise, lack of provocation by the
victim, failure to render aid, and destruction or secretion of evidence may also support an
inference of premeditation. State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 815-16 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2013) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the defendant does not dispute that he shot the victim. Instead, the defendant
argues the State failed to establish that he acted with premeditation. Specifically, the
defendant contends “there was [not] enough time between the bump outside the hotel, the
pushing inside the hotel, and the exchange of words for the passion to subside.”
Additionally, the defendant argues that Ms. Dinkins testified that the defendant had taken
a Percocet that night and was too intoxicated to drive home, and therefore, he did not have
-8-
the ability to form the intent of premeditation. The State contends the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s determination, and we agree.

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the defendant
arrived at the hotel parking lot with Ms. Dinkins and refused to go inside, telling her that
he would “kill any n****r that moves,” that he would “shoot a couple rounds,” and that he
had previously killed two police officers. When the victim began walking from his car
toward the hotel’s entrance, the defendant, who did not know the victim, “bumped” into
him. Ms. Dinkins testified that the victim did not threaten the defendant prior to the
defendant bumping into him nor did she see the victim with a gun. Although the defendant
began walking down the hallway toward Ms. Dinkins’ room, he immediately turned around
and sat down in a chair in the lobby. When the victim entered the lobby, the defendant
approached the victim and shot him nine times at point-blank range before exiting the hotel
through the front door.

Looking specifically to the premeditation factors outlined by our supreme court, the
record establishes the defendant waited for the unarmed victim in the hotel lobby after
briefly considering returning to his hotel room. The defendant shot the victim nine times,
including two fatal gunshot wounds. Afterward, he did not attempt to render aid to the
victim, choosing instead to exit the hotel and dispose of the gun. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d
at 660; Larkin 443 S.W.3d 815-6. Accordingly, the record is sufficient to establish
premeditation so as to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder.

The defendant also argues that he was “too intoxicated to form premeditation.”
“Intoxication itself is not a defense to prosecution for an offense. However, intoxication,
whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence, if it is relevant to negate a
culpable mental state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-503. “[T]he weight to be given the
evidence and the determination of whether the voluntary intoxication negate[s] the culpable
mental elements [are] matters for the jury.” State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tenn.
2000). The jury heard and, by its verdict, rejected the testimony of Ms. Dinkins that the
defendant appeared to be intoxicated due to ingesting alcohol and a Percocet on the night
he shot the victim. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Tampering with Evidence

The defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
tampering with evidence. He argues the State failed to prove the defendant concealed the
gun because “there is nothing in the record that proves he was aware that an investigation
or official proceeding was pending or in progress.” The State contends the evidence was
sufficient to show the defendant tampered with evidence by disposing of the murder
weapon.
-9-
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-503(a)(1) sets forth the following
definition of tampering with evidence:

(a) It is unlawful for any person, knowing that an investigation or official
proceeding is pending or in progress to:

(1) Alter, destroy, or conceal any record, document or thing with intent to
impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or
official proceeding[.]

This statute requires the State to prove “timing, action, and intent” beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 132 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 2
P.3d 954, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)). “The ‘timing’ element requires that the act be done
only after the defendant forms a belief that an investigation or proceeding ‘is pending or in
progress.’” Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 763 (Tenn.
2014). “The ‘action’ element requires alteration, destruction, or concealment.” Hawkins,
406 S.W.3d at 132. To “conceal” a thing means “to prevent disclosure or recognition of”
a thing or “to place [a thing] out of sight.” Id. (citing State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 859
(Tenn. 2010)). For “intent” to be established, the proof must show that through his actions,
the defendant intended “to hinder the investigation or official proceeding by impairing the
record’s, document’s or thing’s ‘verity, legibility, or availability as evidence.’” Id.
(quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-503(a)(1)). Tampering with evidence is a “specific
intent” crime. Id. (internal citations omitted).

The evidence established that after shooting the victim multiple times in front of the
victim’s friends, the defendant walked out of the hotel carrying the murder weapon.
Approximately an hour later, officers located the defendant’s vehicle on the side of the
road two miles away from the hotel. The defendant was walking near his vehicle; however,
the murder weapon was neither on the defendant nor in his vehicle. Upon searching the
defendant’s vehicle, officers discovered a Smith and Wesson chrome magazine on the right
front floorboard with six .40 caliber rounds. Additionally, seven .40 caliber casings were
collected at the crime scene. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence
is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence. See State
v. Ellis, M2020-01451-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 6065321, *6, (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22,
2021) (holding the “[d]efendant knew an investigation into the victim’s death was
impending or about to take place” after he “shot the victim multiple times, in a public
location, in the middle of the day, and in view of multiple witnesses”), no perm. app. filed.
The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

IV. Lesser-Included Offense Jury Instruction
- 10 -
The defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to first-degree murder. The State contends the
trial court properly determined that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not
supported by the evidence. The record reflects that the defendant did not file a specific
written request for lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder, and the trial court
instructed the jury regarding only the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder after
ruling the evidence did not support an instruction for voluntary manslaughter.

Upon written request by either party, “the trial judge shall instruct the jury as to the
law of each offense specifically identified in the request that is a lesser[-]included offense
of the offense charged in the indictment[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110(a). In
determining whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged crime, the trial
court should consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the existence of the
lesser-included offense.” State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2001). In the absence
of a written request, a trial court may instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense, but a
defense is not entitled an instruction, and the failure of the trial court give an instruction is
waived on appeal. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110(b), (c). However, the issue may be
reviewed for plain error. State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tenn. 2006).

Here, the defendant did not submit a written request to the trial court for an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter; therefore, he has waived plenary review of the
issue. Additionally, the defendant has failed to establish that he is entitled to plain error
relief.

Before an error may be recognized, it “must be ‘plain’ and it must affect a
‘substantial right’ of the accused.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1994). “An error would have to [be] especially egregious in nature, striking at the
very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding, to rise to the level of plain error.” State
v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tenn. 2006). In State v. Smith, our supreme court adopted
Adkisson’s five-factor test for determining whether an error should be recognized as plain:

(a) The record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;

(b) A clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;

(c) A substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;

(d) The accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and

(e) Consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.”
- 11 -
24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42). “[A]ll
five factors must be established by the record before this Court will recognize the existence
of plain error, and complete consideration of all the factors is not necessary when it is clear
from the record that at least one of the factors cannot be established.” Id. at 283.

The record shows that the trial court instructed the jury on second-degree murder as
a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-
included offense of first-degree murder. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tenn. 2001); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-18-110(g)(2). However, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on
voluntary manslaughter does not rise to the level of plain error because consideration of
the issue is not necessary to do substantial justice. Our supreme court has indicated that
when a jury receives a sequential instruction as well as an instruction on immediate lesser-
included offenses, as was the case here, the omission of additional lesser-included offenses
is harmless error. See State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998) (noting that
“by finding the defendant guilty of the highest offense to the exclusion of the immediately
lesser offense, second[-]degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected all other lesser
offenses”). The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial court
are affirmed.

____________________________________
J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9943672. Public record. Not legal advice.