# Steen v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 3, 1982 · 640 S.W.2d 912 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9863008 ## Case - **Full name:** Harold STEEN, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas - **Decided:** November 3, 1982 - **Citations:** 640 S.W.2d 912; 1982 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1119 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Onion - **Judges:** McCormick, Clinton, Onion, Roberts, Odom, Teague - **Cited by:** 45 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9863008 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding in a prosecution for failure to stop and render aid that the defendant was “involved” in the collision where his improper lane change caused a passing vehicle to swerve to avoid hitting the defendant, resulting in a head-on collision between the passing vehicle and an … ## Opinion text ONION, Presiding Judge, dissenting. The following opinion was prepared by this writer originally as an opinion for the court. I now adopt it as my dissenting opinion. *917 “This is an appeal from a conviction for failure to stop and render aid. Appellant waived jury trial; and a plea of nolo con-tendere was entered before the trial court. Appellant was found guilty and assessed two (2) years in the Texas Department of Corrections. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation. Appellant perfected his appeal in a timely manner and among other contentions raises the ground of error that the indictment is fundamentally defective because it failed to allege the culpable mental state of appellant as to the occurrence of an accident. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 6.02(b), provides: “If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.” The prosecution in the case at bar was brought under Article 6701d, §§ 38 and 40, V.A.C.S., which provide: “Sec. 38. (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 40. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. “(b) Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not to exceed five (5) years or in jail not exceeding one (1) year or by fine not exceeding Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, or by by both such fine and imprisonment.” “Sec. 40. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and the name of his motor vehicle liability insurer, and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator’s, commercial operator’s, or chauffeur’s license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle colliding (sic) with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.” Sec. 40 amended by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 2029, ch. 810, § 4, eff. Aug. 29, 1977. In Goss v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), it was held that “... [T]he requirements of Sec. 6.02, supra, apply to Art. 6701d, Secs. 38 and 40, supra, and that the culpable mental state thereby required for the offense of failing to stop and render aid is that the accused had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his conduct [V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.03(b)] i.e., had knowledge that an accident had occurred ... such knowledge is an element of the offense, and therefore must be alleged in the indictment, [citations omitted]” 582 S.W.2d at 785 . The indictment in Goss, supra, was held fundamentally defective. Although it alleged that the defendant did “intentionally and knowingly drive and operate his automobile,” that in itself was not an offense; the indictment was defective because it “utterly fail[ed]” to allege that the defendant knew that the accident had occurred. Goss, at 785. The same result was reached in Salazar v. State, 589 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and in Ex parte Rogers, 589 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), where the indictments utterly failed to allege a culpable mental state in connection with the offense. We would take the Goss rule one *918 step further and hold that the statutory offense requires the accused’s knowing that an accident occurred in which the vehicle he was driving was involved. The indictment in the instant case alleged that the appellant: “... knowingly and intentionally while operating a motor vehicle did make an improper lane change which caused S_ H_ a driver to take evasive action which resulted in an accident and subsequent injuries to the said S_ H_ and the defendant did then and there unlawfull (sic) after said accident, knowingly and intentionally fail to stop and render all reasonable assistance to the said S- H_, including the making of arrangements for carrying of the said S_ H_ to a physician for medical treatment, it being apparent that such medical treatment for the said S_ H_was necessary, Against the peace and dignity of the state.” There is no question that the indictment alleges a culpable mental state; in fact, it alleges “knowingly and intentionally” about two separate acts: making an improper lane change and failing to stop and render all reasonable assistance. But neither of these allegations is sufficient in stating the required allegation of knowing that an accident occurred in which the car appellant was driving was involved. A driver may know that he changed lanes and even know it was improper, but that would not imply his knowing that an accident resulted from it. Likewise a driver may know that he failed to stop and render aid at an accident, and implicit within that knowledge would be knowledge of an accident; yet that would be insufficient because it cannot be inferred that he had knowledge that the car he was driving was involved in the accident. The statute does not impose a duty upon anyone happening by who knows an accident has occurred; it specifically places the duty upon “the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident” that results in injury, death or property damage as spelled out in Article 6701d, §§ 38-40, V.A.C.S. The better course in such a case would be to allege that, knowing that an accident had occurred in which the vehicle he was driving was involved, the accused failed to stop and render all reasonable assistance. The conviction is set aside and the indictment is ordered dismissed.” For the reasons set forth above, I dissent. ROBERTS, ODOM and TEAGUE, JJ., join in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9863008. Public record. Not legal advice.