# Blacke v. Industrial Commission

> Appellate Court of Illinois · November 28, 1994 · 268 Ill. App. 3d 26

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861467

## Case

- **Full name:** EDWARD BLACKE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Et Al. (Limestone Township Fire Protection District, Appellee.)
- **Court:** Appellate Court of Illinois
- **Decided:** November 28, 1994
- **Citations:** 268 Ill. App. 3d 26; 205 Ill. Dec. 807; 644 N.E.2d 23; 1994 Ill. App. LEXIS 1446
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Rarick
- **Judges:** McCullough, Rarick
- **Cited by:** 13 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861467

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying statute of limitations found in section 13 — 205 of the Code to section 19(g) of the Act; stating that in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, court will apply Code provision where it is deemed necessary to facilitate purpose of the Act
- applying statute of limitations found in section 13-205 of the Code to section 19(g) of the Act; stating that in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, court will apply Code provision where it is deemed necessary to facilitate purpose of the Act
- characterizing a section 19(g) action based on an arbitration award as an action to enforce liability resulting from a statute, i.e., a “civil action[ ] not otherwise provided for,” for which a 5-year limitations period was appropriate (735 ILCS 5/13—205 (West 2008))
- applying statute of limitations found in section 13-205 of the Code to section 19(g
- applying section 13--205 to a claim for judgment on a workers’ compensation award when the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq . (West 2000)) was silent regarding a limitations period for such claims

## Opinion text

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting:
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, I believe the 10-year limitation of section 13—206 should apply to a section 19(g) action. I therefore dissent.
Section 13—206 provides a 10-year limitations period for actions based on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts or other evidences of indebtedness in writing. A written document qualifies as "other evidence of indebtedness” when one need not resort to parol evidence to establish the vital elements of the agreement and when the document is of the same nature as those written instruments specified. (See Toth v. Mansell (1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669-70 , 566 N.E.2d 730, 733 .) It is true a decision of the Commission cannot be said to be of the same nature as a bond or contract. But, the decision of the Commission here clearly evidences indebtedness on the part of employer and certainly does not need parol evidence to establish its elements. More importantly, however, had claimant’s benefits been "awarded” by virtue of a settlement agreement as opposed to a judgment, the 10-year limitation of section 13—206 would apply. (See Givens v. Givens (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101 , 548 N.E.2d 571, 574 .) The length of time an employee has to collect benefits from an employer should not depend upon whether he settled the matter or went through arbitration. Therefore, because I believe the 10-year statute of limitations more closely comports with the intendments of section 19(g) and better satisfies the public policy of ensuring compensation be paid to injured employees, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision in this instance.
WOODWARD, J., joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861467. Public record. Not legal advice.