# Washington v. Bessemer Bd. of Educ.

> Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama · April 5, 1989 · 547 So. 2d 888

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9937421

## Case

- **Full name:** Billy Washington v. Bessemer Board of Education.
- **Court:** Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
- **Decided:** April 5, 1989
- **Citations:** 547 So. 2d 888; 1989 WL 31925
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Holmes
- **Judges:** Holmes, Robertson
- **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Ex Parte Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 601 So. 2d 93 (1992).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9937421

## Opinion text

I respectfully dissent.
It appears to me that the basis of the majority opinion is that § 36-26-105 (2) requires the Board to select the first member of the review panel. With this conclusion, however, I disagree.
The statute in part states:
"Upon receipt of the request, the employing board and the employee may (1) mutually agree upon a person to hear the employee's appeal or (2) select a panel of three persons, one selected by the employing board, and another selected by the employee and a third agreed upon by the two parties listed hereinabove which shall constitute an employee review panel to hear the employee's appeal."
Ala. Code (1975), § 36-26-105 (emphasis added).
The above language does not specifically designate who shall go first in the selection *Page 894
process in question, and to conclude that it should be the Board, in my opinion, is overreaching, particularly in view of the result reached by so concluding. If the legislature had intended for the Board to go first, it could have easily said so. In fact, in another part of the statute concerning another selection process, the legislature specifically designated who should "strike the first name."
Therefore, I find the majority's conclusion that the Board is to select first not to be the required interpretation of § 36-26-105 (2) of the statute. In view of the above, the basis of the majority's conclusion is not correct, and reversal for the reason stated is not warranted. For this reason, I must dissent from the majority opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9937421. Public record. Not legal advice.