# New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. I.S.

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · June 1, 2010 · 202 N.J. 145

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860967

## Case

- **Full name:** New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, Plaintiff, v. I.S., Defendant. in the Matter of the Guardianship of R.A., Jr., a Minor. New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. C.M., Defendant-Appellant. in the Matter of the Guardianship of R.A., Jr., Minor-Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 1, 2010
- **Citations:** 202 N.J. 145; 996 A.2d 986; 2010 N.J. LEXIS 500
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by LaVECCHIA
- **Judges:** Rivera-Soto, Lavecchia
- **Cited by:** 152 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860967

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding expert testimony based on a comparison of bonding evaluations is not required in an instance involving a "common sense notion that [a] child will be more bonded with his [or her resource] parents than with [the] defendant"
- holding "inadequate visitation plans" consisting of one hour per week of supervised visitation in the Division's offices with the defendant's eleven- month-old son "standing alone, should have caused the rejection of any application seeking the termination of defendant's paren…
- reversing termination of a father's parental rights where, although he initially did not want custody of his child from an extramarital affair, sought to provide alternate custodial arrangements and eventually took custody of his child after demonstrating an ability to provide…
- acknowledging "[i]t is well-established that the period of time a child has spent in foster care is not determinative of whether parental rights to that child should be terminated . . . ."

## Opinion text

Justice LaVECCHIA,
dissenting.
As a result of the Court’s decision today, a four-year-old child will be torn from the arms of the only family he has ever known and placed in the custody of his biological father, a fifty-eight-year-old man who fathered the child during an extra-marital affair and who was unwilling to assume parental responsibilities until more than sixteen months after the child’s birth. In the father’s absence, the child bonded with foster parents with whom he has lived in a nurturing and loving home since he was three months old. In my estimation, no system of justice which purports to have as its polestar the best interests of the child can tolerate the outcome of today’s majority opinion.
The majority’s focus is all about defendant and his interests. Conspicuously absent is any real discussion of the best interests of the four-year-old child who provides the beating heart at the center of this controversy. Respectfully, I must dissent in this matter. The family court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights was based on the best interests of the child and is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. The father’s delay in accepting the child into his life was a form of abandonment that led to the child’s attachment to a new family. The child was in need of a permanent home with parents willing to offer sustenance and love. By the time the father, cast from his own marital home, was willing to parent the child, a point of no return had been passed in the biological clock of this child. By then, the father’s abdication of his parental responsibilities had caused harm to the child, the child had formed a permanent relationship with his foster parents, and the termination of the father’s parental rights would not cause more harm than good.
*185 I.
A.
It is well-established that a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights is subject to a deferential standard of review. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 , 914 A.2d 1265 (2007). An appellate court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the record. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 , 926 A.2d 320 (2007). Particular deference is owed to credibility determinations. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279 , 914 A.2d 1265 . Even where the dispute is over an “alleged error in the trial judge’s evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom,” ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the trial court’s findings will be accorded deference unless it is determined that the court “went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.” Ibid. The majority fails to apply that deferential standard of review, instead reaching its own conclusions that are not only unsupported by, but in stark contrast to, the actual evidence before the trial court. For that reason, it is necessary to present a faithful view of the record.
B.
As the majority notes, the Division of Youth & Family Services (the Division) has had physical and legal custody of Richard Jr. almost immediately from his birth on April 3, 2006, due to the housing instability and incapacity of the infant’s mother, Irene, from drug and alcohol abuse. The child experienced early on some health issues (tremors and seizures) suggestive of withdrawal attributable to prenatal exposure to drugs and/or alcohol ingestion.
Defendant was a married man, father of four children, when he had the affair with Irene that produced Richard Jr. After the affair ceased, defendant did not initiate any continued connection *186 with Irene, or with the son to whom she gave birth. Irene had taken up with another man. Initially she claimed that he, Richard Sr., was the infant’s father and she named the child after him. Paternity testing revealed, however, that Richard Sr. was not the biological father. Several months later, after the court had issued an order requiring DNA testing and after Irene confronted defendant’s wife with the boy’s existence, defendant finally submitted to a State-required paternity test that established him as the father of Richard Jr. 1 By then the child already was eight months old.
Defendant thereafter refused to offer himself as a caretaker for the child for almost nine months from the time that he became certain that he was the child’s biological father. His position regarding care for the child is revealed through a series of hearings conducted in the abuse and neglect action initiated in 2006 concerning Richard Jr. during which defendant was asked repeatedly whether he wanted to take and care for the child. At the January 17, 2007, hearing date at which defendant first appeared he categorically said that he would not take the child. His position was driven apparently by the marital turmoil that had erupted in his life. His wife, with whom he was living, would not take in the infant.
During that hearing the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: Do you wish to have custody of that baby?
[Defendant]: Not for the time being.
THE COURT: When would you like to have custody, when he’s twenty one?
*187 [Defendant]: No.
THE COURT: What’s going to happen with the baby?
[Defendant]: I have to find out who can look for the child because I am married and I have four children with my wife.
THE COURT: You can’t take care of the baby.
[Defendant]: No, not right now.
THE COURT: Do you pay child support? To this baby.
[Defendant]: No because I was waiting for the proof, paternity proof.
THE COURT: Well there’s proof now that you’re the father of the child. Will you—can you pay ehild support?
[Defendant]: According to my income.
THE COURT: [Defendant] is not offering himself as a caretaker, [Deputy Attorney General].
[Deputy Attorney General (DAG)J: Judge just that we did a background check on his family, his wife, and we know he lives with his children. There was no concerns with regards to his family. He had indicated to the Division that his plan for the child was dependent on his wife so I guess I—the Division is to assume at this point that his wife is not interested in assisting him to care for this child, to be clear.
THE COURT: You live with your wife?
[Defendant]: Yes.
THE COURT: Does she want to take care of the baby?
[Defendant]: No.
[DAG]: There we are. So, Your Honor, at this point although everything would be fine, obviously that is not a placement option____
With regards to him not being a plan, I can’t see him being referred for a psychological evaluation at this time if he is not offering himself as a caretaker so the Division will not be referring him to an evaluation.
THE COURT: [Defendant], anything you want to tell me about yourself?
[Defendant]: Your Honor, I want you to know that I have four children and I have problems in my home with my wife because of this situation because I am— I’m not a young man anymore and my income doesn’t allow me to support—I have no space to have the child either unless perhaps I were able to send the child to my country where I will have there people who will look after the child.
THE COURT: Do you wish to have an attorney?
[Defendant]: Well, yes.
THE COURT: ____ [T]he child is to continue in the legal, physical custody of the Division. [Defendant] is not offering himself as a caretaker. He has the right to have counsel. If he wishes to visit, he could sit down with the Division, develop *188 a plan for the child. If he has no plan, not offering himself as a caretaker, I don’t see what the purpose of visitation would be.
Although it is not expressly discussed further on the record, defendant and the Division established a schedule for supervised visits with the child. The next hearing on March 14, 2007, was conducted in defendant’s absence. 2 At that hearing the Division informed the court that the permanency plan for Richard Jr. was to terminate parental rights. Irene was reported to have experienced a drug relapse and continued housing instability. The Law Guardian expressed support for the plan for Richard Jr. and reported that the child was thriving in his foster home. 3 The court instructed the Division to file its guardianship complaint by May 16, 2007, and rescheduled the permanency hearing to that date.
At the May 16, 2007, hearing, much of the proceeding was taken up with discussion of Irene’s admitted drag use, her desire to be placed in another rehabilitation program and not lose rights to Richard Jr., and about the possibility that she might be pregnant again. Defendant also was present. He again was asked by the court if he was in a position to assume caring for the child. He answered again that he could not. Instead, he offered that an unidentified “wife of a friend” could take care of the child. According to the DAG, defendant also had suggested sending the child to the Dominican Republic where he claimed to have “people” who would care for the child. The latter suggestion was not deemed appropriate by the Division and was rejected by the court. *189 Nonetheless, the court instructed the Division to have further discussion with defendant to learn more about his proposed plan for the child, and continued the matter.
At the next hearing in June 2007, the Division reported that defendant had advanced alternative placements for the child, none of which included offering to care for the child himself. When defendant disputed that the Division had contacted the family members whom he had said would care for Richard Jr., the matter was adjourned again.
Thereafter, in the guardianship action conducted before a different judge, Division representative William Larrinaga testified about the Division’s efforts during July 2007 to reach and evaluate the four relative resources that defendant provided. One brother unequivocally stated that he had no interest in taking the child. As for defendant’s two other brothers, Larrinaga telephoned them in July 2007 but was unable to establish contact. The fourth relative resource that defendant had provided was his sister, who informed the Division that she was willing to care for the child. According to Larrinaga, Division representatives visited the sister’s home and determined that the one bedroom apartment, in which four adults were living, was insufficient for placement standards. However, the Division offered to explore alternative housing for her. It was at that point—when the Division informed defendant of the problems with his sister’s home—that defendant finally offered himself as caretaker for his child and informed the Division that he would be getting his own apartment. 4 By then the child was sixteen months old.
*190 At the guardianship trial conducted on October 9, 11, and 12, 2007, the Division presented, in addition to Larrinaga’s testimony, expert testimony from Dr. Ernesto Perdomo, a licensed clinical psychologist who had conducted psychological and bonding evaluations. Dr. Perdomo’s psychological testing of defendant revealed that he was within normal psychological parameters, despite some narcissistic tendencies. Dr. Perdomo also discovered that defendant had problems and stress originating within his family as a result of his infidelity. According to Dr. Perdomo, those circumstances created for defendant a significant amount of tension in his life that, due to his age (fifty-six), the young age of the child, and defendant’s work hours, would make his raising the child on his own difficult. Dr. Perdomo’s assessment of defendant and his situation was realistic. He opined simply and practically that defendant would require help from his extended family to ensure stability and to provide for the needs of this very young child.
In respect of his bonding evaluation of defendant and Richard Jr., Dr. Perdomo described the relationship as minimal. The child was able to separate from defendant without problem. The child also was restless during the evaluation, a characteristic not present during the bonding evaluation with the foster parents. Dr. Perdomo explained that bonding happens very early when a child is between six months and two years old. Dr. Perdomo found the connection between Richard Jr. and his foster parents to be palpable. 5 When the foster parents were asked to leave, Richard Jr. would run after them and cry, indicating the presence of a strong bonding attachment. Dr. Perdomo concluded that there was substantial psychological evidence to indicate that the child would derive maximum psychological benefit by staying with his foster *191 parents because of the duration of the bonding between Richard Jr. and his foster parents, and the importance of its timing in the child’s life. Calling the foster parents the “psychological parents” of the child, Dr. Perdomo said he was “one hundred percent certain” that Richard Jr. would suffer emotional trauma, and that his ability to trust would be damaged, if he now were to be separated from his foster parents.
Dr. Perdomo acknowledged the psychological trauma to Richard Jr. could theoretically be mitigated, but that such mitigation would depend on the degree of stability the child would have in a changed life circumstance. He specifically stated that, if the child was provided a very stable and permanent home, the trauma from the separation from his foster parents could be mitigated. Dr. Perdomo opined, however, that defendant would not be able to provide the stability required to mitigate the psychological trauma to Richard Jr. due to the self-professed turmoil existing in defendant’s life from becoming separated from his wife and the four children they had raised together.
In the opinion issued by the trial court, dated October 19, 2007, the court began by making several basic factual findings, starting first with issues relating to the timing and sequence of events. The court found that defendant “became certain” that he was the biological father of the child on or about December 14, 2006, and, further, that he made his first appearance in court on January 17, 2007. Second, addressing defendant’s claim that he offered relatives as a resource for the child back in January 2007, and that the Division did little to contact those resources, the court explained that it did not credit defendant’s testimony regarding those claims. 6 The court relied on the testimony of Division representative Larrinaga, who reported that, to his knowledge, defendant had not named anyone as a resource until approximately May *192 2007, when he provided the Division with the names of his three brothers and one sister. The court found it relevant that a court order dated May 16, 2007, indicated that defendant was to discuss his plan for the child with the Division some time after that date and, further, that the evidence revealed that the Division attempted to contact the named resources during July 2007. Thus, based on the totality of that information from the record, the court “f[ound] credible the testimony in evidence of the Division that [defendant] did not provide alternative resources for placement until sometime in May or June 2007.” And, third, the court further found that defendant did not offer himself as a placement for the child until sometime in August 2007.
Turning to the uncontroverted testimony of the only expert witness in the ease, the court found Dr. Perdomo to be “extremely credible.” The court found particularly noteworthy his opinion that defendant’s “overall ability to provide for an infant child alone is limited due to his life circumstances and separation from his wife and family and [that] he will certainly need the help of his extended family to provide a stable home environment for his infant son.” The expert’s testimony thereafter was used in the court’s analysis of the four prongs of the best-interests-of-the-ehild test set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
In respect of the first prong that requires a finding that defendant endangered the child’s “safety, health or development,” the court found such harm to have been proven due to defendant’s delay in offering himself as a resource to care for the child. Defendant had knowledge that he was the biological father of the child no later than December 2006, but did not offer himself as a resource to care for his child until August 2007, approximately nine months later. As explained by the court, although that may seem like a short period of time, in this case it was half of the life of the child and ought to be viewed from that perspective. The court noted that the child had been in foster care since he was two months old, was moved to his present foster home at age three months, and that at the time of the trial court’s decision was *193 eighteen months old, having lived for the previous fifteen months with the resource family that wanted to adopt him. The court again rejected defendant’s claim that he offered several resources as early as January 2007, finding “it much more likely ... that he did not offer these relatives until May 2007.” The court added that defendant “did not offer himself as a resource until he was asked to leave the marital home by his wife or as [defendant] phrased it on several occasions T was thrown out of the house.’ ” The court concluded that the Division had proved by clear and convincing evidence that prong one of the best-interests test was met due to what the court called defendant’s “ ‘life circumstances’ and/or the failure to offer himself as a resource until August 2007,” thereby endangering the child’s safety, health, or development.
The court also found that the Division established prong two of the test. That required a finding that defendant was unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm or to provide a safe and stable home for the child. The court focused on the harmful impact from defendant’s delay in coming into Richard Jr.’s life and not offering to act as a care-giving parent to his own son until August 2007, when the child was already sixteen months old. The court’s findings on prong two emphasized Dr. Perdomo’s testimony, which revealed that removing the child from his foster family would cause significant and enduring emotional damage to the child, and his “100% eertain[ty] that the child would have emotional trauma should that separation occur.” The court recognized that Dr. Perdomo indicated that the damage could be mitigated by defendant if he could provide stability and counseling, however, the court agreed with the expert’s assessment that it was not realistic that defendant could provide the type of stability necessary to avoid such harm due to the turmoil in his life. 7 *194 With regard to prong three, the court found that the Division had made reasonable efforts to provide services to help defendant. The Division provided defendant with visitation services since at least March 2007, offered paternity testing for defendant, and considered defendant’s relatives as a resource placement. The court found that the Division acted diligently upon the resource referrals and fully explored all relatives who were named as potential caretakers.
Addressing prong four, the court concluded that terminating defendant’s parental rights would not do more harm than good. Dr. Perdomo had testified that the child had minimal emotional attachment to defendant and that he had bonded significantly with his foster parents to the point that he sees them as his psychological parents. The court noted that the child currently lives next door to his biological half brother and half sister (two of Irene’s other children) and that he enjoys a relationship with them. The court also acknowledged Dr. Perdomo’s certainty that the child would have emotional trauma if separated from his foster family. Based on that evidence, the court found that the Division had proven the fourth prong by clear and convincing evidence.
The court’s opinion concluded by acknowledging that defendant had been able to parent children without problems in the past, that he had no criminal background or reports of abuse, that he was gainfully employed, that he had arranged for day-care services for the child, and that he had made efforts to unite with him. That said, the court emphasized that defendant chose, for a significant period of time, to remain with his wife who did not want this child. He did not offer himself as a resource until *195 August 2007, after he had been expelled from the marital home, after his sister was being asked to move from her apartment if she wished to be considered as a placement for Richard Jr., and after Richard Jr. turned sixteen months old. At that point in time, viewed from the child’s perspective, Richard Jr. had lived for all but his first three months of life in his foster home with his foster family as the only family he had ever known. Based on the totality of those circumstances, the court held that the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was proper so that Richard Jr. could be adopted by his foster parents.
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment terminating parental rights substantially based on the findings and conclusions set forth in the trial court’s opinion.
II.
A.
A judicial order that terminates parental rights “permanently severs the relationship between children and their biological parents.” N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 505 , 852 A.2d 1093 (2004). Few actions taken by the State are as severe. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 600 , 512 A.2d 438 (1986) (citation omitted) (recognizing harsh and irreversible nature of parental-rights terminations). Yet, despite the respect given to the fundamental nature of parental rights, such rights “are not absolute. The constitutional protection surrounding family rights is tempered by the State’s parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 , 736 A.2d 1246 (1999) (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 , 608 A.2d 1312 (1992)). In this matter the Court is asked to address the State’s parens patriae concern for the best interests of a child who from birth was not received into a parent-child relationship with his biological father. The Division asserts that the father’s ongoing *196 reluctance, even when asked, to himself assume parenting responsibility for the child caused further delay in the establishment of a parenting relationship with the child during the first eighteen months of the child’s life. The dispute is over whether such circumstances can support the termination of parental rights.
The best-interests-of-the-ehild test governs in an action to terminate parental rights. Codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), the best-interests test provides that the Division shall petition to terminate parental rights when the following standards are met:
(1) The child’s safety, health or development has been or mil continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child’s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
When applying that best-interests test, courts must bear in mind that the four prongs “overlap and provide a comprehensive standard for deciding what is in a child’s best interest.” M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 280 , 914 A.2d 1265 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
From my perspective, the crux of this dispute centers on the two harm-related prongs. The first two prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) comprise the harm requirement and are closely related to one another, so that “evidence that supports one informs and may support the other as part of the comprehensive basis for determining the best interests of the child.” In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 379 , 736 A.2d 1261 (1999). To justify the termination of parental rights the harm to a child need not be physical. In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 43-44 , 608 A.2d 1327 (1992) (citing In re J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 18, 608 A.2d 1312 ). Serious psychological or emotional harm resulting from *197 parental action or inaction can constitute sufficient grounds on which to terminate parental rights. Id. at 44 , 608 A.2d 1327 .
B.
At the outset I note my agreement with the majority that the length of the father’s delay in In re D.M.H., a case in which this Court found that such delay provided sufficient grounds to terminate parental rights, was much more extensive than in this case. 8 That said, in my view, no one should view the time delay in In re D.M.H. as setting the limits for parental inaction that will spur a concern about the best interests of a child. The harm to a child, flowing from the denial of a parental relationship or from a biological parent’s significant delay in coming to the decision to play a parental role in the life of a child, is harm that our child protection policies seek to eschew. In guardianship cases, concern about the deleterious effects from delay in moving a child into a stable, permanent home placement, where a lasting parent-child relationship may develop unhindered by outside influences, is an evident, animating principle of both substance and procedure.
A child’s need for prompt stability and permanency is a central factor in our Court’s guardianship cases. See, e.g., In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357, 736 A.2d 1246 . We have “long emphasized New Jersey’s strong public policy in favor of permanency.” P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 510 , 852 A.2d 1093 . New Jersey law has *198 followed the general trend toward foster care reforms that limit the amount of time a parent may delay before providing for his or her children. See In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 358, 736 A.2d 1246 ; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J.Super. 76, 111 , 842 A.2d 215 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 , 852 A.2d 192 (2004). That trend has seen a shift in emphasis “from protracted efforts for reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to promote the child’s well-being.” C.S., supra, 367 N.J.Super. at 111 , 842 A.2d 215 . Following enactment of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), New Jersey passed “An Act concerning children and families,” L. 1999, c. 53 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.J.S.A. 9 and 30:4C), to bring New Jersey law into conformity with ASFA New Jersey’s revisions reemphasized the importance of permanency to a child’s well-being and the need for efficient and timely action to achieve that goal. 9 See In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 358-59, 736 A.2d 1246 ; C.S., supra, 367 N.J.Super. at 111 , 842 A.2d 215 ; see also P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 511 , 852 A.2d 1093 . Plainly put, “[a] child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents. Children have their own rights, including the right *199 to a permanent, safe and stable placement.” C.S., supra, 367 N.J.Super. at 111 , 842 A.2d 215 .
Even decisions of our Court that preceded the enactment of the best-interests test recognized that “equivocation and indecision on the part of ... natural parents ... are harmful to the well-being of the child and are relevant in the consideration of the issue of ... termination [of parental rights].” Sorentino v. Family & Children’s Soc. of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313, 324 , 378 A.2d 18 (1977). In my view, codification of the best-interests test has done nothing to eliminate such considerations from the harm analysis for there is an obvious harmful impact on a child from the withholding of parental care and nurture. 10 “[T]he attention and concern of a caring family ‘is the most precious of all resources.’ ” In re D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 379, 736 A.2d 1261 (quoting A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 613 , 512 A.2d 438 ). As such, I find ample support for the State’s proposition that a parent’s delay in assuming a parenting role with a child is the type of harm sufficient to trigger a termination of parental rights under the best-interests analysis, for “[a] parent’s withdrawal of that solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers the health and development of the child.” Ibid.; accord In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., Jr., 161 N.J. 396, 414 , 736 A.2d 1277 (1999) (“[A] father who ... never makes efforts to be a part of a child’s life sufficient to cause the child to view the person as a parent, causes harm to the child.”).
Similar concern about avoiding the deleterious effects on a child from a biological parent’s prolonged delay in establishing a parent-child relationship generally can be found in legislative pronouncements about parental inaction. Reflective of the fact that biology alone does not a parent make, these statutory pronouncements require a biological parent to demonstrate “biology plus,” namely *200 some action to preserve the right to remain a parent to the child. The Legislature has decreed the performance of some parental-type duties within a specific timeframe in order to avoid losing one’s legal right to be a parent to a child through charges of abandonment and the severing of parental rights through adoption or a guardianship action. See N.J.S.A. 9:3-46 (authorizing adoption over biological parent’s objection when “during six-month period prior to the placement of the child for adoption ... the parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental duties of care and support of the child, although able to do so”); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(b) (authorizing termination of parental rights for abandonment based on parent’s failure for six months to have contact with child, although able to do so). In light of the Legislature’s plain concern to not foist on the child the harm caused by a parent’s continuing failure to act as a parent, I can perceive no logical reason to eliminate the consideration of similar harm to a child, attributable to periods of parental inaction or failure to parent, from a more encompassing, best-interests-of-the-child analysis.
III.
A.
The analysis required by the best-interests-of-the-child standard is “extremely fact sensitive.” In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348, 736 A.2d 1246 . Indeed, in commencing an analysis based on prong one of the test, it is apparent to me that a one-size-fits-all approach is simply unavailing when assessing harm to a child caused by a delay in parenting. It is equally apparent to me that the first prong of the best-interests test was satisfied here.
Here, after initially categorically refusing to take in his biological son because his wife with whom he was living would not have the infant, defendant delayed in offering himself as a resource to care for his child until nine months had elapsed from the time he learned with certainty that the boy was his. Although he ad *201 vanced various suggestions for possible placements for the child during that time period, he never offered to care for his child himself. Only when he was ejected from his marital home, when those family members that he had suggested proved unwilling to assume responsibility, when defendant learned that his sister would have to move from her apartment in order to be considered a possible placement for the child, then, and only then, did defendant offer to be the caretaker of his child. That delay in establishing a parental relationship with Richard Jr. was found to inure to the detriment of this developing young child. The trial court found that the months that elapsed were much more critical to the emotional well-being and development of young Richard Jr. than they were to defendant and, therefore, it felt compelled to view those months from the perspective of the person whose time clock matters most in a best-interests analysis: the child. As the trial court stated, “[wjhile [nine months] may seem like a short period of time, in this case, it is half of the life of the child.”
I believe that it was eminently reasonable for the trial court to analyze the length of time that a parent has failed to provide care and nurture to a child from the unique perspective of the child, whose best interests must be paramount. Therefore, the court’s analysis appropriately was influenced by the harmful impact of that delay due to the child’s age and development, as that is essential in the fact-sensitive, individualistic harm analysis required under the best-interests test. See ibid. Generally, all other things being equal, a younger child will require a more time-sensitive commitment from a parent than an older child. See Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 313 , 364 (1984) (“A child’s need for permanence and stability, like his or her other needs, cannot be postponed. It must be provided early.”).
A young developing infant/toddler’s health, safety, and development depends on the establishment of a trusting relationship with a parent, whose love, nurture, care, and support permit the child *202 to develop and grow. It cannot be reasonably disputed that a biological parent’s indifference or neglect in providing these essentials of parental responsibility can cause significant harm viewed from the perspective of the child’s age-specific and developmental needs. Our decisions have emphasized that, in the context of termination hearings, it is the child’s time clock that matters. See In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357, 736 A.2d 1246 (“[W]e have cautioned that placement plans must not lose sight of time from the perspective of the child’s needs.”); see also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 608 , 512 A.2d 438 (“[T]here is a great tension here because, to the extent that adults—and when we speak of adults we mean courts, social workers, and therapists—delay the permanent decision, they lose sight of the child’s concept of time.”). Obviously, when assessing time from the viewpoint of the individual child’s personal clock, one of the primary considerations has to be the age and development of the child. See A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 607 , 512 A.2d 438 (“There is a natural tendency to want to continue working with the parents to restore the family unit. How long a court should be willing to wait, however, depends in part on the age of the child.”).
Other courts also have focused on the age and development of the child when faced with situations in which an individual hesitated to assume a parental role to his or her children, and have found it appropriate and necessary to view the harm from the child’s time clock and point of view. See, e.g., In re C.L., 178 Vt. 558 , 878 A.2d 207, 213 (2005) (“[T]he paramount concern was [the] father’s ability to resume his parental responsibilities for [his child] within a reasonable period of time, measured from the perspective of the child’s needs.”); Robert O. v. Russell K., 80 N.Y.2d 254 , 590 N.Y.S.2d 37 , 604 N.E.2d 99, 103-04 (1992) (“Promptness is measured in terms of the baby’s life____ The demand for prompt action by the father at the child’s birth is neither arbitrary nor punitive, but instead a logical and necessary outgrowth of the State’s legitimate interest in the child’s need for early permanence and stability.”); In re Hall, 99 Wash.2d 842 , 664 P.2d 1245, 1250 *203 (1983) (“That period of time which constitutes the ‘foreseeable future’ depends in part on the age of the child.”).
With that body of law squarely supporting the approach taken by the trial court in this matter in respect of harm under the best-interests test, one should only need to determine whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s finding of harm under prong one. The court found that defendant’s commitment to Richard Jr. was “questionable.” That finding is entirely consistent with the evidence in the record. Defendant failed to offer himself as a resource to his son for nine months during which time Richard Jr. was between seven and sixteen months old, an essential period in the growth and development of Richard Jr. Dr. Perdomo, whom the trial court found to be “extremely credible,” indicated that the period between six months and eighteen to twenty-four months is when a child bonds to his or her primary caretaker and internalizes that person as the person the child can trust and turn to for emotional support. Defendant had the opportunity to establish himself as that person for Richard Jr., but failed to take advantage of that opportunity. Instead, he decided not to provide the support necessary to establish himself as a father-figure to Richard Jr., visiting harm on Richard Jr. in the process through his inaction. If defendant had grasped that opportunity when it was presented to him, these proceedings would not be necessary.
The facts as they existed before the trial court presented a heart-wrenching and difficult case. However, I am left to conclude that defendant’s hesitation in assuming a parent’s care-giving responsibility for his son until the child was sixteen months old, concomitantly delaying in becoming the child’s source of stable and permanent shelter, care, and nurture, constituted sufficient harm to Richard Jr. to satisfy the first prong of the best-interests-of-the-child standard. The trial court’s conclusion to that effect was not “so wide of the mark” as to constitute a mistaken finding on this record. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279 , 914 A.2d 1265 .
*204 The majority, in finding that defendant’s delay did not cause harm to Richard Jr., is forced to rely on the fact that during the time when defendant refused to care for his son, Richard Jr. “obviously was out of harm’s way” because “he was safely in the care of foster parents while under DYFS’s supervision----” See ante, op. at 169, 996 A2d at 1001. Under the majority’s circular reasoning, so long as the Division assumes care of a child when a parent refuses to do so, that fact would preclude a finding that the parent’s delay harmed the child, no matter what impact the parent’s delay had on the child.
The majority’s rigid and inflexible approach fails to account for the specific needs of this child, Richard Jr., as those needs were expressed in the testimony before the trial court. There are no hard and fast rules that establish distinct parameters to the length of delay in parenting that will cause harm to a child, except, of course, for the statutory abandonment timeframes. See N.J.S.A. 9:3-46; see also N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(b)(l)(a). The decision in In re D.M.H. certainly did not fix the minimal amount of time that a parent can delay in becoming a parent to his child while yet avoiding the termination of parental rights. Other factors besides length of time, such as the age and development of the child, will affect the degree of harmful impact resulting from a period of parental delay in parenting a child. 11 See In re K.H.O., supra, 161 *205 N.J. at 357, 736 A.2d 1246 ; A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 607 , 512 A.2d 438 .
The determination of whether a parent’s delay in providing care for his or her child equates to sufficient harm to terminate parental rights under the first prong of the best-interests-of-the-child standard must be an individual-specific, fact-sensitive determination, which recognizes that harmful impact can differ from child to child. A child is not a non-emotive being, able to be passed back and forth like a chattel without psychological consequences, but a growing and developing person in the midst of forming essential emotional contacts with his or her caretakers. The majority ignores this reality, and I cannot agree to sanction a finding that a parent who refuses to care for his or her child for more than half of the child’s life does not cause harm to that child. Such an absurd result cannot be what the Legislature intended in enacting a standard governing the termination of parental rights that focuses on the best interests of the child.
B.
The second prong of the best-interests test focuses on “whether the parent ... is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child, and whether a delay in permanent placement would add to the harm.” M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 283 , 914 A.2d 1265 (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)). That includes inquiry into the “measures taken by the parent after the child’s birth to maintain the parent-child relationship and to foster an environment leading to normal child development.” In re K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 352, 736 A.2d 1246 . The “harms attributable to the biological parent include the prolonged inattention to a child’s needs, which encourages the development of a stronger, bonding relationship to foster parents, which if severed could cause the child profound harm.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
For this prong, “[t]o show that the child has a strong relationship with the foster parents or might be better off if left in their *206 custody is not enough.” In re J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 19, 608 A.2d 1312 . Due, in part, to our recognition of and concern that there are different psychological theories regarding the effects of parental bonding, see id. at 19-23 , 608 A.2d 1312 , we acted to assuage those concerns by requiring that the Division “prove by clear and convincing evidence that separating the child from his or her foster pai’ents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm.” Id. at 19 , 608 A.2d 1312 . Such proof requires not only expert testimony concerning the child’s relationship to his or her foster parents, but also, in cases such as this one where the fitness of a natural parent is not relied on by the Division as a ground for terminating parental rights, an examination of the child’s relationship with his or her natural parents. Ibid.
Here, Dr. Perdomo testified that Richard Jr. would suffer certain, severe, and irreversible harm if he were to be separated from his foster parents. Richard Jr. would suffer from depression in the short term, and long-term manifestations would include difficulty in establishing relationships due to an inability to trust other people. Dr. Perdomo based his conclusions on the bonding evaluations he conducted between Richard Jr. and defendant, and between Richard Jr. and his foster parents. Dr. Perdomo recognized that defendant was a “fit” parent, having participated in the raising of his four other children with his wife, and that defendant’s plan for caring for Richard Jr. was a “good plan” because defendant realized that he would need an extended network to assist him in earing for Richard Jr. Dr. Perdomo also acknowledged the possibility that, if removed from his foster parents, some of the resultant harm to Richard Jr. might be mitigated. Mitigation would require, however, significant stability in order to be realized.
All that considered, Dr. Perdomo opined that he held no conviction that defendant would be able to provide the stability necessary to mitigate the harm to Richard Jr. that would occur if he now were pulled away from his foster parents. Because of the *207 circumstances defendant faced in his life as it existed at the time of the hearing, Dr. Perdomo did not believe that defendant would be capable of providing the nature and degree of stability that Richard Jr. would require to overcome the trauma of being severed from the only parents and home he had known in his life. 12 The trial court found, in accordance with Dr. Perdomo’s testimony, that defendant’s plan was “realistic but not probable to occur.” I see no basis for disturbing that finding given the evidence in the record.
The majority sees fit to ignore the entirety of Dr. Perdomo’s testimony and instead substitutes its own judgment about the harm to Richard Jr. and defendant’s ability to mitigate that harm for that of a recognized expert child clinical psychologist. The majority is only able to justify such an extreme approach, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the foundations of our child welfare jurisprudence, because it wholly mischaracterizes Dr. Perdomo’s testimony. The majority states that Dr. Perdomo opined that defendant was not a fit parent and that he ignored defendant’s plan to care for Richard Jr. Dr. Perdomo, in fact, did not present such one-sided testimony. Dr. Perdomo never testified that defendant was an unfit parent; indeed, he acknowledged that defendant had successfully raised four children. In regard to Richard Jr., Dr. Perdomo described the interactions he observed *208 between defendant and his son as indicative of a good relationship between them. And, despite the majority’s statement to the contrary, Dr. Perdomo clearly accounted for defendant’s proposed plan to care for Richard Jr., calling it both “a good plan” and realistic in that defendant recognized that he would require help caring for Richard Jr. Dr. Perdomo concluded, however, that defendant would be unable to provide the stability necessary to mitigate the harm that was certain to be inflicted on Richard Jr. if the child were separated from his foster family, primarily because of the stress, tension, and turmoil that defendant himself admitted permeated his life. 13
Although one can be sympathetic to the plight in which defendant found himself, that plight was of his own creation. Unfortunately for him, his lengthy failure to act as a parent to Richard Jr. came during a critical portion of the child’s life. Defendant’s delay in offering care to his son not only caused Richard Jr. harm, it also necessarily resulted in Richard Jr. bonding closely with his foster parents. See M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 291 , 914 A.2d 1265 (“[T]he father’s delay has contributed to the strong emotional bonds between the son and his foster parents, a natural conse *209 quence of the passage of time that is germane to the determination of the son’s best interests____ This appeal demonstrates that reunification becomes increasingly difficult with the passage of time because a child may develop bonds with his or her foster family and gain a sense of permanency.”). Dr. Perdomo’s testimony established that separating Richard Jr. from his foster family, with whom he has lived since he was three months old, would inflict upon him certain and severe emotional and psychological harm. 14 The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the second prong of the best-interests-of-the-child standard was met. Because of the type of harm inflicted on Richard Jr., and the fact that defendant would not be able to mitigate effectively the harm, it is not a defense that defendant is currently a fit parent. See In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 182 N.J. 29, 31 , 860 A.2d 923 (2004) (affirming trial court’s judgment “that [the child’s] need for permanency and his identification with his foster parents as his psychological family warranted termination of the parental rights of [the mother], notwithstanding her present ability to be a fit parent”); see also M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 292 , 914 A.2d 1265 (“It is well settled that ... a parent’s fitness is not the touchstone under the best-interests standard.”). In sum, I cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding of harm under prong two was “so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.” Id. at 279 , 914 A.2d 1265 .
C.
Turning to the remaining parts to the best-interests test, prong three requires review of whether “[t]he [Division has made *210 reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child’s placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights.” N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(e) defines “reasonable efforts” as “attempts ... to assist the parents in remedying the circumstances and conditions that led to the placement of the child,” which are to include:
(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in developing a plan for appropriate services;
(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to the family, in order to further the goal of family reunification;
(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of the child’s progress, development and health; and
(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.
The majority directs its ire at the Division for falling woefully short in its provision of services to defendant, particularly with regard to visitation. However, the majority puts the cart before the horse in requiring the Division to provide substantial unsupervised visitation in eases where the parent has repeatedly and consistently made clear that he or she has no interest in caring for his or her child. It is unclear what purpose the type of visitation envisioned by the majority is meant to serve in a case where the parent is not offering himself or herself as a caretaker for the child.
It is true that the Division’s regulations presume an award of unsupervised visits by parents and require a court to state on the record a reason for imposing supervised visitation instead. See N.J.A.C. 10:122D-1.10(e). Under these circumstances, however, a conclusion that the trial court’s order of supervised visitation was so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice is untenable. Although defendant was the biological father to the child, he was in the same position as a stranger in that he was unknown to the toddler. It would make little sense to force unsupervised visitation under such circumstances, especially when there was no evidence it was requested by this father, who was not even seeking custody of the child when the Division commenced *211 visitation. Moreover, defendant refused to change his position about his desire to be caretaker to his son until August 2007. Had defendant expressed a desire to care for his son when he was alerted that he was the boy’s father, I would share the majority’s concerns about the Division’s efforts. But, under the circumstances as they existed here, defendant’s argument that he and his family, none of whom accompanied him to the visits, were somehow prevented from establishing a closer bond with Richard Jr. due to the Division’s failure to allow him unsupervised visits, rings hollow.
Defendant faults the Division for not expending reasonable efforts to assist him because it did not reasonably consider his proposed kinship caretakers as alternatives to termination of parental rights. That argument is without traction, however. We clearly have held that “when the permanency provided by adoption is available, kinship legal guardianship cannot be used as a defense to termination of parental rights under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).” P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 513 , 852 A.2d 1093 . In this case, the foster parents want to adopt Richard Jr. Therefore, kinship legal guardianship does not provide a defense to the termination of defendant’s parental rights.
In sum, although I would agree with the majority that courts must keep vigilant in their review of the Division to ensure that it fulfills its reasonable-efforts obligation, that obligation does not require that the Division remedy the parent’s problem that caused the child to enter foster care. The parent must bear personal responsibility for that fix, with the Division assisting through the provision of services and supervision. Nevertheless, the child should not be kept “in limbo” while adults “hop[e] for some long term unification plan” to work out. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J.Super. 418, 438 , 782 A.2d 458 (App.Div. 2001) (citing In re Adoption of a Child by P.S., 315 N.J.Super. 91, 121 , 716 A.2d 1171 (App.Div.1998)). When behavioral changes are required, the parent must shoulder the brunt of changing, and in a decisive and meaningful way. In this matter, defendant simply *212 took too long to come to the realization that he would be willing to care for his very young son. Only he is responsible for his failure to step forward to be a parent to his child in a timely way. In the interim, the Division provided him with paternity testing, psychological evaluation, and parenting skills classes, and assessed all relatives he suggested. None of that could alter the behavioral change that only defendant could provide, namely coming to the realization that he wished to assume a caretaking, nurturing parental role for his son.
As for prong four of the best-interests test, it requires a finding that “[tjermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.” N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). In this case defendant’s contact with the child has been minimal compared to that of the foster parents, not because the Division vindictively kept him from his son, but because he consistently reiterated that he was unwilling to care for the boy. The expert testimony of Dr. Perdomo unequivocally was that Richard Jr. would suffer serious and enduring harm if removed from his foster home. On the other hand, Richard Jr.’s attachment to defendant was minimal. I agree with the trial court that there was clear and convincing evidence establishing that termination of defendant’s parental rights would not do more harm than good. 15
IV.
In conclusion, I find that the record establishes that the trial court had clear and convincing evidence to support its determination to terminate defendant’s parental rights. The family court conducted a thorough fact-sensitive inquiry in a difficult case, *213 deciding in the end that the father’s interests did not coincide with the best interests of the child. A natural parent cannot take an unreasonable period of time to assume parental responsibilities. A reluctant father, who has not performed parenting functions and who delays unreasonably in offering to be a resource to care and nurture his own child, can cause the type of harm that the best-interests test is intended to ameliorate for a child.
Richard Jr. was in the limbo of foster care for eighteen months while defendant refused to take decisive and meaningful action. On the facts presented, and particularly in light of the uncontroverted expert evidence that defendant could not mitigate the serious and enduring injury to the child that would result from severance of his bond with his foster parents, I would affirm the trial court’s holding that the Division has proved that Richard Jr. has been harmed by defendant’s inaction.
I am sensitive to the fact that defendant was faced with an unpalatable choice. But, contrary to the majority’s repeated assertion, it was not an impossible choice. And, conspicuously absent from the majority’s opinion is any acknowledgement that defendant was faced with such a choice solely as a result of his own indiscretions. When defendant was confronted with the difficult choice, he did not hesitate in choosing, of his own free will, not to care for his son, despite the fact that a paternity test confirmed that he was the father. Instead, defendant remained with his wife who refused to raise the child that was a product of his extramarital affair. It was only nine months later, after defendant’s wife kicked him out of the house and Richard Jr. was sixteen months old, that defendant regretted his decision. Such regret on the part of a father who repeatedly asserted that he would not care for his son does not provide a suitable basis for a court to separate the child from the family that raised him while his father was unwilling to do so. Defendant’s parental rights should be terminated not because he made the wrong choice, but because of the harm that his choice inflicted on his young son. *214 Because the majority fails to appropriately account for the best interests of this child, I must respectfully dissent. 16
Justices LONG and ALBIN join in this opinion.
For reversal and vacation—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—4.
For affirmance—Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA and ALBIN— 3.
Despite the majority’s repeated assertion that defendant had no reason to suspect that he was Richard Jr.'s father until December 2006, the record reflects that as early as July 26, 2006, at an abuse and neglect hearing, Irene provided the court and the Division with defendant’s name and stated that she had talked to him about submitting to a DNA test. When the proceeding was continued on August 11, 2006, she again identified defendant as "the father” and provided defendant's brother's name and address because she did not know defendant’s address. Thereafter, at the October 4, 2006, hearing, Irene provided home and work telephone numbers for defendant, and maintained that she had been in contact with him about submitting to DNA testing. Nonetheless, defendant did not submit to the paternity test until December 2006, shortly after Irene confronted defendant’s wife.
The DAG reported that defendant was out of the country attending to a sick relative. The court deemed his appearance waived in light of the fact that he was not offering himself as a caretaker. During the hearing, the Division reported that defendant had been attending scheduled weekly visits with Richard Jr.; however, it was reported that he still was not offering himself or his wife as a possible caretaker.
When he was three months old, the Division placed Richard Jr. in the home of a married couple who were Irene’s family friends. They have cared for the child ever since and, as the DAG informed the court on March 14, 2007, they are willing to provide a permanent, stable home for him.
Larrinaga testified that because defendant had offered himself as a resource, the Division discontinued its efforts in working with defendant's sister as a placement option. It was also around that time that defendant had separated from his wife and moved out of their marital home. Defendant's plan for child care entailed the following. A friend, who was a licensed day-care professional, was to take care of the child while defendant worked at night and defendant proposed to care for the child himself during the day. He asserted that his problems with his wife would not affect his ability to care for the child because he and his wife were separated. Defendant also asserted that his current salary *190 was sufficient to cover his new living arrangements and the cost of caring for the child. Larrinaga expressed the Division’s concerns about the stability of the plan proposed by defendant and his ability to sustain them financially and otherwise.
The foster parents, who have been married several years and have one child of their own, want to adopt Richard Jr.
Although defendant was open and non-evasive during his testimony, the court found that he was "confused as to dates,” often using the terms "the first time I was in court” or "the second time I was in court” instead of actual dates.
Regarding the aspects of defendant’s life that would affect his ability to provide a safe and stable home for Richard Jr., the court noted, as factors to be taken into consideration, defendant’s age at the time (fifty-six) and that of the child (eighteen months). The court stated that defendant understood that he *194 needed the help of his family and a day-care worker to take care of the child and that defendant testified to having arranged for a licensed day-care professional. The court further observed that defendant’s work schedule made child rearing difficult because he worked nights and often overtime and, the court added, he might be required to work a second job in order to adequately provide for the child. In considering the sum of these circumstances, the court expressed a lack of confidence in defendant's ability to make his plan work because "frankly [defendant’s life is in chaos.”
In In re D.M.H., supra, the father became aware in November 1993 that he was the biological father of two children, a three-year-old and a five-month-old. 161 N.J. at 373, 736 A.2d 1261 . He expressed a desire to unite with his children, but he did not offer at that time to become their caretaker. Ibid. Eleven months later he informed the Division that he wanted the children to be placed with him, but he never returned the paperwork to initiate placement. Ibid. He did nothing further to claim a relationship with his children until March 1995 when he expressed a desire to resume visitation; however, he again failed to follow through and had no contact with the children from November 1995 to May 1996. Ibid. The Division filed an action to terminate his parental rights in March 1996, after two years and four months had passed during which the father repeatedly showed no interest and made no effort to care for his children. Ibid.
It is telling that the majority's discussion of the applicable law begins by quoting In re J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 7-8, 608 A.2d 1312 , for the proposition that the law "clearly favors keeping children with their natural parents and resolving care and custody problems within the family." Ante at 165, 996 A.2d at 998. In re J.C., however, was decided prior to the enactment of ASFA, which "put the safety and health of the child first” and rejected "the current system of always putting the needs and rights of the biological parents first." 143 Cong. Rec. S12.526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee); see also 143 Cong. Rec. H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) ("Our child welfare system too often protects parents' rights rather than children's rights.”). Given that ASFA was motivated partially by state court decisions that removed young children from their adoptive families, with whom they had lived for the majority of their lives, and returned those children to their biological parents, and was intended to prevent such situations from recurring in the future, the majority's decision to remove four-year-old Richard Jr. from the only family he has ever known is even more confounding.
In this context, we have been careful to distinguish between the notion of "inadequate parenting,” which is not in issue here, and the "failure to provide even minimal parenting.” In re D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 379, 736 A.2d 1261 (citing A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 606-07 , 512 A.2d 438 ).
1 note that, in an appropriate case, the reason for the parent's delay in holding himself or herself out as a resource for the child may also be relevant. See In re J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 28, 608 A.2d 1312 (Clifford, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that "the role of the parent in contributing to the need for State intervention" should be considered in determining how long to wait for parent to assume parental role and responsibilities). The special needs of a child and the effect of the parent’s delay in attending to those special needs may also be pertinent and may play a determining role, despite the reason for a parent’s delay. Cf. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 291 , 914 A.2d 1265 (noting that father’s proposed plan was deficient in failing to account for his son’s special needs). Here, however, defendant, although fully able to care for Richard Jr., was unwilling to do so and refused on several occasions to offer himself as a resource to his own son.
1 pause to note that I do not suggest that consideration of defendant’s "life circumstances" would be a sufficient independent ground on which to terminate his parental rights. A careful reading of the trial court's opinion assures me, however, that defendant's "life circumstances" were presented by Dr. Perdomo and relied on by the trial court as factors that could introduce instability into defendant and Richard Jr.'s lives and, thus, came to bear on concerns about whether defendant would effectively be able to provide the stability necessary to mitigate the certain, severe, and irreversible emotional and psychological harm to Richard Jr. if he were separated from his foster parents. The fact that defendant’s life was then “in chaos” thus was pertinent to his ability to provide stability for Richard Jr. and his potential to effectively mitigate some of the harm that would be caused by removing Richard Jr. from his foster parents. Consideration of defendant's "life circumstances" was not improper for that limited purpose.
The majority does not, indeed cannot, take issue with Dr. Perdomo’s conclusion in that regard or the trial court’s agreement with that opinion. Instead, the majority casts aspersions on Dr. Perdomo’s testimony with the incorrect assertion that Dr. Perdomo’s opinion hinged on defendant’s status "as a man who lacks a supportive wife as the basis for recommending that the child should not live with defendant....” Ante at 174, 996 A.2d at 1004. Dr. Perdomo faithfully reported the obvious factual circumstances that defendant faced. And, he simply repeated that defendant had told him that he was experiencing stress and associated problems in his life because his wife had left him as a result of his marital infidelity. Dr. Perdomo acknowledged that such tension was normal and entirely appropriate in light of defendant’s circumstances. Dr. Perdomo did not state, or even suggest, that defendant was an inadequate caretaker because he was male or that female assistance was necessary to raise Richard Jr. Were the majority correct that Dr. Perdomo relied on antiquated gender roles in his testimony, I would share the majority’s concerns. As it is however, the majority’s invocation of this issue serves as a red herring to distract from the real issue in this case and provide the majority convenient cover for ignoring Dr. Perdomo’s uncontested, balanced, and entirely appropriate testimony.
This is not a case where the Division removed a child from his or her biological parents and placed the child with a foster family, thereby causing a child-foster parent bond to form, and then later attempted to rely on that bond as a basis for terminating the rights of the natural parents. See In re K.L.F., supra, 129 N.J. at 46, 608 A.2d 1327 (noting that child welfare system should "not tip the scales and encourage a foster parent-child bond to develop" when natural parent becomes fit and is anxious to resume custodial parent-child responsibilities). Defendant was asked to care for his son and refused the baby entry into his home.
In a familiar refrain, the majority relies on "common sense” to substitute its own judgment for the uncontroverted evidence in the record and reach a different conclusion. This casual dismissal of the evidence that was presented at trial, which recurs throughout the majority's opinion, is troubling and sets a potentially dangerous precedent. We are plainly not qualified to substitute our own judgment about the harm that will befall a child in such a circumstance for the uncontested opinions of a qualified expert who testifies at trial.
Had defendant's parental rights been terminated in this matter, I would have taken the foster parents, who had hoped and planned to adopt Richard Jr., at their word when they promised to keep up contact between defendant and Richard Jr. post-adoption. They appropriately recognized, as do I, the value to Richard Jr. in continued visitation with his biological father. In light of the bare majority vote in this matter inalterably upending this young boy's life, that equitable result is not possible.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860967. Public record. Not legal advice.