# People v. Williams

> Illinois Supreme Court · July 6, 2000 · 193 Ill. 2d 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860650

## Case

- **Full name:** The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. BOBBY O. WILLIAMS, Appellant
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 6, 2000
- **Citations:** 193 Ill. 2d 1; 249 Ill. Dec. 840; 737 N.E.2d 230; 2000 Ill. LEXIS 984
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Bilandic
- **Judges:** McMorrow, Miller, Bilandic, Rathje, Harrison, Heiple
- **Cited by:** 64 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860650

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that it is appropriate to first determine whether error occurred at all
- applying similar standard in capital murder case to assess sufficiency of evidence

## Opinion text

JUSTICE BILANDIC, also specially concurring:
I join in part I of the opinion, which correctly affirms defendant’s convictions. I also join in part 11(C), which recognizes that defendant’s death sentence must be vacated because a majority of this court has not affirmed either one of the two eligibility factors upon which it was based. I also join in parts 11(D) and 11(E). I, however, do not join in parts 11(A) and 11(B) of the opinion, for the reasons explained below.
Cold, Calculated and Premeditated Aggravating Factor
The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — l(b)(ll) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9 — l(b)(ll) (West 1994)). According to part 11(A) of the opinion, the evidence on this factor was insufficient to support the jury’s finding. I disagree. I would affirm the jury’s finding of death eligibility on this factor for the reasons stated in the separate opinion of Justice Rathje.
Felony Murder Aggravating Factor
The jury also found defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b)(6) (West 1994)). According to part 11(B) of the opinion, this finding must be vacated pursuant to People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). I disagree. I would affirm the jury’s finding of death eligibility on this factor. Mack is distinguishable from this case and, thus, it provides no basis for vacating defendant’s death sentence.
The defendant in Mack was found guilty of murder and armed robbery at a bench trial. A jury was empaneled for the death penalty hearing. The jury was properly instructed to determine whether the defendant was eligible for the death penalty solely on the basis of the statutory aggravating factor of murder in the course of another felony (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(6)). The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant eligible for the death penalty. The eligibility verdict form read: “ ‘We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery.’ ” Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 529-30 . The defendant alleged in his post-conviction petition that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on direct appeal that the death-eligibility verdict was legally insufficient. The defendant argued that the jury failed to find that the statutory aggravating factor was proven given that the eligibility verdict form omitted the culpable mental state required to establish murder in the course of a felony. The trial court found appellate counsel ineffective and vacated the defendant’s death sentence.
A majority of this court affirmed and held that appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to seek reversal of the defendant’s death sentence on the basis of the defective eligibility verdict. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 533-38 . In so holding, we found appellate counsel’s performance to be deficient for failing to recognize the fundamental importance of a legally sufficient eligibility verdict, which must include a finding on all essential elements of the statutory aggravating factor at issue. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 533 . In support, we pointed out that a culpable mental state of intent to kill or knowledge of a strong probability of death or great bodily harm is an essential element of the particular statutory aggravating factor upon which the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty was based, namely, murder in the course of a felony. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 533 . Next, we found that, had appellate counsel raised the issue of the defective eligibility verdict, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant’s death sentence would have been reversed. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 533-38 . We based this finding on a determination that the meaning of the jury’s eligibility verdict could not be determined clearly and without speculation from the record, which included a discrepancy between the jury instructions and the verdict form at the eligibility phase. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 535-37 . This court therefore concluded that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue that the death eligibility verdict was legally insufficient because the jury had not found the mental state necessary for finding the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 538 .
Here, at first glance, the circumstances surrounding defendant’s death-eligibility verdict appear to mirror those found problematic in Mack. As in Mack, the State here relied on the section 9 — 1(b)(6) statutory aggravating factor of murder in the course of a felony to establish defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty. To be eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(6), a defendant must have “acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another.” 720 ILCS 5/9— 1(b)(6) (West 1994). Likewise, the jury in this case was also properly instructed as to the grounds for finding defendant eligible for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(6), including the aforementioned mental states. The verdict returned by the jury as to defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty stated:
“We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Bobby Williams, is eligible for a death sentence under the law. We unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that:
the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the murder for which he was convicted in this case; and
the following statutory aggravating factor exists: the murder was committed during the course of an armed robbery.”
Although this death-eligibility verdict form is similar to the death-eligibility verdict form found deficient in Mack, there are significant differences in the circumstances surrounding the respective jury verdict forms. As noted, in Mack, the defendant was found guilty at a bench trial but was found eligible for the death penalty by a jury. Consequently, the sentencing jury in Mack had not made a determination at the guilt phase of the trial regarding the defendant’s mental state while committing the murder. Thus, the jury’s decision as to whether the State proved the defendant’s mental state for purposes of finding the defendant eligible for the death penalty under the murder in the course of a felony aggravating factor could not be ascertained from the record. See Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 537 (explaining that all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted together in determining the meaning of a verdict).
In the case at bar, however, the same jury that found defendant eligible for the death penalty had previously found defendant guilty of the murder of Sharon Bushong. The record reveals that, at the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, the jury was presented with evidence that defendant was caught on videotape deliberately shooting the compliant store clerk in the head after she opened the cash register drawer for him. The jury was also instructed properly on intentional, knowing and felony murder, and returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of the offense of first degree murder. Under these circumstances, we have held that such a general verdict raises the presumption that the jury found that defendant committed the most serious crime alleged, here that being intentional murder. For example, in People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 151-52 (1998), we held that there was no plain error where the sentencing jury returned a general verdict of death eligibility but had not been instructed at the eligibility stage of the sentencing hearing as to the culpable mental state requirement under the felony-murder provision in section 9 — 1(b)(6). We reasoned in Armstrong that the same jury at the guilt phase of the trial, after being properly instructed on the issue of the defendant’s intent, had returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of murder, which raised the presumption that the jury had found the defendant committed the most serious crime alleged, namely, intentional murder. See also People v. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411 (1994) (holding that where an indictment contains several counts arising out of a single transaction and a general verdict is returned, the effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged in each count to which the proof is applicable); People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 157 (1992) (holding that where the jury was charged with instructions including intentional murder and a general verdict was returned, these circumstances raise the presumption that the jury found the defendant guilty of intentional murder).
Accordingly, in this case, the jury did make a mental state finding at the guilt phase of the trial and determined that the State had proved defendant intended to kill Bushong. Moreover, at the eligibility phase, the same jury considered its prior guilty verdict and the evidence from the guilt phase of the trial, and the trial judge properly instructed the jury as to the culpable mental state required under section 9 — 1(b)(6). These factors support the conclusion that the jury found that defendant acted with the culpable mental state necessary to establish defendant’s death-penalty eligibility. See People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 150-51 (1996) (upholding trial judge’s death-eligibility finding based on the aggravating factor of murder in the course of a felony because the trial judge took judicial notice of the jury’s general verdict at the guilt phase of the trial which encompassed the finding of intent necessary for determining eligibility).
Unlike in Mack, the meaning of the eligibility verdict and the intention of the jury is clear, and requires no speculation on the part of this court. Therefore, there has been a valid death-eligibility finding by the sentencing jury, and the circuit court’s reliance on Mack is misplaced. Cf. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 222-27 (1999) (holding that one of the jury’s eligibility verdicts properly established the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty notwithstanding that the jury’s other eligibility verdict, which was based on murder in the course of a felony, was legally insufficient under Mack because the verdict form omitted the necessary mental state; but where this court did not consider that the same jury found the requisite mental state at the guilt phase of the trial after finding the defendant guilty of six counts of first degree murder, including intentional murder); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 66-69 (1998) (same).
In conclusion, I would hold that the jury’s eligibility verdict was sufficient to affirm defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(6).
Disposition of This Appeal
As stated above, I would affirm the jury’s finding that defendant is eligible for the death penalty under both sections 9 — 1(b) (11) and 9 — 1(b)(6). Nonetheless, I agree that, because a majority of this court has not affirmed either one of the two eligibility factors upon which defendant’s death sentence was based, that sentence must be vacated. I therefore join in part 11(C) of the opinion, which explains the disposition of this appeal.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9860650. Public record. Not legal advice.