# State of Iowa v. Jerin Douglas Mootz

> Supreme Court of Iowa · January 27, 2012 · 808 N.W.2d 207

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9880400

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jerin Douglas MOOTZ, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** January 27, 2012
- **Citations:** 808 N.W.2d 207; 2012 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 10
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wiggins
- **Judges:** Zager, Wiggins, Mansfield
- **Cited by:** 78 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9880400

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a presumption of prejudicial error follows an erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge, thereby mandating a reversal of the defendant’s conviction
- holding court’s erroneous ruling on a reverse-Batson challenge leading to denial of a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal because “[a]ny other conclusion would leave the defendant without a remedy”
- discussing use of peremptory challenges, including to “eliminate those jurors perceived as harboring subtle biases ,.. which were not elicited on voir dire or which do not establish legal cause for challenge” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 928 N.E.2d 917, 927…
- noting Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009), held mistaken denial of peremptory strike was not structural error under the federal constitution, apd Rivera recognized the possibility of automatic reversal on state law grounds
- explaining at step one, “the court may consider all relevant circumstances, including a pattern of strikes against jurors of a particular race”

## Opinion text

WIGGINS, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the decision because we should presume prejudice occurs when the court allows a juror who it should have excluded to sit on the jury. The reason I am writing specially is to state that a logical extension of this rule occurs when the court forces a party to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who the court should have removed, but failed to do so, for cause.
Factually, when a party is required to use a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who the court should have excused for cause, that party is unable to use that peremptory strike to remove another questionable juror. In this circumstance, the court allows a questionable juror who should not be on the jury to sit, and we should presume prejudice occurred. This was the rule in State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 232 , 46 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1951), and State v. Reed, 201 Iowa 1352, 1353-54 , 208 N.W. 308, 309 (1926), before this court expressly overruled Beckwith and impliedly overruled Reed in State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Iowa 1993). Although I believe this court was wrong when it overruled Beckwith and Reed , in Neuendorf , we will have to leave this issue for another day when confronted with the proper factual situation.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9880400. Public record. Not legal advice.