# Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Doherty

> Appellate Court of Illinois · May 27, 1999 · 305 Ill. App. 3d 141

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861936

## Case

- **Full name:** BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LYNN QUIGLEY DOHERTY, Director, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants (Jill Adams Et Al., Defendants-Appellees)
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** May 27, 1999
- **Citations:** 305 Ill. App. 3d 141; 238 Ill. Dec. 412; 711 N.E.2d 799
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Cook
- **Judges:** McCullough, Cook
- **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861936

## Opinion text

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As of January 17, 1995, Bridgestone had hired approximately 725 permanent replacements and 225 striking workers had returned to work, a total of 950 employees as opposed to 1,209 before the strike. The Director mistakenly thought 1,100 had come back.
The Department correctly asserts that production levels do not have to return exactly to prestrike levels before an employer reaches substantially normal business operations. But the January production levels here did not even come close to prestrike levels and, combined with the other continuing effects of the strike, the work stoppage at Bridgestone continued. Bridgestone’s production of tires in January 1995 was merely 45% of the amount produced in January 1994. Furthermore, the plant’s productivity for January 1995 was 54% of that in January 1994. These figures existed despite the fact that, beginning January 15, Bridgestone was operating at continuous production, compared to a 24-hour/5-day-per-week schedule in January 1994. Bridgestone failed to meet the original “ticket level” in January 1995 as well as an amended reduced ticket level.
The evidence also reveals that as of January 15, 1995, Bridgestone was still operating with an inexperienced workforce whose efficiency was well below prestrike levels. Salaried employees and some temporary employees were still working in the plant as of January 15, 1995, and salaried employees continued to train the new workforce. Bridgestone still lacked the necessary number of workers to produce the necessary amount of goods. Some machines sat idle, some prestrike maintenance programs could not be performed, and waste percentages were increased from prestrike levels. Similar to Travis, these circumstances do not indicate that, as of mid-January 1995, Bridgestone had returned to substantially normal operations indicating a cessation of the stoppage of work. The Director’s finding that the stoppage of work ceased as of that date is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
I understand the majority decision to affirm the Director in large part because of Bridgestone’s “terse response” to the Department’s February 1, 1995, and February 15, 1995, letters. Bridgestone appropriately stated its position in its response. Bridgestone properly presented its evidence at the time of the hearing. It is improper to rule against Bridgestone here as a sanction. I would affirm the decision of the circuit court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861936. Public record. Not legal advice.