# Reppin v. People

> Supreme Court of Colorado · June 18, 1934 · 95 Colo. 192

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9864859

## Case

- **Full name:** Reppin v. the People.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Colorado
- **Decided:** June 18, 1934
- **Citations:** 95 Colo. 192; 34 P.2d 71; 1934 Colo. LEXIS 291
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Burke
- **Judges:** Butler, Hilliard, Bouck, Burke
- **Cited by:** 36 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9864859

## Opinion text

Me. Justice Burke,
dissenting.
Every normal man shrinks from participation, even as a mandatory official duty, in the infliction of the death *221 penalty. Still more is lie inclined to evade protesting a judgment which saves, or may save, human life. Hence, I would gladly acquiesce in this reversal if I could. But the case seems to me so clear and the assignments so groundless I find myself forced to dissent. I think all questions presented, save one, are conclusively answered by Mr. Justice Butler in the court’s opinion, in which, with that exception, I concur.
Defendant contends that evidence of other offenses, committed, attempted or planned by him, was erroneously admitted. This contention the court sustains. I think it unsupported by a single pertinent authority and wholly unsupported by reason. Several answers might be made to it. I confine myself to one. This jury, as demonstrated in the opinion, had a single duty to perform, i. e., to fix the penalty. To do that justly it must know on what character of man that penalty was to be inflicted. Was he a poor, ignorant, misguided youth, who, in confusion and desperation, had committed' a single offense, or a hardened criminal, much older in experience and iniquity than his years would indicate? It would be an outrage to him not to admit relevant evidence on this subject if . it. were . in his favor, and is equally an injustice to society to exclude it if against him. The rule applicable is not the technical one governing a trial where guilt is the issue, but the rule laid down by statute for the guidance of a judge where the plea is guilty and the duty is imposed upon the judge, with some-measure of discretion, to fix the penalty. O. L. 1921, §7095. Under that statute all facts which might guide discretion or aid judgment are inqtdred into. Nor is the question here even whether, at the time the evidence was admitted, its admission was error. The question is whether, in the present state of the whole record, its consideration was improper. Hereafter, when the plea is guilty of murder, and all the evidence shows first degree, what help may a jury hope from such scant testi *222 mony as the court dares take? Again, how often will this rule, invoked for the benefit of one who seeks to hide his past, work to the infinite injury of one who would gladly reveal it?
I think the judgment should be affirmed.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Chief Justice Adams and Mr. Justice Campbell join herein.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9864859. Public record. Not legal advice.