# Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Dept. of L&I

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · October 18, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9891412

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 18, 2023
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Covey, J.
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9891412

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming a Fire Code Board of Appeals’ decision because “it is the [b]oard which has the expertise, and we will not interfere with the [b]oard’s determination unless found to be arbitrary and capricious, or unsupportable on any rational basis”

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Schindler Elevator Corporation, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Department of Labor and Industry, : No. 1139 C.D. 2022
Respondent : Argued: September 11, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 18, 2023

Schindler Elevator Corporation (Schindler) petitions this Court for
review of the Department of Labor and Industry (Department), Elevator Safety
Board’s (Board)1 September 20, 2022 order2 granting, with the same condition,
variance petitions Schindler filed relative to its 3300 Series elevators (collectively,
Petitions).3 Schindler presents four issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the
Board applied an incorrect standard of review; (2) whether the Board deprived
Schindler of due process; (3) whether the Board arbitrarily and capriciously rejected
Schindler’s design based on subjective preferences; and (4) whether the Board
created a de facto regulation prohibiting Schindler’s design regardless of its safety.

1
The General Assembly created the Board in Section 2214.1 of The Administrative Code
of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, added by Section 3 of the Act of June 28,
2018, P.L. 451, 71 P.S. § 574.1, effective as of August 27, 2018.
2
The Board’s order was mailed on September 23, 2022.
3
The Board assigned the following numbers for Schindler’s individual projects: MD-
57891, MD-59733, MD-60605, MD-60606, MD-60611, MD-60612, MD-60614, MD-60615,
MD-60619, MD-60627, and MD-60628. See Reproduced Record at 402a.
After review, this Court reverses the Board’s imposition of the condition on the
variances.4
In June 2022, Schindler filed the Petitions with the Board for variances
regarding 11 projects, incorporating similar attachments in each of the Petitions that
described the proposed compensatory features supporting the requests. Each of the
Petitions sought 9 or 10 variances (depending on whether the individual elevator
utilized a retractable pit access ladder) from several applicable requirements, but all
of the Petitions contained the following relevant provisions:

2. A variance is requested from [S]ection . . . 2.1.3.1.2(b)
of the [American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(]ASME[)] A17.1a-2002[5] [(ASME Code)]to permit a
governor without the need for an access door, provided the
governor meets the requirements of [S]ections 2.7.4.5, and
2.7.6.3.4; 2.18.6.5 to 2.18.7 of the ASME 17.1-2016.[6]
3. A variance is requested from [S]ection[s] 2.7.5 and
2.7.6 of the ASME 17.1a-2002 to permit the Schindler
drive machine to be installed and accessed in the hoistway
as permitted and meeting all the requirements as
applicable in [S]ection[s] 2.7.5 and 2.7.6 of the ASME
A17.1-2016.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 54a.
On July 19, 2022, the Board held a hearing on the Petitions. Schindler
presented testimony and supporting evidence for its variance requests. The Board
denied the variance requests from Sections 2.1.3.1.2(b), 2.7.5, and 2.7.6 of ASME

4
The International Union of Elevator Constructors submitted an amicus curiae brief in
support of the Board’s decision. National Elevator Industry, Inc. submitted an amicus curiae brief
supporting Schindler’s appeal.
5
“ASME publishes an updated version of ASME 17.1 approximately every three years.
https://www.asme.org/codes-standards/find-codes-standards/a17-1-csa-b44-safety-code-
elevators-escalators-(1). However, the latest edition regulatorily adopted in Pennsylvania was
originally issued in 2002.” Bd. Br. at 4 n.3.
6
“ASME A17.1-2016 is a more-recently issued version of the ASME requirements, but . . .
Pennsylvania regulations currently require conformance with ASME A17.1a-2002. 34 Pa. Code
§ 405.2(a)(1).” Bd. Br. at 7 n.5.
2
A17.1a-2002, but granted the remaining variance requests. On July 20, 2022, the
Board issued orders for each of the 11 Petitions, based on the Board’s July 19, 2022
oral vote (1) granting numerous variance requests, and (2) denying the following
two variance requests:

A variance from Section 2.1.3.1.2(b) of the ASME
A17.1a-2002 to permit a governor without the need for an
access door is denied.
A variance from Sections 2.7.5 and 2.7.6 of the ASME
A17.1a-2002 to permit the Schindler drive machine to be
installed and accessed in the hoistway as permitted and
meeting all the requirements as applicable in Sections
2.7.5 and 2.7.6 of the ASME A17.1-2016 is denied.

Board’s July 20, 2022 Orders at 2 (R.R. at 368a-389a).
On July 29, 2022, Schindler filed a motion for reconsideration, and, at
an August 16, 2022 hearing, the Board unanimously agreed to review its July 20,
2022 orders.7 Schindler presented additional evidence and testimony concerning its
variance requests. Board Member Joe Williams (Board Member Williams), who is
an elevator mechanics union (Union) leader, participated extensively in the hearing,
raising concerns about Schindler’s proposed lack of a car blocking device, showing
a PowerPoint presentation reflecting findings from an independent investigation he
conducted into Schindler’s elevator installations, and questioning Schindler’s
credibility. Schindler’s counsel informed the Board that not a single reported
incident had occurred involving the absence of a car blocking device. R.R. at 484a,

7
On August 19, 2022, Schindler also filed a Petition for Review from the Board’s July 20,
2022 orders in this Court. On August 26, 2022, the Board filed in this Court a Praecipe to Mark
the Petition for Review as Stricken (Praecipe) under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1701(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b), in accordance with Section 35.241(f)(2)(ii) of the General Rules of
Administrative Practice and Procedure, 1 Pa. Code § 35.241(f)(2)(ii), based on the Board’s grant
of reconsideration. Schindler did not oppose the Praecipe. On August 30, 2022, this Court notified
the parties that it had stricken Schindler’s August 19, 2022 Petition for Review.
3
491a. Further, Schindler representatives testified regarding Schindler’s braking
system’s operation and redundancies. See R.R. at 493a-494a, 510a-515a.
On September 20, 2022, the Board issued an order granting all the
variance requests subject to “the condition that physical, manually-operated car
blocking devices are installed in each elevator.” R.R. at 554a-556a. The Board’s
order also permitted Schindler to immediately install the elevators without the
required car blocking device for a six-month period or until a court of competent
jurisdiction issues a final, non-appealable order affirming or reversing the Board’s
decision. See R.R. at 554a-555a. The Board issued its written decision on
September 23, 2022. Schindler appealed to this Court.8
Initially, Section 2214.1 of The Administrative Code of 1929 (Act)
states, in relevant part:

(a) The . . . Board is established and shall consist of the
members as provided in this section.
(b) The Governor shall appoint the members of the
[B]oard with one representative from each of the
following:
(1) The Department . . . .
(2) An elevator manufacturing company.
(3) An elevator servicing company.
(4) An architectural design or elevator consulting
profession.
(5) An elevator inspector.

8
“Our scope of review in this matter is limited to a determination of whether constitutional
rights were violated, whether the decision was rendered in accordance with the law, and whether
necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Bologna v. Pa. Dep’t of Lab. &
Indus., 816 A.2d 407, 410 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
4
(6) A labor organization specializing in the
installation, maintenance and repair of elevators
and other conveyances.
(7) A building owner or manager.
(8) A municipality.
(9) The general public.
....
(f)
....
(3) The [B]oard may grant exceptions and
variances from the requirements of applicable
codes and standards or regulations if the
changes would not jeopardize the safety and
welfare of the general public or individuals
employed in the elevator industry. The
Department[’s Bureau of Occupation and
Industrial Safety (BOIS)] . . . shall accept
applications for all exceptions and variances and
shall make recommendations on the
applications to the [B]oard.
(4) The [B]oard may hold hearings and hear
appeals on matters relating to this section in
accordance with regulations and procedures
established by the [B]oard in consultation with the
Department . . . .

71 P.S. § 574.1 (bold and underline emphasis added).
Section 405.2(a)(1) of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Construction Code
(UCC) adopts specific sections of “‘ASME A17.1-2000’ with ‘A17.1a-2002’
addenda” pertaining to “[e]lectric elevators[.]” 34 Pa. Code § 405.2(a)(1).
Section 405.3 of the UCC states, in pertinent part:

(a) An owner of an elevator or lifting device or an
authorized agent shall apply to the Department for a permit
before the construction, alteration, replacement[,] or repair
of an elevator or lifting device.
5
....
(g) An owner or owner’s agent may request a variance
or appeal the code administrator’s decision to the
Industrial Board[9] under [Section] 403.122 [of the UCC]
(relating to appeals, variances and extensions of time).
The appeal shall be based on a claim that the true intent of
the [A]ct or the [UCC] were incorrectly interpreted, the
[A]ct does not fully apply or an equivalent form of
construction is to be used.

34 Pa. Code § 405.3 (emphasis added).
Section 403.122 of the UCC declares, in relevant part:

(a) An owner or owner’s agent may seek a variance or
extension of time or appeal a building code official’s
decision by filing a petition with the building code official
or other person designated by the board of appeals on a
form provided by the municipality.
....
(d) A board of appeals[10] shall decide an appeal, variance
request or request for extension of time by reviewing
documents and written brief or argument unless the owner
or owner’s agent requests a hearing.
....
(g) A board of appeals may consider the following factors
when ruling upon . . . the request for variance:

9
Prior to the Board’s creation, the Industrial Board reviewed variance requests. In October
2018, the Board assumed such responsibility in accordance with Section 2214.1 of the Act.
10
Schindler contends that Section 403.122 of the UCC is inapplicable because it refers to
the authority of “[a] board of appeals[,]” 34 Pa. Code § 403.122, not the Board. It notes that “[a]
‘Board of Appeals’ is an agency created by a municipality ‘to hear appeals from decisions of the
[municipal] code administrator.’” Schindler Br. at 22 (quoting Section 403.121 of the UCC, 34
Pa. Code § 403.121). Notwithstanding, Section 2214.1 of the Act empowers the Board to grant
variances. Section 405.3 of the UCC directs an owner or owner’s agent to request a variance from
the Industrial Board under Section 403.122 of the UCC, which, until October 2018, had authority
to grant variance requests. Because the Board is now statutorily authorized to grant such variances
in place of the Industrial Board, this Court discerns no error in the Board’s compliance with Section
405.3 of the UCC.
6
(1) The reasonableness of the [UCC]’s application in a
particular case.
(2) The extent to which the granting of a variance or an
extension of time will pose a violation of the [UCC] or
an unsafe condition.
(3) The availability of professional or technical
personnel needed to come into compliance.
(4) The availability of materials and equipment needed
to come into compliance.
(5) The efforts being made to come into compliance as
quickly as possible.
(6) Compensatory features that will provide an
equivalent degree of protection to the [UCC].
....
(i) The board of appeals may:
(1) Deny the request in whole or in part.
(2) Grant the request in whole or in part.
(3) Grant the request upon certain conditions being
satisfied.
34 Pa. Code § 403.122 (emphasis added).

I. Standard of Review
Schindler first contends that the Board erred by applying an incorrect
standard of review that is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s statutory
mandate. According to Schindler,

[t]he Board’s enabling law provides that the Board should
grant a variance if that variance “would not jeopardize the
safety and welfare of the general public or individuals
employed in the elevator industry.” [] 71 P.S. § 574.1(f).
This is a permissive standard, consistent with the ASME
Code, that permits technical innovation and design as long
as that design achieves the safety goals set forth in the
7
ASME Code. The Board’s role is to determine if a
particular variance presents a safety risk and, if it does
not, the variance should be granted.

Schindler Br. at 19 (bold and underline emphasis added).
Notwithstanding Schindler’s assertion, Section 2214.1(f)(3) of the Act
states that “[t]he [B]oard may grant . . . variances[.]” 71 P.S. § 574.1(f)(3) (emphasis
added). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held:

The regulations of the Pennsylvania Code specifically
provide for the discretionary granting of . . . variances.
The statutes and the [Pennsylvania] Code contemplate
exercise of agency discretion in the granting of . . .
variances . . . . These discretionary decisions are exercised
by the application of standards, rules[,] and regulations to
the conditions and circumstances of the particular case.

Petition of Dwyer, 406 A.2d 1355, 1359 (Pa. 1994) (emphasis added; footnote and
citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court has explained:
“Although ‘may’ can mean the same as ‘shall’ where a
statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of
justice, it ordinarily is employed in the permissive
sense.” Commonwealth v. Garland, . . . 142 A.2d 14, 17
n.5 ([Pa.] 1958) (internal citations omitted);
Commonwealth v. A.M. Byers Co., . . . 31 A.2d 530, 532
([Pa.] 1943) (“The word ‘may’ clearly implies
discretionary power. The language is permissive, rather
than mandatory.”). See also Bowser v. Blom, . . . 807 A.2d
830, 835 ([Pa.] 2002) (where court “may” award costs and
fees in child support proceeding, prevailing party is not
automatically entitled to award); Treaster [v. Union, 242
A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 1968)] (statute stating township “may
revise its budget” during fiscal year should not be
construed to mean township was required to do so);
[Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2744,]
Pa.R.A.P. 2744 (appellate court “may award as further
costs damages as may be just” if appeal is frivolous). Cf.
In re Farnese, . . . 17 A.3d 357, 370-71 ([Pa.] 2011)

8
([Pennsylvania] Election Code[11] provision stating court
“shall” award costs “as it shall deem just” does not entitle
prevailing party to automatic award; language
“contemplates a more nuanced, calibrated decision,
perhaps difficult, but not at all a strange matter for courts
of justice”).
Additionally, although th[e Supreme] Court has
occasionally interpreted the word “may” in a statute as
mandatory, [it has] done so “usually where the ends of
justice or constitutional requirements so dictate.”
Treaster, 242 A.2d at 255. . . . Unless there are similarly
compelling reasons for interpreting “may” as
“shall” . . ., the plain, permissive language in [the
statute] leaves the decision . . . to the sound discretion
of the tribunal.

A. Scott Enters., Inc. v. City of Allentown, 142 A.3d 779, 787-88 (Pa. 2016)
(emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Here, the Act does not direct the Board to approve a variance “for the
sake of justice,” id. at 787, nor are there “compelling reasons for interpreting ‘may’
as ‘shall[,]’” id. at 788, especially where, as here, an administrative board consisting
of individuals with special skills related to that administrative board’s functions is
charged in its discretion with rendering a decision. See Troiani Grp. v. City of
Pittsburgh Bd. of Appeals, 273 A.3d 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Rather, the decision to
grant an elevator variance is left to the Board’s “sound discretion[.]” A. Scott
Enters., Inc., 142 A.3d at 788 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, in explaining its reasoning, the Board revealed that it
reviewed the Petitions under a stringent standard regularly used in a zoning context,
whereby a variance applicant must prove unnecessary hardship and demonstrate a
“substantial, serious and compelling” reason for the variance request (Zoning

11
Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600 – 3591.
9
Standard). Bd. Op. at 13; see also Section 910.2(a) of the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), 53 P.S. § 10910.2(a).12
The Board stated:

Here, Schindler is seeking permission to deviate from the
current terms of the UCC[] requirements that are adopted

12
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 89 of the Act of December
21, 1988, P.L. 1329. Section 910.2(a) of the MPC provides:
(a) The [zoning] board shall hear requests for variances where it is
alleged that the provisions of the zoning ordinance inflict
unnecessary hardship upon the applicant. The [zoning] board may
by rule prescribe the form of application and may require
preliminary application to the zoning officer. The [zoning] board
may grant a variance, provided that all of the following findings are
made where relevant in a given case:
(1) That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions,
including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or
shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions
peculiar to the particular property and that the unnecessary
hardship is due to such conditions and not the circumstances or
conditions generally created by the provisions of the zoning
ordinance in the neighborhood or district in which the property is
located.
(2) That because of such physical circumstances or conditions,
there is no possibility that the property can be developed in strict
conformity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance and that
the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable
the reasonable use of the property.
(3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the
[applicant].
(4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential
character of the neighborhood or district in which the property is
located, nor substantially or permanently impair the appropriate
use or development of adjacent property, nor be detrimental to
the public welfare.
(5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent the minimum
variance that will afford relief and will represent the least
modification possible of the regulation in issue.
53 P.S. § 10910.2(a).
10
for public safety and codified by Department[] regulation.
[See] Com[. of Pa.], Indus[.] B[d.] v. Durbin, 354 A.2d 24,
26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976). Accordingly, appellate courts
have held that the reasons for a review board “granting a
variance must be substantial, serious[,] and compelling.”
Valley View Civic Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, []
462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983). The party seeking the
variance bears the burden of proving unnecessary hardship
and absence of injury to the public interest. Abe Oil Co. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of Richmond Twp., 649 A.2d 182, 185
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) [(]citing Ventresca v. Exley, 56 A.2d
210 (Pa. 1948)[)]. The applicant’s burden for a variance
request is heavy and review boards should grant variances
to current requirements sparingly and only under
exceptional circumstances. Appeal of Lester M. Prange,
Inc., 647 A.2d 279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
Boards should not grant variance requests simply because
compliance with the current requirements deprives the
owner of the most profitable uses of the property. Wilson
v. Plumstead T[wp.] Zoning Hearing B[d.], . . . 936 A.2d
1061 ([Pa.] 2007). Reasonable financial considerations or
economic issues are not pertinent to a board’s analysis of
a variance request.

Bd. Op. at 13-14; see also Bd. Op. at 30, Findings of Fact 5, 6.
Board elevator variance approvals are not uncommon.13 Neither
Section 2214.1 of the Act, nor Section 403.122 of the UCC, mandate or imply
application of the aforementioned Zoning Standard.14 Further, this Court has not

13
In fact, the Board’s Chairman acknowledged at the August 16, 2022 hearing that “the
Board had . . . up until this point [] approved 425 variances . . . .” R.R. at 499a.
14
In addition, the Board’s standard “Elevator Safety Board Petition” form requires that the
applicant furnish the following information with respect to the variance request:
• Section of code requesting variance(s).
• Detail what your alternative approach entails and any
compensatory measures.
• State the reasons for the requested variance, including why the
strict letter of regulation is impractical, how the variance would

11
found any prior court decision wherein the Board or the Industrial Board applied the
Zoning Standard to elevator variance requests.15 Given that neither the Act nor the
UCC mandate or imply the Zoning Standard, the Board has not previously applied
the Zoning Standard to elevator variance requests, and the Act’s directive that the
Board may grant a variance “if the changes would not jeopardize the safety and
welfare of the general public or individuals employed in the elevator industry[,]” 71
P.S. § 574.1(f)(3), the Board erred by imposing the Zoning Standard when deciding
the Petitions.16

II. Due Process
Next, Schindler contends that the Board deprived it of due process by
relying on Board Member Williams’ improper and ultra vires investigation and
allowing him to present his findings to the Board in a quasi-prosecutorial role.
Specifically, Schindler contends that Board Member Williams

used his position within the Union to either request or
demand that an elevator mechanic grant him access to the
elevator car tops and shafts in private property located in
Philadelphia for the purpose of photographing Schindler’s
elevator components. [See R.R. at 488a-490a, 495a-

satisfy the code’s intent, and why the modification would not lessen
health, life and safety requirements in the listed code section(s).
R.R. at 52a (emphasis added). Merriam-Webster defines “impractical” as “a: not wise to put into
or keep in practice or effect[;]” “b: incapable of dealing sensibly or prudently with practical
matters[.]” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/impractical (last visited Oct. 17, 2023).
15
In an analogous case, Valimont v. Department of Labor & Industry, Industrial Board,
667 A.2d 759 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), this Court concluded that the Industrial Board had properly
denied a variance request from Section 58.21(a), (c) of the Fire and Panic Regulations, 34 Pa. Code
§ 58.21(a), (c), based on similar variance standards set forth in the relevant regulation. See Section
49.15 of the Department’s regulations, 34 Pa. Code § 49.15 (relating to appeals to the Industrial
Board). The Zoning Standard was notably absent from this Court’s analysis.
16
In its opinion, the Board also reasoned that “[f]or this Board to grant a variance to the
current requirements, Schindler must demonstrate . . . that [it has] provided a safer or as-safe
alternative.” Bd. Op. at 24 (emphasis added). However, that is not the standard.
12
497a]. Moreover, [Board Member] Williams -
presumably from the same technician - obtained
Schindler’s confidential maintenance documents that
Schindler licenses to elevator owners. [See R.R. at 496a].
Schindler Br. at 40.

The record reflects that Board Member Williams, as an adjudicating
Board member, significantly participated as an advocate at the hearings, narrating a
PowerPoint presentation urging against Schindler’s requested variances, and
repeatedly expressing his opinion based on his own investigation that Schindler’s
representations to the Board were untruthful.
Initially, at the Board’s July 19, 2022 hearing, Board Member Williams
stated:

So[,] this came to light because it is coming up across the
country. Across the country . . . [e]levator [s]afety
[b]oards have come to realize that Schindler took this
locking bar out, out of product, they are not installing it
anymore. I found out last week on Thursday[,] and as soon
as I found out that it had been removed, that [Schindler
wasn’t] using it, I called [BOIS representative] Joe
Marchioni and talked to him about it. And then sent a[n]
email to [the Board’s Administrative Officer] Traci
[Willman (Willman)] to withhold these variances so [the
Board] can have this discussion today. Other jurisdictions
are doing the same thing. [This Board is] not the only state
[board] that is questioning this. I mean I find it personally
insulting the response that [Schindler] gave [the Board].
....
So[,] this question is being brought up across the country
in jurisdictions all across the country. [The Board is]
doing [its] due diligence as a [s]afety [b]oard. The
questions [sic] is Schindler wasn’t forthcoming with all
this information[,] that [it] could have given all the
information to the Department when [Schindler]
ask[ed] for these variances. And it has been proven
here today, [Schindler] did not do that. Elevator
Division doesn’t have all the information. [It is] being led

13
to believe by Schindler that [one doesn’t] have to do
any maintenance on these and nobody has to get up in
that overhead. And no mechanic is going to be put in
a dangerous situation and he can do all this without
every [sic] performing maintenance. But yet, [the
Board has] documents in front of [it] that contradict
everything that [Schindler] said. It has happened in
the past with Schindler. [Schindler hasn’t] even --- and
the last incident with the belts, [Schindler wasn’t] even
submitting the correct certificates for conformance.
[The Board is] being asked [to] believe Schindler’s
interp[re]tation of a code. I don’t believe [Schindler is]
meeting the code. That is why it is being discussed here.
[Schindler] need[s] to resubmit [its] variances and [the
Board] will go through this again next week[,] or
[Schindler] can put the safety devices back on the
elevator and keep it safe and have an extra means of
protection and suspension for the mechanic working in
the overhead. It --- if I can --- [the Board] had an issue
with another company over a product that the Board
thought was unsafe. That company went out and came to
a --- the first agreement was, to make a change in the
design that would appease the Board to keep [its elevators]
safer. And then they continue to look for a way to make
[its elevators] safer and to endure a product and twice they
felt things to make it safer and the Board can move on to
make sure the people are safe.
Schindler wants to play a word game here and
interrupt [sic] words and a different meaning and tell
you that [it doesn’t] need to do it. I [m]ean --- quite
frankly the arrogance is sickening.

R.R. at 438a-439a (emphasis added).
At the August 16, 2022 Board hearing, the following exchanges
occurred:

[Board Member Williams]: Here is the PowerPoint. I
want to ask Schindler about jobs that are already installed
and has been [sic] installed.
[Schindler’s Counsel Brian P. Downey (Downey)]: I don’t
mean to interrupt you, let me --- are you under oath,

14
because if you are testifying - I might want to be able to
cross[-]examine you as you are acting as a witness.
[Board Member Williams]: What is that --- I am asking the
Chairman, I am asking to put a PowerPoint up that I think
it is important to the presentation --- to this hearing here.
[Board Legal Counsel Peter Von Getzie (Von Getzie)]:
These are the rules of the Board Member, and he started
taking his oath back on October 16th, 2018.
[Downey]: We --- we --- I know, are able to cross[-
]examine him in that role of any factual representation
here ---
[Von Getzie]: Yes, you can ---
....
[Downey]: . . . We object --- we were given a description
of what he has given of this --- what he is about to offer is
well beyond the scope of what this [B]oard is authorized
to do. He provided --- an individual investigation by
Board Members that are targeting Schindler that we see
over and over and over here. [This Board Member’s
actions are] [ultra vires] and are well beyond what this
Board is authorized to do and well beyond the role that any
individual member can take or potential of taking within
the process. I object at this point.
[Board Member Williams]: . . . Here [are] the diagrams
that come in the installation manual for Schindler for
3300, the car blocking device. Here is the next one, just
the installation diagrams for installing a car blocking
device on the 3300. Next one, same diagrams. Here ---
here is a picture of a Schindler 3300 car blocking device.
This is installed --- Schindler wants you to believe that
it is extremely difficult and financially prohibitive to
retro fit or install these on [its] units, but they are
already installed. They have been installed. These are
units --- elevators that have [sic] installed in Philadelphia.
Go to the next one. There is the piece that goes on the rail,
the piece --- the pin goes into to secure the car. Schindler
equipment --- here is the picture of the brake. The
Schindler brake, it seems to be under question. That
[Schindler] tell[s] [the Board] that there is no maintenance

15
. . . required on that. Go to the next one please. Right on
the brake, [Schindler] is giving instructions on how to
check the brake. I don’t know what [Schindler] defined as
maintenance, but brake inspection --- [Schindler is] telling
[the Board] how to inspect it right on the brake, which is
the same thing on the picture.
R.R. at 487a-488a (emphasis added).
[Board Member Williams]: And they are --- they are being
installed. This is from a job. One job is [sic] just done
a month ago in Philadelphia and the other job is under
construction right now. So[,] I just want the Board to
see --- even though Schindler under oath told [the
Board] that [it] can’t retro fit or it is very difficult to
retro fit --- there is no need to retro fit. [The elevators]
are already designed and engineered to have this
equipment on it. I just want to go through the pictures,
pretty simple stuff. Any experienced elevator mechanic
can put that on in about an hour. . . .

R.R. at 489a (emphasis added). Board Chairman Scott Weiant then asked the Board
members if they had any questions related to Board Member Williams’ presentation.
Several Board members asked questions regarding the need for and the process for
installing car blocking devices, in response to which Board Member Williams
continued:

[Board Member Williams]: So I wasn’t finished with my
PowerPoint yet. I still have more pictures of that. Here is
the picture of the lock and block[] device on a [Schindler
Series] 5500. That is --- you can see the pin going through.
I just want everyone to see --- these are jobs in
Philadelphia. I didn’t go to California to get pictures.
Nobody sent me these. I went out to the job site in
Philadelphia[.] Here the plate goes on the rail --- that is
pin[s] through the rail, two pins. The next one, this is just
some overhead pictures of the machine. Just so the Board
and anybody that is on sees or doesn’t have experience on
these machines. This is what the mechanics are dealing
with in the overhead. There is the picture of the machine
with the belts. And --- by the way that is the machine
that Schindler wants [the Board] to believe that

16
requires no maintenance. Next picture please. Pretty
tight --- up --- I am still talking there [Schindler Elevator
Representative Norman Martin (Martin)].
[Martin]: Yes, but I would like to respond regarding no
maintenance. That is not a fair comment.
....
[Board Member Williams]: . . . . Okay, so question that I
have for Schindler, this isn’t a question. I am just going
to make some statements. [Schindler is] telling [the
Board] there are no maintenance [sic] be done on these
brakes. Yet [Schindler] sent [the Board] pictures and
[the Board has] seen pictures here. And [Schindler is]
asking a mechanic to go into the overhead with a Filler
(phonetic) gauge to check the outer back of the brake.
Okay[,] so that is on top of the car and working on top of
the car as their work platform --- working. And
[Schindler] want[s] [the Board] to believe that the
brake should never fail. I don’t know how [Schindler]
can say never. I have been in this business 40 years and
I have seen a lot of things happen. I have seen a lot of
brakes fail and there is [sic] a lot of different conditions
and every shaft that could cause brakes to fail. Schindler
is telling you that they will never fail, and they don’t
require any maintenance, even though and I will present
this is a --- in the PowerPoint, I don’t think [Willman] got
it. But here is [Schindler’s] Maintenance Control Program
which is supposed to be left on every job. And you read
through the Maintenance Control Program there is [sic]
procedures and maintenance check that [Schindler is]
requiring mechanics to do on brakes and on the machine
and on the motor, and up on the overhead, on the top of
the car as their work platform. And [Schindler is] basing
everything on that theme could never be anything done
[sic] that could cause unattended motion. How can
anybody predict that. You can’t predict that a piece of
machinery won’t fail. And I think every bit of
redundancy that we can have on an elevator to protect
the mechanic or inspector in that overhead is needed.
There is not an [sic] enough recovery. And when
[Schindler] tell[s] [the Board] that the stop switch is
enough, and the inspection switch is enough to remove
it and not let it have any unattended motion, is just not

17
true. There is a possibility that the brake can fail. All of
us that have worked on elevators and have actually worked
on elevators know that there are a million things that can
go wrong that could affect the elevator machine motor and
brake. But when you put that lock and block, car blocking
device in place, there is no chance that car is going to move
unattended in the up direction. The stop switch is not an
[sic] enough. . . . So[,] I am asking the Board to do what
is safe for anybody working inside of that hatch and
require Schindler with the car blocking device on all of
their [machine-room-less elevator systems]. That is the
safest thing to do --- yeah, it is probably a little bit
redundant, but redundancy is a good thing when you are
talking about a man’s life or a wom[a]n’s life or not losing
your finger or your arm and crashing your head into the
machine and the overhead. Because even the slightest bit
of unattended motion on an elevator can kill someone.
That is more important than saving block for Schindler [].

R.R. at 495a-497a (bold and underline emphasis added).

[Board Member Williams]: . . . No one can guarantee
100% that the brakes are not going to fail. We all under -
-- I am assuming everyone here --- I understand how the
enable switch, the stop switch --- whatever you want to
call it, I get how safety circuit works. And it takes power
away and brakes are not going to pick --- but you can’t
guarantee that something couldn’t happen to cause that
brake to fail. And I am going to disagree with Schindler
--- you are not meeting all the requirements of
[Occupational Safety and Health Administration] for a
lock out, tag out, just putting the stop switch on, does
not remove the stored energy. Yeah, the brake is set,
that brake[] fails, nobody can guarantee that it
wouldn’t --- you need something else to make sure the
car doesn’t move. And that is what the lock and block
does, it is removing the stored energy from the elevator,
the car is not going to go up unattended. We are talking
about unattended motion.

R.R. at 505a-506a (emphasis added).

[Board Member Williams]: So[,] everything this
gentleman --- sorry I don’t remember his name, the one

18
that was just talking. A lot of this stuff is independent, I
don’t think it meets the code.
(Cross talking)
[Board Member Williams]: Car top -- we all know there is
maintenance that has to be done up there. The emergency
brake, the normal brake are not independent means to stop
the car from possible unattended motion. Nobody can
guarantee there is not going to be a failure. The stop
switch is not an independent means, the lock and block,
car locking device --- independent means, separate from
the elevator driving machine brake, [e]mergency brake,
motion controller, motor controller. So[,] I don’t know if
I can do this --- I would like to just add a provision to
the variance request, can I do that at this point so we can
---[.]

R.R. at 516a-517a (emphasis added).
The law is well established:

The basic due process requirement that there be a fair
trial before an impartial tribunal is applicable to
administrative tribunals as well as to courts. Potential
dangers exist when there is a commingling of the
investigative, prosecutorial[,] and adjudicative
functions. [This Court has] recognized that the due
process requirement of a fair trial is violated when
these functions are commingled in a single individual
and that due process may be violated when these functions
are performed by different individuals within the same
administrative entity. The test in the latter situation is
whether the functions performed are adequately separate
so that there is no actual prejudice.

Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. City of Reading Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 585 A.2d 1166, 1169
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (bold emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Purcell v.
Reading Sch. Dist., 167 A.3d 216 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
The Georgia-Pacific Court observed:

The law recognizes a due process violation for the
commingling of adjudicative and prosecutorial
functions . . . .
19
The role of the prosecutor is to fashion as
strong a case against the accused as the
evidence will allow. This is manifestly at
odds with the impartiality required of the
adjudicator. When the prosecutor as an
individual is permitted in some manner to
fulfill the role of the fact-finder one of the
necessary elements of a fair trial is lacking.
Bruteyn Appeal, . . . 380 A.2d 497, 501 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]
1977). Since the fact-finding function is critical to
resolution of administrative cases, and is only subject to
limited appellate review, it is imperative that the process
“be afforded the broadest dimensions of constitutional
protection.” P[a.] Hum[.] Rel[s.] Comm[’n] v. Thorp,
Reed & Armstrong, . . . 361 A.2d 497, 501 ([Pa. Cmwlth.]
1976).

Georgia-Pac., 585 A.2d at 1170 (emphasis added).
In Purcell, this Court referenced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
decision in Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992). The
Purcell Court recounted:

“What our [Pennsylvania] Constitution requires,”
reasoned the Supreme Court, “. . . is that if more than one
function is reposed in a single administrative entity, walls
of division [must] be constructed which eliminate the
threat or appearance of bias.” [Lyness, 605 A.2d] at 1209.
The Supreme Court’s concern was not any demonstration
of actual bias; rather, “the potential for bias and the
appearance of non-objectivity is sufficient to create a
fatal defect under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id.
at 1210. Finally, [our] Supreme Court cited its decision in
Gardner v. Repasky, . . . 252 A.2d 704, 706 ([Pa.] 1969),
when it noted proverbially, “A man cannot sit as judge
when he is a member of a board which has brought the
accusations.” [Lyness,] 605 A.2d at 1208.

Purcell, 167 A.3d at 223 (emphasis added).
Here, the record reflects that Board Member Williams acted not as a
neutral adjudicator but, in effect, in a prosecutorial capacity, conducting his own

20
investigation, preparing and presenting a PowerPoint presentation, revealing
Schindler’s internal documents and Board Member Williams’ personal observations
of Schindler’s elevators, challenging the veracity of Schindler’s representations, and
advocating against the requested variances.17 Further, such investigation and
questioning led other Board members to similarly question Schindler. Board
Member Williams, a sitting Board member who was also adjudicating the matter,
engaged in egregious conduct, unconstrained by the Board, that deprived Schindler
of an impartial tribunal and, thus, denied Schindler the due process to which it was
entitled.

III. Abuse of Discretion and Capricious Disregard
Schindler next asserts that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously
rejected Schindler’s design based on subjective preferences despite record evidence
that Schindler’s design is as safe or safer than a car blocking device. Schindler
argues that there was no evidence regarding any legitimate safety concern on which

17
In its opinion, the Board attempts to minimize the impact of Board Member Williams’
role, explaining:
[Board Member Williams] also provided the Board with documents
purportedly from Schindler’s maintenance program. Schindler
objected to the Board admitting these documents into the record. At
the August hearing, [Board Member Williams] provided additional
PowerPoint presentations that included pictures of Schindler’s 3300
Series equipment, pictures of the 5500 Series, and a maintenance
control program document for the 3300s . . . . Schindler also
objected to admitting these documents into the record. However,
the admissions and objections concerning these exhibits are
rendered moot because the Board did not consider or rely on these
documents for [its] decision. Instead, the Board reached [its]
conclusions based on [its] concerns involving the inherent safety
issues discussed herein of technicians performing tasks while on a
car top.
Bd. Op. at 20 n.8 (citations omitted).
21
the Board could have based its denial but, rather, the Board acted on its subjective
preferences. Schindler asserts:

The Board does not have carte blanche to deny variances
for any reason whatsoever, including the subjective
preferences of individual members. The Board’s enabling
legislation limits its authority and grants the Department
the first review of any incoming variance petitions - the
clear inference being that the Board should defer to the
Department’s expertise and diligent review unless it
identifies a legitimate safety concern that would
“jeopardize the safety of the general public” or
technicians. [] 71 P.S. § 574.1(f)(a). Again, the Board’s
actions here were a stunning departure from its normal
practice of granting petitions for variances unless specific,
articulable safety concerns were identified.

Schindler Br. at 25.
“Our precedent states as a general rule that [a decision] ‘is arbitrary and
capricious where it is unsupportable on any rational basis because there is no
evidence upon which [it] may be logically based.’” Const. Drive Partners, L.P. v.
Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 247 A.3d 1198, 1211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Cary v.
Bureau of Pro. & Occupational Affs., State Bd. of Med., 153 A.3d 1205, 1210 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc)).
The Board made the following pertinent factual findings:

9. For an elevator with a traditional mechanical room,
technicians have access to the machinery and brakes
without having to be on top of or underneath the car. [See
R.R. at 407a].
10. The design of the Schindler 3300 Series, which cuts
the power to an elevator’s motor and engages the brakes
while a technician performs maintenance or inspection
services, does not completely eliminate potential energy
from the elevator or the possibility of the car unexpectedly
moving. [See R.R. at 410a-414a, 424a, 427a-428a, 432a,
436a].

22
11. While a technician is working on an elevator,
conditions are often unpredictable and can become
dangerous, resulting in unexpected events that can cause
severe injuries and even fatalities. [R.R. at 410a-413a,
496a, 516a, 523a].
....
12. Schindler requests to install the subject 3300 Series
elevators without including car blocking devices, also
known as “lock and blocks,” to further mitigate
unexpected vertical car movement. [See R.R. at 19a-23a,
403a-404a].
13. A car blocking device is installed on some elevator
models to physically prevent unexpected movement of the
elevator while a technician is performing maintenance or
inspection services from the car top. [See R.R. at 404a].
14. A technician must manually engage a car blocking
device. [See R.R. at 404a].
15. Schindler has provided car blocking devices on other
elevator models. [See R.R. at 403a, 417a].
16. Schindler installs car blocking devices for the 3300
Series elevators in California. [See R.R. at 404a-406a,
484a, 493a, 528a-529a].
17. Schindler has previously installed car locking devices
on these models in other jurisdictions too, including
Pennsylvania. [See R.R. at 403a-404a, 484a, 493a].
18. In some instances, Schindler admits it has chosen to
placate a local authority’s concerns about its elevators’
design that omit the lock and blocks and installed the
devices to avoid delaying an elevator installation project’s
progress. [See R.R. at 405a-406a, 493a-494a, 529a].
19. Using a car blocking device physically stops the
elevator from moving unexpectedly during maintenance
and inspection. [See R.R. at 428a].

Bd. Op. at 10-11.

23
In reaching its decision, the Board declared:

From our own experiences, the Board finds that
Schindler’s assertion that its design adequately removes
stored energy and sufficiently prevents unexpected car
movement is not credible. The Board also disagrees with
Schindler’s averment that using both the Schindler design
and a car blocking device will not make it safer for
technicians working on top of the car. [The Board]
actually embrace[s] and encourage[s] Schindler’s concept
of “wearing a belt and suspenders” analogy. The Board
favors the redundancy of additional safety measures,
especially one such as a car blocking device because it is
independent of the main power and braking system. Using
both systems together sufficiently assures the Board that
the car will be physically stopped from moving while
technicians are working on top of that elevator.

Bd. Op. at 28 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
This Court has explained:

It has long been acknowledged that “those persons who
comprise the membership of the various administrative
boards have been selected for the special skills and
requisite expertise they possess in order to properly render
an independent judgment.” Batoff v. State Bd. of Psych.,
750 A.2d 835, 841 (Pa. 2000). “Pennsylvania courts have
consistently respected that administrative agencies
comprised of persons presumably selected for their
specialized experience and expertise are better qualified
than any court to make a factual finding on a subject within
their field.” Id. “When an administrative agency rests its
conclusion upon its expertise, courts generally respect its
special competence.” No. 1 Cochran, Inc. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 579 A.2d 1386, 1391
n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
The Supreme Court of this Commonwealth
has recognized the special skills and
expertise possessed of those people
comprising the membership of its various
administrative agencies. In Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board v. Sand’s Restaurant

24
Corp., . . . 240 A.2d 801 ([Pa.] 1968), the
Supreme Court stated:
[]An administrative agency with
power after hearings to
determine on the evidence in
adversary proceedings whether
violations of statutory
commands have occurred may
infer within the limits of the
inquiry from the proven facts
such conclusions as reasonably
may be based upon the facts
proven. One of the purposes
which lead to the creation of
such boards is to have
decisions based upon
evidential facts under the
particular statute made by
experienced officials with an
adequate appreciation of the
complexities of the subject
which is entrusted to their
administration. . . [.] In these
cases, we but restated a rule
familiar to the law and followed
by all fact-finding tribunals -
that it is permissible to draw
on experience in factual
inquiries.[]
Id. at . . . 805 (quoting in part from Republic
Aviation Corp. v. Nat[’l] Lab[.] Rel[s.] B[d.],
324 U.S. 793, 800 . . . (1945)).
Kundrat v. State Dental Council & Examining Bd., 447
A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (emphasis added).
Other decisions similarly recognize special deference to
such boards/commissions. See, e.g., Bedford Downs
Mgmt. Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm’n, 926 A.2d
908, 915 (Pa. 2007) (“[T]he [c]ommission has special
expertise and judgment in making licensing decisions.”
(quotation marks omitted)); Rector Church Wardens v.
City of Phila. Hist. Comm’n, 215 A.3d 1038, 1042 (Pa.

25
Cmwlth. 2019) (recognizing the Philadelphia Historical
Commission’s “expertise given its mandated composition
of specialists in historical, architectural, and real estate
fields[]”); Turchi v. Phila. Bd. of License & Inspection
Rev., 20 A.3d 586 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (deference afforded
where Philadelphia Historical Commission composed of
members with specialized knowledge, background, and
expertise in the area of historic preservation); Morelli v.
Fire Code Bd. of Appeals, 559 A.2d 90, 92 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1989) (affirming a Fire Code Board of Appeals’ decision
because “it is the [b]oard which has the expertise, and we
will not interfere with the [b]oard’s determination unless
found to be arbitrary and capricious, or unsupportable on
any rational basis”); Coder v. State Bd. of Chiropractic
Exam’rs, 471 A.2d 563, 571 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984)
(“[D]ecisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accord[]
broad administrative discretion to public agencies in
carrying out the functions conferred upon them by statutes
which the legislature has necessarily been required to
word in broad terms, in deference to the agency expertise
needed to function in a specialized field.”); Swartwood v.
Dep’t of Env’t Res., 424 A.2d 993, 996-97 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1981) (“[I]n the absence of a purely arbitrary exercise of
an agency’s duties or functions, we may not substitute
judicial discretion for administrative discretion in matters,
such as these, which involve technical expertise and which
are clearly within the special knowledge and competence
of the members of the [Environmental Hearing] Board.”).

Troiani Grp., 273 A.3d at 55-56 (footnote omitted); see also Cnty. of York v. Indus.
Bd. of Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 401 A.2d 885 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).
Nevertheless,

an agency’s administrative expertise does not relieve it of
the obligation to make factual findings “supported by the
substantial and legally credible evidence.” [Sand’s Rest[.]
Corp[.], . . . 240 A.2d at 805. Administrative expertise can
be used to resolve conflicts in the testimony and to draw
reasonable inferences from the facts of record. However,
an agency cannot use the specialized knowledge of its
administrators as a substitute for evidence. Neither
Kundrat nor Batoff gives a green light to an agency’s use
of information known to the adjudicator as a basis for fact-

26
finding. To do so would deprive a respondent . . . of the
opportunity to examine the evidence and “parry [its]
effect” with rebuttal evidence to show why the agency’s
information is either wrong or not relevant. Ohio Bell
[Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio], 301 U.S. [292,]
302 [(1937)]. Further, it denies appellate courts the ability
to determine whether an agency’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence.

Kyu Son Yi, DVM v. State Bd. of Veterinary Med., 960 A.2d 864, 872 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2008) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Information known personally to administrative officers
must be disclosed and put on the record
so that the supposed fact may be
supplemented, explained, or refuted by
contrary evidence, and so that a court, on
judicial review, may be informed of what
facts the agency has utilized, so as to
determine the existence of evidence in
support of the decision.
Pub[.] Util[s.] Comm[’n] v. Cole’s Express Re: Motor
Common Carrier Rate Increases [&] Decreases, . . . 138
A.2d 466, 498 ([Me.] 1958) (quoting 42 AM. JUR. Pub[.]
Admin[.] Law § 130).

Kyu Son Yi, 960 A.2d at 870.
Schindler asserts that it submitted “overwhelming evidence[,]”
including expert testimony, that its design was safe. Schindler Br. at 32. According
to Schindler, the Board ignored this evidence and adopted the Board’s personal
preferences regarding necessary safety precautions. The Board approved all
variances Schindler requested, but imposed the car blocking condition in each of the
Petitions despite the lack of evidence demonstrating such a need.
It is unclear the extent to which the Board’s erroneous application of
the Zoning Standard affected its fact-finding and its reasoning when it imposed
relative to each of the Petitions “the condition that physical, manually-operated car
blocking devices are installed in each elevator.” R.R. at 555a. Nor can this Court
27
fully discern the effects of Board Member Williams’ improper investigation and
participation on the Board’s fact-finding and disposition of this matter. Based upon
Board Member Williams’ PowerPoint presentation and the accompanying
information, other Board members inquired further about the material that Board
Member Williams presented. Thus, it is clear that the Board based its finding that
Schindler was not credible, at least in part, on Board Member Williams’ assertions
and questions stemming therefrom. Further, the Board’s use of information arising
from its own voting member’s investigation and related questions was arbitrary and
capricious conduct and deprived this Court of the ability to determine whether the
Board’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Because the entire
Board participated in the hearing and was privy to information Board Member
Williams presented, a remand would serve no purpose beyond placing the matter
before the very same body that was tainted by Board Member Williams’ improper
participation. Thus, this Court must reverse the Board’s decision to the extent that
it imposed on the Petitions’ approval “the condition that physical, manually-operated
car blocking devices are installed in each elevator.” R.R. at 554a-556a.
For all of the above reasons, the Board’s order is reversed to the extent
that it conditioned its approval of the Petitions on Schindler installing physical,
manually-operated car blocking devices in each elevator.18

_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

18
Given this Court’s disposition of this matter, it does not reach Schindler’s final issue.
28
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Schindler Elevator Corporation, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Department of Labor and Industry, : No. 1139 C.D. 2022
Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2023, the Department of Labor
and Industry, Elevator Safety Board’s (Board) September 20, 2022 order is
REVERSED to the extent that it conditioned its approval of Schindler Elevator
Corporation’s (Schindler) variance petitions for its 3300 Series elevators, Board
designated as MD-57891; MD-59733; MD-60605; MD-60606; MD-60611; MD-
60612; MD-60614; MD-60615; MD-60619; MD-60627; and MD-60628, on
Schindler installing physical, manually-operated car blocking devices in each
elevator. The Board’s order is otherwise affirmed.

_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9891412. Public record. Not legal advice.