# Gail Bierman and Beth Weier v. Scott Weier and Author Solutions, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Iowa · January 18, 2013 · 826 N.W.2d 436

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9880340

## Case

- **Full name:** Gail BIERMAN and Beth Weier, Appellees, v. Scott WEIER and Author Solutions, Inc., Appellants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** January 18, 2013
- **Citations:** 826 N.W.2d 436; 41 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1320; 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 5; 2013 WL 203611
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wiggins
- **Judges:** Mansfield, Wiggins, Hecht, Appel
- **Cited by:** 49 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9880340

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, in addition to reputational damage, "[t]o establish a prima facie case in any defamat[ion] action, a plaintiff must show the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff," and also explaining that "[p]ublicati…
- concluding that fact issues remained as to whether the false light allegations were sufficiently publicized based on record evidence that twenty to thirty copies of the book were distributed, the author participated in a television interview promoting the book, the book was av…
- stating that “libel per se is available only when a private figure plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant for certain kinds of defamatory statements that do not concern a matter of public importance.”
- explaining technological change facilitating greater publication of information from individuals blurs the legal distinction between traditional news media and smaller publishers of information

## Opinion text

WIGGINS, Justice
(concurring specially).
I write separately to concur in the result only. I agree we should not abandon libel or slander per se. In addition to the reasons stated by the majority, I believe the only way a defamed person can definitely vindicate his or her reputation is to bring an action against the defamer. When a defamatory act gives rise to a per se claim, we should not require the defamed person to prove damages in order to vindicate his or her name. This is true for two reasons. First, in many cases, damages may be impossible to prove, and thus many per se cases would never be resolved. Second, a jury award of one dollar vindicates the defamed person’s reputation, a remedy far superior to any dollar amount a jury might award.
I also agree that Author Solutions, Inc. is a media defendant under any test we could devise to determine when a defendant is a media defendant. However, rather than articulate a test or factors for the bench and bar, the majority attempts to pigeonhole the facts of this case into caselaw from other jurisdictions. I think the majority bypassed an important opportunity to articulate a test or factors that would assist our courts and attorneys in identifying a media defendant in future litigation. As one author has noted: “The state supreme court grants review selectively; the court is intended to specialize in law development functions, to resolve legal issues of great importance to the jurisprudence of the state, and to assure decisional uniformity throughout the state.” Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate Courts: A Comparison of Florida’s System with Those of the Other States and the Federal System, 45 Fla. L.Rev. 21, 29 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
By not providing a test or factors, the majority fails to perform one of our primary functions and gives credence to the dissenter’s argument that technological developments in communications and the proliferation of new electronic media will make it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between media and nonmedia defendants. I believe the orderly development of common law requires such an analysis, and this court could — and *468 should — develop principled standards to differentiate between media and nonmedia defendants.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9880340. Public record. Not legal advice.