# Harp v. Commonwealth > Kentucky Supreme Court · October 27, 2008 · 266 S.W.3d 813 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9883830 ## Case - **Full name:** Wilbert HARP, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee - **Court:** Kentucky Supreme Court - **Decided:** October 27, 2008 - **Citations:** 266 S.W.3d 813; 2008 Ky. LEXIS 323; 2008 WL 4691847 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Schroder - **Judges:** Minton, Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Venters, Schroder, Scott - **Cited by:** 136 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9883830 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that even assumirig indirect bolstering/vouching occurred and where the child victim's mother may have not believed the abuse occurred, testimony that does not directly speak to the child victim's character for tnithfulness, but rather referenced that many cases of sex… - holding, based on the Court's "definitive[]" holding in Noel, that "any prejudice suffered by [the defendant] was [in]sufficient to overcome the general rule regarding admissibility of similar acts perpetrated against the same victim" - holding that "the law requires specific identifiers to be placed in each count in a case involving multiple counts of the same offense." - stating in dicta that it would reverse a conviction based on an instruction that combined multiple criminal acts - finding preserved error is not harmless where jury instructions failed to distinguish factually between multiple counts of the same crime ## Opinion text Opinion by Justice SCHRODER Concurring in Result Only. I concur in result only, because, as to part III(E), I believe the majority erred in its legal analysis and in leaving an issue open which is likely to arise again on retrial. The majority recognized that the jury could infer that Mason and Speaker were “indirectly” vouching for B.B.’s credibility, but then questioned whether this was error because they did not “directly” vouch. In Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744-45 (Ky.2008), we recognized that a witness does not have to explicitly vouch for another witness’s credibility in order for the testimony to be improper, but that implicit vouching runs afoul of the law as well. Id. Therefore, under Bell , I believe the testimony was error. I am also puzzled by the majority’s apparent belief that because B.B.’s credibility was challenged somewhat through the mother’s testimony, that this could open the door for the vouching. If the majority is equating the mother’s testimony with evidence referring to character for untruthfulness, this would open the door only to evidence referring to character for truthfulness. KRE 608(a). The majority recognized, and I agree, that Mason’s and Speaker’s testimony did not refer to character for truthfulness. Therefore, it would not be admissible under KRE 608(a). For the aforementioned reasons, I believe the admission of the testimony at issue was error. As to the convictions we are affirming, however, I agree with the majority that no palpable error occurred, and would affirm those convictions. However, because the case is being remanded in part, we also have the issue of the testimony arising again on retrial. Because I believe the testimony was error, I *826 believe it should be inadmissible on retrial. The majority, although concluding that even if the testimony was error, it was not palpable, did not actually decide if it was, in fact, error. In order to avoid confusion on retrial, or the issue arising again on appeal, I believe it was incumbent upon the majority to actually decide whether or not this testimony is, in fact, error. For these reasons, I concur in result only. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9883830. Public record. Not legal advice.