# Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Myers, D.

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · July 19, 2017 · 164 A.3d 1162

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9877416

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Darrell MYERS, Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 19, 2017
- **Citations:** 164 A.3d 1162; 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1689; 2017 WL 3045867
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Todd
- **Judges:** Saylor, Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy
- **Cited by:** 104 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9877416

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the language of Section 1547 does not (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 16 - J-A23018-22 ____________________________________________ constitute an independent exception to the warrant requirement under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions
- stating that under the Implied Consent Law, a licensee arrested for driving under influence of alcohol “has a critical decision to make[,]” and setting forth the consequences the licensee must weigh before deciding whether or not to submit to chemical testing
- holding that an unconscious arrestee was incapable of voluntarily consenting to a blood test because his unconscious state deprived him of ability to make a knowing and conscious choice under the totality of the circumstances
- explaining that Birchfield’s holding -6- J-S10019-24 “supports the conclusion that … an individual must give actual, voluntary consent at the time that testing is requested”
- explaining that Birchfield’s holding “supports the conclusion that . . . an individual must give actual, voluntary consent at the time that testing is requested.”

## Opinion text

JUSTICE TODD,
Concurring
I agree with the majority that, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, Myers had an unequivocal statutory right to refuse blood testing. Furthermore, I agree that statutory right was violated in the instant case. Finally, and as a result, I agree that suppression was warranted. See Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 531 Pa. 103 , 611 A.2d 681, 683 (1992) (“blood test results acquired in contravention of [Section 1547] must be suppressed”). In my view, the statutory analysis suffices to resolve the issue before us, and so I would not address the constitutional dimensions. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II.A, II.B, and II.D of the Majority Opinion, and its mandate, but do not join the remainder.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9877416. Public record. Not legal advice.