# Stovall v. Universal Const. Co., Inc.

> Supreme Court of Alabama · June 4, 2004 · 893 So. 2d 1090

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9931746

## Case

- **Full name:** India Stovall, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Children, David G. Stovall and Joel Stovall v. Universal Construction Company, Inc., D/B/A Turner-Universal. Universal Construction Company, Inc., D/B/A Turner-Universal v. Penwal Industries, Inc.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Alabama
- **Decided:** June 4, 2004
- **Citations:** 893 So. 2d 1090; 2004 WL 1233970
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Johnstone
- **Judges:** Houston, Johnstone, Lyons
- **Cited by:** 47 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9931746

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding “general administrative responsibility for company-wide safety” insufficient to impute liability
- noting that in absence of agreement to the contrary, Alabama courts apply the law of the state where the contract was formed

## Opinion text

I respectfully dissent from affirming the summary judgment in favor of the general contractor Turner on the claims of Elee Stovall's personal representative in case no. 1021938. The record contains substantial evidence that Turner owed Elee Stovall a duty imposed by § 25-1-1 (a), Ala. Code 1975, "to render . . . the place where [his] employment [was] performed reasonably safe for [him] . . ." (emphasis added) and that Turner breached that duty.
Turner was Elee's employer as defined by § 25-1-1 (c)(1), Ala. Code 1975, in that Turner had "control or custody of . . . [Elee's] place of employment" (emphasis added) in that it was the very project, the big model rocket, Turner had contracted to build. The subcontract between Turner and the painting subcontractor Penwal expressly provided that Turner would light this workplace and Penwal would not. While Elee's personal representative did not sue Turner for breach of contract, the contract nonetheless constitutes substantial evidence that Turner did not relinquish custody or control of Elee's workplace to Penwal for the purpose of rendering it reasonably safely lit, and therefore Turner did not delegate or otherwise avoid the duty imposed by § 25-1-1 (a) to render the workplace reasonably safely lit. Turner owed this statutory duty to light the place , irrespective of whether or not Turner controlled the work. For these reasons, and for the reasons expressed by Justice Lyons in his special writing, which I join insofar as it addresses case no. 1021938, I respectfully submit that we should reverse the summary judgment in case no. 1021938.
But for one exception, I concur in the main opinion insofar as it reverses the dismissal of Turner's third-party claim against the subcontractor Penwal for indemnity in case no. 1021953. The exception is that, since, in my opinion, Elee's personal representative is entitled to proceed to trial on several of her claims against Turner, Turner is entitled to proceed against Penwal not only for costs of defense, as the main opinion holds, but also for indemnification against any judgment for damages and costs that Elee's personal representative may win by trial.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9931746. Public record. Not legal advice.