# People v. Chatman

> Illinois Supreme Court · January 19, 2024 · 238 N.E.3d 1055

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9925366

## Case

- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** January 19, 2024
- **Citations:** 238 N.E.3d 1055; 2024 IL 129133
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 16 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

2024 IL 129133

IN THE
SUPREME COURT

OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 129133)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
MICHEAL D. CHATMAN, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 19, 2024.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford,
and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In January 2020, the State charged defendant, Micheal D. Chatman, with four
counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)-(3) (West 2018)) in connection
with the shooting death of Ricky Green. Prior to trial, the State sought to introduce
statements made by Dominique “Dee” Collins, who was unable to be located, under
the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule (Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)
(eff. Jan. 1, 2011)) and the sixth amendment confrontation clause (U.S. Const.,
amend. VI). The Champaign County circuit court allowed Collins’s statements to
be introduced, finding him unavailable and that the State had made reasonable,
good-faith efforts to secure his presence at trial. A jury found defendant guilty of
felony murder, and the court sentenced him to prison. The appellate court affirmed.
2022 IL App (4th) 210716, ¶ 1.

¶2 Now on appeal, defendant argues the State was required to demonstrate good-
faith efforts to procure Collins’s presence at trial but failed to do so. We affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Not long after midnight on March 23, 2018, Ricky Green was shot twice and
killed in Champaign. Shortly before his death, Green was in a car with defendant,
codefendant Michael Simmons, and Kotia Fairman. After police officers followed
their car, Green, defendant, and Simmons ran because they had guns and drugs in
the car. While they fled, an altercation ensued between Green and defendant, during
which defendant shot Green. Items tied to defendant and Simmons were later found
in the car, including a .357 Magnum revolver, which was not used to shoot Green.

¶5 Based on this incident, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of
a firearm by a felon and obstruction of justice. In August 2018, defendant pleaded
guilty and received a sentence of probation. The State did not charge him with
Green’s murder until January 2020. This occurred after the State on December 30,
2019, secured a video-recorded statement from Dee Collins, wherein he related to
Detective Jeremiah Christian that defendant had confessed to Collins shortly after
the shooting.

¶6 In October 2020, the State filed a motion in limine to admit Collins’s statements
due to forfeiture by wrongdoing. The motion alleged Collins was interviewed on
December 30, 2019, after his arrest on a traffic warrant. Collins said he had been
with defendant the morning after the shooting when defendant bragged about
killing Green. Defendant told Collins that he, Simmons, and Green were in the back
seat of a vehicle and defendant had planned to rob Green of a gun. As they fled
from the police, defendant grabbed Green’s gun. When Green later tried to retrieve
it, defendant feared for his safety and shot Green.

-2-
¶7 The motion claimed defendant talked in recorded jailhouse phone calls about
Collins speaking to the police and making sure he did not testify. Although
defendant did not give specific orders during the calls to prevent Collins from
testifying, defendant’s father and brother indicated they would ensure Collins
would not cooperate with the police or appear at trial. On February 16, 2020,
Collins sent an officer a text message that read, “Everybody think I told on Mikey
[(Defendant)] idk how they getting this information I’ve been getting threats from
a lot of people.” Collins fled to Iowa. On March 12, 2020, Collins met with a
detective in Iowa and stated he had been receiving threatening text messages and
social media posts from people associated with defendant and Simmons. The
motion claimed Collins had moved out of state because he feared for his life. On
October 9, 2020, Detective Christian sent a text message to Collins’s phone
number. Collins initially did not respond, but a later response said Christian had the
wrong number.

¶8 In February 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s motion. The
State introduced defendant’s jailhouse phone calls pertaining to Collins and
Collins’s December 2019 video-recorded statement. Following arguments, the
court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
intended by his actions to prevent Collins, a material witness, from testifying. The
court reserved the issue of whether the State had made reasonable efforts to secure
Collins’s presence for a later hearing.

¶9 That hearing took place on May 6, 2021, and Detective Christian testified
regarding his efforts to locate Collins. He tried locating Collins on February 16,
2021, through a posting on “I-Board,” an intelligence-based software program that
disseminates information locally to various law-enforcement agencies and all
officers. He reposted it on April 28 and May 5. Christian indicated the postings had
been viewed 119 times without a response. He noted Collins had not been listed as
a missing person in LEADS 1 or on any list with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

1 LEADS is Illinois’s Law Enforcement Agencies Data System. See, e.g., 20 ILCS 2605/2605-

375 (West 2018).

-3-
¶ 10 Prior to the reasonable efforts hearing, Christian had traveled to Iowa to meet
with Collins. He later communicated with law enforcement in Davenport, Iowa, in
hopes of finding him. Christian testified he served a subpoena in Aurora on
Demetria Chatman, defendant’s mother, who was also related to Collins, but denied
any contact with Collins. In listening to defendant’s jailhouse calls, Christian
indicated defendant told a third party that he and his counsel had been unable to
contact Collins. Christian stated he had received information that Collins was in
Indianapolis “for a show” but provided no other details.

¶ 11 Following the testimony, the circuit judge stated as follows:

“We’re looking under Illinois Rules of Evidence number 804 that indicates
a witness is unavailable if the proponent of the statement has been unable to
procure the declarant’s attendance by process or other reasonable means.

So the real question here is whether or not the State has made good faith
efforts to present Mr. Collins as a witness at trial here. Is there something
somebody could always do more? I suppose there is. I suppose the deputy—the
officer could have gone back to Davenport recently, but he went there once.
There is no such thing as a national database. He’s really not a missing person.
I think he could best be described as Officer Christian indicated, he’s somebody
who didn’t want to be found.

I’m not sure how effective putting it on this board was when it was really
just local, but he did contact law enforcement in the Davenport, Iowa, area, and
they hadn’t had any contact with him in a number of years. I don’t know who
he spoke to, but the witness did indicate that everybody he had spoken to,
nobody knew the whereabouts. And although it doesn’t—at first blush, it
sounded like attorney-client information, Ms. Alferink [(assistant state’s
attorney)] clarified that it appeared that Mr. Chatman made some statements to
other individuals indicating that he believes that Mr. Collins is—cannot be
found even by the defense. I don’t know if that’s true or not. But the real
question is whether or not the State has used good faith efforts and used
reasonable means and effort. And based on the totality of the circumstances
here, the Court is going to make that finding. And, therefore, the Court is going
to show that the State has tried to get Mr. Collins’ attendance by process or

-4-
other reasonable means. They’ve used good faith effort. They’ve been unable
to do so. And, therefore, the statements will be admissible.”

¶ 12 Prior to the start of defendant’s trial in September 2021, the circuit court held a
second hearing on the State’s efforts to locate Collins. Detective Christian testified
that the I-Board posting regarding Collins had been viewed more than 250 times
since the last posting. In August 2021, Christian researched various databases in
search of a recent address for Collins. He and another police detective went to an
address of an apartment complex on Green Street in Champaign, but there appeared
to be no one inside. They also went to a house on Springfield Avenue in Champaign
that Collins had used in 2018, but Christian said the house appeared to be vacant
and no one answered the door. Christian stated he went to the residence of Collins’s
brother, Devonte McCormick, on Dale Drive in Champaign but, although there
were vehicles in the driveway and Christian suspected people were inside, no one
answered the door.

¶ 13 Christian stated he traveled out of state to a home linked to Collins but there
was no one inside, and Christian had no reason to think Collins lived there any
longer. Christian also stated he and a detective traveled to Kendall County to check
two addresses linked to Collins, but they received no answer at either location.

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Christian testified no warrants had been issued for
Collins and no request had been put into LEADS to find him. The last time
Christian dialed Collins’s phone number, he heard a voice he did not recognize, and
the man said he had the wrong number.

¶ 15 Following arguments, the circuit judge stated as follows:

“Well, the Court has already found that there was forfeiture by wrongdoing.
The issue now is whether or not the State has made reasonable efforts to show
that Mr. Collins is unavailable. I did find that back in May. And now I’ve heard
more testimony about what efforts have been made since this time. And Mr.
Nolan [(defense counsel)] argues that it was a half-hearted attempt that they
knocked on a door and heard some noise and left, and that’s true. But most of
the other arguments that Mr. Nolan makes really are not persuasive.

-5-
In terms of putting someone into LEADS for statewide. I heard the
testimony that you would need a warrant, and there’s no warrant, and so it
would not be allowed into LEADS. He’s *** unaware of the database for the
FBI and how that has to be done. And, in fact, Ms. Alferink just indicated here
that although she did get a warrant for several other witnesses, that’s because
they had been served with a subpoena and Mr. Collins had not.

What I did hear is that there has been continued effort to put this person on
the iBoard, which of course is more locally centralized. But if you have
detectives in our area working on other cases, they may hear nuggets about Mr.
Collins, so it is a useful tool, although it is somewhat local. But he did go to a
number of addresses. He called some numbers. He went out of state.

He has made in my opinion reasonable efforts. Not perfect efforts. Not all
the efforts that could possibly be made, but reasonable efforts. And the State
simply has to show this that the witness is unavailable by preponderance of the
evidence, which I certainly do find at this time.

Therefore, the Court is going to find reasonable efforts to locate Mr. Collins
have failed. He is unavailable. The statements will come in pursuant to the
Court’s previous order.”

¶ 16 The case then proceeded to a jury trial. As the appellate court laid out the
testimony and evidence in its opinion, we will summarize only those facts necessary
to fully analyze the issues on appeal. The trial testimony established that, on the
afternoon before Green’s murder, defendant and Simmons planned to steal Green’s
gun. In the evening, defendant sent Facebook messages to Green inviting him to
get together with him and Simmons. The three went to a party before leaving and
picking up Kotia Fairman.

¶ 17 Defendant later heard from his mother, who asked them to pick her up at a
trailer park. Upon arrival, they saw police in the area, so they parked near the
entrance. Earlier, Calvin Wilson, who was dating defendant’s mother, had told
police about a domestic dispute they had that evening. Wilson told police that
defendant might have information and described the car he was in.

-6-
¶ 18 Shortly after midnight, police officers saw a car that matched Wilson’s
description of the one in which defendant had been riding. When officers
approached, the driver of the car drove off. The officers eventually found the car
parked in the middle of the street. Fairman was walking around the car, but
defendant, Green, and Simmons were no longer there. Inside the car, officers found
Simmons’s identification, defendant’s cell phone, and a .357 Magnum revolver.

¶ 19 As officers approached the vehicle, they heard yelling and gunshots in the
distance. Another officer responded to a call of shots fired and discovered Green
lying in the street. Green, who had been shot in his groin and shoulder, later died at
the hospital. A brown left boot was found near Green’s body, and a brown right
boot was found under a nearby parked car. Forensic testing determined that DNA
on the left boot was consistent with defendant’s DNA profile.

¶ 20 In the early morning hours, defendant knocked on the door of Alexandrinique
Anderson and asked to use her phone. Defendant was barefoot at the time and told
her he had come from the trailer park where he had been attacked by “some
Mexicans” and had to defend himself.

¶ 21 The video recording of Collins’s statement to the police was played for the jury.
Collins said that, on the morning after Green’s murder, defendant arrived at
Collins’s brother’s home without any socks or shoes. Defendant told Collins that
he tried to take Green’s gun and run but Green chased him, so defendant turned
around and shot him twice. Defendant then ran away.

¶ 22 Police interviewed defendant two days after the murder and again in October
2019. During both interviews, he denied shooting Green. He said he jumped out of
the car to run from police, heard shots, ran faster, and lost his shoes. The State’s
evidence included incriminating statements defendant made during his jailhouse
phone calls while he was in custody on the gun possession charge and later on the
murder charge.

¶ 23 Defendant also confessed to Dennis Griham while they were housed in the same
cellblock of the county jail in February 2020. Griham, who was in prison at the time
of defendant’s trial, testified defendant stated he and Simmons had called Green
and told him they “had a lick, which meant something had come up.” They picked
up Green, “rolled around for a little while,” and wound up at a trailer park.

-7-
Defendant told Griham he “tussl[ed]” with Green for the gun and defendant
“accidentally shot Mr. Green in the chest twice.” Defendant stated he ran, lost one
of his boots, and hid.

¶ 24 Defendant testified in his own defense. He claimed the text messages between
him and Simmons were not about robbing Green. Instead, he, Simmons, and Green
planned to steal guns from Green’s friends. When the police attempted to stop their
vehicle, the men “started tucking guns under the seat.” When their car stopped,
defendant grabbed a gun and ran. After defendant and Green stopped running,
Green asked for his gun. Defendant wanted to get away from the police first, but
Green “got aggressive.” Green grabbed him, and defendant tried to get away. When
Green continued to grab defendant and put a hand on his shoulder, defendant tried
to run and then shot him. With Green still on him, defendant fired again. Defendant
then ran and hid under a car.

¶ 25 Defendant stated he never went to Devonte McCormick’s house and never saw
Collins on the morning after the shooting. Defendant also testified that Griham
asked a lot of questions about his case but twisted his words and “made up his own
little story.”

¶ 26 The jury found defendant guilty of felony murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West
2018). Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for acquittal or, in the alternative, for a
new trial, arguing inter alia that the State did not meet its burden of proving
forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit Collins’s statement. The circuit court denied the
motion and sentenced defendant to 55 years in prison.

¶ 27 Defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in finding the State made
reasonable, good-faith efforts to procure Collins’s attendance at trial. 2022 IL App
(4th) 210716, ¶ 46. Initially, the Fourth District agreed with defendant that the State
is required, in the context of Rule 804(a)(5) (Ill. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) (eff. Jan. 1,
2011)), to show that reasonable, good-faith efforts were made to procure a witness’s
attendance. 2022 IL App (4th) 210716, ¶ 54. The appellate court went on, however,
to find the State’s efforts to locate Collins were reasonable and thus the circuit
court’s similar finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 64.
The Fourth District affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Id. ¶ 73.

-8-
¶ 28 In November 2022, defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal, and we
allowed that petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 29 ANALYSIS

¶ 30 Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues this court should adopt
the Fourth District’s holding that, when seeking to introduce hearsay statements
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, the State must demonstrate its good-
faith efforts to procure a witness’s attendance where the witness is allegedly
unavailable due to the opposing party’s wrongdoing. Second, he argues the State
failed to show good-faith efforts in securing Collins’s presence at trial. Third, he
argues the circuit court’s error in admitting Collins’s statement violated his
constitutional right to confront a witness against him and that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 31 I. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

¶ 32 The common-law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing serves both as an
exception to the hearsay rule and to the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment. People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 96-97 (2010); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). The doctrine is codified in Illinois Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(5) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) and Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).
People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶¶ 18-19.

¶ 33 Ordinarily, the rule against hearsay would prohibit the introduction at trial of
out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. ¶ 17.
However, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception in Rule 804(b)(5) provides that
“[a] statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing
that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness” is not excluded by the hearsay rule. Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (eff. Jan. 1,
2011).

¶ 34 As the proponent of the hearsay here, the State had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant engaged in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure Collins’s unavailability. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331,

-9-
¶ 39. Where the circuit court makes a finding by a preponderance of the evidence,
that finding will only be reversed if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where ‘the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence presented.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322,
332 (2008)).

¶ 35 In this case, defendant does not challenge the circuit court’s finding that he
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing to prevent Collins from testifying. Instead,
his arguments center on Collins’s unavailability and his belief that the State was
required to demonstrate good-faith efforts to procure Collins’s attendance at trial.

¶ 36 For the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to apply, the declarant must be
unavailable. Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Rule 804(a) defines
“unavailability as a witness” and lists five situations in which a witness may be
found to be unavailable. Ill. R. Evid. 804(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Here, only one
scenario applies—where the declarant “is absent from the hearing and the
proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance ***
by process or other reasonable means.” Ill. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

¶ 37 Illinois Rule of Evidence 804 is modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 804,
and this court may look to federal law as guidance in determining the State’s
obligations in seeking to introduce the statements of an unavailable witness. See
People v. Thompson, 2016 IL 118667, ¶ 40. In analyzing an exception to the
confrontation clause, the United States Supreme Court has stated a declarant is not
unavailable “ ‘unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to
obtain his presence at trial.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
74 (1980) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)).

¶ 38 In the appellate court, the State relied on People v. Golden, 2021 IL App (2d)
200207, in arguing the prosecutor need not make good-faith efforts to secure a
witness’s testimony if the statements are being admitted under Rule 804(b)(5). In
Golden, the defendant had argued Rule 804(b)(5) included the requirement under
Rule 804(a)(5) “that the proponent of the hearsay statement demonstrate an
inability to procure the declarant’s attendance by process or other reasonable
means.” Id. ¶ 70. The Second District disagreed and stated as follows:

- 10 -
“Rule 804 governs exceptions to the rule against hearsay where the
declarant is unavailable. Ill. R. Evid. 804 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Rule 804(a)(5)
expressly encompasses situations in which the declarant ‘is absent from the
hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the
declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision
(b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or testimony) by process or other
reasonable means.’ Ill. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). By its very terms,
then, Rule 804(a)(5) does not apply to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing
as codified in Rule 804(b)(5).” Id. ¶ 71.

¶ 39 In support of its conclusion, the Second District went on to cite this court’s
decision in Peterson, which stated Rule 804(b)(5) “ ‘identifies only two criteria or
factors that must be satisfied for the admission of hearsay statements under the
rule:’ wrongdoing on the part of the defendant and evidence that the wrongdoing
was committed with the intent to, and did, render the witness unavailable to testify.”
Id. ¶ 72 (quoting Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 32). The court also cited People v.
Zimmerman, 2018 IL App (4th) 170695, ¶ 98, which found Rule 804(b)(5) only has
those same two factors that must be satisfied. Golden, 2021 IL App (2d) 200207,
¶ 72. The Second District believed this interpretation of Rule 804(b)(5) “does not
require the State to demonstrate in any particular manner that the witness was
unavailable despite its best efforts to procure the witness’s attendance.” Id.

¶ 40 The Fourth District in this case disagreed with Golden as it related to the plain
language of Rule 804(a)(5). 2022 IL App (4th) 210716, ¶ 51. In looking at Rule
804(a), the appellate court stated “subdivision (a)(5) applies to subdivisions (b)(1)
and (5) when the declarant’s attendance cannot be procured and to subdivisions
(b)(2), (3), and (4) when either the declarant’s attendance or testimony cannot be
procured” as those subdivisions apply to dying declarations, statements against
interest, and statements of personal or family history. Id. ¶ 51 & n.2. Thus, the court
concluded Rule 804(a)(5) applied to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Id.
¶ 51.

¶ 41 The Fourth District also rejected Golden’s reliance on Peterson and
Zimmerman, stating neither addressed the interaction between subdivisions (a)(5)
and (b)(5) of Rule 804. Id. ¶ 52. “Peterson addressed whether additional indicia of
reliability were required to introduce a hearsay statement where the defendant

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procured the declarant’s unavailability by killing them and Zimmerman addressed
what types of statements were admissible under Rule 804(b)(5).” Id. The Fourth
District held that, “because a witness must be unavailable as a prerequisite to
forfeiture by wrongdoing, it falls on the proponent of the statement to demonstrate
unavailability by a preponderance of the evidence in some manner under Rule
804(a).” Id. ¶ 53.

¶ 42 As the State contended Collins could not be located and thus could not be served
or otherwise compelled to come to court, the Fourth District found it fell “within
the purview of Rule 804(a)(5) and require[d] the State to show that good-faith
reasonable efforts were made to procure the witnesses’ attendance by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 54.

¶ 43 We note the State here has abandoned any reliance on Golden and does not cite
the opinion in its brief to this court. Even if it did, on the issue of the State’s
obligations under Rule 804(a)(5) and (b)(5), we find the Fourth District’s reasoning
is correct. The plain language of Rule 804(b)(5) requires the unavailability of a
witness, and Rule 804(a) defines unavailability. When considering a witness’s
unavailability in the confrontation clause context, this court has required the State
to “ ‘either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose
statement it wishes to use against the defendant.’ ” People v. Torres, 2012 IL
111302, ¶ 54 (quoting People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 118 (1998)); see also
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (stating a witness is not unavailable under the sixth
amendment unless the prosecutor has made good-faith efforts to obtain his presence
at trial). The same applies when the State seeks to introduce hearsay statements
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.

¶ 44 Accordingly, we hold that, when the State seeks to introduce hearsay under this
exception, the State must demonstrate that the witness is unavailable and that
reasonable, good-faith efforts were made to procure the witness’s attendance by a
preponderance of the evidence. To the extent Golden holds the proponent of
statements of an unavailable witness under Rule 804(b)(5) need not demonstrate
good-faith efforts in securing that witness’s attendance at trial, that portion of the
opinion is hereby overruled.

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¶ 45 II. Reasonable, Good-Faith Efforts

¶ 46 Now that we have found, as did the Fourth District, that the State is required to
demonstrate good-faith efforts in securing Collins’s attendance at trial, we turn next
to the question of whether the efforts made in this case were reasonable.

¶ 47 In defining the good-faith requirement, several general propositions have
emerged, namely:

“ ‘The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of
procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness’ intervening death),
“good faith” demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a possibility,
albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the
obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. “The lengths to which
the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a question of reasonableness.”
[Citation.] The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite
good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness. As
with other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution bears the burden of
establishing this predicate.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Torres, 2012 IL 111302,
¶ 54 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75).

¶ 48 “[W]hen a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of
additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness’
presence [citation], but the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to
exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.” Hardy v. Cross, 565
U.S. 65, 71-72 (2011) (per curiam). Moreover, a good-faith effort “is not an ends-
of-the-earth effort.” United States v. Chun Ya Cheung, 350 Fed. App’x 19, 23 (6th
Cir. 2009). “Whether good-faith and reasonable diligence have been exercised is
determined on a case-by-case basis after a careful review of the facts and
circumstances.” People v. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d 207, 215 (1995).

¶ 49 In this case, Collins received numerous threats from defendant’s family and
friends and, as a result, fled to Iowa in February 2020. He initially met with
detectives in Iowa in March 2020, and nothing indicated he planned on not
cooperating with police or intended to move elsewhere. However, he eventually
stopped responding, and his whereabouts became unknown.

- 13 -
¶ 50 Detective Christian testified that, when he last attempted to call Collins’s phone
number, he did not recognize the voice of the person who answered and that person
said he had the wrong number. In his attempts to find Collins, Christian posted
Collins’s information on the I-Board in February 2021, alerting local law-
enforcement agencies and officers. He reposted the information in April and May
2021. Although the posting was viewed hundreds of times, Christian did not receive
any responses. He also contacted law-enforcement officers in Davenport, Iowa, but
they had no contact with Collins.

¶ 51 In August 2021, Christian also researched various databases to try to locate a
recent address for Collins. After doing so, he and another detective attempted to
make contact at an apartment complex on Green Street in Champaign, but no one
appeared to be inside. They went to Collins’s former address on Springfield Avenue
in Champaign, but it appeared no one lived at the house. They went to the residence
of Collins’s brother on Dale Drive in Champaign, but although Christian suspected
people were inside, no one answered the door. Detectives traveled to an address in
Iowa, but no one was at the house. They also tried two addresses in Kendall County
without success.

¶ 52 Christian served a subpoena in Aurora on defendant’s mother, who was related
to Collins, and she stated she had no contact with Collins. None of defendant’s
other family members provided any information on Collins’s whereabouts.
Defendant’s jailhouse phone calls indicated that he and his counsel had been unable
to locate Collins.

¶ 53 From all accounts, Collins did not want to be found. Notwithstanding that fact,
Detective Christian utilized the information available to him in an ongoing attempt
to find him. Through the I-Board postings, the phone call to Collins’s last known
number, and the visits to multiple addresses in different counties and different
states, Christian made good-faith efforts to locate Collins without success. While
the State’s efforts might not be considered extraordinary, the question here is
whether the efforts to locate Collins were reasonable. We find that they were.

¶ 54 Defendant, however, argues more could have been done. Specifically,
defendant argues the State could have mailed subpoenas to the addresses Collins
was affiliated with, Collins could have been listed as a missing person in LEADS,

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and Collins’s phone records could have been subpoenaed to help learn his
whereabouts.

¶ 55 We find the success of the proposed actions speculative at best. As to the
mailing of a subpoena, there is no indication that Collins was living at any of the
addresses Christian visited, and thus any such attempt at mailing the subpoena
would most likely have been futile. Christian also testified he could not place
Collins’s information in LEADS because he had not been served with a subpoena.
A missing person can be placed into LEADS when there is a reasonable concern
for that person’s safety, but it requires a “missing person report,” and Collins was
not so much missing as he was intentionally not wanting to be found. See LEADS
3.0 Manual, Ill. State Police (Apr. 25, 2022), https://isp.illinois.gov/Law
Enforcement/LEADS3Manual [https://perma.cc/HT2W-94JV]. Lastly,
subpoenaing Collins’s phone records would not guarantee finding him, given his
clear intention not to be discovered. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 76 (noting “the great
improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating the witness, and
would have led to her production at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a concept
of reasonableness required their execution”).

¶ 56 Defendant also cites several cases that he contends show what reasonable,
good-faith efforts look like and how they, when compared to this case, prove the
State’s efforts were deficient. See e.g., United States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 1215 (11th
Cir. 2019); People v. Payne, 30 Ill. App. 3d 624 (1975). However, these cases and
others like them deal with facts that are distinguishable from those of the case
before us. Moreover, the reasonableness of the State’s efforts depends on an
analysis of the specific facts of each individual case, eschewing a rigid case-by-
case comparison. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (treating
“reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is
likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a
given case”); Smith, 928 F.3d at 1228 (noting “there is no brightline rule for
reasonableness” and “a reasonableness inquiry necessarily is fact-specific and
examines the totality of the factual circumstances of each particular case”).

¶ 57 While “[o]ne, in hindsight, may always think of other things” (Roberts, 448
U.S. at 75), nothing indicates Christian learned of tips or leads about Collins’s
whereabouts and failed to follow up on them. Although the State’s efforts in

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locating Collins failed to bear fruit, they were in the end reasonable. Given the
totality of the facts and circumstances here, the circuit court’s finding that the State
made reasonable, good-faith efforts to locate Collins was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.

¶ 58 As we find no error in the admission of Collins’s statements, we need not
address defendant’s final claim that the introduction of the statements violated his
right to confront a witness against him.

¶ 59 CONCLUSION

¶ 60 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment, which
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 61 Judgments affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9925366. Public record. Not legal advice.