# Theresa Graham v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Company

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 18, 2017 · 857 F.3d 1169

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9875517

## Case

- **Full name:** Theresa GRAHAM, as PR of Faye Dale Graham, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Individually and as Successor by Merger to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the American Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA, Inc., Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** May 18, 2017
- **Citations:** 857 F.3d 1169; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8718; 2017 WL 2176488
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Carnes
- **Judges:** Tjoflat, Hull, Marcus, Wilson, Pryor, Martin, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Carnes
- **Nature of suit:** REH
- **Cited by:** 49 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9875517

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reasoning that the fact that “the express-preemption provi- sion” at issue “does not cover the” substance of the plaintiﬀs’ claims “supports an inference that there is no implied preemption of those” claims
- explaining that “the central features of due process” are “no- tice” and “an opportunity to be heard”

## Opinion text

JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority opinion’s decision that federal law does not preempt the jury findings in the underlying Engle litigation. As to defendants’ Due Process Clause challenge, the latter presents a close question on which reasonable minds can differ. I do not disagree that the majority opinion articulates reasonable arguments in explaining why it rejects defendants’ challenge. On balance, however, I agree with Judges Tjoflat and Wilson that on the particular and unusual facts of the underlying Engle litigation, its jury findings are too non-specific to warrant them being given preclusive effect in subsequent trials. Concluding that defendants’ due process rights were therefore violated, I respectfully dissent as to the Majority’s contrary holding.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9875517. Public record. Not legal advice.
