# Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons

> Kentucky Supreme Court · August 21, 2003 · 113 S.W.3d 85

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884064

## Case

- **Full name:** PATHWAYS, INC., Appellant, v. Brenda HAMMONS, Appellee
- **Court:** Kentucky Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 21, 2003
- **Citations:** 113 S.W.3d 85; 2003 Ky. LEXIS 164; 2003 WL 21990220
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Keller
- **Judges:** Johnstone, Lambert, Cooper, Graves, Wintersheimer, Keller, Stumbo
- **Cited by:** 202 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884064

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that if the defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
- discussing the distinct legal concepts of duty and causation

## Opinion text

Justice KELLER.
Concurring Opinion by
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, although a jury could find that Pathways breached its duty to Hammons, Pathways’ placement of Hammons at Moore’s Boarding Home “was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries for which Ham-mons is claiming damages in her action against Pathways.” 1 Accordingly, because Pathways’ alleged breach of its duty was not a legal cause of Hammons’ injuries, I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Pathways. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the duty that Pathways owed to Hammons.
The majority holds “that Pathways owed a duty to Hammons to use the current list of registered boarding homes circulated to it by the Department of Health when Royse searched for a boarding home that would accept Hammons.” 2 In my view, this articulation of Pathways’ duty is erro *94 neous in its level of specification, which addresses itself more to a breach analysis than to a definition of the duty owed. In Kentucky, “[t]he rule is that every person owes a duty to every other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable injury.” 3 Although the majority correctly observes that legislative and administrative enactments help define the scope of risks foreseeable to an actor, and the record in this case establishes that Moore’s Boarding Home was operating in violation of law, Pathways itself violated no law by placing Hammons in an unlicensed facility. And, “[s]ince this is not a case in which the relevant standard of care is supplied by [statute or] regulations, the duty owed ... must be defined by common law, i.e., that degree of care exercised by reasonable and prudent” 4 mental health care service providers. In my view, the Court of Appeals appropriately characterized Pathways’ duty when it stated, “Pathways is in the profession of providing services to mentally ill patients and owes a duty to render those services with reasonable care.”
. Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 85, 93 (2003).
. Id. at 91 .
. Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328, 332 (1987).
. Carman v. Dunaway Timber Co. Inc., Ky., 949 S.W.2d 569, 571 (1997).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9884064. Public record. Not legal advice.