# Boglin v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama · April 26, 2002 · 840 So. 2d 926

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9933075

## Case

- **Full name:** Boglin v. State of Alabama.
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
- **Decided:** April 26, 2002
- **Citations:** 840 So. 2d 926; 2002 WL 732112
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Baschab
- **Judges:** Baschab, Shaw
- **Cited by:** 13 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9933075

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Boglin’s plea was involuntary when the trial court ascertained that Boglin had signed the Ireland form, but failed to ascertain that Boglin had read and understood the form or to engage in any colloquy with Boglin to show that his plea was voluntary

## Opinion text

I concur with that part of the majority opinion that holds that "a waiver of the right to seek postconviction relief . . . cannot operate to preclude a defendant from filing a Rule 32 petition challenging the voluntariness of the guilty plea, the voluntariness of the waiver, or counsel's effectiveness." However, I dissent from that part of the majority opinion that holds that the appellant did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea because the trial court allegedly did not comply with the requirements set forth in Rule 14.4(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., Boykin , and Twyman . I appreciate the necessity of ensuring that a defendant understands his rights when he signs documents such as the ones the appellant signed in this case. However, in this case, even though it did not specifically ask the appellant whether he understood his rights, the trial court had a reasonable basis for concluding that the appellant understood his rights and that he voluntarily waived them. It asked the appellant if he could read and write and if he had signed each of the documents of his own free will, and the appellant responded that he had. Therefore, the trial court could have concluded, by implication, that the appellant had read the documents. Also, once he signed the documents, there was, as there is with any other contract, a presumption that the appellant understood the documents and that the documents were valid. Finally, the trial court personally addressed the appellant and had the opportunity to observe his demeanor and body language during the plea proceeding. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the appellant understood what he was doing. Requiring that every guilty plea colloquy contain the "magic words" "do you understand" will undercut the effectiveness of a form that was intended to be a practical solution in the courtroom. Instead, the determination of whether a defendant understands his rights should be made on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. *Page 937

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9933075. Public record. Not legal advice.
