# Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.

> Supreme Court of Iowa · September 19, 1979 · 283 N.W.2d 289

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861145

## Case

- **Full name:** Bobbin HOWARD, Appellant, v. DES MOINES REGISTER AND TRIBUNE COMPANY, Dr. Roy C. Sloan and Margaret Engel, Appellees
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** September 19, 1979
- **Citations:** 283 N.W.2d 289; 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1667; 1979 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1000
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Larson
- **Judges:** McCormick, Reynoldson, Allbee, Uhlenhopp, McGiverin, Rees, Harris, Larson, Legrand
- **Cited by:** 40 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861145

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the exemption in the Iowa Freedom of Information Act for "hospital records" and "medical records" of a "patient or former patient, including outpatient," did not apply to "county home" records in possession of the Governor's Office because the documents, which add…

## Opinion text

LARSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I join the dissent of Justice McGiverin as to Division II of the plurality opinion. I dissent separately as to Division I.
Under the reasoning of Division I, the information found in the offices of the governor and the Jasper County auditor are “public records” under our freedom of information act and therefore proper subjects of publication. I believe that even if section 68A.2, The Code, would otherwise be available to permit publication of these items of “public” information, they are medical records within the exception to the disclosure act. It is probably true that they are not “medical records” in the traditional sense; and it may be conceded as the plurality contends that they were “neither compiled by a hospital or medical personnel nor maintained as records of a hospital or physician.” However, the statute does not impose any such restrictions, and I believe it would be inconsistent with the spirit and context of the act for us to impose them. If the items of information here are “records” under the act as contended by the plurality, it is only necessary to determine whether they are medical records for purposes of the exception. They are “medical” records if they pertain to “condition, diagnosis, care or treatment.” § 68A.7(2), The Code. These records here did pertain to medical treatment of the plaintiff. She was sterilized by surgical procedure.
The underpinning of this statutory exception is, I believe, a recognition of the deeply personal and sensitive nature of medical information. This exception should be interpreted to effect this strong policy consideration. Dean Wigmore, while criticizing the analogous doctor-patient privilege, recognized some justification for the privilege in sex-related medical evidence. 8 J. Wig-more, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2380(a), at 830 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Justice Blackmun, in advocating a broad scope of the medical file exception to the federal disclosure act, also recognized the strong policy considerations attending dissemination of medical information, saying:
It is almost inconceivable to me that the Court is willing today to attach the qualification phrase to medical files and thereby open to the public what has been recognized as almost the essence of ultimate privacy. The law’s long established physician-patient privilege establishes this. Anyone who has had even minimal *306 contact with the practice of medicine surely cannot agree with this extension by judicial construction .
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 387-88 , 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1611 , 48 L.Ed.2d 11, 36 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
I believe the publication here could reasonably have been found by a factfinder to improperly invade plaintiff’s privacy, and that chapter 68A does not place the underlying information into the public domain so as to emasculate the right to pursue that claim without a trial. I would reverse and remand for trial on the merits.
LeGRAND, J., joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9861145. Public record. Not legal advice.
