# Trident Engineering & Procurement, P.C.

> Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals · May 8, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9900200

## Case

- **Court:** Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
- **Decided:** May 8, 2023
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS

Appeals of - )
)
Trident Engineering & Procurement, P.C. ) ASBCA Nos. 60541, 62144
)
Under Contract No. W52P1J1-14-D-0037 )

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Michael E. Barnicle, Esq.
Arnold & Porter
Chicago, IL

Keith J. Feigenbaum, Esq.
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
Washington, DC

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Scott N. Flesch, Esq.
Army Chief Trial Attorney
CPT Jules L. Szanton, JA
Dana J. Chase, Esq.
CPT Camille J Grathwohl, JA
Trial Attorneys

OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE THRASHER ON THE
GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND APPELLANT’S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This dispute involves a contract for Trident Engineering & Procurement, P.C.
(Trident) to provide the U.S. Army Contracting Command - Rock Island (government)
a 12-month leases of non-tactical vehicles in Qatar, Camp As Sayliyah. Relevant to
these appeals, in addition to providing non-tactical leased vehicles, Trident was to
maintain the vehicles and invoice for traffic violations and tolls. In December 2015,
Trident’s representative, without authorization, retrieved the leased vehicles under the
contract and permanently transferred them to a third party. As a result, the
government terminated the contract for default, and the contracting officer issued a
negative Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) rating.

The government moved for summary judgment, and Trident moved for
cross-summary judgment. We grant the government’s motion for summary judgment
in part and deny it in part. We deny Trident’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS (SOF) FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION

Base Contract and Task Orders 0006-0008

1. The U.S. Army Contracting Command - Rock Island awarded an indefinite
delivery indefinite quantity, firm fixed price contract W52P1J-14-D-0037 (contract)
for Non-Tactical Vehicle leasing services at various camps in Qatar, Jordan, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Trident Engineering and Procurement P.C. (Trident,
appellant) (R4, tab 1 at 000003). Trident was to provide all equipment, tools,
materials, supervision, and other items and non-personal services necessary to
maintain the vehicular leasing and maintenance requirements. The vehicle leases
would be established on a 12-month cycle. (Id.)

2. The contract period of performance was for one base year (February 3,
2014 – February 2, 2015) with two 1-year option periods (R4, tab 1 at 000003).

3. At issue in this appeal are the government’s leases for five non-tactical
vehicles and the claimed costs for “traffic violations and tolls,” described below in
Task Orders 0006-0008.

4. Task Order 0006 was issued on July 6, 2015, for a 12-month lease of
non-tactical vehicles in Qatar. Trident was to deliver to the government two full-sized
SUVs. A separate contract line item number (CLIN) 0012AA for “traffic
violations/tolls” was established in the amount of $2,376.00. (Gov’t mot., ex. G-5
at 00000037; app. reply to gov’t resp. to app’s statement of undisputed material facts
dtd. 1 April 15, 2022, ¶¶ 1-2). 2

1
In response to the government’s motion for summary judgment, appellant submitted
a “Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Fact” in its reply brief dated
April 15, 2022, which corresponds to the numbered paragraphs in the
government’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts alleged in its motion.
Relevant paragraphs are noted herein. Appellant’s statement will be cited as
(app. statement of genuine issues of material fact).
2
Both parties move for summary judgment and assert no disputed material facts
regarding their respective legal positions, but they interpret the contract and
events differently. “Merely because a party has moved for summary judgment
and avers there are no genuine issues of fact precluding its recovery does not
mean that it ‘concede[s] that no issues remain in the event [that its] adversary’s
theory is adopted.’” We evaluate each cross-motion “separately on its merits,
and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the defending party; the
Board is not bound to ‘grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the
other.’” United Healthcare Partners, Inc., ASBCA No. 58123, 16-1 BCA
¶ 36,374 at 177,113; Osborne Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 55030, 09-1 BCA

2
5. Similar to Task Order 0006, Task Orders 0007 and 0008 were issued on
July 6, 2015, and September 13, 2015, for 12-month leases of non-tactical vehicles in
Qatar. Trident was to deliver a mid-size SUV and a crew-cab pickup (4x4) under Task
Order 0007 and deliver a full-size SUV under Task Order 0008 (gov’t mot., ex. G-5
at 00000041, 00000043, 00000047, 00000049; app. reply to gov’t resp. to app’s
statement of undisputed material facts dtd. April 15, 2022, ¶¶ 12-14). Task Orders 0007
and 0008 established a separate CLIN 0012AA for “Traffic Violations/Tolls” in the
amount of $2,359.20 and $1,326, respectively (gov’t mot., ex. G-5 at 00000045,
00000049).

6. On November 14, 2015, Mr. Tony Kuster (Vice President of Operations,
Trident) responded to the contracting officer’s representative (COR) email of the same
day that Mr. Hany Mostafa 3 is Trident’s representative in Qatar and that Mr. Mostafa
will coordinate vehicles to be removed off-base for repairs and maintenance (R4,
tab 14 at 000167-68).

7. On November 26, 2015, the COR emailed Mr. Kuster that Mr. Mostafa
documented vehicle damage on a vehicle inspection report. Mr. Kuster responded the
same day that Trident would request an equitable adjustment if Mr. Mostafa indicated
the damage on the sign-off sheet. (R4, tab 43 at 000301-02)

8. On December 20, 2015, the COR sent an email to the contracting officer
(CO), Ms. Keller, informing her that he had received text messages from
Mr. Mohammed Alajmi claiming to be a partner of Trident, who asserted he had not
received payment for the vehicles leased in the government’s possession for the Qatar
Task Orders 0006-0008 and that he wanted the vehicles back (Rule 4, tab 13 at 000135;
app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 15;app. reply to gov’t resp. to app’s
statement of undisputed material facts dtd. April 15, 2022, ¶ 15).

9. On December 21, 2015, Mr. Alajmi forwarded an email exchange between
him and Mr. John Zvarick (Executive Vice-President of Trident) to the COR (R4,
tab 16). In the forwarded email, Mr. Zvarick stated to Mr. Alajmi that Trident was
losing “hundreds of thousands of dollars” with its Army vehicle leasing contract, which
Trident was “ending,” but that he was willing to negotiate a settlement with Trident’s

¶ 34,083 at 168,513 (quoting Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States,
812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
3
The parties have cited various spellings of Mr. Hany Mohamed Mostafa. Therefore,
the Board will use the spelling provided in the Camp As Sayliyah Personnel
Security Questionnaire and the screening Badge Request: Mostafa (R4, tab 10
at 000107; tab 63). However, if the Board quotes a document, it will employ
the spelling of Mr. Mostafa from that document.

3
business partners for the past due payments for the leased vehicles. But he also stated
that if Mr. Alajmi retrieves the leased vehicles in Kuwait, Mr. Zvarick will “walk
away” from the Qatar contract. Additionally, Mr. Zvarick suggested settling Trident’s
past due debts, noting that Mr. Alajmi, as the vehicles’ registrant and Trident’s “full
power of attorney,” could retrieve the leased vehicles and sell them. Also, Mr. Zvarick
reminded him that “I have given you full power of attorney . . . . All the cars that
remain are in your name so what you do with them is between Al Manar and you. My
advice is to sell them and to give Al Manar all the money to settle as much of the debt
as possible.” Finally, Mr. Zvarick stated that if Mr. Alajmi did not renew the vehicles’
licenses, he would not send him any more money, and it would be up to Mr. Alajmi to
solve the past due payments. (Id. at 000170-71)

10. On December 22, 2015, the CO emailed Mr. Zvarick and Mr. Tony Kuster
(Vice President of Operations, Trident), informing them that the COR was contacted
by Mr. Alajmi, who alleged he was a partner of Trident, and the registered owner of
the leased vehicles under the contract, but has not received payment. The CO
informed Trident that the government could not prohibit the vehicles’ owner and
registrant from picking up the leased vehicles. Additionally, the CO stated if
Mr. Alajmi picked up the leased vehicles before the end of the task order and Trident
failed to provide replacement vehicles, Trident would be in default. (Rule 4, tab 15
at 000145-46; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶¶ 16-18)

11. The same morning Mr. Zvarick responded to Ms. Keller, stating that Trident
is looking into the issue “to insure there is no interruption of service” (R4, tab 15
at 000145) (app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 19).

12. Mr. Kuster responded to Ms. Keller the next day, December 23, 2015,
stating that the leased vehicles were registered to Mr. Alajmi. Still, Trident failed to
take any measures to provide replacement vehicles if Mr. Alajmi retrieved them,
writing, in part:

We would like to acknowledge that Mr. Alajmi is not a
partner of Trident, but rather a sponsor of Trident
E&P Inc in Kuwait.

That being said, he is correct in that he registered our
vehicles under his name in Qatar. While it is incorrect that
he is not being paid for any “services” he provides, Trident
has taken measures to provide replacement vehicles in the
event he continues on this path.

We are working diligently to resolve this dispute with
Mr. Alajmi, however Trident is prepared to give adequate

4
notice to the COR in the event it becomes necessary to
replace the vehicles.

...

Please rest assured that Trident will continue to provide
uninterrupted service in support of this contract.

...

We are available . . . myself in Kuwait and John in PA.

(R4, tab 18 at 00018; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶¶ 20-21; (app.
reply to gov’t resp. to app’s statement of undisputed material facts dtd. April 15, 2022,
¶ 19)

13. The same morning, the CO sent an internal email to the contract specialist
and other government members informing them that Trident had stated “they have a
plan in place to provide replacement vehicles” if Mr. Alajmi retrieved them from the
government (R4, tab 17 at 000151-52; app. statement of genuine issues of material
fact, at 9, ¶ 22; app. reply to gov’t resp. to app’s statement of undisputed material facts
dtd. April 15, 2022, ¶ 20). 4

14. On December 24, 2015, the COR emailed the CO informing her that
Mr. Alajmi wanted the vehicles back and was attempting to coordinate a pickup from the
government on December 28, 2015 (Rule 4, tab 17 at 000151; app. statement of genuine
issues of material fact, ¶ 24).

15. The contract specialist emailed the CO on the morning of December 28,
2015, that Mr. Alajmi had texted him and was waiting for an email response from the
CO before picking up the leased vehicles, “Mr. Alajimi [sic] has not picked up the
vehicles yet. He did send me a text stating that he sent Katie [the CO Ms. Keller] an
email and was waiting for her responds [sic] prior to picking up the vehicles” (R4,
tab 21 at 000194; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, at 10, ¶ 25).

4
Appellant does not dispute the contents of the CO’s email dated December 23, 2015,
and the CO’s declaration. However, appellant disputes “that the
[g]overnment’s actions constituted a review of Mr. Alajmi’s claims. The
Government failed to vet Mr. Alajmi’s claims to the vehicles and accepted
Mr. Alajmi’s claims at face value after a perfunctory email to Trident.” (App.
reply to gov’t resp. to app’s statement of undisputed material facts dtd.
April 15, 2022, ¶ 20)

5
16. The same morning, the CO responded, stating that she had received an
email from Mr. Alajmi. Still, she could not provide any information or assistance to
him as the government does not have privity of contract with Mr. Alajmi (R4, tab 21
at 000194; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 25).

17. That evening, the contract specialist emailed the CO and ACC-RI support
staff to ask if Mr. Alajmi had picked up the vehicles and whether Trident had provided
replacement vehicles (R4, tab 21 at 000195).

18. On December 30, 2015, 1600 Qatar time, Mr. Hany Mostafa, Trident’s
representative and designated vehicle representative in Qatar, retrieved five leased
vehicles under Trident’s active task orders T0006, T0007, and T0008 at Camp
As Sayliyah (R4, tab 10 at 1; tab 14 at 000167; tab 23 at 00213; tab 25; tab 37 at 000279;
tab 63; gov’t mot. at 1, 8; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 32).
Vehicle inspection sheets were completed and signed by both the COR and Mr. Mostafa 5
(R4, tabs 22, 62; gov’t mot., ex. G-5 at 00000081; app. statement of genuine issues of
material fact, ¶ 26).

19. The State of Qatar Vehicle Registration cards for the vehicles that
Mr. Mostafa picked up on December 30, 2015, shows all the vehicles were registered to
and owner[ed] by Mr. Mohammad Abudullah M. D. Alajmi 6 (R4, tab 62; app. statement
of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 33). Appellant does not object to the vehicle
identification information or that the vehicles were registered to Mr. Alajmi but does
object that Mr. Alajmi was the vehicles’ owner.

20. The CO issued a cure notice under task orders 0006, 0007, and 0008 on
January 6, 2016, for the leased vehicles and maintenance in Qatar. The CO explained
that five leased vehicles were retrieved by Trident on December 30, 2015 and had yet
to be replaced. The CO provided Trident 10 days to cure its deficiency, after which
the government would terminate its contract for cause pursuant to Federal Acquisition

5
(1) vehicle #635181, VIN #1FMJU1H54CEF25113, Ford Expedition; (2) vehicle
#647729, VIN #1FMJU1H52CEF25093, Fort Expedition; (3) Vehicle #635176,
VIN #1GNKR8ED4CJ281962, Chevy Traverse; (4) vehicle #282918, VIN
#1GC1K9CG4BF165853, Chevy Silverado; and (5) vehicle # 635182, VIN
#1FMJU1H59CEF13295, Ford Expedition.
6
(1) vehicle #647729, VIN #1FMJU1H52CEF25093 registered on November 26,
2015; (2) vehicle #282918, VIN #1GC1K9CG4BF165853 registered on
December 14, 2015; (3) vehicle #635176, VIN #1GNKR8ED4CJ281962
registered on November 25, 2015; (4) vehicle #635181, VIN
#1FMJU1H54CEF25113 registered on December 1, 2015; and (5) vehicle
#635182, VIN #1FMJU1H59CEF13295 registered on December 13, 2015.

6
Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4(m), COMMERCIAL ITEMS, TERMINATION FOR
CAUSE. (R4, tab 25; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 36)

21. Mr. Zvarick sent an email to Mr. Alajmi on January 7, 2016, telling him to
either return the vehicles or sell them as soon as possible:

I am shocked that you pulled the cars off the base. Unless
you put these cars back on base immediately Mohammed,
then I have no choice but to end any further interaction
with you or to commit any further funds.

If this is your choice, and you certainly can decide to do
that, then I would suggest that you make every effort to
sell the vehicles as soon as possible.

(Gov’t mot., ex. G-5 at 00000076; app. statement of genuine issues of material fact, ¶ 37)

22. In response to the cure notice, Mr. Kuster stated via email to the CO on the
morning of January 20, 2016, that “I think we have sorted out any problems” and he
will be responding in more detail later that day regarding Trident’s current contract
status and its “predicament” (R4, tab 23 at 000169).

23. Later that evening, Mr. Kuster sent a follow-up email to the CO stating that
“Trident is unable to provide vehicles . . . . Please consider this our negative response”
(R4, tab 23 at 000169-70).

24. The next day, January 21, 2016, the CO issued a Notice of Termination for
Cause for the vehicle lease and maintenance services since Trident failed to timely
address the cure notice dated January 6, 2016, and to provide replacement vehicles
(R4, tab 32; tab 33 at 000248; app. reply to gov’t resp. to app’s statement of
undisputed material facts dtd. April 15, 2022, ¶ 25).

25. The CO issued three separate modifications for Task Orders 0006, 0007, and
0008, on January 28, 2016, to terminate the task orders for cause in accordance with
FAR clause 52.212-4(m) (R4, tab 34 at 000253, 000260, 000266). Under the narrative
section, the CO explained that Trident picked up the leased vehicles on December 30,
2015, and that “Trident is authorized to invoice for approved services under this task
order during this period of performance ONLY. Trident shall not invoice for services
after 30 December 2015” (R4, tab 34 at 000255, 000261, 000267).

7
Contractor Performance Assessment Report (CPAR)

26. The CO issued a CPAR dated April 12, 2016, for performance being
assessed from February 3, 2015 – January 21, 2016, the first option year:

Evaluation Areas Past rating Rating
Quality: Satisfactory Satisfactory
Schedule: Marginal Unsatisfactory
Management: Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Regulatory Compliance: Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

(R4, tab 37 at 000278)

27. The CO provided detailed rating explanations for each evaluation area.
The CO outlined several of Trident’s deficiencies directed at lack of compliance with
contract terms, failure to provide required documentation under the PWS, poor
communication, poor management, and failure to provide uninterrupted service.
Briefly, under the “schedule” evaluation, the CO explained that Trident failed to
provide uninterrupted service, did not timely respond to the January 6, 2016, cure
notice, and failed to take any actions or provide corrective action to the cure notice.
Under the “management” evaluation, the CO outlined several issues related to
Trident’s failure to submit invoices in accordance with the conditions of the contract,
failed to correct invoicing issues, and long periods in which the government could not
get in touch with Trident. In addition, the CO described poor management of its
employees, resulting in the removal of the vehicles from the base, which caused a
break in service. Under the “regulatory compliance” section, the CO stated that
Trident was issued a Level 1 Non-Conformance Report for failure to provide
maintenance reports and failed to provide documentation as required in the PWS, such
as proof of insurance. The CO noted that the government had sent multiple requests
for this documentation to Trident. Finally, under the “additional/other” section, the
CO described the events surrounding the vehicles being removed from the base on
December 30, 2015, without replacement vehicles being provided and Trident’s failure
to timely respond to the CO’s January 6, 2016, cure notice. (R4, tab 37 at 000279)

Invoices and Invoice Processing

28. The parties refer to invoice submissions and invoice payments through the
Wide Area Workflow (WAWF), which shows Trident’s invoice requests, supporting
details, and the subsequent government processing actions of the invoice. However,
we are unable to ascertain whether the “violations and tolls” CLIN were billed or
included in the voice totals and whether invoices marked as “blocked for payment” by
the payment official were paid. For example, Orders 006 – 008 utilize at least two
CLINs for repayment of the leased vehicles (CLINs 002, 003) and a single CLIN for

8
traffic violations and tolls (CLIN 0012AA). However, it is unclear whether invoices
1-20 demonstrate repayment for the (i) leased vehicles and (ii) traffic violations and
tolls. For example, invoices 2, 4, and 5 are marked “blocked for payment” by the
payment official. The payment official marks some invoices under Task Orders 007
and 008 that the traffic violations and tolls were listed but not billed (invoices 6, 8-12,
14, 15). Lastly, only invoices 16-20 are marked as “paid” by the payment official, but
these invoices do not include the traffic violations and tolls CLIN, 0012AA, in the
invoice total (“unit price” and “invoice amount” are listed as $0.00). The following
chart summarizes the 20 WAWF invoices with corresponding Rule 4 references (R4,
tabs 39-42, 44-59):

Deliever invoice shipment invoice date Payment Official
CLIN # unit price Product/Service ID cite
y Order number number amount invoiced comments

Full Size SUV (635181
R4, tab
1 T0006 TQV0601B TQVS607Z 0002AB $990.00 $1,980.00 6/6/2016 & 635182) 9-Jul-2015 6/20/2016:
39
to 8-Aug-2015 "Document was
Traffic Violations/Tolls processed by the
0012AA $412.01 $412.01 9-Jul-2015 to 8-Aug- entitlement system"
2015
Traffic Violations/Tolls
22-Aug-2015 to 4-Sep- 7/25/2016: "Invoice R4, tab
2 T0006 TQV0608A TQVS614Z 0012AA $412.01 $412.01 7/7/2016
2015 (1500QR) Ford Blocked for payment" 40
Expedition
Traffic Violations/Tolls 7/25/2016:
18-Sep-2015 to 25- "Document was R4, tab
3 T0006 TQV0609A TQVS615Z 0012AA $412.01 $412.01 7/7/2016
Sep-2015 (1500QR) processed by the 41
Ford Expedition entitlement system"
Traffic Violations/Tolls
7/25/2016: "Invoice R4, tab
4 T0006 TQV0610A TQVS616Z 0012AA $412.01 $412.01 7/7/2016 2-Oct-2015 (1500QR)
Blocked for payment" 42
Ford Expedition
Traffic Violations/Tolls
7/25/2016: "Invoice R4, tab
5 T0006 TQV0611A TQV0611A 0012AA $82.42 $82.42 7/7/2016 9-Oct-2015 (300QR)
Blocked for payment" 44
Ford Expedition
Mid Size SUV (635176) 9/12/2016: "Please do
6/24/201 not list clins that are R4, tab
6 T0007 TQV0701C TQVS709Z 0002AA $965.00 $965.00 10-Jul-2015 to 9-Aug-
6 not being billed on 45
2015
future invoices, this
Crew Cab Pickup Truck keeps the invoice from
0003AF $1,001.00 $1,001.00 4X4 (282918) 10-Jul- flowing into the pay
2015 to 9-Aug-2015 system on
Traffic Violations 10- its own. Clin 0012AA
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 Jul-2015 to 9-Aug- was listed but is not
2015 billed."
6/24/201 Mid Size SUV (635176) R4, tab
7 T0007 TQV0702C TQV0702C 0002AA $965.00 $965.00
6 10-Aug-15 to 9-Sep-15 46
Crew Cab Pickup Truck 9/12/2016: "Processed
0003AF $1,001.00 $1,001.00 4X4 (282918) 10-Aug- for payment"
15 to 9-Sep-15
Traffic Violations 10-
0012AA $82.40 $82.40
Aug-15 to 9-Sep-15
9/12/2016: "Please do
6/24/201 Mid Size SUV (635176) R4, tab
8 T0007 TQV0703B TQVS711Z 0002AA $965.00 $965.00 not list clins that are
6 10-Sep-15 to 9-Oct-15 47
not being billed on
Crew Cab Pickup Truck future invoices, this
0003AF $1,001.00 $1,001.00 4X4 (282918) 10-Sep- keeps the invoice from
15 to 9-Oct-15 flowing into the pay
system on
Traffic Violations 10- its own. Clin 0012AA
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 was listed but is not
Sep-15 to 9-Oct-15
billed."
9/12/2016: "Please do
6/24/201 Mid Size SUV (635176) R4, tab
9 T0007 TQV0704B TQVS712Z 0002AA $965.00 $965.00 not list clins that are
6 10-Oct-15 to 9-Nov-15 48
not being billed on

9
Crew Cab Pickup Truck future invoices, this
$1,001.00 $1,001.00 4X4 (282918) 10-Oct- keeps the invoice from
15 to 9-Nov-15 flowing into the pay
system on
Traffic Violations 10- its own. Clin 0012AA
$0.00 $0.00 was listed but is not
Oct-15 to 9-Nov-15
billed."
9/12/2016: "Please do
6/24/201 Mid Size SUV (635176) R4, tab
10 T0007 TQV0705B TQVS713Z 0002AA $965.00 $965.00 not list clins that are
6 10-Nov-15 to 9-Dec-15 49
not being billed on
Crew Cab Pickup Truck future invoices, this
0003AF $1,001.00 $1,001.00 4X4 (282918) 10-Nov- keeps the invoice from
15 to 9-Dec-15 flowing into the pay
system on
Traffic Violations 10- its own. Clin 0012AA
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 was listed but is not
Nov-15 to 9-Dec-15
billed."
Mid Size SUV (635176) 9/12/2016: "Please do
6/24/201 not list clins that are R4, tab
11 T0007 TQV0706C TQVS714Z 0002AA $675.50 $675.50 10-Dec-2015 to 30-
6 not being billed on 50
Dec-2015
Crew Cab Pickup Truck future invoices, this
0003AF $700.70 $700.70 4X4 (282918) 10-Dec- keeps the invoice from
2015 to 30-Dec-2015 flowing into the pay
system on
Traffic Violations 10- its own. Clin 0012AA
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 Dec-2015 to 30-Dec- was listed but is not
2015 billed."
Full Size SUV (647729) 9/12/2016: "Please do
5/12/201 R4, tab
12 T0008 TQV0801B TQVS807Z 0002AB $1,105.00 $1,105.00 13-Sep-2015 to 12- not list clins that are
6 51
Oct-2015 not being billed on
future invoices, this
keeps the invoice from
Traffic Violations/Tolls
flowing into the pay
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 13-Sep-2015 to 12-
system on its own. Clin
Oct-2015
0012AA was listed but
is not billed."
Full Size SUV (647729)
6/20/201 R4, tab
13 T0008 TQV0802C TQVS808Z 0002AB $1,105.00 $1,105.00 13-Oct-2015 to 12-
6 52
Nov-2015
Traffic Violations/Tolls 9/12/2016: "Processed
13-Oct-2015 to 12- for payment."
0012AA $274.72 $274.72 Nov-2015 (Backup
documentation
attached)
Full Size SUV (647729) 9/12/2016: "Please do
5/12/201 R4, tab
14 T0008 TQV0803B TQVS809Z 0002AB $1,105.00 $1,105.00 13-Nov-2015 to 12- not list clins that are
6 53
Dec-2015 not being billed on
future invoices, this
keeps the invoice from
Traffic Violations/Tolls
flowing into the pay
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 13-Nov-2015 to 12-
system on its own. Clin
Dec-2015
0012AA was listed but
is not billed."
Full Size SUV (647729) 9/12/2016: "Please do
6/20/201 R4, tab
15 T0008 TQV0804B TQVS810Z 0002AB $663.00 $663.00 13-Dec-2015 to 30- not list clins that are
6 54
Dec-2015 not being billed on
future invoices, this
keeps the invoice from
Traffic Violations/Tolls
flowing into the pay
0012AA $0.00 $0.00 13-Dec-2015 to 30-
system on its own. Clin
Dec-2015
0012AA was listed but
is not billed."
Ford Expedition, Full
Size SUV (635181 & R4, tab
16 T0006 TQV0602A TQVS602Z 0002AB $990.00 $1,980.00 5/5/2016 5/13/2018: "Paid"
635182) 9-Aug-2015 to 55
8-Sep-2015
QatarNTVTrafficViolati
0012AA $2,005.49 $0.00
onandTolls
Ford Expedition, Full
Size SUV (635181 & R4, tab
17 T0006 TQV0603A TQVS603Z 0002AB $990.00 $1,980.00 5/5/2016 5/13/2018: "Paid"
635182) 9-Sep-2015 to 56
8-Oct-2015
QatarNTVTrafficViolati
0012AA $2,005.49 $0.00
onandTolls

10
Ford Expedition, Full
Size SUV (635181 & R4, tab
18 T0006 TQV0604A TQVS604Z 0002AB $990.00 $1,980.00 5/5/2016 5/13/2018: "Paid"
635182) 9-Oct-2015 to 57
8-Nov-2015
QatarNTVTrafficViolati
0012AA $2,005.49 $0.00
onandTolls
Ford Expedition, Full
Size SUV (635181 & R4, tab
19 T0006 TQV0605A TQVS605Z 0002AB $990.00 $1,980.00 5/5/2016 5/13/2018: "Paid"
635182) 9-Nov-2015 58
to 8-Dec-2015
QatarNTVTrafficViolati
0012AA $2,005.49 $0.00
onandTolls
Ford Expedition, Full
Size SUV (635181 & R4, tab
20 T0006 TQV0606 TQVS606Z 0002AB $726.00 $1,452.00 5/5/2016 5/13/2018: "Paid"
635182) 9-Dec-2015 to 59
30-Dec-2015
QatarNTVTrafficViolati
0012AA $2,005.49 $0.00 5/5/2016
onandTolls

Trident’s March 31, 2019, Claim

29. Trident filed a certified “Contract Claim for Damages due to Government
Breach,” dated March 1, 2019, demanding “$27,510.99 for services provided before
the vehicle transfer, and $392,515.79 in damages resulting from the government’s
breaches” (a total of $420,026.78) (gov’t mot., ex. G-2 at 9-11, 15; ex. 3; R4, tab 60
at 2)). In addition, Trident alleges that the “final CPAR” is “arbitrary and capricious”
and requests revisions to accurately reflect Trident’s performance (gov’t mot., ex. G-2
at 13-14). Finally, Trident’s claim requests that the termination for cause under Task
Orders 0006-0008 should be converted to a termination for convenience as Trident’s
interrupted services were caused by the government’s breach of unauthorized transfer
of the leased vehicles to Mr. Alajmi (id. at 14).

COFD dated May 16, 2019

30. The CO issued a final decision on May 16, 2019, for Trident’s March 1,
2019, claim (R4, tab 60). The CO determined that Trident’s claim “lacks merit” and
denied it in its entirety (R4, tab 60 at 000385).

Katherine Keller Declaration

31. Katherine Keller was assigned to ACC-RI and was the CO for the contract
and testified by submittal of a sworn declaration. We find the declaration of CO Keller
credible and not contradicted by any evidence of comparable weight. 7

7
See Black Tiger Co., ASBCA No. 59819, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,046 at 180,336 (Board
found that the submitted declarations credible, “persuasive and of great weight
[and] Appellant has offered no evidence or made any argument to rebut these
declarations. . .”); Smart Constr. & Eng’g Co., ASBCA No. 59354, 15-1 BCA
¶ 36,018 at 175,917 (The Board finding that the declaration was credible,
supported by the record, and highly probative).

11
32. CO Keller declared that Trident stated that Mr. Mostafa would be its
representative and provided documents for the background check to obtain a base access
badge to enter the base as Trident’s representative. In his role as Trident’s
representative, Mr. Mostafa provided quality assurance on the vehicles. He addressed
vehicle issues such as requiring repairs, registration, tire changes, and/or oil changes,
being involved in accidents, and receiving traffic fines. Mr. Mostafa would then work to
resolve those issues on behalf of Trident. In addition, the CO declared that Mr. Kuster
informed the government that Mr. Mostafa had the authority to inspect vehicles, perform
maintenance work on the vehicles, and pick up the vehicles from the government. Thus,
as Trident’s representative, Mr. Mostafa handled all vehicle inspections, maintenance,
and returns. (Gov’t reply, Katherine Keller decl. ¶¶ 2, 3)

33. CO Keller declared that the government never initiated any communications
with Mr. Alajmi. After learning of his allegations against Trident, Ms. Keller informed
the COR and support staff to cease all communications with Mr. Alajmi (gov’t reply,
Katherine Keller decl. ¶ 4).

34. CO Keller declared that when the government first learned of Mr. Alajmi’s
dispute with Trident, it investigated and determined that the leased vehicles in the
government’s possession were registered to Mr. Alajmi (gov’t reply, Katherine Keller
decl. ¶ 5).

35. Ms. Keller informed Trident of Mr. Alajmi’s allegations. Mr. Kuster
confirmed the dispute, and Mr. Kuster “assured that Trident would provide
replacement vehicles, if necessary, to ensure uninterrupted service in accordance with
the Contract” (gov’t reply, Katherine Keller decl. ¶ 6).

36. CO Keller declared that Trident did not further communicate with the
government concerning its dispute with Mr. Alajmi. As Trident’s representative,
Mr. Mostafa “was the individual the government would have expected to pick up the
subject vehicles in the event that Trident’s dispute with Mr. Aljami was not resolved
and Trident intended to provide replacement vehicles to ensure uninterrupted services
for the remainder of the performance period.” (Gov’t reply, Katherine Keller decl. ¶ 7)

Trident’s Notice of Appeals, and Board’s Notices of Docketing

37. Trident appealed the Termination for Cause on April 19, 2016, which was
docketed as ASBCA No. 60541 on April 20, 2016, and later on August 12, 2019,
Trident appealed the CO’s May 16, 2019 decision denying the claim for damages,
which was docketed as ASBCA No. 62144 on August 13, 2019. Thereafter, the Board
granted the parties’ motion to consolidate the appeals on September 17, 2019.

12
Relevant Contract Clauses and Performance Work Statement (PWS)

38. Included in the Contract’s Special Contract Requirements section was the
language: “Sponsorship. The Contractor shall obtain local sponsorship as required for
all personnel for the purpose of providing in-country legal representation, work visas
and resolution of other personal business or domestic matters, in compliance with host
nation labor laws” (R4, tab 1 at 21).

39. The contract states that services shall be performed in accordance with the
Performance Work Statement (PWS) (R4, tab 1 at 3, 30).

40. The contract incorporated by reference FAR 52.212-4, CONTRACT TERMS
AND CONDITIONS – COMMERCIAL ITEMS (JULY 2013), which reads in part:

...

(f) Excusable delays. The Contractor shall be liable for
default unless nonperformance is caused by an occurrence
beyond the reasonable control of the Contractor and
without its fault or negligence such as, acts of God or the
public enemy, acts of the Government in either its
sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics,
quarantine restrictions, strikes, unusually severe weather,
and delays of common carriers. The Contractor shall
notify the Contracting Officer in writing as soon as it is
reasonably possible after the commencement of any
excusable delay, setting forth the full particulars in
connection therewith, shall remedy such occurrence with
all reasonable dispatch, and shall promptly give written
notice to the Contracting Officer of the cessation of such
occurrence.

...

(m) Termination for cause. The Government may
terminate this contract, or any part hereof, for cause in the
event of any default by the Contractor, or if the Contractor
fails to comply with any contract terms and conditions, or
fails to provide the Government, upon request, with
adequate assurances of future performance. In the event of
termination for cause, the Government shall not be liable
to the Contractor for any amount for supplies or services
not accepted, and the Contractor shall be liable to the

13
Government for any and all rights and remedies provided
by law. If it is determined that the Government improperly
terminated this contract for default, such termination shall
be deemed a termination for convenience.

(R4, tab 1 at 25); FAR 52.212-4, CONTRACT TERMS AND CONDITIONS –
COMMERCIAL ITEMS (JULY 2013)

41. The contract also contained the provision “1.0 GENERAL
INFORMATION,” which reads:

Description of Services/Introduction: The contractor shall
provide all equipment, tools, materials, supervision, and
other items and non-personal services necessary to
maintain the vehicular leasing and maintenance
requirements as defined in this Performance Work
Statement (PWS). The contractor shall perform to the
standards listed in this contract.

(R4, tab 1 at 31)

42. Trident identified Tony Kuster and John Zvarick as Contract Managers.
Trident did not designate any other Contract Managers internally, or identify any other
Contract Managers to the CO or COR. The PWS provides:

1.12 Contract Manager:

The Contractor shall provide a Contract Manager who
shall be responsible for the performance of the work. The
name of this person and an alternate who shall act for the
contractor when the manager is absent shall be designated
in writing to the contracting officer within 24hrs of
contract award. The contract manager or alternate shall
speak, read and write English and have full authority to act
for the contractor on all contract matters relating to daily
operation of this contract. The Manager shall be the
central point of contact with the COR and Contracting
Officer for performance of all work under the contract.

1.13 Personnel:

1.13.1 The contractor shall advise the COR immediately of
any changes in personnel. “Immediately” for the purpose

14
of this notification shall mean: The beginning of the next
regular business day.

(R4, tab 1 at 33)

PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT (PWS)

43. The Badging section states all contractor personnel who have access to
U.S. military installations shall be cleared and badged and that “[t]he contractor will
be responsible for control and accountability of personnel brought on to U.S. military
installations” (R4, tab 1 at 32, PWS ¶¶ 1.8.6, 1.8.7).

44. PWS Part 4.0 describes the contractor-furnished property, equipment, and
services:

4.1 The Contractor shall provide specified vehicles and all
services required to keep the vehicles in a safe, operational
manner.

4.2 The Contractor shall provide a list of those services
based upon vehicles ordered per task order.

4.3 The contractor shall deliver vehicles within the
timeframe agreed to in this contract and must meet the
minimum acceptance criteria provided herein. If the
Contracting Officer determines that any vehicle furnished
is not in compliance with this contract, the Contracting
Officer shall promptly inform the contractor. If the
contractor fails to replace the vehicle or correct the defects
as required by the Contracting Officer, the U.S.
Government may:

(a) Charge or off-set against the contractor any excess
costs occasioned thereby

(b) Terminate the contract under the Default clause of this
contract. Failure to pass the acceptance inspection in the
timeframe specified may result in consideration for a
monetary penalty.

(R4, tab 1 at 36)

45. PWS ¶ 4.6 Joint Inspection reads:

15
The Contractor or the Contractor’s Representative and the
Contracting Officers Representative (COR) shall perform a
joint inspection and shall document in writing the vehicle
condition upon delivery and return of the vehicles. This
will be the sole validating document used when returning
the vehicles to the contractor. The following minimum
criteria shall be met at the time of acceptance inspection.
The Government shall accept or reject vehicles promptly
after joint inspection. All assets under contract will be
delivered to the Contracting Officer Representative or
designated representative for an Acceptance Inspection.
Any item delivered that does not meet the outlined
requirements in this Statement of Work will be deemed
“Rejected” and reported to the Contracting Officer in
writing. This shall be annotated on the Acceptance
Inspection sheet.

4.6.1 The Government will not be responsible for any
damage or missing items not documented on the inspection
checklist or for fair wear and tear. The Contractor and
Government Contract Representative shall sign the
inspection document. A joint inspection will be
documented on a Transportation Department Leased
Vehicle Inspection Check List. If the contractor fails to
conduct a joint inspection or overlooks an item while
conducting a joint inspection with a government
representative the contractor will be held liable for all
damage that was not identified at the time of inspection.

4.6.2 The vehicles that are modified will be according to
the NTSB standards. Vehicles that are not with (sic) the
standards shall be rejected. The vendor, at no cost to the
government, shall replace unacceptable vehicles within 24
hours.

(R4, tab 1 at 36-37)

46. PWS ¶¶ 4.9, 5.3, and 5.13 describe that “the Contractor may replace the
vehicle at any time with an equal or higher quality vehicle” unscheduled or scheduled
service (R4, tab 1 at 39-41).

47. PWS ¶ 10.0 Liability and Insurance contains the following:

16
The U.S. Government shall not be responsible for loss of
or damage to, leased vehicles resulting from (1) normal
wear and tear, or (2) negligence of the Contractor, its
agents, or employees. The Contractor shall be liable for,
and shall indemnify and hold harmless the U.S.
Government against, all actions or claims for loss of or
damage to property or the injury or death of persons,
resulting from the fault, negligence, or wrongful act or
omission of the Contractor, its agents or employees. The
Contractor shall provide and maintain insurance covering
its liabilities in amounts that are in accordance with Host
Nation Law for requirements concerning the amount liable
per person, amount per occurrence for death or bodily
injury, and amount for property damage or loss.

(R4, tab 1 at 43)

DECISION

I. Summary Judgement Standard of Review and The Parties’ Positions

A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary judgment will be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one which may make a difference in the
outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
There is a “genuine” dispute as to such a fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
[fact-finder] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” (id. at 242). Once the
moving party has met its burden of establishing the absence of disputed material facts,
then the non-moving party must set forth specific facts, not conclusory statements or
bare assertions, to defeat the motion. Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntax (U.S.A.), Inc., 739 F.2d
624, 626-27 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

In evaluating the parties’ contentions, we are guided by the familiar rule that
“[t]he fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not mean that the
[Board] must grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other; summary
judgment in favor of either party is not proper if disputes remain as to material facts.”
Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

17
B. The Parties’ Positions

The government moves for summary judgment arguing that appellant fails to
meet its burden to show that the government breached the contract for returning the
vehicles to appellant’s representative, breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, bailment, and its termination for cause was proper as Trident failed to address
the CO’s cure notice. Additionally, the government argues the CO’s negative CPARS
rating was accurate as Trident failed to provide leased vehicles as required by the
contract and that it has reimbursed appellant for any services rendered prior to removal
of the vehicles. (Gov’t mot. at 1, 19-20)

Appellant requests that we deny the government’s motion for summary
judgment and, instead, grant summary judgment in its favor (app. cross-mot. and resp.
at 1, 10-15).

We address the following seven issues: (1) breach of contract for failure to
return the leased vehicles, (2) breach of contract for communicating with a third-party
concerning contract performance, (3) breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing, (4) breach of the bailment agreement, (5) failure to pay for services
provided, (6) request to convert the termination for cause to a termination for
convenience, and (7) the CO issuing an arbitrary and capricious CPARS rating.

II. Discussion

A. Appellant Did Not First Materially Breach the Contract By Not Having An
Ownership Right in the Leased Vehicles

As the claimant, appellant bears the burden of proving an affirmative monetary
claim against the government by a preponderance of the evidence. M.A. Mortenson
Co., ASBCA No. 53062 et al., 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,573 at 155,906, and cases cited therein.
Appellant must establish liability, causation, and resultant injury. Wilner v. United
States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Wunderlich
Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 180 (1965). The elements of a breach of
contract claim are: (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty
on the part of the government arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and
(4) damages caused by the breach. Lockheed Martin Integrated Sys., Inc., ASBCA
Nos. 59508, 59509, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,597 at 178,284 citing San Carlos Irrigation &
Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Military Aircraft
Parts, ASBCA No. 60009, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,388 at 177,410; Northrop Grumman Sys.
Corp. Space Sys. Div., ASBCA No. 54774, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,517 at 170,237). To
succeed, appellant must prove all four of the elements.

18
The government denies it breached the contract and asserts that appellant first
materially breached the contract by not having an ownership right in the vehicles,
which would excuse any subsequent breach by the government (gov’t mot. at 30, 31).
Specifically, the government argues that paragraph 1.0 of the PWS required Trident
“to provide all ‘equipment, tools, materials, supervision, and other items and non-
personal services necessary to maintain the vehicular leasing and maintenance
requirements as defined in [the] Performance Work Statement’” (id. at 30). The
government points out that the vehicles were owned and registered to a third party,
which appellant does not refute (gov’t mot. at 30-31, n.3). In the government’s reply,
it shifts its argument that the contract required Trident to have an “ownership interest”
in the leased vehicles to a “possessory interest” (gov’t reply at 38-39). “A possessory
interest is different from an ownership interest as a possessory interest ‘includes the
present right to control property, including the right to exclude others, by a person who
is not necessarily the owner’” (id. at 39). Thus, the government argues that Trident
failed to maintain a possessory interest in the leased vehicles when the vehicles were
registered to a third party, failed to pay its lenders for the leased vehicles, and to avoid
its mounting debts, provided Mr. Alajmi full power of attorney to re-sell the vehicles
(id. at 39-40). Consequently, the government argues that appellant committed a prior
material breach by providing vehicles it had no possessory interest in and thus could
not maintain the leasing and maintenance requirements per the performance work
statement (id. at 38-41). Trident argues that the contract was silent on ownership
rights and that “[t]he contract only required Trident to ‘furnish’ or ‘provide’ the
vehicles,” terms which the contract did not define (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 11).

The Federal Circuit has described the doctrine of a first material breach as
follows:

[W]hen a party to a contract is sued for breach, it may
defend on the ground that there existed a legal excuse for
its nonperformance at the time of the alleged breach.
Faced with two parties to a contract, each of whom claims
breach by the other, courts will “often...impose liability on
the party that committed the first material breach.”

Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted); see also Supreme Foodservice GmbH, ASBCA No. 57884 et al.,
16-1 BCA ¶ 36,387 at 177,398-99; Afghanistan Trade Transp. Co., ASBCA
No. 59782, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,077 at 176,165.

We turn to the contract and PWS. Contract interpretation is a question of law.
Barron Bancshares, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1368; Cienega Gardens v. United States,
194 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed.Cir.1998)In interpreting a contract, we begin with the plain
language of the contract. See, e.g., Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United States,

19
365 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An additional canon of contract interpretation
is that the contract should be read as a whole, harmonizing and giving meaning to all
provisions. ThinkQ, Inc., ASBCA No. 57732, 13 BCA ¶ 35,221 at 172,825 (citing
NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

PWS clause 1.0 states that “The contractor shall provide all equipment, tools,
materials . . . to maintain the vehicular leasing and maintenance requirements as
defined in this Performance Work Statement” (SOF ¶ 41) (emphasis added). The PWS
continues to use the terms “provide” or “furnish” when describing the contractor’s
responsibilities for the leased vehicles. (SOF ¶ 44). We agree with appellant that the
contract required Trident to “provide” and “furnish” the vehicles, but the contract was
silent on the ownership or possessory interest that was required (app. cross-mot. and
resp. at 1).

Contract interpretation cases are subject to summary disposition where the
contract language is unambiguous. Muniz v. United States, 972 F.2d 1304, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). A contract provision is clear and unambiguous if only one reasonable
interpretation exists. C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1993). The contract is unambiguous that it required Trident to “supply or
make available” the leased vehicles over the term of the contract by employing the
terms “provide” and “furnish.” The plain and unambiguous meaning of the written
agreement will control. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 292 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). Where the terms “provide” and “furnish” language is unambiguous and
susceptible only to one reasonable meaning, the Board’s review is limited to the plain
meaning without considering extrinsic evidence. Lebolo-Watts Constructors 01 JV,
LLC, ASBCA No. 59740 et al., 21-1 BCA ¶ 37,789 at 183,433. We conclude that the
contract did not require appellant to have an ownership interest in the leased vehicles.
In addition, the government’s possessory interest argument also falls short. The
contract employs the terms “provide” and “furnish,” not “possessory.” Accordingly,
as we hold that the contract did not require appellant to have an ownership interest in
the leased vehicles, appellant did not first materially breach the contract.

B. Breach of Contract (Communications Regarding Contract Performance)

i. The government did not breach the contract for receiving
communications from Mr. Alajmi, and appellant has failed to show that
the government coordinated with Mr. Alajmi to retrieve the leased
vehicles

Appellant asserts “that the Government fell for a scam perpetrated by
Mr. Alajmi—a con artist with no privity of contract and a fake Trident email address.
The Government asked no questions of Mr. Alajmi, but turned over Trident’s vehicles

20
to him to Trident’s detriment” (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 10). Trident argues that the
government materially breached the contract by transferring the leased vehicles to a
third party, Mr. Alajmi (id. at 11). Trident asserts that once Mr. Alajmi informed the
government that he intended to retrieve the leased vehicles on December 28, 2015, the
government did not investigate his claims and did not fully communicate this
information back to Trident (id. at 14-15). Trident stated it was blindsided that the
government allowed the leased vehicles to be retrieved by Mr. Alajmi on December 30,
2015, and, as a result, only learned of this with the cure notice (id. at 12). Additionally,
Trident argues that the government should not have intervened in the dispute between
Trident and its local sponsor, Mr. Alajmi, and by doing so, breached the contract and
caused Trident’s failure to perform (id. at 12).

If appellant can demonstrate, as it alleges, that the government coordinated the
transfer of the leased vehicles to a third party who does not have contract privity with
it, then Trident’s claims for breach of contract, bailment, and breach of the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing would be significantly bolstered. However,
appellant’s position appears to focus on the result: Mr. Alajmi eventually was able to
retrieve the vehicles through Trident’s representative, Mr. Mostafa; thus, the
government must have been responsible and liable for Trident’s alleged damages. We
agree with the government that appellant’s allegation of breach of contract for
receiving communications from Mr. Alajmi is meritless. Appellant has not identified a
contractual obligation that the government breached nor shown how the government
“breached” a duty by the COR receiving a text message from Mr. Alajmi (SOF ¶ 8).
Furthermore, appellant has failed to show that the government coordinated the transfer
of the vehicles or that the government knew Mr. Mostafa intended to give the vehicles
to Mr. Alajmi (SOF ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, 16). Quite the opposite.

The government reasonably informed Trident of Mr. Alajmi’s claims and
requested a response regarding its future performance. After learning of Mr. Alajmi’s
claims, the CO promptly emailed Mr. Zvarick and Mr. Kuster and informed them that
Mr. Alajmi claimed to be a partner of Trident and the registered owner of the leased
vehicles but had yet to receive payment from Trident. Consequently, he wanted the
leased vehicles in Qatar returned to him. (SOF ¶ 10) In addition, the CO informed
Trident that it could be in default if leased vehicles could not be provided throughout
the entire contract term (id.). Finally, the CO requested receipt of its email and for
Trident to respond to the issues raised and its future performance no later the next day
(id.). Trident’s written response to the CO’s concerns was not of shock and dismay at
Mr. Alajmi’s claims; rather, Trident acknowledged some of Mr. Alajmi’s claims: that
he was Trident’s sponsor; that the leased vehicles are registered under his name; and
that Trident was working behind the scenes to resolve the dispute with Mr. Alajmi
(SOF ¶¶ 11, 12). In addition, Trident stated that if the leased vehicles were retrieved,
it had a plan to replace vehicles to ensure there was no service interruption under the
contract (SOF ¶ 12).

21
The government’s actions were reasonable and prompt once it learned of
Mr. Alajmi’s claims against Trident. The CO immediately emailed Trident of
Mr. Alajmi’s allegations, reminded them of their contractual obligations, and
requested a detailed response regarding its future performance.

Appellant relies heavily on email exchanges of the CO’s support staff who
received communications from Mr. Alajmi as “evidence” that the government
coordinated the transfer of vehicles to Mr. Alajmi:

From December 24, 2015 to December 30, 2015, the
Government communicated directly with Mr. Alajmi and
coordinated the transfer of the vehicles to Mr. Alajmi
without ever speaking to Trident’s Contract Managers in
total disregard for the Contract.

...

The Government knew exactly what Mr. Alajmi’s
intentions were with respect to Trident’s vehicles, but
failed to exercise ordinary care by conducting due
diligence into Mr. Alajmi’s false claims of entitlement.
From at least December 20, 2015 to December 30, 2015,
the COR was in contact with Mr. Alajmi through text
messages.

(App. cross-mot. and resp. at 14, 21)

The text messages that appellant refers to are one-sided communications from
Mr. Alajmi to the CO’s support staff (SOF ¶¶ 14-15, 17). In addition, the CO instructed
her support staff to refrain from communicating with Mr. Alajmi. The CO emailed
Mr. Alajmi stating that the government could not provide him any information or
assistance since the government lacks privity of contract with him (SOF ¶¶ 15-16, 33).
Appellant has failed to cite any evidence in the record that the government
communicated or coordinated with Mr. Alajmi regarding the transfer of the lease
vehicles. The government’s actions were prudent and reasonable under the
circumstances. Appellant has failed to carry its burden of element (3) to show how the
government breached a contractual duty. Lockheed Martin Integrated Sys., Inc., 17-1
BCA ¶ 36,597 at 178,284. Accordingly, the government’s motion for summary
judgment on this issue is granted, and appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment
on this issue is denied.

22
C. Breach of Contract (Failure to Return the Vehicles)

We now turn to whether the government breached the contract by allowing
Trident’s representative, Mr. Mostafa, to retrieve the leased vehicles on December 30,
2015. A breach of contract is simply the non-performance of a contractual duty.
Kasarsky v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 296 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The
government argues that it did nothing more than wait to see what transpired between
Trident and its sponsor regarding Mr. Alajmi’s claims (gov’t mot. at 26; gov’t reply
at 23; SOF ¶¶ 13, 36). Appellant alleges that “the Government fell for a scam
perpetrated by Mr. Alajmi,” “the Government failed to conduct any sort of inquiry
into the validity of Mr. Alajmi’s claims (that were fraudulent)” and that the
“Government asked no questions of Mr. Alajmi but turned over Trident’s vehicles to
him” (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 10, 14). Now, we turn to the issue of how the
leased vehicles were removed from the Qatar base, Camp As Sayliyah.

i. Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the government violated Qatari
law and regulations

Appellant alleges that the “Government gave away the vehicles to an unknown
third party without a shred of legal entitlement to the vehicles under Qatari law or with
any repossession rights under Qatari law” (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 12). Though
our rules empower us to attempt to determine foreign law, we are not obligated to do
so. Agility Logistics Servs. Co. KSC, ASBCA No. 57415 et al., 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,658
at 178,518; Weigel Hochdrucktechnik GmbH & Co. KG, ASBCA No. 57207, 12-1
BCA ¶ 34,975 at 171,924. Instead, we may require the party relying upon foreign law
to demonstrate its application in a particular matter. Sungwoo E&C Co., ASBCA
No. 61144 et al., 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,125 at 185,208; Agility Logistics Servs. Co. KSC,
17-1 BCA ¶ 36,658 at 178,518. Foreign laws can be demonstrated through written or
oral expert testimony and extracts from foreign legal materials. Rosinka Joint Venture,
ASBCA No. 48143, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,653 at 143,139. Given that appellant is asserting
the government breached the contract and gave away the vehicles to a third party
without legal rights under Qatari law, it is appellant’s burden to show how “an
unknown third party,” Mr. Alajmi, and the government violated repossession rights
under Qatari law. Appellant seems uncertain in the application of Qatari law on the
issue of the retrieval of the leased vehicles, later equivocating whether the government
“likely violate[d] Qatari law” (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 14). Appellant has not cited
any Qatari law, statute, or case law for its proposition. Accordingly, appellant has not
shown who, if anyone, under Qatari law violated its rights in the leased vehicles
retrieved by Mr. Mostafa. The Board lacks sufficient expertise to answer that question
on its own. See Agility Logistics Servs. Co. KSC, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,658 at 178,518;
Weigel Hochdrucktechnik Gmbh & Co. KG, 12-1 BCA ¶ 34,975 at 171,924.

23
ii. The government did not breach the contract by allowing Trident’s
representative, Mr. Mostafa, to retrieve the leased vehicles

Next, appellant argues that the government violated the vehicle return
conditions outlined in the contract and thus breached the contract and is liable for the
leased vehicles being indirectly transferred to Mr. Alajmi (amended compl. dtd.
September 30, 2020, ¶¶ 13, 14; app. cross-mot. and resp. at 2-3, 13, 24-25). Appellant
argues only Trident’s Contract Manager, Mr. Kuster, or his alternate, Mr. Zvarick,
were allowed to sign off for the return of the vehicles, citing contract paragraph 4.6.1
(app. cross-mot. and resp. at 13). “When the Government gave Trident’s vehicles to
Mr. Alajmi without the involvement of Trident’s Contract Managers, the Government
knew it was working beyond its contractual limits and without Trident’s knowledge or
consent, thereby changing the Contract and breaching paragraph 4.6.1 of the Contract”
(id. at 18). Appellant argues that the retrieval of the leased vehicles by Mr. Alajmi
through Trident’s agent, Mr. Mostafa, was through the government’s coordination with
both Mr. Alajmi and Mr. Mostafa, “Mr. Mustafa was there at the Army’s request after
the Army unilaterally coordinated with Mr. Alajmi without Trident’s knowledge or
consent. Mr. Mustafa was merely a ‘vehicle’ that transferred the vehicles to
Mr. Alajmi as the Army knew Mr. Mustafa had base access, whereas Mr. Alajmi did
not.” (Id. at 15)

Trident’s financial issues with a third party placed the government in a difficult
position. As a result, Trident asks us to find that the government breached its contract
when it allowed Trident’s Qatar representative, Mr. Mostafa, to sign the vehicle
inspection reports and to retrieve the vehicles from Camp As Sayliyah. What was the
government supposed to do in this situation? Not allow Trident’s only representative
who had authorized access to Camp As Sayliyah to perform vehicle inspections,
document inspection reports, and retrieve the vehicles (as permitted under the
contract)? Trident’s position is not legally tenable.

Reliance Upon the PWS

Appellant’s argument that only its Contract Manager, Mr. Kuster, or his
alternate, Mr. Zvarick, were allowed to sign off for vehicle returns. Appellant’s
reliance on PWS “paragraph 4.6.1’s requirement that the Contract Manager sign off on
vehicle returns,” and Mr. Mostafa signing the joint inspection sheets on December 30,
2015, resulted in the government changing the contract without Trident’s agreement is
misplaced (id. at 13). The PWS is clear that the “contractor or contractor’s
representative” can perform the joint vehicle inspection (SOF ¶ 45). Mr. Mostafa was
Trident’s “representative” having entry access to Camp As Sayliyah and performed
vehicle retrieval and inspection duties consistent with his previous duties on the
contract. Accordingly, we decline to adopt appellant’s narrow interpretation of PWS
paragraphs 4.6 and 4.6.1.

24
In addition, the contract is clear that Trident indemnified the government for the
wrongful actions of its representatives:

The U.S. Government shall not be responsible for loss of
or damage to, leased vehicles resulting from (1) normal
wear and tear, or (2) negligence of the Contractor, its
agents, or employees. The Contractor shall be liable for,
and shall indemnify and hold harmless the U.S.
Government against, all actions . . . resulting from the
fault, negligence, or wrongful act or omission of the
Contractor, its agents or employees.

(SOF ¶ 47) (emphasis added)

By its very terms, PWS ¶ 10.0 Liability and Insurance clause covers the type of
“loss”: the “wrongful act” of Trident’s representative who coordinated with a third
party to remove the leased vehicles from Camp As Sayliyah. The U.S. government
cannot be held liable for the wrongful acts of the contractor’s representatives. The
plain language of the clause and case law support this conclusion. See also Kellogg
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 59357, 59358, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,071
at 176,144 (The Board interpreting a clause stating, “‘caused by willful misconduct or
lack of good faith’ of the contractor.”; the Board read the indemnification clause
consistent the with its plain terms); Tokai Transp. Co., ASBCA No. 5063, 60-2 BCA
¶ 2,666 at 13,309 (Liability clause reading, “The Contractor shall be liable to, and shall
indemnify, the Government for any and all losses . . . when such loss or damage is
caused in whole or in part by the wrongful act or omissions, or negligence of the
Contractor, its agents, servants, or employees. . . .” The Board concluding that “under
the terms of the contract it became the clear responsibility of the appellant to protect
the Government from loss of the cargo by any wrongful act by agents or employees
and to indemnify the Government for such loss.” (id. at 13,309).

Mr. Mostafa had at least Apparent Authority to Retrieve the Vehicles

Trident states that Mr. Mostafa “was a mere valet who moved vehicles from
place A to place B” and lacked “actual nor apparent authority to transfer Trident’s
vehicles to Mr. Alajmi” (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 16). “For Mr. Mustafa to have
actual authority to dispose of the vehicles would have required Trident to manifest its
intent to delegate such authority” (id.). Trident argues that the government did not
have a reasonable belief that Mr. Mostafa had apparent authority to take the vehicles
and give them to Mr. Alajmi, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01
(“Creation of Actual Authority”); United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York,
738 F.3d 1320, 1333-36 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Trident argues that “[t]he third party’s belief
cannot be based only on the agent’s actions or conduct” citing U.S. v. Ziegler Bolt &

25
Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 881-82 (Fed. Cir. 1997). (App. cross-mot. and resp. at 16).
Trident points to the government’s reliance on Mr. Mostafa’s prior vehicle transfers
“[i]n an attempt to justify its unauthorized actions . . . . [h]owever, prior transfers were
routine involving vehicles being exchanged for service and not involving final
inspection or otherwise removing the vehicles from the Contract” (id. at 17). Trident
argues that it should not be held accountable for the leased vehicles transferred to
Mr. Alajmi through Mr. Mostafa since the government knew of Mr. Alajmi’s
intentions, the government should have communicated this information to Trident.

We note that the doctrine of apparent authority, although not applicable to the
government, can be applied to contractors. Peter Bauwens Bauunternehmung GmbH
& Co. KG, ASBCA No. 44679, 98-1 BCA ¶ 29,551 at 146,497, aff’d, 194 F.3d 1338
(Fed. Cir. 1999). Apparent authority is determined by looking at the conduct of the
principal to assess whether the principal created a reasonable belief that the actor was
authorized by the principal in the manner relied on. Am. Anchor & Chain Corp. v.
United States, 331 F.2d 860, 861 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (Apparent authority may be “created
by written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, if reasonably
interpreted, causes a third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act
done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.”).

Trident argues that there can be no exercise of apparent authority if the principal
does not somehow convey its consent for the signing of the vehicle inspection reports
and that it cannot do so if it is unaware of Mr. Mostafa’s activity (app. cross-mot. and
resp. at 17). However, the principal need not be conscious of every action by the
person acting with apparent authority to convey his consent for it; rather, it is enough
that the principal acquiesces in actions that imply that the actor possessed the level of
authority necessary to bind the company in the way he undertook to. Horton Constr.
Co., ASBCA No. 61085, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,622 at 182,651-52 (The Board finding
apparent authority even when the “government never demonstrated that [employee]
had ever signed a final release before, supposedly refuting his apparent authority to do
so, is similarly misguided. . . . [Employee] presented as having apparent authority to
do all things related to the contract’s administration without reservation. Nothing
about his behavior or appellant’s acquiescence gave the government cause to doubt
that his authority should not extend to executing the final release.”) Compare Seven
Seas Shipchandlers, LLC, ASBCA No. 57875 et al., 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,908 at 175,530-31
(In a dispute dealing with government payment in Afghan cash to contractor’s
employee, intended as payment on contractor’s contracts, but employee disappeared
with the money. The Board found no apparent authority when there was no evidence
that anyone in the government formed a belief that employee possessed the authority
to collect cash for contractor. The CO was silent about his perception of employee’s
authority, at least another government official knew that employee was not among
those authorized to accept cash for contractor, and government was not aware

26
employee had performed cash collection in the past, and employee had forged
contractor’s signatures on payment vouchers.)

Through Trident’s actions, this authority to perform joint vehicle inspections,
sign the joint inspection reports, and retrieve the vehicles, was delegated to its Qatar
representative, Mr. Mostafa. Trident’s contract managers did not obtain badges to
access Camp As Sayliyah. They did not have any of its contract managers present in
Qatar to conduct the joint inspections under the Contract. Mr. Mostafa was Trident’s
only Qatar representative (SOF ¶¶ 6, 18). The PWS is clear that a “contractor’s
representative” can perform the joint inspection and “document in writing the vehicle
condition upon . . . return of the vehicles.” The nature of the contract required Trident
to access Camp As Sayliyah to deliver vehicles and retrieve vehicles for regular
maintenance. (SOF ¶¶ 1, 44-46) Trident was allowed to retrieve and replace vehicles
“at any time” to conduct scheduled/unscheduled maintenance (SOF ¶ 46). Trident
elected Mr. Mostafa as its Qatar representative and submitted his information for base
access. Once Mr. Mostafa’s background check was completed, he was provided a base
access badge to enter the base. (SOF ¶¶ 18, 32) As Trident’s representative,
Mr. Mostafa’s role at Camp As Sayliyah included dropping off and retrieving vehicles,
vehicle maintenance, vehicle registration, invoicing, addressing issues from traffic
accidents and traffic fines, and coordinating requests for equitable adjustment (SOF
¶ 32). Appellant has taken various positions in the role of its representative,
Mr. Mostafa, during this dispute. The cited record and appellant’s admissions in its
March 1, 2019, claim do not support appellant’s purported role for Mr. Mostafa
asserted in its cross-motion that Mr. Mostafa was a “mere valet” who had no authority
as its representative (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 16-17). Appellant’s March 1, 2019,
claim admits that Mr. Mostafa’s role as its Qatar representative included “picking-up /
dropping-off serviced vehicles during the Contract’s performance” (gov’t mot., ex. G-2
at 2).

Mr. Mostafa’s actions of performing a joint inspection and documenting the
vehicles’ condition on December 30, 2015, were consistent with his previous duties as
Trident’s representative under the contract. See also (SOF ¶¶ 6, 7); Horton Constr.
Co., 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,622. Trident’s actions established apparent authority of
Mr. Mostafa to sign vehicle inspection reports by not obtaining access to Camp
As Sayliyah for its contract managers. In addition, its contract managers were not
badged to enter Camp As Sayliyah and located thousands of miles from Qatar (see
SOF ¶ 12). We are guided by Trident’s actions and its utilization of its representative,
Mr. Mostafa, throughout contract performance. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 148
Fed. Cl. at 368–69 (“If the principal places a person in a position or office with
specific functions or responsibilities, from which third parties will infer that the
principal assents to acts by the person requisite to fulfilling the specific functions or
responsibilities, the principal has manifested such assent to third parties.”); Great Am.
Ins. Co. of New York, 738 F.3d at 1335 (“[T]he pattern of agents exceeding their

27
authority with no objection from [the company] would lead a reasonable person in the
government’s position to believe that such acts were authorized.”).

The Adverse Interest Exception Does Not Apply Since Appellant Benefited from
Mr. Mostafa’s Actions

Appellant cites Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234,
1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007) for the proposition that “[a] principal is not affected by the
knowledge of an agent in a transaction in which the agent secretly is acting adversely
to the principal and entirely for his own or another’s purposes” (app. cross-mot. and
resp. at 17). Thus, Trident argues that Mr. Mostafa’s actions as Trident’s
representative of retrieving the vehicles on December 30, 2015, and subsequently
transferring them to Mr. Alajmi, cannot be attributed to it (id.).

The mere fact that the agent’s primary interests are not coincident with those of
the principal, however, is insufficient to invoke the adverse interest exception. Long
Island Sav. Bank, 503 F.3d at 1250. In Long Island, the agent served as a bank’s CEO
and a senior member of a law firm specializing in banking and mortgages. In violation
of banking law, the bank’s CEO funneled legal work associated with mortgage
closings to his law firm. The bank’s CEO derived financial benefits from legal fees
generated as he was also a partner with the law firm performing the legal services.
The court found that the record failed to show that the bank’s CEO entirely abandoned
the bank’s interests for his own. The court found the adverse interest exception did not
apply to the principal, the bank, as it would have needed to pay for outside counsel for
representation in foreclosure proceedings and derived a benefit of competent legal
assistance associated with mortgage closing services on behalf of the bank. Long
Island Sav. Bank, 503 F.3d at 1250.

Even if Long Island applied, Mr. Mostafa’s retrieval of the leased vehicles on
behalf of Mr. Alajmi was not “entirely” in his interests without even incidental benefit
to the principal, Trident. The cracks in the financial relationship between Trident and
its Qatar sponsor, Mr. Alajmi, appeared early on during contract performance with
Mr. Kuster threatening to pull the leased vehicles from the government, “[i]f we want
to pull our vehicles from the contract due to Ajmi [sic] situation, I need to work that
out” (gov’t mot., ex. G-5 at 00000058). Moreover, after Mr. Mostafa retrieved the
vehicles, Mr. Zvarick emailed Mr. Alajmi stated that he had given him “full power of
attorney” and that he should “make every effort to sell the vehicles as soon as
possible” “to settle as much of the debt as possible” (SOF ¶¶ 9, 21). Thus, the retrieval
of the leased vehicles by Trident’s representative benefited Trident in paying down its
mounting debts for failure to pay the vehicles’ leases. See Long Island Sav. Bank, 503
F.3d at1250; Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (principal received the benefit of subcontractor’s services, although

28
the principal’s agents were receiving kickbacks from the subcontractor). Accordingly,
the adverse interest exception cited by appellant does not apply.

Trident Ratified Mr. Mostafa’s Actions

Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act supposedly done on his
behalf by another, but which was not authorized. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp.
Space Sys. Div., 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,517 at 170,238. “Ratification requires knowledge of
material facts involving the unauthorized act and approval of the activity by one with
authority.” Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d 1429,
1433-34 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The essence of ratification is that the prior unauthorized
act is treated as if it had been authorized by the “principal” at the outset. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Agency §§ 4.01, 4.02 (2006).

Mr. Zvarick’s January 7, 2016, email ratified the actions of Trident’s
representative, Mr. Mostafa, who retrieved the vehicles from Camp As Sayliyah.
Mr. Zvarick was aware by the cure notice that the five leased vehicles were retrieved
by Mr. Mostafa on December 30, 2015 and had yet to be replaced. The next day,
Mr. Zvarick emailed Mr. Alajmi on January 7, 2016, to “make every effort to sell the
vehicles as soon as possible” (SOF ¶ 21). The combination of the January 6 cure
notice and Mr. Zvarick’s January 7 email shows Trident knew Mr. Mostafa removed
the leased vehicles from Camp As Sayliyah; and Mr. Zvarick, after the fact, approved
his actions by encouraging Mr. Alajmi to sell the vehicles to recoup his financial losses
(SOF ¶¶ 20-21). Ratification is all or nothing. A principal cannot ratify only the
beneficial parts of an agent’s conduct while refusing to affirm the rest. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.07 (2006). “Ratification is effective even when the third party
knew that the agent lacked authority to bind the principal but nonetheless dealt with
the agent” (id. at § 4.01 cmt. b). Accordingly, Mr. Zvarick’s January 7 email to
Mr. Alajmi was a ratification that retroactively created the effects of actual authority
for Mr. Mostafa’s actions to remove the leased vehicles from Camp As Sayliyah on
December 30, 2015. 8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 4.01, 4.02 (2006).

Once the fact of Trident’s non-delivery is established, the burden is on the
appellant to show that its failure to perform was beyond its control and without its

8
A principal can be held “accountable under an unauthorized agreement if the
principal knowingly receives or retains the benefits of the agreement, even if
the principal expresses disapproval of such agreement or some portion thereof.
(‘A person may not, by ratifying an act, obtain its economic benefits without
bearing the legal consequences that accompany the act.’).” Weeks v. United
States, 144 Fed. Cl. 34, 50 (2019) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
4.07 cmt. b) (internal citations omitted)).

29
fault or negligence. DCX, Inc. v. Perry, 79 F.3d 132, 134 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 992 (1996); Double B Enters., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 52010, 52192, 01-1
BCA ¶ 31,396 at 155,110. Trident has failed to show that its non-delivery or returning
leased vehicles to Camp As Sayliyah was excusable.

We hold that the government did not breach the contract for failure to return the
vehicles as 1) PWS paragraphs ¶ 4.6 and ¶ 4.6.1 allowed the joint vehicle inspection
and signing document reports by the “contractor or the contractor’s representative”; 2)
PWS paragraph ¶ 10.0 indemnifies the government for actions of the contractor or its
employees; 3) Mr. Mostafa had apparent authority to perform joint vehicle inspections,
sign the inspection reports, and remove the vehicles from Camp As Sayliyah based on
past contract performance; 4) the adverse interest exception does not apply since
Trident benefited from its encouragement of Mr. Alajmi to sell the vehicles to recoup
any financial losses for its failure to pay the leases; and, 5) Trident ratified
Mr. Mostafa’s actions. Accordingly, appellant has failed to carry its burden of element
(3) to show how the government breached a contractual duty. Lockheed Martin
Integrated Sys., Inc., 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,597 at 178,284. The government’s motion for
summary judgment on this issue is granted, and appellant’s cross-motion for summary
judgment on this issue is denied.

D. Breach of Bailment Agreement

When the government rents property from a contractor, a bailment for the
parties’ mutual benefit is created. Mohammad Darwish Ghabban Est., ASBCA
No. 51994, 00-2 BCA ¶ 31,114 at 153,671; Analog Precision, Inc., ASBCA
Nos. 31277, 32877, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,804 at 100,170; Innovations Hawaii, ASBCA
Nos. 30619, 30627, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,376 at 97,967. Returning bailed property in a state
unfit for service may give rise to a claim for damages. Mohammad Darwish, 00-2
BCA ¶ 31,114 at 153,671-72; Manufactured Hous. Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 41269 et
al., 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,159 at 125,407.

Appellant argues that Trident leased the vehicles to the government, and the
government did not exercise reasonable and ordinary care when it “voluntarily
transferred the vehicles to a third party, Mr. Alajmi, knowing that Mr. Alajmi intended
to deprive Trident of those vehicles” (amended compl. dtd. September 30, 2020 at 12;
see also app. cross-mot. and resp. at 25).

The law imposes upon the bailee the duty to protect the property by exercising
ordinary care and, on the termination of a bailment, to redeliver the identical thing
bailed in substantially the same condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted, or account
for it in accordance with the contract. Mohammad Darwish Ghabban Est., 00-2 BCA
¶ 31,114 at 153,671-72. Where there is a written contract, the rights and obligations of
the parties are determined by the contract’s provisions. The bailee by express

30
agreement or by fair implication in the contract can assume the risk of loss of the
bailed item without regard to fault. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Moore, 183
U.S. 642 (1902); H.N. Bailey & Assocs., ASBCA No. 29298, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,763
at 100,004, aff’d on reconsid., 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,005.

The record does not support appellant’s allegations that “the COR plotted with
Mr. Alajmi to take the vehicles off Contract to Trident’s detriment” (app. cross-mot.
and resp. at 13). The government followed the procedures for joint inspection outlined
in the PWS ¶ 4.6 (SOF ¶ 45). The government exercised ordinary care in protecting
Trident’s leased vehicles and redelivered the leased vehicles to Trident’s
representative, Mr. Mostafa. Mr. Mostafa was the only Trident representative with
base access at Camp As Sayliyah. As Trident’s Qatar representative, Mr. Mostafa
delivered vehicles to Camp As Sayliyah, performed vehicle maintenance, invoiced,
and picked up vehicles. Appellant has failed to show that the government coordinated
with Mr. Alajmi the transfer of the leased vehicles or that the government knew that
Mr. Alajmi would use Mr. Mostafa as a proxy to obtain the vehicles. In addition,
Trident had assured the CO that it “has taken measures to provide replacement
vehicles in the event he [Mr. Alajmi] continues on this path,” a reassurance which the
CO relied on (SOF ¶¶ 12-13).

The government’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted, and
appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue is denied.

E. Breach Of Implied Duty Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing

Appellant argues that the government “had a duty not to interfere with Trident’s
performance and not to take any action that could destroy Trident’s reasonable
expectations regarding the benefits of the Contract.” Specifically, Trident argues that
the government voluntarily transferred the vehicles to a third party, Mr. Alajmi. The
government did so without Trident’s approval and knew Mr. Alajmi intended to
deprive Trident of the vehicles. (Amended compl. dtd. September 30, 2020 at 13)

“[E]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and enforcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981), quoted in Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351 (2010). To
determine whether there has been a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing, there is a focus on whether a party has acted in accordance with the purpose
of the contract, has interfered with the other party’s performance, or acted in such a
way as to destroy the other party’s reasonable expectations as to the fruits of the
contract. Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
ECC Int’l, LLC, ASBCA No. 58993 et al., 22-1 BCA 38,073 at 184,894. Failure to
fulfill that duty constitutes a breach of contract, as does failure to fulfill a duty
“imposed by a promise stated in the agreement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

31
CONTRACTS § 235 (1981); Metcalf Constr. Co., 742 F.3d at 990. The courts have long
applied those principles to contracts with the federal government. E.g., Precision Pine
& Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 828 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Malone v. United
States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445–46 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The “implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing cannot expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those in the express
contract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s provisions.” E.g., Precision
Pine & Timber, Inc., 596 F.3d at 831. Although, in one sense, any “implied” duty
“expands” the “express” duties, our formulation means simply that an act will not be
found to violate the duty (which is implicit in the contract) if such a finding would be
at odds with the terms of the original bargain, whether by altering the contract’s
discernible allocation of risks and benefits or by conflicting with a contract provision.
Metcalf Constr. Co., 742 F.3d at 991.

As discussed at length above, appellant has:

1. Failed to show that the government transferred the leased vehicles to a third
party and,

2. Failed to show that the government did not follow the joint inspection and
documentation procedures in PWS ¶ 4.6, and,

3. Failed to show the government knew that Trident’s representative,
Mr. Mostafa, intended to transfer the vehicles to Mr. Alajmi.

Because the government had a reasonable expectation that Trident’s Qatar
representative, Mr. Mostafa, performed duties consistent with his performance during
the contract period, the government (i) acted in accordance with the purpose of the
contract in performing the vehicle inspections and signing the reports with Mr. Mostafa,
(ii) the government did not interfere with Trident’s performance for releasing the
leased vehicles to Trident’s representative, Mr. Mostafa, and (iii) the government did
not destroy Trident’s reasonable expectations as to the fruits of the contract.

The government’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted, and
appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue is denied.

F. Invoices For Services Provided Before the Transfer of Vehicles

i. Appellant did not abandon its claim in the amount of $27,510.99 for costs
associated with past-due leasing, maintenance, and traffic violations

The government argues that the CO had concluded that “it already paid the
$27,510.99” invoices and “provided proof of payment” in the COFD, and “appellant
has not provided any evidence countering the government’s showing payment of the

32
claimed invoices.” Therefore, the government argues that appellant has “abandoned”
this portion of its claim, and as “appellant has not disputed the government’s proof of
payment, the claim should be denied” (gov’t mot. at 16, n.2).

Appellant’s amended complaint requested that “the Government pay Trident for
all invoices due under the Contract” in the amount of $27,510.99 for costs associated
with past due leasing, maintenance, and traffic violations for invoices under Task
Orders 006-008 (amended compl. dtd. September 30, 2020, at 15). Accordingly, we
conclude that appellant did not abandon this portion of its claim.

ii. Material facts are in dispute concerning the alleged non-payment for
services provided before the transfer of vehicles

The invoiced documents to which the government refers do not show
“payment” for all three task orders. For Task Order 0006, for example, the
government refers to 10 invoices that the payment official has noted are “blocked for
payment” or the traffic violations and tolls CLINs were excluded and not billed (SOF
¶ 28: “blocked for payment” invoices 2, 4, 5; excluded CLINS, invoices 16-20).
Invoices for Task Orders 0007 and 0008 have similar issues of not capturing the traffic
violations and tolls amount in the total invoice amount (SOF ¶ 28, invoices 6, 8-12,
14-15).

We conclude that material facts are in dispute regarding the invoices for Task
Orders 006, 0007, and 0008. Without expert testimony regarding the WAWF invoices,
we cannot ascertain whether the traffic violations and tolls CLIN 0012AA were
included in the processed invoices and whether the term “paid” means the invoice was
approved to be paid or whether Trident was paid money. For the foregoing reasons,
both the government’s motion and Trident’s cross-motion for summary judgment on
damages for services provided before the transfer of vehicles are denied.

G. The Government’s Termination for Cause

A termination for default is a drastic sanction that should be imposed (or
sustained) only for good grounds and on solid evidence. Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v.
United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v.
United States, 408 F.2d 424, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citation omitted)). Though this is an
appeal brought by Trident, because a termination for default is essentially a
government claim, the government bears the initial burden of proving “by a
preponderance of the evidence that a termination for default was justified.” Keystone
Cap. Servs., ASBCA No. 56565, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34,130 at 168,753 (citing Lisbon
Contractors, 828 F.2d at 765). “If the government establishes a prima facie case
justifying the termination, the burden shifts to the contractor to prove the default was
excusable.” Truckla Servs., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 57564, 57752, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,638

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at 178,445 (citing ADT Constr. Grp., Inc., ASBCA No. 55358, 13 BCA ¶ 35,307
at 173,312).

i. The government established a prima facie justification for the
termination

The termination in this appeal is governed by FAR 52.212-4(m), CONTRACT
TERMS AND CONDITIONS — COMMERCIAL ITEMS (JULY 2013) (SOF ¶¶ 20,
40). FAR 52.212-4(m) allows the government to terminate for cause for any one of
three reasons: (1 ) default by the contractor; or (2) failure of the contractor to comply
with contract terms and conditions; or (3) failure to provide the government, upon
request, with adequate assurances of future performance. The government has
established a prima facie basis to terminate on all three grounds.

Task Orders 0006, 0007, and 0008 required Trident to provide a 12-month lease
of five non-tactical vehicles in Qatar (SOF ¶¶ 2-5). However, it is undisputed, and the
cited record shows that Trident’s representative, Mr. Mostafa, retrieved the five
vehicles on December 30, 2015. In addition, Trident failed to timely respond to the
CO’s cure notice and provide replacement vehicles as required by the contract (SOF
¶¶ 1-5, 18-20, 23, 44). After a week without vehicles, pursuant to PWS paragraph
¶ 4.3, the CO determined Trident was not in compliance for failure to supply vehicles
under the task orders and issued a cure notice dated January 6, 2016, for Trident to
provide replacement vehicles within 10 days (SOF ¶¶ 20, 44). Trident failed to
provide the CO with adequate assurances of future performance within the 10-day
deadline. Trident did not timely respond to the cure notice, and on January 20, 2016,
Mr. Kuster responded that “Trident is unable to provide vehicles . . . .” (SOF ¶ 23).
The government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that its
termination for cause was justified. The burden now shifts to Trident to prove its
default was excusable.

ii. Appellant has failed to show its default was excusable

The nexus of appellant’s argument is that government’s prior material breaches
directly caused Trident’s lack of performance, namely, the transfer of the leased
vehicles indirectly to Mr. Alajmi (app. cross-mot. and resp. at 27-28). Thus, appellant
argues that its non-performance is excused, and the termination is improper (app.
combined memorandum of law and opp. to gov’t summary judgment mot. dtd. April 15,
2022 at 11-12).

Paragraph (f) of FAR 52.212-4, Excusable delays, postulates that such delays
must be “beyond the reasonable control of [Trident] and without its fault or
negligence,” and provides examples. For reasons already explained at length and
exhausted above, appellant has failed to show that the government first materially

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breached the contract, acted in bad faith, or was responsible for Trident’s failure to
perform under the contract conditions. Appellant’s reasoning that Mr. Alajmi
ultimately obtained the leased vehicles, the government must have been directly
involved and responsible is faulty and unsupported by the cited record. Briefly,
appellant has failed to show that the government communicated and/or coordinated
with a third party, Mr. Alajmi, to transfer the leased vehicles. Appellant’s citation to
emails and texts messages from Mr. Alajmi to government personnel in an attempt to
obtain information or “coordinate” retrieval of the leased vehicles is insufficient to
show that the government coordinated with Mr. Alajmi (SOF ¶¶ 8-9, 14-16, 33, 36).
The cited records demonstrate that the government was uncommunicative with
Mr. Alajmi (not responding to Mr. Alajmi’s text messages and emails) and did not
provide him with any assistance (refusing to provide Mr. Alajmi any information after
repeated requests; the CO correctly refused to communicate or provide any assistance
with Mr. Alajmi as he lacked privity of contract) (SOF ¶¶ 8, 9, 14-16, 33, 36). In
addition, appellant has not shown the government knew or should have known that
Trident’s representative, Mr. Mostafa, would obtain the leased vehicles on behalf of
Mr. Alajmi. Accordingly, appellant failed to show its default was excusable without
fault or negligence.

The government’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted, and
appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue is denied.

H. Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS)

i. The Board has jurisdiction over appellant’s CPARS claim, and appellant
did not abandon it

The government argues that “the Board does not have the jurisdiction to grant
specific performance such as revising the CPARS assessment” citing Versar, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 56857, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,437 at 169,959 (gov’t mot. at 16, n.2). In the
alternative, the government argues that appellant’s CPARS claim should be dismissed
since appellant has abandoned it (gov’t mot. at 16, n.2).

The government is correct that we do not possess jurisdiction to order an agency
to revise a CPARS rating. PROTEC GmbH, ASBCA No. 61161 et al., 18-1 BCA
¶ 37,064 at 180,420. However, we can assess whether the contracting officer
reasonably rendered the disputed performance rating or was arbitrary and capricious in
assigning an inaccurate and unfair performance evaluation and abused her discretion.
Versar, Inc., 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,437 at 169,959; MicroTechnologies, LLC, ASBCA
Nos. 59911, 59912, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,354 at 177,236. Thus, we may remand a matter to
require a contracting officer to follow applicable regulations and provide appellant with
a fair and accurate performance evaluation. MicroTechnologies, LLC, ASBCA

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Nos. 59911, 59912, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,125 at 176,348; Colonna’s Shipyard, Inc., ASBCA
No. 56940, 10-2 BCA 34,494 at 170,139-40; Versar, Inc., 10-1 BCA 34,437 at 169,959.

We view appellant’s CPARS claim as making one central assertion, that the
government acted arbitrarily and capriciously, or in “bad faith,” when it evaluated
appellant’s performance as being “unsatisfactory.” (See SOF ¶ 29). Appellant’s claim
appears to challenge the CO’s CPARS assessment as being arbitrary and capricious in
assigning poor performance evaluation, which, Trident alleges, was a situation created
by the government: requesting “a new CPAR assessment” because “[t]he Final Report
is also on its face unreasonable because the analysis is incorrect, self-serving and
completely backwards” and alleges that the government “fail[ed] to perform factual
and/or legal due diligence” in the CPARS report (gov’t mot., ex. G-2 at 9, 13). Here,
by seeking that the Board overturn the COFD, which included its decision on Trident’s
CPARs claim, appellant seeks an order remanding the appeal to require the CO to
provide Trident with a fair and accurate performance evaluation. See PROTEC
GmbH, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,064 at 180,420; Sungwoo E&C Co., ASBCA Nos. 61144,
61219, 19-1 BCA ¶ 37,449 at 181,976 (The Board has jurisdiction over the
government’s performance evaluations to determine whether they were arbitrary and
capricious when the government failed to exercise contract options and the contractor
alleged the government acted in bad faith.). The CPARS claim was not abandoned as
appellant’s amended complaint discusses at length the facts surrounding the CPARS
assessment (amended compl. dtd. September 30, 2020 ¶¶ 59-61). Under the heading
“Requested Relief,” appellant requested that the Board “[o]verturn the contracting
officer’s Final Decision” and “[a]ward Trident any other relief that the Board deems
appropriate” (id. at 15, ¶¶ g, n).

Therefore, we possess jurisdiction over Trident’s CPARS claim, and appellant
did not abandon it.

ii. The CO’s CPARS rating was not arbitrary and capricious

Trident received “unsatisfactory” ratings under the evaluation areas of schedule,
management, and regulatory compliance (SOF ¶¶ 26, 27). The nexus of appellant’s
claim is that the government acted in bad faith and created the situation which resulted
in the leased vehicles being “repossessed” by Mr. Alajmi (gov’t mot., ex. G-2 at 8-10;
amended compl. dtd. September 30, 2020 ¶¶ 60, 70, 75-76, 85, 89, 92, 94, 99).
Government officials are presumed to have acted in good faith. To prove bad faith,
Trident would have to show with convincing clarity a high probability that the CO
responsible for the CPARS acted from “personal animus with specific intent to injure
it.” Pangea, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 62561, 62640, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,026 at 184,669; see also
Genome-Commc’ns, ASBCA Nos. 57267, 57285, 11-1 BCA ¶ 34,699 at 170,889
(allegedly bad faith, retaliatory contract termination); Defense Sys. Co., ASBCA
No. 50918, 00-2 BCA ¶ 30,991 at 153,005 (allegedly bad faith, retaliatory cure notice)).

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Appellant has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the negative
evaluation was unjustified and was precipitated by the government’s alleged
coordination with Mr. Alajmi to retrieve the vehicles (which appellant has failed to
cite support in the record for its position). The cited record does not support that the
government acted in bad faith, coordinated with Mr. Alajmi to retrieve the vehicles, or
that the CO acted arbitrarily and capriciously to issue a negative performance
evaluation. Quite the opposite.

Once learning of the potential dispute between Mr. Alajmi and Trident, the CO
immediately emailed Trident, to which Mr. Zvarick responded that they “are working
diligently to resolve this dispute with Mr. Alajmi” to “insure there is no interruption of
service” (SOF ¶¶ 8, 10-12). It was appellant’s representative, Mr. Mostafa, who
retrieved the vehicles from the government (SOF ¶¶ 18-19). Appellant paints itself as
the victim in this situation that the vehicles were retrieved, and they could not obtain
them back from Mr. Alajmi. Behind the scenes, after receiving the January 6, 2016,
cure notice, Mr. Zvarick encouraged Mr. Alajmi to either return the vehicles to the
government or “make every effort to sell the vehicles as soon as possible” (SOF ¶ 21).
Mr. Zvarick’s position to minimize his potential debts with Mr. Alajmi through selling
the leased vehicles is opposite of Trident’s contract requirements to provide the leased
vehicles (SOF ¶¶ 1-5, 9, 21). Although indicating in its response to the cure notice that
Trident would be able to “sort[] out any problems” with Mr. Alajmi and provide the
leased vehicles to the government, Trident again reversed course and stated to the CO
that it would be unable to provide the leased vehicles (SOF ¶¶ 22-23). Thus, the record
reflects an unfortunate situation where Trident’s Qatar sponsor was able to indirectly
retrieve the leased vehicles to address an ongoing financial dispute with Trident, not the
contracting officer acting in bad faith in issuing negative performance evaluations (SOF
¶¶ 9, 11-12, 18-19, 21-23). The CO’s CPARS report describes in detail the late
delivery of vehicles, poor communication (prolonged periods of not reaching any
Trident’s representatives), incorrect invoicing procedures, failure to timely respond to
the cure notice, and failure to provide replacement vehicles (SOF ¶ 27).

We conclude that the CO did not abuse her discretion and did not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in assigning her performance assessment of Trident.

The government’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted, and
appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue is denied.

CONCLUSION

The government’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and appellant’s
cross-motion for summary judgment is denied as to: Breach of Contract –Failure to
Return the Vehicles, Breach of Contract – Communications Regarding Contract

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Performance, Breach of Bailment Agreement, Breach Of Implied Duty Of Good Faith
And Fair Dealing, Improper Termination for Cause, and the Contractor’s Performance
Assessment Report rating was not arbitrary and capricious. The parties’ motions are
denied for the costs associated with past-due leasing, maintenance, and traffic
violations, as there are material facts in dispute.

Dated: May 8, 2023

JOHN J. THRASHER
Administrative Judge
Chairman
Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals

I concur I concur

RICHARD SHACKLEFORD OWEN C. WILSON
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge
Vice Chairman Vice Chairman
Armed Services Board Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals of Contract Appeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 60541, 62144, Appeals of
Trident Engineering & Procurement, P.C., rendered in conformance with the Board’s
Charter.

Dated: May 8, 2023

PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS
Recorder, Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9900200. Public record. Not legal advice.