# Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons

> Kentucky Supreme Court · August 21, 2003 · 113 S.W.3d 85

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884065

## Case

- **Full name:** PATHWAYS, INC., Appellant, v. Brenda HAMMONS, Appellee
- **Court:** Kentucky Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 21, 2003
- **Citations:** 113 S.W.3d 85; 2003 Ky. LEXIS 164; 2003 WL 21990220
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stumbo
- **Judges:** Johnstone, Lambert, Cooper, Graves, Wintersheimer, Keller, Stumbo
- **Cited by:** 202 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884065

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that if the defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
- discussing the distinct legal concepts of duty and causation

## Opinion text

Justice STUMBO.
Dissenting Opinion by
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s reversal of the Court of Appeals. I disagree with the Court’s reasoning that although Appellant breached its duty to Appellee, the breach was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries to Appellee.
Appellant’s professional relationship with Appellee began in 1982 after she was diagnosed as having bipolar manic depressive disorder. Appellee relied on Appellant to make decisions for her. Appellant knew or should have known that the severity of Appellee’s mental disorder made it impossible for her to process choices, consequences, and develop alternative solutions for her housing and financial needs. Appellee lacked the mental capacity to comprehend that if she returned to Moore’s Boarding Home she may be harmed a second time. She trusted and relied upon Appellant to provide solutions including, a safe environment in which to live.
As stated in Miller v. Mills, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 520, 522 (1953).
We think it is clear that so far as foreseeability enters into the question of liability for negligence, it is not required that the particular, precise form of injury be foreseeable — it is sufficient if the probability of injury of some kind to persons within the natural range of effect of the alleged negligent act could be foreseen.
Appellant’s failure to convey to Appellee the likelihood of harm and its failure to take steps that Appellee could not take for herself was negligence. Appellant’s negligence created a situation that placed Ap-pellee at risk for injury. A reasonable person would have recognized that placing Appellee in an unregistered, unlicensed boarding home where she had previously been assaulted placed her in harms way. Given that the offender, Mr. Stacy, was a resident at Moore’s Boarding Home, the likelihood of a second assault was very high.
Because I believe the negligent acts of Appellant were a substantial factor in the injuries sustained by Appellee, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884065. Public record. Not legal advice.