# Magley v. State

> Indiana Supreme Court · October 21, 1975 · 263 Ind. 618

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9862085

## Case

- **Full name:** Donald Floyd Magley v. State of Indiana
- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** October 21, 1975
- **Citations:** 263 Ind. 618; 335 N.E.2d 811; 1975 Ind. LEXIS 339
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Arterburn
- **Judges:** Arterburn
- **Cited by:** 112 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 1997 Ind. LEXIS 243 (1997).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9862085

## Opinion text

Opinion Concurring in Result, Dissenting in Part
Arterburn, J.
I concur in the result reached in this case, but not the language therein which states that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was voluntary in the collateral hearing before the judge to determine the admissibility of the confession,
*642 The trial judge’s preliminary hearing on admissibility in such a case does not go to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Therefore, the standard that the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary is not applicable, but only one of a preponderance of the evidence. It is when the evidence of the confession is submitted to the jury and the jury determines its credibility that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.
I realize that previously in Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 , Justice Hunter speaking for this Court said the State on the issue of admissibility has a “heavy burden” to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given voluntarily. Of course, this is true in the trial before the jury, but in my opinion, this has no application to a collateral issue of admissibility heard by the trial judge. In this reasoning I am supported by the recent United States Supreme Court case of Lego v. Twomey, (1972) 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 , which has held that the standard for the judge to determine the voluntariness of a confession for admissibility is not the same standard a jury uses for conviction. The judge merely determines the voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. There is no issue of guilt or innocence involved in the hearing before the trial judge on the issue of voluntariness. Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable doubt has no application. When the issue goes to the jury, of course, the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be supported.
Givan, C.J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 335 N.E.2d 811 .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9862085. Public record. Not legal advice.