# Commonwealth v. Wise

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · September 15, 2017 · 171 A.3d 784

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9878447

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Sherry Lynn WISE, Appellant
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 15, 2017
- **Citations:** 171 A.3d 784
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Moulton
- **Judges:** Shogan, Moulton, Stevens
- **Cited by:** 47 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9878447

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that where a police officer gave a visual and audible signal to defendant to pull over and defendant continued to drive, the evidence was sufficient for fleeing or attempting to elude
- holding that “when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the language is clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning”
- finding waiver where the appellant provided only a vague, undeveloped argument in support of her claim and did not cite to the record or relevant and controlling case law
- finding an issue waived where the appellant failed to develop any argument or cite to controlling case law
- finding waiver on appeal of an undeveloped issue

## Opinion text

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY
MOULTON, J.: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction, and concur with its decision to affirm the judgment of sentence. However, I do not join the majority’s analysis of the statutory interpretation question briefed by the parties, as I believe it is unnecessary to a proper disposition of this case.
Appellant was charged with violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733 under two different theories — failing to bring her vehicle to a stop after being directed to stop; and fleeing after being directed to stop. While both theories were submitted to the jury,'the jury instructions delivered by the trial court required a finding that Appellant “was aware of the officer’s signal to stop and refused to do so,” N.T., 9/12/16, at 119. Accordingly, we need not consider the question whether the statute’s reference to “a pursuing police officer” modifies “otherwise flees,” because no one contends that it modifies “fails or refuses to ... stop.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9878447. Public record. Not legal advice.