# Estate of Owen v. Lyke

> Indiana Court of Appeals · October 20, 2006 · 855 N.E.2d 603

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884260

## Case

- **Full name:** In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Pattie L. OWEN, Deceased, Rodney M. Logan and Carol Logan, Co-Personal Representatives, Appellants-Respondents, v. Toni L. Lyke, Appellee-Petitioner
- **Court:** Indiana Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** October 20, 2006
- **Citations:** 855 N.E.2d 603; 2006 Ind. App. LEXIS 2138; 2006 WL 2987746
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Baker
- **Judges:** May
- **Cited by:** 11 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884260

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[i]n. both the will and tryst contexts, substance trumps form”

## Opinion text

BAKER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
My colleagues have done an admirable job of giving life to Owen's testamentary words. I concur in large part with their conclusions but must respectfully dissent from the finding regarding the "rental restriction." Slip op. p. 9.
Article V bestows a life estate in trust upon Lyke. It does not, however, afford her the right to rent the residence; and in fact, it imposes the duty of renting the residence upon the Logans without in any way requiring that they rent or consider renting the farm to Lyke. As noted by the majority, the trust's purpose "is the management of the farm and the rental of the residence during Lyke's lifetime." Slip op. p. 7. The trust, therefore, is not intended to bestow upon Lyke the right to rent the residence. Had the document been silent on this matter, we would not conclude that Lyke had a right to rent the residence *614 because it places rental responsibility on the Logans and does not give Lyke a right of first rental refusal. Thus, in my view the trial court erred in finding that Lyke's "right to either rent or rent out the residence" was restricted, inasmuch as she did not have such a right in the first place. Appellant's App. p. 31 (emphasis added).
I also part from my colleagues' conclusion that this clause tends to encourage Lyke to divorce Brian, inasmuch as Article V does not prevent the Logans from renting to Brian while he and Lyke are married; it merely provides that Lyke may not be the tenant. Moreover, whether Lyke is a tenant in no way affects her right to receive the rent proceeds. Thus, she need not divorce Brian either to live on the property or to receive the income from the rental of the residence. I would reverse the trial court, therefore, on its finding that the rental restriction is void as against public policy. In all other respects, I concur with the majority opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884260. Public record. Not legal advice.