# White v. Pauly > Supreme Court of the United States · January 9, 2017 · 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 409 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9873111 ## Case - **Full name:** Ray WHITE, Et Al. v. Daniel T. PAULY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samuel Pauly, Deceased Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** January 9, 2017 - **Citations:** 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 409; 580 U.S. 73; 85 U.S.L.W. 4027; 196 L. Ed. 2d 463; 137 S. Ct. 548; 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5; 2017 WL 69170 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ginsburg - **Judges:** Ginsburg - **Cited by:** 2,495 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9873111 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining it is a “longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’” but must instead “be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case” to prevent turning “the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of 31 virtually… - stating that the Tenth Circuit’s observation that the case “present[ed] a unique set of facts and circumstances.... should have been an important indication ... that [the officer’s] conduct did not violate a clearly established right” (internal citation and quotation marks omi… - stating that officers’ violation of knock and announce rule, which' appellate court held was a constitutional’ violation but hot a clearly established'one, could not serve as basis for liability on theory that it was proximate cause of subsequent use of force - explaining that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate ... [because] immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) - explaining that lower court’s recognition that the case before it “‘present[ed] a unique set of facts and circumstances’ . . . alone should have been an important indication . . . that [the officer]’s conduct did not violate a ‘clearly established’ right” ## Opinion text Justice GINSBURG, concurring. I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it does not foreclose the denial of summary judgment to Officers Truesdale and Mariscal. See 814 F.3d 1060 , 1068, 1073, 1074 (C.A.10 2016) (Court of Appeals emphasized, repeatedly, that fact disputes exist on question whether Truesdale and Mariscal "adequately identified themselves" as police officers before shouting "Come out or we're coming in" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, as to Officer White, the Court, as I comprehend its opinion, leaves open the propriety of denying summary judgment based on fact disputes over when Officer White arrived at the scene, what he may have witnessed, and whether he had adequate time to identify himself and order Samuel Pauly to drop his weapon before Officer White shot Pauly. Compare id., at 1080 , with ante, at 552 - 553. See also Civ. No. 12-1311 (D NM, Feb. 5, 2014), pp. 7, and n. 5, 9, App. to Pet. for Cert. 75-76, and n. 5, 77 (suggesting that Officer White may have been on the scene when Officers Truesdale and Mariscal threatened to invade the Pauly home). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9873111. Public record. Not legal advice.