# DEANGELO GEORGE ROBINSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · February 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9929332

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** February 2, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9929332

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the defendant failed to show his speedy trial rights were violated and stating: “There was no oppressive pretrial incarceration because Joyner was serving a lengthy state prison sentence.”
- explaining that under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision is “clearly erroneous” and the appellate court will reverse because the trial court has “failed to give legal effect to the evidence” in its entirety

## Opinion text

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________

Case No. 5D23-0330
LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX
_____________________________

DEANGELO GEORGE ROBINSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.
_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Adrian G. Soud, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Robert J. Pearce, III,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Welch, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

February 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.

The issues in this speedy trial case are whether (a) the four
factors in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954), were met; and
(b) what remedy is required if a violation of the right to speedy trial
is established. Based on the panel’s opinions, (a) Chief Judge
Edwards and Judge Makar agree that the Melton factors were met
while Judge Boatwright disagrees, finding that factors one and
three were not met; (b) all judges agree that if the Melton factors

1
were met the remedy for a violation of the right to speedy trial
under applicable precedent is to discharge the defendant, see State
v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001); (c) all judges agree
that Robinson did not comply with the procedural requirements of
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, Florida’s speedy trial
rule, which would have entitled him to a discharge; (d) parts III
(A)-(B) of Judge Boatwright’s opinion—in which Chief Judge
Edwards and Judge Makar join—analyze and pass upon the
question of whether Williams remains valid or should be
reconsidered; and (e) all judges concur in the certification of the
following question of great public importance:

WHETHER THE HOLDING IN STATE V. WILLIAMS,
791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), SHOULD BE
MODIFIED TO CLARIFY THAT FLORIDA RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.191 DOES NOT
ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS INCLUDING
THE RIGHT TO AUTOMATIC DISCHARGE AFTER
EXPIRATION OF THE RULE’S PRESCRIBED TIME
PERIOD?

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions; QUESTION
CERTIFIED.

EDWARDS, C.J., concurs with opinion.
BOATWRIGHT, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
MAKAR, J., concurs in part and in result with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

2
Case No. 5D23-330
LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

EDWARDS, C.J., concurring.

Appellant, Deangelo George Robinson, appeals the order
denying his motion for discharge based on the claimed expiration
of the speedy trial period found in Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.191.1 Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(“FDLE”) agents forcefully arrested, then searched, Robinson in
Suwannee County pursuant to a Duval County warrant for his
arrest on attempted murder and firearm charges.2 That Duval
County warrant was the sole basis for pursuing and arresting him.
Put another way, absent that warrant, FDLE’s detention and
search of Robinson would have completely lacked probable cause.
After FDLE had him in handcuffs, they discovered drugs on his
person and a search of his car revealed more illegal drugs and
firearms. For reasons unexplained, Duval County’s attempted
murder charges against him were put on the back burner.
Robinson was turned over to Suwannee County where he was
convicted and received a 20-month prison sentence on the drug and
firearm possession charges. The issue on appeal is whether
postponing prosecution of the charges for which a defendant is
initially arrested stops the speedy trial clock. For the reasons
explained below we hold that it does not. We are compelled to
reverse and remand for the trial court to grant Robinson’s motion
for discharge.

BACKGROUND FACTS

1 This appeal was initially filed in the First District Court of

Appeal and was transferred to this Court pursuant to the
realignment of districts on January 1, 2023.
2 Robinson was previously convicted of possession of firearms

by a convicted felon.

3
On March 29, 2015, Robinson’s son accidentally hit another
child with a homemade toy sword on a playground. That child’s
father asked Robinson’s son to quit swinging that sword around.
When Robinson learned of this event, he drove to the other child’s
apartment and confronted that child’s father. It was alleged that
after some discussion, Robinson retrieved a pistol from his car,
walked up to that child’s father and shot him in the head. Several
witnesses identified Robinson as the shooter, leading the
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (“JSO”) on April 7, 2015 to obtain a
warrant for his arrest for the crimes of attempted murder and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Thus, the references
to the Duval County charges and the Duval County warrant
throughout this opinion.

FDLE Search and Takedown

Robinson proved to be elusive. The JSO sought assistance
from the FDLE to try to locate and arrest Robinson on the active
Duval County warrant. In late October of 2015, the FDLE
determined that he was attending a large music festival in
Suwannee County. The FDLE contacted the Suwannee County
Sheriff’s Office, advised they were bringing in FDLE teams to
apprehend Robinson, and requested assistance in executing the
Duval County warrant. The JSO did not participate in the
Suwannee County operation.

On November 2, 2015, members of the FDLE’s Special
Operations Group3 (“SOG”) in one vehicle, followed Robinson from
the music festival back to a Suwannee County motel. The deputies
waited in a separate vehicle parked at an adjacent restaurant, 40–
50 yards away from where the takedown was to occur. Those
Suwannee County deputies would later testify that FDLE ran the
entire operation, that FDLE was there specifically to arrest
Robinson, and that the only reason for approaching and
apprehending Robinson was to execute the Duval County warrant.
Robinson was not on Suwannee County’s radar at all for any local
matters at that time.

3 The FDLE SOG was compared by some witnesses to a SWAT

team.

4
With guns drawn, FDLE agents approached Robinson near
his vehicle, took him to the ground, and placed him in handcuffs.4
The first Suwannee deputy took about ten seconds to run over to
where the takedown had already occurred, arriving after the
FDLE had Robinson on the ground in handcuffs. The second
Suwannee deputy reached the scene a few seconds later. FDLE
agents told the deputies there was a gun in Robinson’s vehicle; the
deputies went to the car and confirmed that. As FDLE officers
patted down the handcuffed Robinson, they found illegal drugs
which they handed over to the deputies. A more detailed search of
the vehicle revealed more drugs and firearms. The first Suwannee
County deputy prepared one probable cause affidavit that said in
part, “[a]fter arrest of the defendant, vehicle was found to have a
concealed firearm, plain view, drugs in the center portion vehicle
between the seats.” The same deputy prepared another probable
cause affidavit that said, “[t]he Suwannee County Sheriff’s Office
assisted FDLE in an arrest of the above-named defendant for
murder in Jacksonville, Florida.”

Booked and Convicted on “Local Charges”

That same day, November 2, 2015, FDLE turned Robinson
over to Suwannee County so that he could be booked into their jail.
Initially, the Suwannee deputies expected that Robinson would be
transported to Jacksonville to face the charges set forth in the
active Duval County warrant. At some point, it was agreed that
Suwannee County would prosecute Robinson on the drug and
firearms possession crimes, which were termed the “local charges.”
No explanation was given for delaying Robinson’s prosecution on
the more serious Duval County charges. The paperwork prepared
by the Suwannee County deputies reflected that Robinson was
being booked into their jail only on the local charges. The deputies
were unable to include detailed information in their booking
reports about the Duval County charges because they never had a
copy of that warrant.

4 Robinson did not resist the FDLE officers during the
takedown.

5
Robinson was charged and convicted in Suwannee County on
the local drug and firearms charges. He was sentenced to serve
20.4 months in prison. Two days before the end of that sentence,
he was transported to Jacksonville on April 28, 2017. On the
following day he went through the first appearance process where
he was formally charged and booked on the Duval County
attempted murder and firearm charges set forth in the April 2015
Duval County warrant.

Robinson filed a motion for discharge, claiming that the
November 2, 2015 takedown and detention by FDLE was an arrest
for speedy trial rule purposes and that the speedy trial period had
run before he was formally charged on the Duval County charges
on April 29, 2017. The trial court scheduled a hearing during
which the State presented the testimony of the two Suwannee
County deputies and Robinson testified on his own behalf.

After receiving evidence and entertaining argument of
counsel, the trial court ruled that the speedy trial time had not run
because, “the [Duval County] warrant was not served upon the
defendant at the time FDLE officers and Suwannee sheriff’s
officers approached him on November 2, 2015.” The trial court
found that it was “very clear that April 28th of 2017 was the date
that the defendant was served with a [Duval County] warrant and
was detained or arrested, rather, on that warrant,
notwithstanding the approach of November 2, 2015.” The trial
court’s February 6, 2020 written order stated that the motion for
discharge was denied for reasons stated on the record, referring
obviously to the statements above. 5

5 Robinson’s petition for writ of prohibition filed in the First

District Court of Appeal seeking review of the denial of his motion
for discharge was per curiam denied by an unelaborated order.
Robinson v. State, 326 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). That prior
decision does not prevent this appeal. See Topps v. State, 865 So.
2d 1253, 1258 (Fla. 2004) (“[U]nelaborated orders denying relief in
connection with all extraordinary writ petitions issued by Florida
courts shall not be deemed to be decisions on the merits which
would later bar the litigant from presenting the issue under the
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless there is a
citation to authority or other statement that clearly shows that the

6
Robinson ultimately entered a “best interest” guilty plea on
the Duval County charges. On October 13, 2022, he was
adjudicated guilty and sentenced to serve 20 years in prison on the
attempted murder charge and a concurrent 15 years on the
firearms charge with 1994 days of jail credit.

This timely appeal followed.6

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court’s ruling on a speedy trial-based motion for
discharge presents mixed questions of fact and law.” Davis v.
State, 253 So. 3d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citing State v.
Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001)). “The trial court’s
factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent,
substantial evidence, but its legal conclusions are subject to de
novo review.” Id. There are no disputes as to any findings of fact
in this case. We are presented with pure questions of law involving
application of the Melton elements and Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.191.
ANALYSIS

Florida’s Speedy Trial Rule

Rule 3.191 provides the mechanism by which a defendant may
secure the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.191. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
“guarantees the accused a speedy trial to limit the duration of
possible public scorn, adverse impact on employment, and other
consequences brought about by arrest or indictment that can only
be cleared by a verdict of not guilty or a permanent dismissal of

issue was considered by the court on the merits and relief was
denied.”).
6 The trial court ruled and the State stipulated, below and on

appeal, that denial of his motion for discharge was dispositive. See
Gilliam v. State, 312 So. 3d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). Thus,
the issue is preserved for appeal.

7
the charges.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967)). This Court has described the
right to a speedy trial as “an important safeguard to prevent undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to
defend himself.” Id. (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,
120 (1966); State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973)).

Rule 3.191(a) provides that every person charged with a felony
shall be brought to trial within 175 days of arrest, and the time
period commences when the person is “taken into custody” as
defined in 3.191(d), which reads in pertinent part:

(d) Custody. For purposes of this rule, a person is taken
into custody:
(1) when the person is arrested as a result of the
conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the
crime charged;

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191. The rule is not self-executing as the
defendant is normally required to serve a notice of expiration of
speedy trial time, which results in a hearing within five days, and
the requirement that the prosecution shall be ordered to bring the
defendant to trial within ten days. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p).
That opportunity to bring the defendant to trial within ten days is
referred to as the “recapture period.” Gilliam, 312 So. 3d at 1282.7
If the speedy trial period has run and the defendant is not brought
to trial within the recapture period, on proper motion, the

7 While not found in the rule, the Florida Supreme Court has

held that the recapture period is not available to the State if it fails
to file charges until after the 175 days has lapsed. State v.
Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001). We join our dissenting
colleague in requesting the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider
State v. Williams for the reasons set forth in parts III A and B of
Judge Boatwright’s opinion. The information charging Robinson
with attempted murder in the first degree and possession of a
concealed weapon by a convicted felon for the March 2015 shooting
was filed June 19, 2017.

8
defendant “shall be forever discharged from the crime.” Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). To say the least, that is a dramatic remedy.

“Arrest” as Defined by Melton Elements

Whether an arrest has occurred for purposes of Florida’s
speedy trial rule is not as clear as it could be. The word “arrest”
means different things in different circumstances. “[A] person may
be ‘in custody’ for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings, yet not
have been arrested for purposes of the speedy trial rule.” Davis,
253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 599
(Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). “Likewise, police ‘seizure’ of an individual
may trigger Fourth Amendment protection and yet not constitute
an arrest for purposes of speedy trial.” Id. The potential for
confusion is exacerbated rather than mitigated by the supreme
court’s use of adjectives to refer to a “technical arrest” or a “formal
arrest” as neither term is used in rule 3.191. See Griffin v. State,
474 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1985); Davis v. State, 286 So. 3d 170, 172
(Fla. 2019) (Davis II). To further complicate matters, the
definition of “arrest” in Florida speedy trial jurisprudence differs
from the federal speedy trial rule even though both are grounded
in the same Sixth Amendment right.

Florida’s speedy trial rule provides that “[t]he time periods
established by this subdivision shall commence when the person is
taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode
that gave rise to the crime charges.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d). We
might be tempted to end our analysis here, as Robinson’s arrest on
the Duval County charges resulted in him being taken into
custody; however, we must continue. “A formal arrest, complete
with fingerprinting and formal charges, is not always necessary to
start the running of the speedy trial time.” State v. Christian, 442
So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). But “something more than an
investigatory detention is required.” Id.

The “seminal case on what constitutes an arrest under the
speedy trial rule is Melton v. State.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238. In
Melton, the supreme court had this to say:

It is uniformly held that an arrest, in the technical
and restricted sense of the criminal law, is “the

9
apprehension or taking into custody of an alleged
offender in order that he [or she] may be brought into the
proper court to answer for a crime.” When used in this
sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A
purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or
pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure
or detention of the person to be arrested by a person
having present power to control the person arrested; (3)
A communication by arresting officer to the person whose
arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there
to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the
person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of
the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain
him.

75 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1954) (internal citations omitted). “All four
Melton elements must be present to conclude that an arrest has
occurred.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Brown v. State, 623
So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).

The only Melton element at issue here is the third one. The
first element is satisfied as it is clear that FDLE’s purpose and
intention on November 2, 2015, was to arrest Robinson under the
authority of the Duval County warrant. The second element is also
satisfied because FDLE agents did seize and detain Robinson by
taking him down, handcuffing him, and turning him over to
Suwannee County to be jailed. Element four was met, as Robinson
testified that he understood that it was the FDLE agents’ intent to
arrest him there in the motel parking lot. When asked whether he
felt like he was free to leave, Robinson testified that he was
“definitely not free to leave” and “was scared to flinch because I
figured they probably would have shot me if I would have.”
Commendably, the parties stipulated that Melton elements two
and four have been established.

We turn our focus, then, to Melton element three—was there
a communication by arresting officers, here the FDLE agents, to
Robinson of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an
arrest. Robinson testified during the hearing on his motion for
discharge that the FDLE agents ran towards him with guns
drawn, “saying they were there to arrest me for a warrant out of

10
Duval County.” Immediately after that statement, Robinson was
on the ground being handcuffed. In response to the State’s cross
examination, Robinson clarified the sequence of events: it was
while the FDLE agents were trying to get him on the ground that
they told him that they were arresting him for a Duval County
warrant for attempted murder. This testimony is undisputed.

The State tries to undercut Robinson’s testimony, pointing out
that no FDLE agents testified during the motion hearing.
Furthermore, the two Suwannee County deputies who did testify
at the hearing said that they did not hear anybody tell Robinson
he was being arrested on the Duval County warrant and neither of
them mentioned the warrant to Robinson. However, the record is
clear that the first Suwannee County deputy physically joined the
FDLE agents about ten seconds after the takedown and the second
deputy arrived still later. Both deputies testified that Robinson
was already on the ground and in handcuffs by the time the
deputies were actually on scene. One deputy testified that while
he did not hear anybody say they were arresting Robinson on the
Duval County warrant, he had to admit that he could not say that
it did not happen. The trial court may have been free to reject
Robinson’s unrebutted testimony if he had found Robinson to not
be a credible witness, but there was no such finding. Nor did the
trial judge discuss whether or when Robinson was told by FDLE
that he was being arrested on the Duval County warrant.

Robinson argues that the FDLE agents were required by law
to inform him that they were arresting him on the Duval County
warrant. He refers to section 901.16, Florida Statutes (2021),
which states in pertinent part that “[a] peace officer making an
arrest by a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued.”8 While we
need not rely on that argument, neither will we accept the State’s
invitation to presume that the FDLE agents ignored section
901.16, especially in light of Robinson’s unrebutted and
unchallenged testimony that the agents complied with their

8There are statutory exceptions to this required
communication of arrest based on a warrant, but none apply here.

11
statutory obligation to advise him that he was being arrested on
that warrant as he was being taken to the ground and handcuffed.
Further, law enforcement had no reason other than the warrant to
approach, much less detain, Robinson prior to the take down.

The First District’s case of Gilliam v. State dealt with similar
issues. In August, 2018, Mr. Gilliam was stopped in St. Lucie
County, Florida by a local law enforcement officer. Gilliam, 312
So. 3d at 1281. When the officer had dispatch check Gilliam’s
license it turned out he had “an extraditable felony warrant out of
Duval County.” Id. The officer reported that he then “placed
Gilliam in custody and advised him why.” Id. After placing
Gilliam in custody, the officer searched his car and found both
drugs and paraphernalia. He was booked into the St. Lucie County
Jail on the local drug charges but was not booked on the Duval
County warrant. Id. 1281–82. After spending sixteen months
dealing with the St. Lucie County charges, he was released to the
Duval County authorities on December 21, 2019. On February 3,
2020, the information on the Duval County charges was filed; the
next day, Gilliam moved for discharge based on the speedy trial
rule. Id. at 1282. The trial court denied his motion.

As the First District noted, “[t]he Florida Supreme Court has
consistently held that the speedy trial period begins upon a
defendant’s initial arrest.” Id. at 1283 (citing Bulgin v. State, 912
So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. 2005)). “[T]he date of the original arrest is
the focal point for speedy trial considerations, irrespective of
changes made in charges.” Id. (quoting Weed v. State, 411 So. 2d
863, 865 (Fla. 1982)). The First District conducted a Melton
analysis and concluded that Gilliam’s motion for discharge should
have been granted. Id. 1284–85.

Just as in our case, the search of the defendant’s vehicle in
Gilliam occurred after he had been detained and placed in custody
pursuant to a Duval County warrant. Absent the probable cause
to arrest provided in both cases by Duval County warrants, law
enforcement would have been conducting unlawful warrantless
searches of Gilliam’s and of Robinson’s vehicles. However, both
defendants were arrested on warrants; thus, the post-arrest
searches in both cases were the legitimate bases for prosecution of
the defendants on local charges. “Where a person is arrested

12
pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate, numerous cases
have held that the person is in ‘custody’ within the meaning of the
speedy trial rule.” Id. at 1284 (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So.
2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1975)). The fact that neither Gilliam nor
Robinson were booked into the local county jail on a Duval County
warrant is immaterial, as they were both detained and taken into
custody because of their warrants.

Thus, despite some factual differences, Gilliam supports our
conclusion under a Melton analysis that the speedy trial clock was
triggered when FDLE agents arrested Robinson in Suwannee
County on the Duval County warrant. The trial judge’s denial of
Robinson’s motion for discharge was improperly based on when the
Duval County warrant was formally served, which is not a Melton
element, although it has been discussed but not adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court as an event that might in the future trigger
the speedy trial clock.

In both Gilliam and our case, the trial judges focused on when
the defendant was formally advised of the Duval County charges,
either by first appearance or service of the arrest warrant. That
set of circumstances is what the Florida Supreme Court described
as a “formal arrest” in Davis II. “We determine that ‘arrest’ in the
speedy trial context should mean formal arrest, which is the only
type of detention by law enforcement that implicates the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right.” Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 172
(emphasis added). However, the supreme court then made it clear
in Davis II that Florida’s speedy trial rule, as written, did not
require a “formal arrest.” Id. The court defined “formal arrest,”
as used in federal speedy trial jurisprudence, as “when an accused
is taken into custody for the purpose of being ‘held to answer’ in
court for specified criminal charges.” Id. at 174 (quoting United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1971)). The supreme court
in Davis II went on to say that “[f]ormal arrest would therefore
necessarily be preceded by a determination and assertion that
probable cause exists to believe that the suspect committed the
crime(s) for which he or she is being arrested.” Id. Of course, in
the matter now before us, the warrant for Robinson’s arrest
included the finding of a Duval County circuit judge that “there
exists probable cause” to believe that Robinson committed the

13
crimes of attempted murder in the first degree and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.

Whether Robinson’s arrest based on the warrant might
constitute a “formal arrest” is, for now, beside the point. This is
because, rather than adopt the “formal arrest” standard used in
federal proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court referred that
proposed rule change to the Florida Bar’s Criminal Procedure
Rules Committee. Indeed, in Davis II the Court announced that
“[i]n the meantime, we adhere to Griffin v. State, which adopted
the ‘arrest’ definition from Melton v. State, for purposes of
determining when the speedy trial rule period begins to run under
our current rule.” Id. at 172 (internal citations omitted). For
whatever reasons, that referral did not result in a change in rule
3.191.9 Thus, Melton, as we applied it above, still governs.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we find that on November 2, 2015, when FDLE
agents arrested Robinson in Suwannee County under authority of
the Duval County warrant, the speedy trial time began to run. The
fact that he was charged and convicted in Suwannee County for
crimes that were based on contraband discovered incident to or
following that initial arrest did not stop the speedy trial clock. As
he was neither charged nor tried within 175 days from that date,
he was entitled to have his motion for discharge granted. We are
compelled to reverse the trial court’s order denying that motion.
We remand for entry of an order granting Robinson’s motion for
discharge, vacating the related judgment and sentence, and for
any further proceedings related to terminating his imprisonment
on the underlying charges.

9As discussed in Judge Boatwright’s opinion, the Florida
Supreme Court is considering just such a change in the rule.

14
Case No. 5D23-330
LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

BOATWRIGHT, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part.

I disagree with the majority’s holding that all four Melton
factors were present under the circumstances in this case. In
particular, for the reasons explained below, I do not believe the
record supports that Robinson established the presence of the first
and third Melton factors. Thus, I would affirm the trial court’s
denial of Robinson’s motion for discharge.

I.

On April 28, 2017, Robinson was served with the Duval
County warrant at issue in this case. Subsequently, Robinson filed
a motion for release, as well as a motion for an adversarial
probable cause hearing, alleging that he had been arrested on the
charges relevant to this case on April 28, 2017, but the State had
not filed an information within the applicable time limits. On June
19, 2017, the State filed an information charging Robinson with
attempted first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Based on the State filing the information, it
appears that Robinson abandoned his two previous motions and
then filed an unlimited waiver of his speedy trial rights waiving
his constitutional rights and any rights under rule 3.191.1

Robinson then changed course and filed a motion for discharge
pursuant to rule 3.191. In his motion, he alleged that he had
actually been taken into custody on the Duval County warrant on

1 Although not raised by either party on appeal, Robinson
waived his speedy trial rights prior to filing his motion for
discharge. He filed his waiver on October 2, 2017, after the 175-
day period had elapsed. However, under Florida Supreme Court
precedent addressing analogous circumstances, Robinson’s post-
expiration waiver would not foreclose his right to a discharge
under rule 3.191(a). See State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570, 579 (Fla.
2010).
15
November 2, 2015, when he was apprehended in Suwannee
County, rather than April 28, 2017, the date on which he had
previously claimed he was first arrested on the charges at issue.
In the motion for discharge, Robinson argued that the State had
failed to bring him to trial within 175 days of November 2, 2015.
Robinson argued that he was entitled to discharge under rule
3.191 because the State had failed to file formal charges within 175
days after the date on which he was apprehended in Suwannee
County. He contended that because he had been “arrested” within
the meaning of rule 3.191 in Suwannee County on November 2,
2015, the State had until April 25, 2016, to bring him to trial, but
it failed to do so. He further asserted that because the State had
not filed an information within 175 days of November 2, 2015, the
State was not entitled to a recapture period. Thus, he argued he
was entitled to a discharge.

The trial court held a hearing on Robinson’s motion for
discharge. The State called two Suwannee County Sheriff’s Office
(SCSO) deputies, who had arrested Robinson on the Suwannee
County charges, to testify regarding the circumstances
surrounding Robinson’s takedown on November 2, 2015. According
to their testimonies, on October 30, 2015, a special agent with
FDLE contacted SCSO, explaining that FDLE had located
Robinson, who was wanted for charges in Duval County, at a park
in Suwannee County, where he was attending a music festival.
FDLE sought SCSO’s assistance in apprehending Robinson
because it was concerned about approaching him at a crowded
music festival when he was known to be potentially armed. FDLE
agents coordinated with SCSO deputies to orchestrate a takedown
of Robinson. FDLE agents located Robinson as he was leaving the
festival in a vehicle and followed him to a motel in Suwannee
County.

The SCSO deputies were passengers in a separate vehicle
driven by an FDLE special agent. The FDLE agent parked the
vehicle at a nearby restaurant approximately 40 to 50 yards away
from the motel. After the FDLE agents had positively identified
Robinson, they effected the takedown as he was entering his
vehicle in the parking lot of the motel. The SCSO deputies exited
the vehicle immediately after they received the takedown
command. It took their group approximately ten seconds to get to

16
the parking lot, where FDLE agents had Robinson on the ground.
One of the SCSO deputies testified that the driver’s side door of
Robinson’s vehicle was open, where he saw, in plain view, a gun
that was partially hidden and a bag containing what he suspected
were illegal mushrooms. The deputy also indicated that upon their
arrival, an FDLE agent, noting the open car door, immediately
remarked, “Do you see a gun? There’s a gun.” The SCSO deputies
further observed that the FDLE agents had removed illegal drugs
from Robinson’s pocket during their search of his person. At that
time, the SCSO deputies, who had been previously made aware by
FDLE that Robinson was a convicted felon, decided to arrest
Robinson as a result of the firearm and drugs that were found in
plain view during the takedown. They arrested Robinson on
charges of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana over 20
grams, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a full
investigation, he was additionally charged with trafficking in
methamphetamine and possession of MDMA.

According to the SCSO deputies, they initially arrived on the
scene to assist FDLE with the Duval County warrant, but they
ultimately decided to arrest Robinson for the drug and firearm
charges, which were entirely unrelated to the Duval County
warrant. They testified that they never arrested Robinson on the
Duval County warrant, nor did they ever advise him that he was
under arrest for the Duval County warrant. They additionally
stated that they never heard the FDLE agents tell Robinson he
was under arrest for the Duval County charges. However, on cross-
examination, one deputy was asked to speculate whether anyone
could have mentioned the Duval County warrant to Robinson, to
which he responded, “I could not say no,” but reiterated that he
never heard it being said.

The SCSO deputies wrote in the arrest affidavit for their local
charges that Robinson had been arrested on the Duval County
charges. However, they explained the reason for doing this was
that they thought FDLE was independently going to arrest
Robinson for those charges, which it never did. Rather, FDLE
elected to allow SCSO to pursue the local charges, and it merely
placed a detainer on Robinson for the Duval County charges. This
detainer documentation was entered into evidence.

17
Robinson did not call any witnesses to testify at the hearing;
however, he took the stand on his own behalf. Robinson testified
that prior to the November 2, 2015 encounter, he knew he had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest out of Duval County because
his child’s mother had apprised him of the warrant. Robinson then
provided what could be construed as conflicting testimony
regarding the exact statements by the FDLE agents. On direct
examination, Robinson stated that as he was walking towards his
vehicle, FDLE agents told him he was under arrest for the Duval
County charges. However, on cross-examination, he stated he was
only told that he was under arrest for the Duval County charges
while he was being taken down to the ground by the FDLE agents
and at no other time were the Duval County charges mentioned to
him.

There were no other witnesses called to testify. Only the two
SCSO deputies and Robinson testified at the hearing. The FDLE
agents did not testify.

During closing arguments, the main focus was whether, under
Melton, Robinson had been arrested on the Duval County warrant.
Robinson’s counsel argued that all four Melton factors were
present, thus proving Robinson had been arrested for the Duval
County charges within the meaning of rule 3.191 during the
November 2, 2015 takedown. Robinson’s counsel specifically
focused on the presence of the third Melton factor, arguing that
Robinson’s testimony conclusively established the FDLE agents
had communicated to him that he was under arrest for the Duval
County charges.

The State argued that all four Melton factors were not
present. In regard to the first Melton factor, although the State
initially argued that the FDLE agents could have detained
Robinson on reasonable suspicion based on the warrant, the
State’s primary contention was that the circumstances clearly
established that FDLE’s intent to arrest Robinson on the Duval
County warrant immediately changed once the agents saw the
contraband and firearm in plain view in Robinson’s car. The State
asserted that this was evidenced by FDLE’s decision not to move
forward on the Duval County warrant but rather to defer to the

18
SCSO deputies on the local charges, which were evident and
substantial at the onset of the takedown.

The State additionally called into question Robinson’s
credibility. In particular, the State argued that the SCSO deputies
testified they never heard the FDLE agents tell Robinson that he
was under arrest for the Duval County charges, and Robinson
admitted he previously knew about the warrant because his child’s
mother informed him of the charges. In addition, the State argued
that Robinson’s testimony was not credible because it was unlikely
that the FDLE agents were advising Robinson of the Duval County
warrant while they were securing him due to the high alert of the
situation. Rather, it was more likely that they were making sure
he was secure on the ground and that the other individuals in his
party were secure instead of informing him of the charges in the
first ten seconds of the takedown. The State concluded by arguing
that Robinson had not been arrested on the Duval County charges
such as to trigger rule 3.191, but that a detainer had been placed
on him for those charges while he was being prosecuted for the
Suwannee County charges.

The trial court then denied the motion for discharge, finding
that Robinson had not been arrested on the Duval County
charges—during the takedown or any other time. The court
explained: “The approach of FDLE, the reason for their approach,
meaning the warrant, does not render the conduct and the
approach to the defendant and the searching of the defendant that
of an arrest.” The court additionally elaborated that the SCSO
deputies had provided a valid explanation as to why they had
initially stated in the arrest affidavit that Robinson had been
arrested on the Duval County charges. The court indicated that it
also relied on the State’s documentation evidencing that a hold had
been placed on Robinson for the Duval County charges as a result
of the November 2, 2015 takedown, and it accordingly determined
this to be a situation where a detainer was in place, rather than
an actual arrest such as would trigger the provisions of rule 3.191.

II.

19
The right to a speedy trial is triggered “when the person is
arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode that gave
rise to the crime charged.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d)(1). However,
it should be noted that “a detainer placed by one county for a
prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within
the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the
running of the speedy trial time.” State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55,
56 (Fla. 1977). As delineated by the majority, the Florida Supreme
Court in Melton articulated a four-factor analysis for determining
whether a custodial detention constitutes an arrest and thus
triggers the provisions of rule 3.191. 75 So. 2d at 294. For a court
to conclude that an arrest has occurred within the meaning of rule
3.191, “all four Melton elements must be present.” Davis, 253 So.
3d at 1238 (citing Brown v. State, 623 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1993)). Therefore, it is the defendant’s burden to prove the
existence of an arrest pursuant to Melton when filing a motion for
discharge under rule 3.191. See State v. Cheek, 294 So. 3d 934, 941
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (finding that where the defendant did not
establish all four of the Melton factors were present, he had failed
to prove he was arrested within the meaning of rule 3.191 for
speedy trial purposes).

This Court has recognized the difficulty in establishing the
presence of all four Melton elements.2 Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1242.
Regarding these elements, our Court has said that “requiring the
presence of all four elements demands a level of clarity and
certainty that is often lacking in these situations” as it can place
“too much emphasis on the presence or absence of any single
element.” Id. In particular, some elements require a very
subjective analysis. For instance, under element one, “the court
must somehow determine whether the officer subjectively

2 This court previously argued that a totality of the
circumstances test would be better in determining whether an
arrest was made, rather than the formalities required by the
Melton analysis. Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1242–43. However, on
certification, the Florida Supreme Court declined to recede from
the Melton analysis and instead advocated for a rule change. Davis
II, 286 So. 3d. at 170.

20
intended to effect an arrest.” Id. As evident in this case, proving
the subjective intent of the arresting officer can be a challenge.

As to the first Melton factor, Robinson was required to
establish that “there was a purpose or intention” by the law
enforcement officers to effect an arrest on the Duval County
warrant. The SCSO deputies were the only law enforcement
officers who were present at the hearing. And although the SCSO
deputies testified they had initially been contacted to assist FDLE
with its efforts to effectuate an arrest on the Duval County
warrant, they ultimately testified that they arrested Robinson
solely on the local charges resulting from the contraband found
during the takedown, which was in plain view. In addition, they
indicated that the FDLE agents never asked them to arrest
Robinson on the Duval County warrant, nor was Robinson
arrested on the warrant. Thus, there was no proof that the SCSO
deputies’ intent was to arrest Robinson on the Duval County
warrant.

In regard to the FDLE agents’ intent, the SCSO deputies
specifically indicated that the FDLE agent who initially
apprehended Robinson, as he was entering his vehicle,
immediately advised them of the contraband in plain view in
Robinson’s car, and the FDLE agents promptly deferred to the
SCSO deputies to proceed forward in booking Robinson on the local
charges. The importance of this is that the FDLE agents did not
testify at the hearing, meaning the record is devoid of any
testimony regarding their intent after they saw the contraband as
they apprehended Robinson. The State’s position was that the
“situation turned” during the takedown when the FDLE agents
saw the contraband in Robinson’s vehicle and thus, their intent
changed. This is a plausible theory of how the takedown occurred,
and is consistent with the SCSO deputies’ testimony that the
Duval County warrant was not brought up based on what was
discovered during the takedown. Obviously, the trial court deemed
this argument persuasive when it found that “the approach of
FDLE, the reason for their approach, meaning the warrant, does
not render the conduct and the approach to the defendant and the
searching of the defendant that of an arrest.”

21
This case is therefore distinguishable from Gilliam v. State,
which is relied upon by the majority. 312 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA
2021). In Gilliam, it was a St. Lucie County officer who
apprehended Gilliam, advised him why he was being arrested,
searched him, and then decided to place charges based on the
contraband found during his search incident to arrest. Notably,
when it found the first Melton factor to be present, the court stated,
“The arresting officer explained in the report: ‘Upon running
Gilliam, dispatch advised he had an extraditable felony warrant
out of Duval County. I placed Gilliam in custody and advised him
why.’” Id. at 1284 (emphasis added). This statement constituted
direct evidence demonstrating that the arresting officer intended
to effect an arrest under the authority of the Duval County
warrant and that he explained that intent to Gilliam before the
officer searched Gilliam and found the contraband forming the
basis of the separate local charges. Id. In this case, however, there
is a degree of separation between the FDLE agents who initially
apprehended Robinson and the SCSO deputies who ultimately
arrested him. It was not the FDLE agents who indicated their
intent to effectuate an arrest, but rather, it was the SCSO deputies
who arrested Robinson on their local charges. As observed by the
State in its closing argument, FDLE’s conduct following the
takedown constituted evidence of its intent not to arrest Robinson
on the Duval County warrant.

There was competent substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that there was not an arrest on the Duval County
warrant. Notably, there was evidence to support that although the
FDLE agents’ original intent was to arrest Robinson on the Duval
County warrant, their intent changed during the takedown and
subsequent investigation. As the State argued, the FDLE agents
could have seized Robinson solely based on reasonable suspicion or
alternatively their intent changed once they viewed the
contraband in plain sight in his car. According to the State, once
the FDLE agents apprehended Robinson under these
circumstances, they clearly did not have an intent to move forward
to arrest him on the Duval County warrant, or else they would
have taken some sort of affirmative step to effectuate an arrest on
the Duval County warrant (or would have indicated to the SCSO
deputies that they should move forward on those charges as well).

22
Robinson could have called the FDLE officers as witnesses to
clarify their intent and meet his burden but chose not to do so. The
error of not calling the FDLE agents to testify was apparently
recognized by defense counsel when the State began to posit
alternative theories as to why Robinson may have been detained.
Robinson’s counsel recognized this key issue, stating to the court:
“So I don’t know if I need to talk to the State about providing you
those depos or getting an FDLE witness here. I did not expect that.
And that is when the reasonable suspicion part came up, I’m stuck
on what to do.” However, Robinson instead decided to rely solely
on his own testimony regarding what the FDLE agents
communicated to him, but his testimony did not address the FDLE
agents’ subjective intent when they ultimately effectuated the
takedown. As a result, he did not establish the subjective intent of
the FDLE agents or at the very least that the FDLE agents’ intent
did not change.

Regarding the third Melton factor, the majority’s position
appears to be that Robinson’s testimony was uncontroverted and
dispositive as to whether there was a communication by the
arresting officers that they intended to arrest Robinson on the
Duval County warrant. In particular, the majority relies on the
fact that Robinson stated he was told he was under arrest for the
Duval County warrant as he was taken to the ground. Since the
SCSO deputies arrived at Robinson’s location within ten seconds
after the takedown signal was given, the majority assumes that
the deputies could not have heard what was communicated to
Robinson as he was taken to the ground, and thus, his testimony
was undisputed. While it is true that “[a]s a general rule,
uncontroverted factual evidence cannot simply be rejected,” it may
be rejected if “it is contrary to law, improbable, untrustworthy,
unreasonable, or contradictory.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d
543, 560–61 (Fla. 2010). In addition, this principle usually arises
where there is only one person to testify regarding the facts at
issue. See State v. G.H., 549 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
(finding that where an officer was the only person to testify at a
suppression hearing, and where his testimony was neither
impeached, discredited, controverted, self-contradicting, nor
physically impossible, the trial court was bound to accept the
officer’s testimony as to what occurred for purposes of granting or
denying the motion to suppress).

23
However, Robinson’s testimony was not uncontroverted. The
SCSO deputies specifically testified that they never told Robinson
he was under arrest for the Duval County charges and that they
did not hear the FDLE agents tell him he was under arrest for
those same charges. And although it took the SCSO deputies
approximately ten seconds from the takedown command to arrive
at the scene, the circumstances indicated they were almost
immediately within earshot of the FDLE agents. There is nothing
in Robinson’s testimony, or the testimonies of the SCSO deputies,
demonstrating that the SCSO deputies were unable to hear what
was transpiring as the FDLE agents were effectuating the
takedown. Additionally, as this short period of time is crucial to
the majority’s position, Robinson’s testimony was not clear as to
the timing of the statements, as he provided conflicting testimony
regarding when he was actually told he was under arrest for the
Duval County charges. Robinson first testified that the FDLE
agents told him about the Duval County warrant as they were
approaching him, but then contradicted himself on cross-
examination by stating that he was informed about the warrant as
they were taking him to the ground.

Robinson’s overall credibility was at issue as he was a
convicted felon, rendering the veracity of his statement even more
tenuous. Moreover, Robinson testified that he independently knew
about the Duval County warrant because his child’s mother had
advised him of the warrant. He admitted he immediately
speculated that the FDLE agents were approaching him based on
the Duval County warrant because he was unaware of any other
reason for their approach. This gave Robinson an independent
basis for knowing about the Duval County warrant rather than
being informed of such by the FDLE agents. The State keyed in on
these credibility issues by arguing that Robinson’s testimony was
not credible because it was unlikely that the FDLE agents were
advising Robinson of the Duval County warrant while they were
securing him due to the high alert of the situation; rather, it was
more likely that they were focused on ensuring he was secure on
the ground and the other individuals in his party were secure
instead of informing him of the charges.

24
Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the court
ruled that the FDLE officers did not “arrest” Robinson on the
Duval County warrant on November 2, 2015. The court gave
detailed reasons on the record as to why there was not a valid
arrest. Although the court did not specifically comment on
Robinson’s credibility, by determining that there was not a valid
arrest for the purposes of Melton it can be inferred that the court
necessarily disregarded Robinson’s self-serving testimony.

Under the standard of review by which we are constrained,
the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that there was no arrest on the Duval County
warrant as the result of law enforcement’s actions on November 2,
2015. See Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 174 (“The trial court’s factual
findings will be sustained if they are supported by competent,
substantial evidence.”); see also State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120,
132–33 (Fla. 2003) (holding that “competent, substantial evidence
is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and a reviewing court
must assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its
weight”; and stating that evidence contrary to a trial court’s ruling
“is outside the scope of the inquiry, for a reviewing court cannot
reweigh the ‘pros and cons’ of conflicting evidence.”) (internal
citations omitted). The majority appears to hold that the trial court
did not make the necessary factual findings or that Robinson’s
credibility was inadequately addressed to support its ruling.
However, nothing in either rule 3.191 or Melton (and its progeny)
requires a trial court to make any particular degree of factual
findings regarding the Melton factors. Regardless, even if the trial
court made conclusions, rather than factual findings, reversal is
only required “[w]hen the appellate court is convinced that an
express or inferential finding of the trial court is without support
of any substantial evidence, is clearly against the weight of the
evidence, or that the trial court has misapplied the law to the
established facts.” Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. 1956)
(explaining that under these circumstances, the trial court’s
decision is “clearly erroneous” and the appellate court will reverse
because the trial court has “failed to give legal effect to the
evidence” in its entirety). As a result, the decision of the trial court
is not clearly erroneous, because based on the evidence presented,
the court could have correctly concluded that Robinson failed to
establish that there was an arrest under Melton.

25
In sum, as the Florida Supreme Court has articulated, the test
here is not that of a “totality of circumstances.” Rather, Robinson
was required to establish all four Melton factors were present to
successfully move for discharge. Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 174–75.
Because Robinson failed to establish the presence of all four of
Melton factors, the trial court correctly denied the motion to
discharge.

III.

I disagree with the majority that there was a valid arrest
under a Melton analysis, and I consequently disagree with the
majority’s determination that Robinson should be discharged.
However, insofar as the majority has opined that there was a valid
arrest, I agree with their application of the current precedent in
regard to a discharge under rule 3.191. I write further to elaborate
on the problems arising from our current precedent’s disregard of
the plain text of rule 3.191.

A.

Florida’s rules of procedure “are construed in accordance with
the principles of statutory construction.” Saia Motor Freight Line,
Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006) (citing Brown v. State,
715 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1998) (“Our courts have long recognized
that the rules of construction applicable to statutes also apply to
the construction of rules.”)). As such, the Florida Supreme Court’s
express adoption of the “supremacy-of-text” principles of statutory
construction in Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d
942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020), applies to the construction of rule 3.191.

To interpret the meaning of legal texts, Ham counsels:

[W]e follow the “supremacy-of-text principle”—namely,
the principle that “[t]he words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
context, is what the text means.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 56 (2012). We also adhere to Justice Joseph Story’s
view that “every word employed in [a legal text] is to be

26
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,
unless the context furnishes some ground to control,
qualify, or enlarge it.” Advisory Op. to Governor re
Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration
Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner,
Reading Law at 69).

308 So. 3d at 946–47 (alterations in original).

The right of an accused to a speedy trial in Florida is
guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution.
Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 174. In addition, rule 3.191 provides a
procedural mechanism to enforce a defendant’s right to a speedy
trial. Rather than rely on a constitutional guarantee, Robinson
relies on rule 3.191 for his relief. The relevant language of rule
3.191 is as follows:

(a) Speedy Trial without Demand. Except as
otherwise provided by this rule, and subject to the
limitations imposed under subdivisions (e) and (f), every
person charged with a crime shall be brought to trial
within 90 days of arrest if the crime charged is a
misdemeanor, or within 175 days of arrest if the crime
charged is a felony. If trial is not commenced within these
time periods, the defendant shall be entitled to the
appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (p). The
time periods established by this subdivision shall
commence when the person is taken into custody as
defined under subdivision (d). A person charged with a
crime is entitled to the benefits of this rule whether the
person is in custody in a jail or correctional institution of
this state or a political subdivision thereof or is at liberty
on bail or recognizance or other pretrial release condition.
This subdivision shall cease to apply whenever a person
files a valid demand for speedy trial under subdivision
(b).

27
Notably, rule 3.191(a) does not contain any language
requiring an information be filed within this 175-day period. In
addition, according to the express language of the rule, the remedy
upon expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period is not an
automatic discharge, but is instead specifically set forth in
subdivision (p). Subdivision (p), entitled “Remedy for Failure to
Try Defendant within the Specified Time,” provides in pertinent
part:

(2) At any time after the expiration of the prescribed time
period, the defendant may file a separate pleading
entitled “Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time,” and
serve a copy on the prosecuting authority.

(3) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a
notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall
hold a hearing on the notice and, unless the court finds
that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists,
shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within
10 days. A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-
day period through no fault of the defendant, on motion
of the defendant or the court, shall be forever discharged
from the crime.

The rule requires that to be forever discharged from the crime, a
defendant would need to file a “Notice of Expiration of Speedy
Trial” after the expiration of the prescribed time period. The State
would then be granted a total of 15 days following the filing of a
Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial as a recapture period to bring
a defendant to trial.

In this case, Robinson did not comply with the requirements
of rule 3.191(p). He did not file a Notice of Expiration of Speedy
Trial, nor was the State granted an opportunity for recapture.
Based on the plain text of the rule, he should not be granted an
automatic discharge.

However, the Florida Supreme Court (over 20 years ago)
interpreted rule 3.191 to mean that the recapture period applies
only when the information or indictment charging the defendant
is filed within the speedy trial period, and the State is not entitled

28
to the recapture period if it fails to act until after the 175-day
speedy trial period has expired. State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088,
1091 (Fla. 2001). As a result, if the State fails to file charges before
the 175-day speedy trial period lapses, the State “loses the benefit
of recapture” and the defendant is entitled to discharge under rule
3.191. Thus, the court in Williams held “that the speedy trial time
begins to run when an accused is taken into custody and continues
to run even if the State does not act until after the expiration of
that speedy trial period. The State may not file charges based on
the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired.” Id.

The rule, as interpreted in Williams, is unworkable in the
context of this case, where Robinson was never charged with a
crime based on the Duval County warrant. If Robinson was in fact
arrested, as claimed by the majority, it was only within the
constraints of Melton. Formally, the warrant was never served on
Robinson at the time of the November 2, 2015 encounter. He did
not go through a first appearance proceeding on these charges.
Rather, internally he was considered to have a detainer placed on
him regarding the Duval County charges. Most importantly, since
Robinson was not formally charged, the court process that should
have alerted the State to the commencement of the running of the
speedy trial time was never initiated; i.e., the State never received
the executed warrant which would have alerted it to the fact that
the speedy trial clock had been triggered. Without any such
notification, the State could not have known that it needed to file
an information in this case and as such, was not provided with the
benefit of recapture under rule 3.191. As Justice Wells astutely
observed in this context: “I reiterate that making the speedy trial
rule run from the time of arrest rather than from the time of filing
of an indictment or information ignores the reality of the
organization of law enforcement and state attorneys in this state.”
In re Amends., 886 So. 2d 197, 201 (Fla. 2004) (Wells, J.,
concurring).

The complications evidenced by the facts in this case
demonstrate precisely why the recapture provision was added into
the rule. Previously, rule 3.191 provided for an automatic
discharge; and the recapture provision was later added into the
rule in 1984. However, the Williams court, by its decision, added

29
the automatic discharge back into the rule. As Justice Lawson has
pointed out:

This is, after all, the speedy trial rule, not the speedy
discharge rule. And, that opportunity for a speedy trial is
what the express terms of the rule unambiguously
provide a defendant and the State. Ironically, over thirty
years ago we specifically removed, as antithetical to the
rule’s purpose, the very remedy of immediate discharge
that the majority writes back in with its anti-textual
“interpretation.”

Born-Suniaga v. State, 256 So. 3d 783, 791 (Fla. 2018) (Lawson, J.,
dissenting) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 committee notes (1984));
State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570, 576 (Fla. 2010) (“The creation of the
recapture period emphasizes the purpose of the rule—‘to promote
the efficient operation of the court system and act as a stimulus to
prosecutors to bring defendants to trial as soon as practicable, thus
minimizing the hardships placed on accused persons awaiting
trial.’ In other words, the recapture period illustrates the principle
that the defendant has a right to a speedy trial, not a right to a
speedy discharge without trial.”).

In sum, when applying Florida’s principles of construction to
rule 3.191, there is no sound means of reconciling Williams with
the plain language of rule 3.191. It is impossible to read into rule
3.191 the remedy provided to Robinson by Williams—i.e., an
automatic discharge without first affording the State an
opportunity for recapture. However, though I disagree with
Williams, I recognize that this court is constrained by its holding.
State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020) (“In a case where we
are bound by a higher legal authority—whether it be a
constitutional provision, a statute, or a decision of the Supreme
Court—our job is to apply that law correctly to the case before us.
When we are convinced that a precedent clearly conflicts with the
law we are sworn to uphold, precedent normally must yield.”);
accord Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 550–51 (Fla. 2020). Thus,
Judge Makar and I agree that even if there had been a valid arrest
under Melton, but for the opinion in Williams and its progeny, an
affirmance would still be appropriate because Robinson did not
comply with the procedural requirements of rule 3.191 which

30
would have entitled him to a discharge. As such, Judge Makar’s
certified question in his concurring opinion is justified, and I join
in certification. Therefore, the precedent should be re-visited or a
rule change should be implemented.3

B.

Not only is the text of the rule not being adhered to, but the
ruling in Williams transformed a procedural rule into a
substantive rule. Rule 3.191 was designed to provide a procedure
to protect the speedy trial right guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. See generally R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d 1167, 1169–
72 (Fla. 1992); State v. Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1986).
However, the automatic discharge read into rule 3.191 by the
Florida Supreme Court in Williams does not comport with Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence and creates a statute of limitations not
provided for by the legislature. See Williams, 791 So. 2d at 1093
(Wells, J., dissenting) (explaining that this rigid interpretation of
rule 3.191 has “created a judicial statute of limitation without
foundation in the language of the rule”); Bulgin v. State, 912 So.
2d 307, 314 (Fla. 2005) (Wells, J., dissenting) (stating that an

3 Indeed, this exact rule change has been proposed and is
presently pending before the Florida Supreme Court on its own
motion. The proposed change to rule 3.191 seeks to rectify the
issues caused by Williams, and would require the defendant to file
a notice of expiration of speedy trial and then afford the state an
opportunity for recapture (rather than being granted an automatic
discharge) in all cases. In re Amends., Case No. SC22–1123
(proposed on Jan. 18, 2024) (not yet reported). Notably, in addition
to the mandatory recapture period, the proposed change to rule
3.191 provides that the 175-day speedy trial period does not begin
until a defendant has been formally charged (as opposed to
arrested), thus effectively eliminating the need for a Melton
analysis concerning whether a defendant has been “arrested”
within the meaning of rule 3.191. Id. Finally, the proposed rule
change provides that where it is determined that rule 3.191 has
been violated, any discharge under the rule shall be without
prejudice unless there is a determination that the defendant’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Id.

31
automatic discharge “eviscerates the statute of limitations enacted
by the legislature”); Reed v. State, 649 So. 2d. 227, 229 (Fla. 1995)
(Overton, J., dissenting) (stating in regard to the creation of an
automatic discharge under 3.191, “I write to express my belief that
the majority has now crossed the line and made our speedy trial
rule substantive rather than procedural by this construction and
that, consequently, it is unconstitutional.”).

Additionally, although the Florida Constitution grants the
Florida Supreme Court exclusive rule-making authority, this
power is limited to rules governing procedural matters and does
not extend to substantive rights. Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481,
484 (Fla. 1993). The Florida Supreme Court has previously stated
that statutes of limitations provide substantive rights and
supersede our procedural rules. Id. However, under Williams, the
procedural rule supersedes legislative authority in establishing a
judicially created statute of limitations. In this case, Robinson was
initially charged by information with attempted first-degree
murder. There is no statute of limitations for that charge, as it is
a life felony. § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). Therefore, rule 3.191,
as interpreted in Williams, effectively creates a 175-day statute of
limitations for an offense which otherwise carries no statutory
time limit for prosecution. See Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597,
601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Sharp, J., concurring) (stating that “the
speedy trial rule as interpreted by case law, has drastically
shortened the statute of limitations for prosecution of crimes, and
as such it has become the defendant’s best defense and ally”).

In addition, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the
right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment, however, does not
provide strict guidelines or timing rules as prescribed in rule 3.191.
Rather, the Sixth Amendment generally provides a more flexible
balancing test to determine whether the right has been violated.
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the United
States Supreme Court provided the following analysis:

A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little
more than identify some of the factors which courts
should assess in determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some

32
might express them in different ways, we identify four
such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.

Id. at 530. Thus, the rule becomes one of a totality of the
circumstances test, where no one factor is “either a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of
speedy trial”; but “[r]ather, they are related factors and must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be
relevant.” Id. at 533.

Rule 3.191 is designed as a procedure to protect this
constitutional right. However, Robinson has not alleged that his
Sixth Amendment right has been violated, nor has he alleged any
prejudice. As a result, he has no substantive claim for a dismissal
under the Sixth Amendment. Robinson’s claim is based solely on
the passage of time under rule 3.191. In this regard, the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial rule was “not primarily intended to
prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time.” United
States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). Rather, the right is
primarily “designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy
incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while
released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” Id.
However, in Williams, the court created an alternative substantive
deadline based not on the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but
merely on the passage of time. Robinson was never prejudiced in
this matter, as he did not suffer from a lengthy pre-trial
incarceration because he was already serving a prison sentence on
the Suwannee County charges. See State v. Joyner, 460 So. 2d 584,
585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding the defendant failed to show his
speedy trial rights were violated and stating: “There was no
oppressive pretrial incarceration because Joyner was serving a
lengthy state prison sentence.”). Thus, he would have had no
remedy for a violation of his Sixth Amendment right but for the
judicial interference in this area of substantive law vis-à-vis
Williams. As Justice Lawson aptly stated, these unnecessary
automatic discharges are created when the “judiciary unjustifiably
interferes with substantive law or executive discretion under the

33
guise of procedural rulemaking.” Born-Suniaga, 256 So. 3d at 792
(Lawson, J., dissenting).

IV.

I respectfully dissent because I do not think that Robinson
met his burden to show that the four Melton factors were present
and accordingly believe that an affirmance is appropriate.
However, I concur with the majority to the extent of their
application of the current precedent in Williams and its progeny in
regard to a discharge under rule 3.191 and their acknowledgment
that the precedent in Williams should be re-visited or a rule
change should be implemented. Additionally, as indicated above,
this case precisely illustrates the unworkability of the current
precedent interpreting rule 3.191 in cases where the State has not
been alerted to the need to file an information and where the State
has not been given the benefit of the recapture provision provided
by rule 3.191. As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, Florida’s
focus on the Melton factors unnecessarily overcomplicates the
inquiry. Davis II, 286 So. 3d at 175. As this Court has previously
explained, and the Supreme Court recognized, there is a legitimate
and unresolved concern that “the narrowed focus on the Melton
factors, along with the wording of the current rule [3.191], could,
in theory, lead to a determination that an individual has been
arrested for speedy trial purposes even though he or she was not
arrested for the purpose of being held to answer in court for
criminal charges.” Id. This is exactly what has happened in this
case. Robinson can point to no violation of a substantive right that
would provide him with an automatic discharge on this attempted
murder charge. However, based on the decision in Williams, a
procedural rule has supplanted substantive laws. As the Florida
Supreme Court has appropriately stated, “a procedural rule
designed to protect a substantive right should come into play when
the substantive right is implicated—not before.” Id. Therefore, I
reiterate the need for this precedent to be re-visited or re-
evaluated through the rule making process.

34
Case No. 5D23-330
LT Case No. 16-2017-CF-003961-AXXX

MAKAR, J., concurring in part and in result.

In this speedy trial case, the record supports the conclusion
that each of the four factors in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
1954), were met and thereby established that an arrest was made
for purposes of triggering the 175-day period set forth in Florida’s
speedy trial rule. In this regard, the sole purpose of the FDLE’s
encounter with Robinson in Live Oak after the Suwannee Music
Festival was to arrest him on the Duval County warrant, which
they did; that local sheriff’s officers arrested Robinson on drug
charges arising from a post-arrest search does not negate FDLE’s
arrest on the Duval attempted murder and felony handgun
possession charges—two concurrent arrests are permissible. Plus,
the record doesn’t support the notion that FDLE and the sheriff’s
officers called an audible during the arrest with FDLE essentially
making a split-second decision to abandon its monthslong plan to
arrest Robinson; instead, both authorities understood that they
were both arresting Robinson, albeit on different charges.

The parties contest the third Melton factor, which is whether
there was “communication by the arresting officer to the person
whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there
to effect an arrest[.]” Id. at 294. Again, the record establishes that
the FDLE officers’ sole purpose was to arrest Robinson and that
Robinson understood that he was being arrested. Melton does not
require that the arresting officer specify the details of the warrant
involved, only that an arrest is intended. Even if Robinson’s
undisputed testimony was less than credible, it would nonetheless
be consistent with the statutory obligation of an arresting officer
to “inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that
a warrant has been issued” absent circumstances that are not
present in this case. See § 901.16, Fla. Stat. (2023) (entitled
“Method of arrest by officer by a warrant”). Officers are presumed
to comply with their statutory duties; thus, even though they did
not testify, the FDLE officers who arrested Robinson
presumptively informed Robinson of the reason for the arrest and
that a warrant existed. On the record presented, the third Melton
factor is met, thus I concur in the conclusion that Robinson was

35
arrested for purposes of triggering Florida’s speedy trial rule. And
because the State did not file the Duval County charges for almost
two years, the 175-day period in the rule had expired.

Next is the remedial question. On this point, the record shows
that Robinson was less than vigilant in protecting his right to a
speedy trial and did not avail himself of the procedural protections
of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. Were the
jurisprudential slate a clean one, affirmance would be in order
because of these shortcomings. What stands in the way, as Judge
Boatwright points out, is the supreme court’s decision in State v.
Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), which concluded that
the “State may not file charges based on the same conduct after
the speedy trial period has expired.” Judge Boatwright’s analysis
demonstrates why Williams needs to be reconsidered and its
holding modified; and why rule 3.191 needs to be modified as well
to provide greater clarity. In addition, I would certify a question of
great public importance, such as “Whether the holding in State v.
Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001), should be modified to
clarify that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 does not
establish substantive rights including the right to automatic
discharge after expiration of the rule’s prescribed time period.”

In summary, I concur in Chief Judge Edwards’s opinion,
which concludes that the Melton factors were met and that the
speedy trial time period expired; I also concur in parts III (A)-(B)
of Judge Boatwright’s opinion and in result because that’s what is
required under the holding of Williams, a precedent that ought to
be revisited and for which a certified question is justified.

36

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9929332. Public record. Not legal advice.