# People Ex Rel. Castle v. Wright > Illinois Supreme Court · March 22, 1956 · 8 Ill. 2d 454 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884499 ## Case - **Full name:** The People Ex Rel. Latham Castle, Attorney General, Petitioner, vs. Warren E. Wright, State Treasurer, Respondent - **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court - **Decided:** March 22, 1956 - **Citations:** 8 Ill. 2d 454; 134 N.E.2d 269; 1956 Ill. LEXIS 276 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Schaefer - **Judges:** Latham Castle - **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884499 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding res judicata applicable to consecutive taxpayer actions ## Opinion text Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting: It seems to me that in its eagerness to reach a result which it considers desirable, the majority has disregarded settled principles and overridden the rights of litigants. The case is decided upon the ground that the issues it presents have already been adjudicated. The issues in this case have not, of course, ever been actually determined by any court, nor was the respondent in this case a party to the previous actions which are said to have adjudicated these issues. Under the normal operation of the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, the parties and the issues in this case would not be affected by the result of the earlier actions. For its extension of the normal boundaries of res judicata in this case, the majority relies upon Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122 . In the Harmon case this court held that certain contentions advanced by a taxpayer could not be raised because they had been presented by the pleadings in an earlier suit filed by another taxpayer, and could have been determined in the earlier proceeding. That the doctrine of the Harmon case is not applicable here is made clear by our decision in Johnson v. Daley, 403 Ill. 338 . We there held that although certain sections of the Cigarette Tax Act had been held valid in Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 322 , which was a taxpayer’s suit, the decision in that case did not bar another taxpayer from challenging the validity of certain other provisions of the Cigarette Tax Act, because his contentions were not within the issues framed by the pleadings in the Routt case. In Johnson v. Daley we said of the Harmon case: “In a previous suit certain taxpayers had unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a town and its officers from issuing certain bonds. The Harmon case was a bill seeking to enjoin the town officials from collecting taxes to pay the principal and interest thereof, and praying that they be decreed to be null and void. In the latter suit an additional ground was advanced for attacking the validity of the election authorizing their issue. We there held that the former decree was ‘conclusive as to all questions within the issue whether formally litigated or not.’ In that opinion, we pointed out that ‘the point now raised against the bonds was presented by the pleadings and issues in the Pinckney suit (Chicago and Iowa Railroad Co. v. Pinckney, 74 Ill. 277 ) and might have been raised and determined in that suit.’ In Routt v. Barrett, on the other hand, the constitutionality of the present clause in section 1 of the Cigarette Tax Act was not presented by the pleadings and issues, and could not have been litigated.” 403 Ill. at 340-341 . So in this case, the issues presented are not within the issues framed in the earlier cases in which they are said to have been adjudicated. A reading of the opinion in People ex rel. Castle v. Taylor, and People ex rel. Humrich v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com. 7 Ill.2d 501 , and reading of the pleadings in People ex rel. Humrich v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com., circuit court of Cook County No. 55C— 1:6053, makes it clear that the sole question raised in those cases was this: “Does the Illinois Toll Highway Act authorize the issuance of a single series of bonds to finance the construction which the Commission proposes, or does it require the issuance of three separate series of bonds?” 7 Ill.2d 503 . One of the cases relied upon as an adjudication of the merits of this case is People ex rel. Humrich v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission, No. 55C-16053, in the circuit court of Cook County. At the suggestion of the attorneys for the Commission, and in an effort to cooperate to secure speedy determination of the case, the relator abandoned his action in the circuit court and refiled it in this court as an original action. In this court it was consolidated with People ex rel. Castle v. Taylor, and both cases were decided together. The only decision on the merits was that rendered by this court in the consolidated cases, which appears at 7 Ill.2d 501 . As has been stated, that case involved a single issue of law. This case presents entirely different issues. They are not mentioned in the majority opinion, and therefore it is necessary to describe some of them briefly here. For example, the Quincer petition, which was incorporated in the pleadings in this case, alleges that Clore, Forgan & Co. and Halsey, Stuart and Co., the contract purchasers of the bonds, had been previously appointed to advise the Toll Highway Commission with respect to the terms and conditions that were to be incorporated in the bonds ultimately offered for sale. It alleges that they therefore stood in a fiduciary relationship to the Commission and to the people of the State of Illinois, and were thereby precluded from becoming interested, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of the bonds. Similarly, the State Treasurer alleges that the managing underwriters imposed a secret condition precedent to their offer, that the commission should concurrently with the delivery of the bonds, purchase $30,000,000 in specified bonds from a designated insurance Company, with the result that the sale of $30,000,000 of toll highway bonds was actually a trade rather than the sale for cash required by the statute. Whether the truth of these charges could ultimately be established is of no significance in the decision of this case. What is important is that they involve issues of fact. It has long been settled, for adequate reasons that need not be restated here, that this court does not take jurisdiction of an original action which presents issues of fact. (See, for example, People ex rel. Jones v. Robinson, 409 Ill. 553 ; Monroe v. Collins, 393 Ill. 553 .) This court thus has no jurisdiction to determine the issues presented in this case. Moreover, it had no jurisdiction to determine those issues in any earlier action. The net of it is that litigants are deprived of their day in court on the ground that the issues which they seek to raise have been decided against them in an action to which they were not parties, in a case which did not present the issues they seek to raise, and by the judgment of a court which lacked jurisdiction to decide those issues. Mr. Chiee Justice Hershey concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884499. Public record. Not legal advice.