# Pratt-Holdampf v. Trinity Medical Center

> Appellate Court of Illinois · May 12, 2003 · 338 Ill. App. 3d 1079

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861842

## Case

- **Full name:** DEBRA A. PRATT-HOLDAMPF, as Special Adm’r of the Estate of Robert Guinn, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRINITY MEDICAL CENTER Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** May 12, 2003
- **Citations:** 338 Ill. App. 3d 1079; 273 Ill. Dec. 708; 789 N.E.2d 882
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Holdridge
- **Judges:** McDade, Holdridge
- **Cited by:** 23 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861842

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, that a wrongful death action filed by a pro se plaintiff is not void ab initio because “the risks to individual clients and to the integrity of the legal system inherent in representation by a person who has never qualified to practice law are not present in the insta…

## Opinion text

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:
The majority accurately states that only licensed attorneys can represent other persons in legal actions and that unauthorized legal practice requires dismissal of a cause. See Ratcliffe v. Apantaku, 318 Ill. App. 3d 621 (2000); Leonard v. Walsh, 73 Ill. App. 2d 45 (1966); Blue v. People, 223 Ill. App. 3d 594 (1992). However, I believe the majority errs in finding an exception to this rule under the instant facts. I thus respectfully dissent.
The majority relies on three cases to construct its exception, all of which are distinguishable. In Janiczek v. Dover Management Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1985), the plaintiff retained a licensed attorney who was later disbarred unbeknownst to the plaintiff. In his disbarred state, the attorney filed a complaint that was later dismissed according to the above-stated rule. “Given these unique circumstances” (Janiczek, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 546 ), the court held that dismissal with prejudice was an unduly harsh sanction against the plaintiff, who never consciously chose to be represented by a lay person. Thus, an exception to the general rule was appropriate. In McEvers v. Stout, 218 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472 (1991) (involving an attorney licensed in Wisconsin but not Illinois), the court elucidated the rationale for this exception by stating: “a nullity rule appears to punish the litigant rather than the offending attorney.”
Unlike Janiczek and McEvers, the instant case does not involve a complaint filed by an unlicensed attorney for an unwitting client. Since Pratt-Holdampf prepared and filed her own complaint, she could not possibly claim that she thought the person initiating the suit was duly licensed. Accordingly, the unique circumstances mentioned above are not present. Without such circumstances, as the Janiczek court noted, the general rule of dismissal applies “even where the lay agent merely files the complaint over his own signature, and all subsequent court appearances are made by a duly licensed attorney.” Janiczek, 134 111. App. 3d at 545. This is apparently what happened in the instant case.
Neither is the decision in Moushon v. Moushon, 147 Ill. App. 3d 140 (1986), availing to Pratt-Holdampf. In that case, a corporation’s complaint (signed by its president, a nonattorney) survived because it stated that the corporation “[came] by its attorney.” Moushon, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 147 . The instant complaint, on the other hand, was prepared, signed, and filed by a nonattorney. The Moushon court distinguished this situation when making its decision.
The cases cited by the majority simply do not justify a departure from the well-established rule that nonattorneys cannot represent other parties in court. Accordingly, I dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861842. Public record. Not legal advice.